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In response to increasing stakeholder pressure on firms to improve environmental and 
social performance, firms increasingly adopt supply chain sustainability management 
(SCSM) that place new requirements on their suppliers. This research explores how 
SCSM from a firm (i.e., a buyer) influence their own and their suppliers’ financial 
performance using objective measures. The difference in the magnitude of the impact of 
SCSM on these two levels of the supply chain is explored. Factors that influence the 
impact of SCSM on financial performance are investigated for both buyers and their 
suppliers, focusing on the nature of SCSM and firm-level characteristics.  
Event study methodology was used to measure the financial performance of buyers 
and suppliers by estimating the abnormal stock returns in response to buyers’ SCSM 
announcements made between 1990 and 2016. In the buyer analysis, 308 announcements 
of buyers’ SCSM were used. In the supplier analysis, a ‘related firms’ design was used 
by matching the suppliers to their paired buyers, to give a sample of 2189 supplier 
observations derived from 219 buyers’ SCSM announcements. A cross-sectional 
regression analysis was used to test the effects of the factors on financial performance for 
each of the buyer and supplier observations in the samples. A paired sample t-test using 
the observations paired from the same announcements was used to investigate the 
different impact of SCSM on buyers and suppliers.  
The impact of SCSM on both buyers’ and suppliers’ financial performance is 
statistically significant and negative and is more negative for suppliers. Three factors 
influence buyers’ financial performance change in response to SCSM adoption. Less 
negative financial performance was found when several buyers jointly develop and 
mandate SCSM on their suppliers using a ‘group SCSM’ approach or when they 
emphasize the social dimension of SCSM (e.g., labor rights). However, buyers with high 
growth prospects suffer more negative financial performance.  
Five factors influence suppliers’ financial performance change in response to SCSM 
compliance. The suppliers that have a high level of buyers’ dependence and high 
inventory slack have less negative financial performance when they are required to 
comply with their buyers’ SCSM. However, group SCSM approach used by buyers and 
a long-term relationship with buyers increase suppliers’ negative financial performance. 
iii 
A high level of financial slack and dependence on buyers interactively create more 
negative financial performance.  
There are two main research implications. While the impact of SCSM in a supply chain 
context (in dyadic relationships) suggests all parties are worse off, a buyer can shift the 
burden of SCSM to its suppliers as shown by the greater magnitude of negative financial 
performance for the supplier than the buyer. There are factors that both buyers and 
suppliers can consider and control to balance sustainability with financial performance 
through a buffer or benefit, when SCSM is being adopted.  
The magnitude of the expected negative financial performance suggests challenges in 
SCSM adoption for managers, particularly the shift of risks and costs to suppliers. 
Managers may deal with business risks relating to SCSM based on the influential factors 
proposed by this research to buffer against the negative impacts. The negative financial 
performance over the supply chain suggests that the long-term prospects for SCSM are 
fragile. Policy implications include additional societal support (e.g., tax support) for the 
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Chapter 1. Introduction 
 “At approximately 9:00 a.m. local time on Wednesday, April 24, 2013, Rana Plaza, an 
eight-story commercial building in Savar Bangladesh, collapsed. […], there were 1133 
fatalities and 2348 injuries. […], the Rana Plaza disaster is one of the worst industrial 
accidents in history. The scale of this unspeakable tragedy increased awareness of […] 
the need to improve supply chain governance mechanism for working conditions and 
safety […].” (Jacobs & Singhal, 2017, p. 1) 
Human activities have created substantial environmental and social damages; for 
example, climate change and poor working conditions are threatening people’s 
livelihoods. Society has been increasingly calling on firms to become more sustainable 
through balancing their environmental and social performance with economic/financial 
growth. Due to firms’ close work in supply chain operations in modern business, firms’ 
aggregate sustainability performance is the function of their supply chain partners’ 
conducts (Tate et al., 2012). The societal demand for sustainability, therefore, has been 
extended to request firms to manage their supply chain partners’ environmental and social 
performance through supply chain sustainability management (SCSM) (e.g., improving 
work safety). However, the 2013 Rana Plaza disaster has revealed the gap between the 
societal desirability of SCSM and firms’ adoption of SCSM in practice, with many 
factories in Rana Plaza operating as the supply chain partners of high-profile Western 
firms. Are these high-profile Western firms reluctant to manage their suppliers’ 
environmental/social performance because they are concerned about the possibility of 
negative financial performance? Are these suppliers also reluctant to comply with their 
buying firms’ SCSM mandates in fear of negative financial performance? Are there any 
factors that influence the negative financial performance of the firms and their suppliers 
in SCSM adoption? This research examines these questions by empirically investigating 
the relationship between SCSM and financial performance and what the influential 
factors are in the relationship.  
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1.1 Sustainability and SCSM  
In today’s business society, no firm can avoid the pressure of sustainability. 
Governments have legislated regulation concerning sustainability, and consumers have 
continuously requested that firms offer sustainable products and services. Sustainability 
is a macroeconomic concept that is focused on using resources to meet the needs of 
present human development without compromising the ability of future generations to 
meet their needs (WCED, 1987). In the face of regulations and market demands, firms 
commonly transfer the macroeconomic concept of sustainability into daily business 
activities through the triple bottom line (TBL) (Elkington, 1998). TBL states that in 
business activities, firms should balance financial, social, and environmental dimensions 
(Elkington, 1998; Marshall & Toffel, 2005). For example, while firms’ aim is financial 
growth, they should also measure their performance on the reduction of the use of energy 
and other resources, waste, and pollution, and on the provision of diversity, equitable 
opportunities, workplace safety, and democratic processes and accountable governance 
structure (Gimenez et al., 2012; Jeurissen, 2000).  
A firm’s sustainability performance is influenced by how sustainably the firm’s supply 
chain partners operate (Tate et al., 2012). The societal expectation of sustainability has 
been widely extended from a firm’s operations to supply chain operations, which 
demands the firm’s SCSM. The concept of SCSM has undergone rapid development in 
recent years (Touboulic & Walker, 2015). SCSM covers a broad scope of supply chain 
operations in a sustainable manner (e.g., product design and product life extension) 
(Carter & Rogers, 2008; Linton et al., 2007). One of the key perspectives in SCSM is 
procurement/purchasing (Touboulic & Walker, 2015), which involves the buyers (the 
downstream firms in the supply chains close to the ‘point of sales’) issuing a requirement 
or mandate to their suppliers (the upstream firms in the supply chains; mainly first-tier 
suppliers) to improve environmental and social performance through SCSM practices. 
These SCSM practices manly include buyers’ evaluation, monitoring, assessments, and 
selection of their suppliers based on certain environmental and social conditions.   
1.2 Research gap  
Stakeholder theory and resource dependence theory (RDT) provide the theoretical lens 
to study SCSM as a systematic approach, as shown in Figure 1.1. Stakeholder theory 
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(Freeman, 1984) supports that buyers’ adoption of SCSM is caused by the pressure from 
buyers’ downstream stakeholders (e.g., government, Non-Government Organizations 
[NGOs], and consumers). Buyers’ failure in managing their suppliers’ sustainability 
performance may place buyers in a risky position of being punished by the downstream 
stakeholders (e.g., loss of sales) (Busse, 2016). RDT supports that buyers’ power in the 
management of buyer-supplier relationships enables buyers to mandate their suppliers’ 
sustainable operations (Hall, 2000; Touboulic et al., 2014). Suppliers have to comply with 
SCSM practices in order to maintain the business with buyers, which are their most 
important financial stakeholder.  
 
Figure 1.1 SCSM Chart  
Buyers’ SCSM can effectively transfer downstream stakeholders’ pressure regarding 
the responsibility of environmental and social performance to the upstream suppliers 
(Hall, 2000; Zorzini et al., 2015). Nonetheless, are there business risks and costs to the 
firms relating to SCSM adoption, such as increasing operational complexity and 
transaction costs due to the additional requirements of sustainable operations in buyer-
supplier relationships? Can buyers and suppliers gain sufficient benefits (e.g., reputation 
from stakeholders) to offset the business risks and outweigh the costs, thus improving 
their financial performance? A review of the literature shows that the answers to the 
questions have remained unclear. This research identified three research gaps relating to 
these questions. 
First, the relationship between buyers’ SCSM adoption and their financial performance 
is unclear. While the conceptual literature points out that SCSM enables buyers to 
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improve their financial performance by using the theories, such as Natural Resource-
based View (NRBV) (Carter & Rogers, 2008; Markley & Davis, 2007), empirical studies 
provide conflicting findings on the buyers’ financial performance in SCSM as discussed 
in the literature review by Touboulic and Walker (2015). Most importantly, there is a 
common bias in the empirical studies investigating buyers’ financial performance. 
Researchers have drawn attention to the social desirability bias in the use of survey-based 
methods to study buyers’ financial performance (Carter & Easton, 2011; Walker et al., 
2012). Social desirability bias refers to positive self-evaluation bias when collecting 
perceptual data through questionnaires or interviews as in survey-based search (Dam & 
Petkova, 2014; Mullainathan & Bertrand, 2001). While survey-based methods have been 
predominantly used in studying buyers’ financial performance relating to SCSM, a 
majority of these studies have not addressed social desirability bias (Carter & Easton, 
2011). This bias remained unaddressed in the meta-analysis by Golicic and Smith (2013) 
which found buyers’ positive financial performance relying on the data largely generated 
from survey-based research. Thus, the positive relationship between SCSM and buyers’ 
financial performance supported by the previous studies (Golicic & Smith, 2013; Schmidt 
et al., 2017)) may be a biased result.  
In fact, there are business risks and costs associated with SCSM in practice (Pagell & 
Shevchenko, 2014), as reflected by the reluctance of firms in managing their 
sustainability performance in the case of Rana Plaza disaster (Jacobs & Singhal, 2017). 
However, what the business risks are is concealed by the desirability for the positive 
financial performance in the SCSM research (Wu & Pagell, 2011), particularly with the 
perceptual measures that bear social desirability bias. Therefore, a methodology with 
objective measures is required to explore the costs relating to SCSM adoption, providing 
buyers’ managers with insight into business risk when they adopt SCSM.  
Second, suppliers’ financial performance has not been widely investigated. Most of 
the SCSM literature has remained focused on studying buyers’ financial performance. 
However, SCSM is the operation between supply chain partners, particularly with buyers’ 
immediate suppliers. The unclear impact of SCSM on suppliers’ financial performance 
makes suppliers’ managers hesitant in working with their buyers to implement SCSM 
practices. Moreover, without exploring suppliers’ financial performance, only a limited 
understanding of the impact of SCSM on supply chains can be reached. Any improvement 
in buyers’ financial performance with SCSM adoption may be achieved by moving the 
business risks to their suppliers. The green bullwhip effect illustrates the buyers’ shift of 
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the costs to their suppliers by adding rigorous practices and compressing timeline of 
compliance (Lee, Klassen, Furlan, & Vinelli, 2014). There has been no clear empirical 
evidence on how suppliers’ financial performance is affected by the green bullwhip effect 
and if suppliers, thus, have more costs than their buyers in SCSM.  
Third, there is little understanding of the factors (e.g., nature of SCSM practices and 
firms’ attributes) that influence the buyers’ and suppliers’ business risks relating to 
SCSM. Without exploring these factors, the SCSM literature offers limited insight into 
what to do when these business risks appear (Pagell & Shevchenko, 2014). Also, buyers 
and suppliers have different attributes and operations in their supply chains and SCSM 
adoption. Thus, different sets of influential factors may be found for buyers and suppliers 
respectively. However, within the SCSM literature, there has been a lack of studies on 
the overall influential factors and very little specific exploration based on different supply 
chain positions.  
1.3 Research objectives and questions 
Only the analysis incorporating these business risks and associated costs can reveal the 
true relationship between SCSM and financial performance. Given buyers’ supply chain 
power, these business risks can be transferred to their suppliers. Suppliers may, thus, bear 
more costs in their SCSM compliance. The identification of business risks is only the first 
step. The exploration of the factors that mitigate the business risks supports the 
development of sustainability in the supply chains. Both buyers and suppliers can 
effectively manage their financial performance by adopting these factors as strategies, 
when they make efforts to improve their environmental and social performance. Improved 
sustainability with no detriment to financial performance is true sustainability (Pagell & 
Shevchenko, 2014). These thoughts lead this research to three research objectives and 
subsequently five research questions in Table 1.1, which are developed into specific 
hypotheses in Chapter 2 along with a review of the literature.  
Table 1.1 Research Objectives and Questions 
Research objective one: to investigate the impact of buyers’ SCSM on their financial 
performance, using objective measures. 
 Research question 1.1: What is the impact of buyers’ SCSM on their financial 
performance?  
Research question 1.2: What factors influence this impact?  
Research objective two: to investigate the impact of buyers’ SCSM on their suppliers’ 
financial performance by using objective measures, providing a supply chain impact of SCSM. 
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 Research question 2.1: What is the impact of buyers’ SCSM on their suppliers’ 
financial performance?  
Research question 2.2: What factors influence this impact?  
Research objective three: to investigate the different impact of buyers’ SCSM on the financial 
performance of buyers and suppliers.  
 Research question 3: Is there a difference in financial performance between buyers 
and their paired suppliers relating to buyers’ SCSM?  
1.4 Research approach 
To achieve these research objectives, event study methodology and cross-sectional 
regression analysis were adopted in this research. Event study methodology is a technique 
that isolates the component of stock returns due to firm-specific events by adjusting them 
for market factors. These adjusted returns are referred to as ‘abnormal returns’ (Hendricks 
& Singhal, 1996). The buyers’ abnormal returns to the SCSM announcements made by 
buyers were used as the estimate of buyers’ financial performance (research question 1.1). 
The abnormal returns as an objective measure of financial performance avoid social 
desirability bias.  
In the analysis of suppliers’ financial performance, the methods of studying ‘related 
firms’ in event study methodology were used. The paired supplier observations were 
derived from buyers’ SCSM announcements. The suppliers’ abnormal returns to the 
buyers’ SCSM announcements were used as the estimate of suppliers’ financial 
performance relating to SCSM (research question 2.1). The abnormal returns from buyers 
and their paired suppliers to the same SCSM announcements were tested with a paired 
sample t-test in the estimate of the difference in financial performance between buyers 
and suppliers (research question 3).  
Several influential factors based on the review of the literature were hypothesized. The 
cross-sectional regression analysis was used to test the effects of the influential factors on 
the financial performance for each of the buyers’ (research question 1.2) and suppliers’ 
observations in the samples (research question 2.2). 
1.5 Research contribution 
By achieving the three research objectives above, four general contributions to the 
literature are made.  
First, this research contributes empirical evidence to the literature that buyers have a 
negative financial performance when they adopt SCSM. The business risks and costs 
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from the buyers’ perspective are discussed in this research. The use of objective measures 
and a relatively large sample ensures an unbiased result.  
Second, this research is the first to explore suppliers’ financial performance relating to 
SCSM. The finding on suppliers’ negative financial performance not only fills the 
research gap in the investigation of SCSM from suppliers’ perspective but also 
demonstrates the impact of SCSM in a supply chain context (with the analysis on both 
buyers and suppliers’ financial performance). 
Third, suppliers were found to have a more negative financial performance than 
buyers. This finding contributes to the understanding of the green bullwhip effect, 
indicating that the buyers’ financial burden is shifted to suppliers, while the stringent 
sustainability practices and compressed timeline are transferred to suppliers.  
Fourth, this research contributes to the literature by exploring the factors that influence 
the negative financial performance of both buyers and suppliers. Thus, this research not 
only identifies the business risks for both buyers and suppliers in SCSM but also provides 
practical solutions to reduce the business risks. The findings on these influential factors 
indicate an opportunity to mitigate the negative financial performance in SCSM and 
trigger the development of an SCSM framework that has a systematic approach to balance 
the environmental and social performance with financial performance.  
The theoretical contribution of this research is underlined by its suggestion, 
explanation, and extension to relevant theories in the SCSM research. Stakeholder theory 
has commonly been used to explain stakeholder pressure as the major force of firms’ 
adoption of sustainability practices (Busse, 2016; Pagell & Shevchenko, 2014). This 
research finds there is a lost value in the supply chain dyads adopting SCSM practices, 
indicating a lack of support from downstream stakeholders. The stakeholder theory in the 
SCSM context merely proposes the coercive force (e.g., punishment on environmental 
misconducts but few rewards on sustainable operations). The study of the group approach 
of SCSM, as a hybrid form, is an extension to transaction cost economics (TCE). The 
positive impact of the group approach for buyers but the negative impact for suppliers 
found in this research suggests the insight of this extension to the TCE in the SCSM 
context, where this hybrid form is shifting buyers’ transaction costs to their suppliers. The 
theory of swift and even flow (SEF), and the theory of variation and uncertainty buffering 
(VUB) are the theoretical lenses in this research to develop several main hypotheses (e.g., 
the disruption to the even flow of operations and thus negative financial performance for 
buyers and suppliers; the effect of operational and financial slack on protecting the even 
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flow of operations). The present research expands the application of SEF from single 
firms to the level of supply chain dyads. The finding of negative financial performance at 
both parties in a supply chain dyad suggests that the disruption to suppliers’ even flow 
increases the variabilities in their buyers’ operations and adds cost. With regard to VUB, 
this research explains the theory by identifying the effectiveness of inventory slack and 
exploring the conditional effect of financial slack in the SCSM context.  
In summary, the novelty of studying supply chain dyads in this research contributes a 
more complete impact of SCSM on financial performance. Particularly, the finding of 
buyers’ cost transfer suggests the importance of study SCSM at the supply chain level 
and the SCSM research can not solely rely on the finding from the buyers’ perspective. 
The present research also took the initial step to explore the managerial strategies 
managers can consider to mitigate negative financial performance. The significant 
findings suggest that there are opportunities to reduce business risks relating to the SCSM.  
1.6 Thesis outline 
This section of the thesis outlines the central topics of this research.  
In Chapter 2, the extant literature is investigated more comprehensively. There are 
several sections of interest. The chapter starts with a review of two broad background 
concepts: sustainability and supply chain management (SCM). The discussions on 
stakeholder theory, resource dependence theory (RDT), TCE, the theory of SEF and VUB 
as the theoretical lenses in this research are presented in the sections on sustainability and 
SCM. The application of stakeholder theory and RDT to SCSM are discussed thoroughly 
to provide theoretical lenses for analyzing SCSM as a systematic approach that effectively 
transfers stakeholder pressure from the downstream to the upstream supply chains and 
ensures the improvement of environmental and social performance in the supply chains. 
By highlighting several research gaps in the literature with a focus on buyers’ and 
suppliers’ financial performance and influential factors, this research attempts to develop 
hypotheses to fill these research gaps with the research outcomes. The hypotheses 
development are in the core sections of Chapter 2.  
In Chapter 3, the details of the methodology adopted in this research are presented. 
Given the positivist paradigm, event study methodology is introduced. In particular, the 
methods of ‘related firms’in the analysis of suppliers are discussed in detail through steps, 
due to the sophistication of the methods. The variable construction sections present the 
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details of how each of the hypothesized mitigating sources is constructed as the 
independent variables in the cross-section regression models and tested against the 
abnormal returns of buyers and suppliers as the dependent variables. Different regression 
techniques are chosen for the buyer and supplier analysis, and the reasoning for the 
choices are discussed. Finally, a paired sample t-test is introduced as the method to test 
the difference in the financial performance between buyers and suppliers.  
In Chapter 4, the test results conducted through the methods in Chapter 3 are presented 
in graphs and tables and discussed accordingly. After presenting descriptive statistics to 
validate the collected data in the analysis, the main results are introduced. The order of 
Chapter 4 is to demonstrate the test results of the financial performance and the results of 
the hypothesized influential factors firstly from buyers’ perspective and secondly from 
suppliers’ perspective. Finally, the test results on the difference between buyers’ and 
suppliers’ financial performance are displayed.  
In Chapter 5, the discussions based on the research findings in Chapter 4 are given. 
The academic implications are presented along with a comparison of the findings of this 
research with those of the previous literature. While the findings with statistical 
significance are discussed as the main contributions of this research to the literature, the 
hypothesized items without statistical significance are also critically discussed. Practical 
implications are also discussed, with the focus on raising managers’ awareness of 
negative financial performance and providing them with the practices needed to 
accommodate negative financial performance. Finally, the theoretical contributions of 
this research are provided at the end of Chapter 5. These include suggestion, explanation 
and extension to stakeholder theory, the green bullwhip effect, TCE, SEF, and VUB.  
In Chapter 6, answers to the research questions are given, and the research objectives 
are evaluated. The chapter also positions this research in a much broader context than 
merely the findings on financial performance and influential factors. The changes and 
development of SCSM research and the effect of downstream stakeholders in the SCSM 
system highlight the relevance of this research in the wider context. Chapter 6 concludes 
the thesis by discussing the limitations identified through the analysis process, and several 
proposed avenues for future research.
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Chapter 2. Literature Review 
This chapter explores the current literature relating to SCSM in order to understand 
the principal concepts, identify the research gaps and objectives, and develop hypotheses. 
Figure 2.1 illustrates the structure of this chapter.  
Sustainability and SCM are two aligned concepts leading to SCSM (Ashby et al., 
2012). This chapter starts with an overview of sustainability followed by SCM. In the 
discussion on sustainability, TBL is introduced as a tool to operationalize sustainability 
at the corporate level when firms are motivated to conduct sustainable development by 
stakeholder pressure as illustrated in stakeholder theory.  
The concept of SCM is outlined in order to discuss the management of the dyadic 
relationships between buyer and supplier. The theoretical underpinnings of SCM relevant 
to this research are the theories of RDT, TCE, SEF, and VUB, which provide theoretical 
lenses to understand buyers’ and suppliers’ financial performance in supply chain 
operations.  
Drawing on the discussion of sustainability and SCM, the concept of SCSM is 
explored. This research focuses on the procurement/purchasing perspective of SCSM, 
where buyers adopt SCSM to improve their suppliers’ environmental and social 
performance. The application of stakeholder theory and RDT in SCSM explains why 
buyers adopt SCSM and why suppliers comply with their buyers’ SCSM, suggesting the 
systematic approach of SCSM. SCSM practices, governance mechanisms, and 
dimensions are explored to further provide background information on SCSM.  
SCSM conceptualizes that financial performance increases with environmental and 
social performance. However, the impact of SCSM on buyers’ financial performance 
remains unclear in the literature, while suppliers’ financial performance has not been 
widely studied. Also, there has been a lack of investigation on the factors that influence 
buyers’ and suppliers’ financial performance in SCSM. SCSM research provide no 
insight into what to do when SCSM is detrimental to financial performance. These 
research gaps are explored in the review of the literature and lead to the research 
objectives of this research.  
Three research objectives are presented in section 2.4, and the hypotheses are 
developed accordingly in section 2.5. First, the impact of SCSM adoption on buyers’ 
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financial performance and the influential factors on buyers’ financial performance are 
studied. Second, the impact of SCSM compliance on suppliers’ financial performance 
and the influential factors on suppliers’ financial performance are investigated. The 
influential factors for both buyers and suppliers focus on the nature of SCSM (e.g., SCSM 
dimensions) and firm-specific characteristics (e.g., operational slack). Third, the 
difference in the financial performance between buyers and suppliers in SCSM is 
explored. The investigation of the financial performance of both buyers and suppliers 
provides the supply chain impact of SCSM. The exploration of influential factors on the 
firms’ financial performance in SCSM (both buyers and suppliers) offers strategies to 
mitigate the business risks in relation to SCSM.  
Suppliers  financial performance and 
influential factors in SCSM compliance
(Section 2.5.2)
Buyers  financial performance and 
influential factors in SCSM adoption
(Section 2.5.1)
Different financial performance of buyers 











Research objectives and questions
(Section 2.4)
 
Figure 2.1 Structure of Literature Review Chapter 
2.1 Sustainability 
In 1987 the World Commission on Environment and Development (WCED) report 
(commonly known as the Brundtland Report after its chairwoman) was published in 
response to the increasing gap between environmental concerns on the increasingly 
evident ecological consequences of human activities and socio-political concerns about 
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human development issues. The report led to the popularization of the concept of 
‘sustainable development’ within society (Robinson, 2004). Sustainability was defined as 
“development that meets the needs of the present without compromising the ability of 
future generations to meet their own needs” (WCED, 1987, p. 8). Specifically, the report 
underlined the need for poverty alleviation, environmental improvement, and social 
equitability through economic growth (Mebratu, 1998). The importance of the Brundtland 
Report is that it provided a transition of sustainability development from a set of technical 
concepts to the political and business mainstream (Linton et al., 2007), suggesting that 
education, institutional development, and law enforcement must be a part of sustainable 
development (WCED, 1987). The Brundtland Report constituted a major political turning 
point for the concept of sustainable development (Mebratu, 1998). Since its publication, 
legislations have been adopted worldwide by governments to initiate national/regional 
sustainability (Linton et al., 2007). For instance, the European Union (EU) legislated on 
the restriction of hazardous substances (RoHS) directive in the electrical and electronic 
industries, requiring certain hazardous substances (e.g., lead and mercury) to be 
substituted with safer alternatives in order to increase the recycling and/or reuse of such 
products (European Union, 2003).  
In the mid-1990s, authorities were probably the most active players in the attempt to 
implement sustainable development. However, the focus has recently shifted strongly 
towards business as a major actor, as most managers have accepted corporate 
sustainability as a precondition for doing business (Dyllick & Hockerts, 2002).  
2.1.1 Corporate sustainability 
The world is being shaped by the sustainability development facilitated by political 
forces at the global and national level; the wide societal acceptance of sustainability 
creates market demands on sustainable products; the disclosure of environmental and 
social problems has been increasing on the corporate level. The regulations, market forces, 
and firms’ risk aversion push corporations to integrate sustainability concepts into 
business (Shrivastava, 1995).  
On a corporate level, the concept of sustainability illustrates the new relationship that 
firms have with societal, institutions and natural ecosystems (Schwartz & Carroll, 2008). 
In today’s business, managers should not have a single focus on economic development 
but should perceive the necessity of sustainability in business success. Firms are required 
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to incorporate the sustainability concept into business routines, so as to meet the needs of 
firms’ direct and indirect stakeholders (e.g., shareholders, employees, clients, pressure 
groups, communities), without compromising their ability to meet the needs of future 
stakeholders (Dyllick & Hockerts, 2002).  
While the concept of sustainability is appealing, it is not always clear to a manager 
how to address these factors and develop day-to-day responses to improve sustainability. 
There are three major difficulties when business firms integrate corporate sustainability. 
First, sustainability is a macroeconomic and societal definition, which may provide 
policies on the global and national level. Firms, however, find it difficult to determine 
how their individual roles fit within the broad principle of sustainability (Gimenez & 
Tachizawa, 2012; Shrivastava, 1995). Second, sustainability does not prioritize between 
present needs and future needs, while the firms’ benefits, costs, and strategies may 
conflict in short and long-run development (Starik & Rands, 1995). Third, future needs 
are unsure, and importantly the technologies and resources required to predict and meet 
these needs are not clearly demonstrated in the sustainability concept (Marshall & Toffel, 
2005; Starik & Rands, 1995).  
These problems create difficulties in the implementation of corporate sustainability 
and encourage researchers and practices to explore the solutions to help firms 
operationalize sustainability in business activities. TBL developed by Elkington (1998) 
in his book “Cannibals with Forks” is usually used as a way to operationalize 
sustainability at the corporate level. In the next section, TBL will be discussed.   
2.1.2 Triple bottom line  
Elkington (1998) used the term “cannibal” to refer to business firms in the rapidly 
evolving capitalist economies, where “it is the natural order of things for corporations to 
devour their competitors” in order to gain financial growth (Jeurissen, 2000, p. 229). 
However, if “the cannibal adopts the fork,” which refers to business firms undertaking 
sustainability measures while achieving economic prosperity, the business itself, its 
shareholders, the stakeholders, society, and the environment all benefit (Jeurissen, 2000). 
Thus, Elkington (1998) developed TBL, whereby firms combine environmental, social, 
and economic/financial bottom lines in daily business decisions to pursue long-term 
sustainable growth.  
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Four important sustainable business strategies suggested by Elkington (1998) are 
summarized below. First, firms should build risk management relating to sustainable 
issues to avoid potential costs. With the increasing attention on sustainability since the 
Brundtland Report, firms face growing political and market pressure, where external 
watchers benchmark and rank their sustainability performance (Jeurissen, 2000). Only 
integrating environmental and social performance into business activities can ensure 
continued economic growth. Second, firms should understand the social or ethical values 
which are related to economic value creation. Business values are expanded from a focus 
on tangible, owned assets to intangible assets which are generated from firms’ social 
status. Third, sustainability is not a challenge; rather it is an unprecedented source of 
commercial opportunity to create competitive advantages. Technological innovation and 
improved eco-efficiency in relation to sustainability provide firms with resources to 
succeed (Jeurissen, 2000). Fourth, the firms’ business time perspective should be changed 
from a short-term economic dimension to long-term sustainability (Dyllick & Hockerts, 
2002). Firms have historically overemphasized short-term profits. However, the spirit of 
sustainability requires firms to meet both present and future stakeholder demands. Firms, 
therefore, should develop a long-term business vision which ensures competitiveness and 
reduces social and environmental degradation. These business strategies have a close 
correspondence to firms’ daily activities, and thus ensure TBL is widely adopted as the 
framework of corporate sustainability (Carter & Rogers, 2008; Gimenez & Tachizawa, 
2012). 
However, there are criticisms of TBL. First, Jeurissen (2000) discussed that a key 
obstacle in implementing TBL is the requirement that business firms radically change 
while ignoring the already existing disordered business world from the environmental and 
social perspective. It is, thus, questionable whether firms are motivated to really 
incorporate environmental and social bottom lines into business activities when firms are 
required to use existing financial resources to build social status. Second, by relating 
social and environmental values to financial performance, TBL, in fact, merely illustrates 
firms’ goals on financial performance with the addition of environmental and social 
commitments (Norman & MacDonald, 2004). Third, it is always problematic to meet all 
stakeholder demands simultaneously, as various stakeholders have different weights 
assigned to firms’ financial, social, and environmental performance (Dyllick & Hockerts, 
2002; Norman & MacDonald, 2004).  
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The third criticism suggests critical questions in sustainability, which is the role of 
stakeholders. Who are the firms’ stakeholders? Why do firms choose to listen to these 
stakeholders who demand environmental and social performance? Stakeholder theory 
provides a theoretical lens to explain these questions. In the next section, stakeholder 
theory will be introduced.  
2.1.3 Stakeholder theory 
Stakeholder theory is concerned with the reciprocal relationships between firms and 
their numerous stakeholders, where firms can achieve business success by taking 
stakeholders’ interest into account (Donaldson & Preston, 1995). Freeman (1984) defined 
that a stakeholder is any group or individual who can affect or is affected by the 
achievement of the organization’s objectives. Internal stakeholders may include owners, 
managers, and employees. External stakeholders may cover suppliers, customers, 
competitors, local communities, NGOs, or activist groups, media, and government 
agencies (Busse, 2016).  
Stakeholder theory illustrates the firms’ relationship with these stakeholders by 
referring to three features: instrumental, descriptive, and normative (Donaldson & 
Preston, 1995). Instrumental stakeholder theory demonstrates the benefits of firms 
managing stakeholder relationships (Jones, 1995). Descriptive stakeholder theory 
discusses the categories and importance of stakeholders, and how firms take into account 
stakeholder interest (Jawahar & McLaughlin, 2001). Normative stakeholder theory 
presents the normative ethical reason why firms should consider stakeholder interests. 
The normative and ethical reason for firms’ sustainability is ambiguous (Donaldson & 
Preston, 1995). This research focuses on sustainability as firms’ self-interested pursuit of 
financial performance. Hence, normative stakeholder theory is not within the scope of 
this research. The present research applies instrumental and descriptive stakeholder 
theories as theoretical lenses to discuss the competing stakeholders’ interest in relating to 
firms’ sustainability and the financial benefits of managing the stakeholder relationships. 
Instrument stakeholder theory views the relationships with stakeholders is a means to 
achieve firms’ business success. Firms stand to gain by investing in the creation and 
maintenance of relationships with stakeholders (Jones, 1995). Descriptive stakeholder 
theory further categorizes the stakeholders and posits the way in which firms can manage 
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the various stakeholder relationships. Firms can identify stakeholder relationships based 
on stakeholder power, legitimacy, and urgency (Jawahar & McLaughlin, 2001).  
Stakeholder power relates to the degree to which a stakeholder group can influence 
firms to do something that they would not have done otherwise (Busse, 2016). The degree 
of power is decided by firms’ dependence on the stakeholder group for resources (Jawahar 
& McLaughlin, 2001). Stakeholder legitimacy indicates the normative principle of 
stakeholders’ requests (Mitchell et al., 1997), where legitimate requests are consistent 
with a generalized perception of desirable, proper, or appropriate social values, belief, 
and definition (Busse, 2016). Stakeholder urgency identifies the timely scale of a 
stakeholder group’s claim, which shows the requested degree of firms’ immediate 
response to the stakeholders’ requests (Mitchell et al., 1997). The most salient 
stakeholders should have a high degree of power, legitimacy, and urgency. The firms’ 
adherence to these stakeholders creates the highest financial performance as well as 
competitive market position (Busse, 2016).  
Stakeholder theory explains the reason that firms adopt corporate sustainability while 
financial performance is still not assured. Campbell (2007) discussed that the imperative 
of maximizing financial profit is at the heart of the modern corporation. The investment 
in environmental and social performance does not necessarily improve financial 
performance, and thus firms hesitate to proactively adopt corporate sustainability (Hall, 
2000). However, there has been increasing public awareness of corporate sustainability, 
as discussed in section 2.1.1. There have been emerging firm stakeholders that have a 
high level of concern on sustainability issues and are influential in firms’ financial 
performance. Governments have taken a tougher regulatory position in the first instance 
to force firms to change their environmental and social performance. The violation of 
these regulations results in costly legal obligations. A variety of NGOs has emerged as a 
strong force to monitor the environmental and social behaviors of firms. The NGOs’ 
disclosure of firms’ environmental and social misconduct to end consumers creates a 
great business risk. Firms’ damaged reputation leads to increased costs, where consumers 
may stop buying the firms’ products, and firms have to invest in restoring the reputation 
to consumers. These stakeholders create a substantial pressure for firms’ adoption of 
corporate sustainability.  
As discussed in descriptive stakeholder theory, these stakeholders (e.g., government, 
NGOs, consumers) have great stakeholder power, legitimacy, and urgency, as the firms 
rely on these stakeholders to continue their operations and sales. The investment in 
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corporate sustainability represents the firms’ legitimacy and thus maintains the 
relationship with these stakeholders as suggested by instrumental stakeholder theory. The 
adoption of corporate sustainability avoids the harm of sustainability-related risks to 
firms’ financial performance.  
In summary, stakeholder theory explains that firms’ adoption of sustainability is forced 
by the pressure from their stakeholders. These stakeholders have a high concern for 
sustainability issues and are influential on firms’ financial performance due to their 
stakeholder power, legitimacy, and urgency.  
Suppliers and buyers (i.e., business customers) are important stakeholders as supply 
chain partners. In today’s business, firms’ operations are increasingly based on ‘supply 
chain vs. supply chain’ (Ashby et al., 2012). Suppliers’ and buyers’ engagement in 
sustainability ensures they can meet the demands of those stakeholders (e.g., government, 
NGOs, and consumers) in terms of environmental and social performance (Carter & 
Rogers, 2008). In the next section, the perspective of supply chain management (SCM) 
will be presented as background information, leading to the discussion on the integration 
of sustainability into SCM.  
2.2 Supply chain management  
The flow of goods from source to end market involves the operations of multiple firms, 
which jointly work on the delivery of the goods between each other and thus create a 
chain of supply. The concept of a supply chain was developed from logistics literature in 
the 1990s (Houlihan, 1988). A supply chain encompasses all activities associated with 
the upstream and downstream flow and/or transformation of products, services, finance, 
and information from a raw materials stage through to the end consumers (Seuring & 
Müller, 2008). A supply chain may have multiple degrees of complexity according to the 
number of actors involved (Mentzer et al., 2001). Analytically, a typical supply chain 
chart is presented in Figure 2.2. Suppliers, buyers, and consumers in end markets, as 
supply chain actors, create the fundamental composition and have direct contact along 
the supply chain.  
The specific activities between these supply chain actors comprise the supply chain 
process. The core process of a supply chain includes source, make, deliver, and plan from 
the upstream to the downstream supply chain, as in Figure 2.2, where the plan is used to 
manage the source-make-deliver process (Huan et al., 2004). The source process contains 
Chapter 2 Literature Review 
18 
the supply chain activities from suppliers to buyers, make is buyers’ internal value-added 
production, and deliver comprises the supply chain activities from buyers to end 







Figure 2.2 A Typical Supply Chain Chart 
A supply chain is only a phenomenon of business (Mentzer et al., 2001). The 
operations in a supply chain do not ensure firms reduce costs and explore market 
opportunities. The integration of the operations from many independent organizations is 
difficult, as each of these supply actors has its own objectives. Hence, a mechanism is 
required to coordinate firms’ functions and create a high level of supply chain 
performance, where in general the overall costs are low, and the responsiveness to market 
demand is high (Beamon, 1999). Supply chain management (SCM) is such a mechanism 
to integrate the efforts across firms.  
2.2.1 Supply chain management definitions 
The increasing uncertainty of market demand, the stiff competition on time and 
quality, and particularly the trend of global sourcing requires firms’ decision making at a 
supply chain level. The traditional interface between different firms has now become the 
integration of supply chain operations, which develops SCM (Cooper & Ellram, 1993; 
Cooper et al., 1997).  
Because of a large number of parties and functions in a supply chain, SCM has evolved 
from different disciplines and multiple perspectives. Thus there are many SCM 
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definitions (Croom et al., 2000). Vaaland and Heide (2007, pp. 20-21) classified three 
groups of SCM definitions:  
 Actor-oriented definitions focus on the capabilities of supply chain actors to 
organize and manage the flow of materials from ‘point of origin’ to ‘point of 
sales’; 
 Process-oriented definitions focus on activities and processes in the supply 
chains, where SCM is the “integration of key business process from the end user 
to original suppliers that provide products & services and information that add 
value to customers and other stakeholders.” (Lambert et al., 1998, p. 1); and 
 Relation-oriented definitions focus on the relationship between the actors in the 
supply chain and how cooperation and mutual interest can lead to improvement. 
Encompassing these aspects in SCM, Mentzer et al. (2001, p. 18) developed the SCM 
definition as: 
The systemic, strategic coordination of the traditional business 
functions and the tactics across these business functions within a 
particular company and across businesses within the supply chain, 
for the purposes of improving the long-term performance of the 
individual companies and the supply chain as a whole. 
This definition illustrates two important factors of SCM relating to this research. First, 
A supply chain should be viewed as a single entity rather than a set of fragmented parties 
each working on their own function (Houlihan, 1988; Mentzer et al., 2001). Thus any 
individual firm’s operational and financial performance are directly or indirectly 
influenced by any of their supply chain partners’ operations, as seen in Figure 2.2. 
Second, SCM requires relationship management between supply chain actors. The inter-
functional coordination along a supply chain relies on the commitment, risk, and 
dependence between firms (Mentzer et al., 2001). While the supply chain relationship is 
unable to be visually presented in Figure 2.2, relationship management is an important 
source to support the coordination between actors and process.  
This definition conceptualizes SCM in a broad sense that covers many nuances 
(Burgess et al., 2006). There are SCM concepts that are developed grounded in this broad 
definition while explains the specific aspects in SCM. In the next section, the concepts of 
the demanded oriented supply chain, supply chain integration, and complex adaptive 
system are introduced, due to their relevance to the sustainability issues. The discussion 
provides a further review of SCM.   
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2.2.2 The development of supply chain management concepts 
The changes in the markets with fierce competition, short product life cycle, and 
stochastic demands have forced firms to revisit their supply chain management strategies 
(Gunasekaran & Ngai, 2005). In the past years, there have been many changes in the 
concepts of SCM that firms have applied to seek for satisfying the marketplaces. The 
demand-oriented supply chains, supply chain integration, and complex adaptive system 
are three important concepts in the development of SCM and related to SCSM 
(Childerhouse & Towill, 2011; Wolf, 2011; Wu & Pagell, 2011). In this section, these 
three concepts are discussed to provide a broad review of background information about 
SCM.  
In the debate of the best practices of SCM, the product-oriented supply chain and the 
demand-oriented supply chain are two strategies that firms can adopt according to the 
operations requirements (Croom et al., 2000). While the product-oriented supply chain 
focuses on physical efficiency (e.g., cost reduction) and determines supply by inventories, 
the demand-oriented supply chain requires that the supply chain is designed based on 
consumer data and implements strong collaboration between supply chain partners to 
achieve a more efficient response to consumer needs (Childerhouse et al., 2002). In 
modern business practices, many firms have struggled to continuously capture 
efficiencies using a product-oriented SCM strategy, because the inventory-driven supply 
can “bear little resemblance to what is optimally required by the whole system” 
(Childerhouse & Towill, 2006, p. 358). To cope with the rapid changes of market 
conditions, firms often adopt market-responsive strategies, such as end-consumer driven 
product specifications, as the core concept in the demand-oriented supply chain (Basnet 
& Seuring, 2014).  
Supply chain integration is an important requirement for the demand-oriented supply 
chain (Childerhouse & Towill, 2006). Supply chain integration suggests the strong 
sharing and coordination in the dimensions of organizational relationship, information, 
and resources, where the optimization of the overall systems in supply chains can achieve 
better performance than a string of optimized sub-systems (Childerhouse & Towill, 
2011). The integrated supply chains facilitate the smooth material/service flows, and thus 
improve the flexibility and responsiveness to the market demands.  
From the perspective of sustainability, market demand has changed to require the 
additional environmental and social attributes considered in the product and production 
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design. The demand-oriented supply chain concept indicates that firms need to change 
operations accordingly to meet the changes. However, sustainable operations are 
frequently beyond the traditional business models (Touboulic & Walker, 2015), which 
complicates implementation of the demand-oriented supply chain when sustainability is 
desired. Wolf (2011) discussed supply chain integration with regard to sustainability as 
being far outside of traditional SCM dimensions. Firms are challenged by the integration 
with stakeholders that request sustainable operations, responsibility sharing, and aligned 
incentive and rewards when they seek to create supply chain integration and demand-
oriented supply chains that enhance sustainability. Thus, there seems a gap between the 
idealized prescription and actual practices in “sustainability-demand-oriented supply 
chains.”  
Another important SCM view is the complex adaptive system, where a supply chain 
is regarded as a self-organizing, dynamic, and evolving system, and, therefore, a supply 
chain emerges rather than results from a design of singular entity (Pathak et al., 2007). 
This view holds that the efforts in control, implementation, planning, and measurement 
of supply chains may be only effective to a certain extent due to the complex nature of 
supply chains. There are always emergencies, such as new and unexpected process, 
structure, pattern, and properties, which decrease the effectiveness of these design efforts. 
These emergencies increase dynamism in the market environment and create a “rugged 
landscape”. A “landscape” represents the potential states that a system can attain in the 
market environment. When a landscape is rugged, the highest point in this landscape (i.e., 
an optimal state for the system) is difficult to be found and may be determined by tightly 
coupled components. Supply chain members are unlikely to identify the global optimality 
at the system level in such a rugged landscape (Choi et al., 2001). Managers need to 
remain vigilant of these emergencies and adapt business goals and infrastructure 
appropriately to the market environmental changes (Matos & Hall, 2007). Choi et al. 
(2001) discussed from the view of complex adaptive system that a firm survives a longer 
time if it adjusts goals and infrastructure quickly according to the changes of their 
customers, suppliers, and competitors; also, a supply network gains greater efficiency if 
it can expose and change weak members rather than being artificially bound by long-term 
relationships. 
The complex adaptive system view of supply chains illustrates firms’ decision making 
in dealing with the increased emergencies with regards to sustainability. Sustainable 
operations change firms’ decision making boundaries and parameters, and there is an 
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absence of complete and reliable information on the interactions between environmental 
and/or social attributes and economic performance (Matos & Hall, 2007). Thus, 
sustainability creates emergencies that force firms to go through a rugged landscape, 
where global optimal state in the system is unlikely to be determined, and thus firms rely 
on the available information and adapt their goal to the local optima (Wu & Pagell, 2011), 
such as seeking self-interest by transferring costs to weak supply chain members. The 
supply chain actors die if they could not quickly adapt their goals to these emergencies 
and the changes in their partners’ goals (Pathak & Dilts, 2002). The view of the complex 
adaptive system suggests that from the perspective of sustainability, firms in supply 
chains are more likely to make locally focused decisions that have less-than-optimal 
outcomes at the system level (Wu & Pagell, 2011).  
The discussion on the demand-oriented supply chain, supply chain integration, and 
complex adaptive systems provides a wide review of SCM concepts and improves the 
understanding of sustainability in the SCM context. The level of analysis through these 
SCM concepts can be on a dyadic, chain, or network level (Croom et al., 2000). This 
research focuses on a dyadic relationship between buyers and their suppliers.  
A dyadic relationship refers to the firm as a buyer and its direct supplier in the 
purchasing and supply context (Miemczyk et al., 2012). SCM research particularly 
focuses on the dyadic relationship (Chen & Paulraj, 2004). The buyer-supplier 
relationship is in the most elementary supply chain (Mentzer et al., 2001). Therefore, the 
study of the dyadic relationship simplifies the investigation of complex SCM issues. 
Moreover, as the basic element in a supply chain, that is, multiple buyer-supplier 
relationships, which include the buyer’s buyer, and the supplier’s supplier, demonstrate 
the multiplier effect over the entire supply chain (Deitz et al., 2009).  
The study of a dyadic relationship is of paramount importance in the present 
sustainability research. There is a lack of research investigating the supply chain impact 
of sustainability (Pagell & Shevchenko, 2014). The relationship aspect of a dyad is a 
widely researched area and has generated abundant works (Chen & Paulraj, 2004). 
Therefore, there is a strong theoretical foundation to take an initial step from a dyadic 
relationship to explore the complex impact of sustainability on a supply chain. Moreover, 
Zimmer et al. (2016) discussed two challenges to manage sustainability beyond a dyadic 
relationship. First, contractual relationships are important for firms to acquire 
procurement information and to subsequently conduct analysis and develop activities for 
sustainable operations. The missing contractual relationships between firms beyond 
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dyadic relationships (e.g., buyers and their second-tier suppliers) create a difficulty to 
manage sustainability at the inter-firm level. Second, the exponential increase of sub-
suppliers further upstream hinders firms’ systematic sustainability management. 
Consequently, the present research focuses on dyadic relationships. The initial 
investigation of a dyadic supply chain impact in this research provides a foundation for 
research exploring triadic or chain impacts.   
The present research follows the literature (Busse, 2016; Foerstl et al., 2015; Hall, 
2000; Schmidt et al., 2017) to define that buyers are the firms in the downstream supply 
chains close to the ‘point of sales’. Buyers are high-profile firms in the end markets. 
Suppliers are the firms in the upstream supply chain. Due to the low proximity to the 
point of sales, suppliers are often not directly exposed to the pressure and demand in the 
end markets.  
In SCM research, theories can shed significant light on research thought (Ketchen & 
Hult, 2007) and represent the keystone of knowledge production (Handfield & Melnyk, 
1998). Through the theoretical lenses, the present research can draw understanding in the 
analysis of buyer-supplier relationships, such as, why these relationships exist and how 
they can be managed. Since the present research focuses on a dyadic relationship, the 
theories used in this research refer to RDT and TCE which are applicable to the analysis 
of supply chain dyads (Grover & Malhotra, 2003; Mahapatra et al., 2012). In addition, 
the theories of SEF and VUB provide the theoretical lenses to understand the performance 
impact relating to the operational changes in supply chains. In the next sections, these 
four SCM theories that are relevant to this research will be introduced.  
2.2.3 Theoretical underpinnings of SCM 
This research focuses on firms’ financial performance in buyer-supplier relationships. 
There must be a focus on the benefits and costs of managing the relationships and 
operations between buyers and suppliers. The theoretical perspectives that are employed 
in this research are resource dependence theory (RDT), transaction costs economics 
(TCE), the theory of swift, even flow (SEF), and the theory of variation and uncertainty 
buffering (VUB). These theories provide insights into the role of power, transaction costs, 
the costs of disruptions to the operations, and the buffering mechanisms to the disruptions, 
which link with firms’ financial performance. In the next sections, these theories will be 
discussed.  
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2.2.3.1 Resource dependence theory  
RDT (Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978) proposes that the reason for creating buyer-supplier 
relationships is that very few firms are self-sufficient concerning strategic and critical 
resources. Firms are interdependent in businesses. Buyers require critical and scarce raw 
materials and components from suppliers, and suppliers depend largely on buyers for 
sales.  
In the supply chain operations, buyers and suppliers bring resources together and 
jointly create value by reducing the overall costs and improving responsiveness to 
consumer demand. However, the sharing of value is dependent on the power (Kim & 
Wemmerlöv, 2015), which serves as a way of managing the buyer-supplier relationships 
as suggested in RDT (Touboulic et al., 2014). A powerful supply chain partner in the 
relationships can retain the large share of value resulting from the exchange, while a less 
powerful supply chain partner is more likely bear the high share of risks and costs 
(Casciaro & Piskorski, 2005; Touboulic et al., 2014).  
Power is generated by two forces (Dabhilkar et al., 2015). The first is the criticality of 
the resources. A supplier that has commercially and operationally important items 
required by a buyer has a higher level of power than the buyer. The second is the 
availability of the alternatives to source the same resources. A buyer that has many 
alternative suppliers producing the same item is more powerful than any of these 
suppliers. When power imbalance exists in a relationship where a firm is more powerful 
than another, the powerful firm is likely to exercise power to adjust the other party’s 
operations (e.g., requiring flexible arrangements beyond the contract terms), whereas the 
less powerful firm is more likely to comply with the requests (Touboulic et al., 2014).  
In buyer-supplier relationships, buyers, on average, are more powerful than suppliers 
(Hall, 2000; Touboulic et al., 2014). Buyers are commonly the channel leaders that rule 
and govern the supply chain operations, have high proximity to end consumers in supply 
chain positions, and design the product and service offered to the end markets (Seuring 
& Müller, 2008). Buyers are relatively larger firms than suppliers in terms of 
sales/revenue and therefore, have a higher load of resources, capabilities, and information 
(Kim & Wemmerlöv, 2015). Buyers commonly have many alternative suppliers, while 
financial resources and market information on buyers are essential to any single supplier 
(Kim & Wemmerlöv, 2015).  
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The power position in favor of buyers enables them to mandate their suppliers’ 
engagement in what is deemed appropriate for the buyers. A large portion of heavy 
manufacturing is conducted by suppliers, while buyers mainly do the assembly and 
distribution (Tate et al., 2012). The integration of the suppliers’ operations is essential to 
the buyers in response to the market demands. A powerful buyer is able to mandate the 
changes in its suppliers’ operations to meet the market demand. Recent technical and 
organizational innovations are often initiated by powerful buyers that mandate the 
applications of their suppliers (Hall, 2000), such as radio-frequency identification (RFID) 
integration between Wal-Mart and its suppliers (Deitz et al., 2009). 
Relational mechanisms are advocated and likely to be against the use of power in 
buyer-supplier relationships (Heide, 1994; Liu et al., 2009). Relational mechanisms 
emphasize the inherent and moral control, governing exchanges through consistent goals 
and a cooperative atmosphere; the trust between buyers and suppliers can build in 
relational mechanisms (Liu et al., 2009). The use of power may reduce the trust in the 
relationship (Heide, 1994).  
However, strategic use of power may lead to systematic performance improvement 
(Maloni & Benton, 2000). Power always exists in supply chains and is largely taken by 
buyers (Kim & Wemmerlöv, 2015; Maloni & Benton, 2000). Buyers have the power to 
make positive changes (e.g., sustainability) by coordinating supply chains (Hall, 2000). 
Benton & Maloni (2005) found that from the operations perspective, a powerful buyer 
dominant relationship may improve the effectiveness and efficiency of supply chain 
operations, and thus the overall performance, given that buyers carefully leverage the 
application of power. As the firms in the downstream proximate to end markets, buyers 
have access to the market information and vision on supply chain operations. The power 
increases buyers’ capabilities to integrate the supply chain operations as a whole in the 
effective and efficient response to the market information. Buyers’ conscious and 
considerate use of power may also lead to suppliers’ satisfaction and willingly compliance 
(Benton & Maloni, 2005). In the case of RFID integration, Wal-Mart’s power ensures the 
rapid adoption of RFID tags by its suppliers to reduce out-of-stock incidences, track 
products, and cut supply chain costs (Deitz et al., 2009). 
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2.2.3.2 Transaction cost economics  
Another important aspect of managing buyer-supplier relationships is the transaction 
costs, as illustrated in TCE (Williamson, 1981). TCE, in general, posits that the firm is 
viewed as a governance structure as opposed to a production function (Grover & 
Malhotra, 2003). Under certain conditions, the costs of conducting economic exchange 
in a market may exceed the cost of organizing the exchange within a firm. The firm should 
use transition costs as the unit of analysis to make the business decision between ‘buy’ 
and ‘make’, where the firm will make the products or service internally, if it is too costly 
to transact within the market (Hawkins et al., 2008). 
Two assumptions in TCE are bounded rationality and opportunism. Bounded 
rationality indicates that cognitive ability is limited in business decision making, as the 
pertinent facts relating to business are incomplete due to a lack of information. In 
contractual relationships between buyers and suppliers, there is uncertainty and therefore 
permanent fixture, which involves renegotiations and contingency clauses as a dispute 
arises and the uncertainty is resolved (Hawkins et al., 2008).  
Opportunism is the second assumption in TCE. Opportunism is defined as firms’ self-
interest seeking with guile through cheating, deception, breach of contract, false 
promises, withholding information, and disguising attributes or preferences (Hawkins et 
al., 2008; Williamson, 1981, 1987). Blois (2006) discussed that the firms’ opportunism is 
the norm in an exchange relationship, where firms will engage in opportunism when it is 
profitable.  
One of the antecedents to opportunism is firms’ dependence/power (Hawkins et al., 
2008). In buyer-supplier relationships, when a buyer observes a supplier that is highly 
dependent on itself (e.g., few alternative buyers), the buyer may utilize monopoly power 
to conduct opportunistic behavior on the supplier, for example, requesting a price 
reduction (Yigitbasioglu, 2010). A key factor that increases the supplier’s dependence on 
the buyer is ‘asset-specific investment’ (Hawkins et al., 2008). Asset-specific investment 
refers to the degree of investment made by the supplier of goods and or/service for a 
specific buyer, including site specificity, physical specificity, human assets specificity, 
and dedicated assets. These investments are specific in the transaction with the buyer and 
cannot be put into other buyer-supplier relationships (Williamson, 1981, 1987; 
Yigitbasioglu, 2010). The asset-specific investment increases the level of suppliers’ 
opportunism risks. Suppliers are locked in the relationship, as these asset specific 
Chapter 2 Literature Review 
27 
investments return little value in the transactions with others buyers. Suppliers’ 
vulnerability via the hold-ups puts them at risk of buyers’ opportunism (Hawkins et al., 
2008).  
To safeguard against the risks of opportunism, firms must develop effective 
governance mechanisms in relationships. Governance mechanisms are the means by 
which order is accomplished in a relationship in which potential conflict threatens to undo 
or upset opportunities to realize mutual gains (Gimenez & Sierra, 2013; Tachizawa & 
Wong, 2015). In a buyer-supplier relationship, buyers utilize governance mechanisms, 
such as quality assurance inspections and on-time delivery surveillance to ensure 
suppliers’ compliance with agreements (Hawkins et al., 2008).  
However, transaction costs are increased with all forms of governance (Dyer, 1997). 
Four types of transaction costs may arise (Adobor & McMullen, 2014; Dyer, 1997; 
Hawkins et al., 2008; Hill, 1995). Search costs are used to collect information to identify 
exchange partners. Bargaining costs rise due to the changing circumstances coupled with 
bounded rationality, which leads to negotiation and renegotiation. Monitored costs are 
those that guarantee the fulfillment of contractual obligations. Enforcement costs refer to 
ex-post bargaining and sanctioning a trading partner that does not perform according to 
the agreement.  
TCE suggests that firms (both buyers and suppliers) should make efforts to minimize 
these transactions costs, which can ensure the improvement of financial performance 
through the transactions in buyer-supplier relationships (Grover & Malhotra, 2003).  
2.2.3.3 The theory of swift, even flow and the theory of variation and 
uncertainty buffering 
The ultimate goal of SCM is to meet market demands with low costs through integrated 
operations in supply chains (Mentzer et al., 2001). However, what should firms do to 
meet the market demand with low costs? The theory of swift, even flow (SEF) and the 
theory of variation and uncertainty buffering (VUB) are the two relevant theories 
discussing the answer to this question.  
SEF was developed by Schmenner and Swink (1998), which proposes that 
continuously improved productivity is the best way to meet market demands with low 
costs. Productivity is “getting more outputs from a given set of inputs” (Schmenner, 2015, 
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p. 341). Productivity is associated with variability and speed in operation (Stratton, 2008). 
The theory of SEF holds that, 
The more swift and even the flow of materials through a process, the 
more productive that process is. Thus, productivity for any process – 
be it labor productivity, material productivity, or total productivity – 
rise with the speed by which materials flow through the process, and 
it falls with increases in the variability associated with the demand 
on the process or with the steps in the process itself. (Schmenner & 
Swink, 1998, p. 102) 
A low evenness of flow and speed in operations flow reduce productivity and thus 
create negative financial performance (Schmenner, 2001). The reduction of variability 
(i.e., even flow) and improvement in speed (i.e., swift) are two essential factors in the 
theory of SEF (Schmenner, 2015). Variability causes disruptions to the even flow of 
operations. The increasing demand volatility and variety in production (e.g., 
overproduction, inventory, and defects) raise the variability and thus must be reduced. 
Improvement in speed is gained by reducing throughput time as much as possible, where 
throughput time is the time taken to produce something from start to finish. By reducing 
the disruption and throughput time, “one eliminates the non-value added aspects of 
production, which is where the cost and inefficiencies lie” (Schmenner, 2015). Therefore, 
financial performance can be improved. Lean management is very much in tune with the 
theory of SEF (Seuring, 2009), where quality enhancement, waste elimination, and 
inventory reduction are significant techniques to keep the even flow.   
The second theory is VUB proposed by Stratton (2008). The theory of VUB was 
developed from the theory of SEF. VUB supports that low evenness of flow in operations 
reduces productivity and thus degrades financial performance. However, VUB stresses 
that supply chain strategies should encompass the operations trade-off between cost-
efficiency and availability (i.e., meeting market demand) (Stratton, 2008). VUB discusses 
the need to respond to a dynamic market by strategic buffering while continuously 
keeping the even flow in operations. The rapid changes in markets make the disruptions 
to the even flow of supply chain operations unavoidable (Craighead et al., 2007). For 
example, the increasing market demand for sustainability in the 21st century has been 
pressuring firms to substantially change their operational processes (Seuring & Müller, 
2008). While firms should make efforts to reduce the variability and improve speed as 
SEF suggests, there are always residual variation and uncertainty such as these 
unavoidable disruptions to the even flow of operations (Stratton, 2008). Firms should 
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strategically identify the operation trade-offs (e.g., costs and availability). The continuous 
reduction of variability (e.g., overproduction and inventory) may reduce the costs but also 
firms’ ability to cope with variation and uncertainty of market demands. Firms should 
continuously maintain swift and even flow in operations. However, buffer mechanisms 
(e.g., spare inventory and capacity) should be built to enable the trade-off balance 
between cost-efficiency and availability (Stratton, 2012). Strategic buffering reduces the 
disruptions caused by variation and uncertainty, thus facilitating the even flow of 
operations. Firms are able to continuously meet the market demands, which mitigates the 
negative impact of the disruptions on financial performance.  
In summary, VUB supports the premise of SEF that variation and uncertainty cause 
disruptions to even flow in operations, and thus degrade financial performance. VUB 
further emphasizes that financial performance is protected from these disruptions through 
the use of buffering mechanisms.   
The theory of SEF and VUB are important in this research. Sustainability requires 
firms to improve their environmental and social performance in addition to ordinary 
business activities (Hall, 2000; Tachizawa & Wong, 2015). The stakeholder demand for 
sustainability thus increases the variation and certainty in supply chain operations. Unless 
a great scale of additional benefits can be generated by sustainable operations, in light of 
the theories of SEF and VUB, sustainable operations create disruptions to even flow of 
operations, thus undermining firms’ financial performance.  
VUB suggests that financial performance can be protected by buffering mechanisms. 
The market demand for sustainability creates a disruption to the even flow of operations. 
The firms that have strategically adopted buffering mechanisms can utilize the spare 
resources (e.g., additional inventory and capacity), mitigating the impact of the 
disruptions to the even flow. Thus, the firms are able to continuously meet market 
demands, which offsets the negative impact on financial performance caused by 
sustainable operations.  
Sustainability has been widely extended to firms’ supply chains (Touboulic & Walker, 
2015). In a dyadic relationship, suppliers are mandated by their buyers to improve 
environmental and social performance through supply chain sustainability management 
(SCSM). SCSM is an additional transaction term in buyer-supplier relationships 
(Tachizawa & Wong, 2015). SCSM is expected to increase the variation and uncertainty 
and thus disrupt the even flow of suppliers’ operations in line with the theories of SEF 
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and VUB. The buffering mechanisms adopted by suppliers can effectively mitigate the 
negative impact of disruption as suggested by VUB.  
2.2.3.4 The relationships among the used theories 
Multiple theories are used in this research to explain different aspects of SCSM. This 
section discusses the interweaving of these theories and clarifies their relevance to this 
research.  
Stakeholder theory provides a theoretical background to understand the stakeholder 
pressure for sustainability at the supply chain level. Specifically, in dyadic relationships, 
the stakeholders that require sustainable operations have different power, legitimacy, and 
urgency over each of the buyers and suppliers. Additional forces are required to transfer 
this stakeholder pressure in the supply chains, where the governance of buyers increases 
suppliers’ compliance with the supply chain sustainability practices. Thus, stakeholder 
theory provides the understanding of the role of governance for buyers and compliance 
for suppliers in the procurement/purchasing perspective of SCSM. The difference in role 
between supply chain dyads requires this research to focus on different sets of operational 
strategies in the analysis of buyers and suppliers.  
Grounded on this generic background through stakeholder theory, the theory of SEF 
supports the analysis of financial performance of buyers and suppliers. SEF suggests that 
the compliance with additional environmental and social operational requirements 
disrupts the suppliers’ even flow, and consequently increases the variabilities in buyers’ 
operations with a detrimental financial impact. The theory of VUB supplements the 
theory of SEF; when the disruption to the even flow is inevitable, buffering mechanisms 
can protect firms from financial loss. The theory of VUB supports the exploration of slack 
resources in the SCSM context.  
Buyer’s governance ensures the suppliers’ compliance with sustainability practices. 
TCE provides a theoretical lens to understand the relationships between different 
governance mechanisms and financial performance. RDT complements TCE by 
understanding the power perspective in dyadic relationships. Power imbalance influences 
the firms’ governance in the relationships, and thus changes the financial performance.  
The application of these interwoven theories strengthens this research to develop the 
hypotheses from a more complete theoretical frame relating to SCSM. In the next section, 
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SCSM will be discussed in detail as the background, leading to the analysis of financial 
performance for buyers and suppliers in the SCSM context.  
2.3 Supply chain sustainability management  
Firms’ operations are bounded by supply chains; traditional operational performance 
(e.g., cost, quality, flexibility, and delivery) is dependent on the integration of the 
operations of supply chain partners (Vachon & Klassen, 2006). A firm’s sustainability 
operations and performance, therefore, depend on how their supply chain partners operate 
in a sustainable manner (Tate et al., 2012). Increasing environmental and social 
misconducts have been disclosed on the suppliers’ side, which raises stakeholders’ and 
thus firms’ concerns about sustainability issues in supply chains. Moreover, “real” 
sustainability should not be only in the products that are sold to consumers but also 
contained in the process by which the products are manufactured. A shirt that is woven 
from sustainably grown cotton may be promoted by a buyer as a sustainable garment, 
even though it was sewn by a Bangladeshi supplier under highly unsustainable conditions 
(Busse, 2016). Therefore, sustainability must be conducted and studied in the supply 
chain context, which encourages the integration of sustainability into SCM research.  
SCM literature has been well-developed due to its evolvement from established 
operations research and supply chain practices. It provides a theoretical background to 
integrate sustainability issues, and thus develops SCSM (Ashby et al., 2012). SCSM is a 
relatively new research field; the earliest publication is around the beginning of the 21st 
century (Carter & Easton, 2011). However, the interest in SCSM has been growing 
rapidly over the years due to the increasing understanding of sustainability issues in the 
supply chain context (Zailani et al., 2012).  
A prominent SCSM work is the study of Carter and Rogers (2008), which used a 
conceptual theory building approach to present a theoretical framework of SCSM. This 
framework was conceptualized with TBL and focuses on the interaction of 
environmental, social, and economic/financial performance in SCM. Importantly, Carter 
and Rogers (2008) illustrated the tangible actions and four supporting facets of SCSM. 
The examples of these tangible actions that fall in TBL include cost saving on reduced 
packaging, reuse, and recycling, lower health and safety costs due to improved working 
conditions, reduced labor costs in the form of higher motivation and productivity, shorter 
lead-time, improved product quality, lower disposal costs resulting from environmental 
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management systems, and enhanced organizational reputation from environmental and 
social engagement (Carter & Easton, 2011; Carter & Rogers, 2008).  
The four supporting facets of SCSM discussed by Carter and Rogers (2008) are in 
Figure 2.3 and are summarized by Carter and Easton (2011, p. 49) as below:  
 strategy – holistically and purposefully identifying individual SCSM initiatives 
which align with and support the organizations’ overall sustainability strategy;  
 risk management – contingency planning for both the upstream and 
downstream supply chains; 
 organizational culture – ingraining and encompassing organizational 
citizenship, and including high ethical standards and expectations along with 
respect for society and the natural environment; and 
 transparency – proactively engaging and communicating with key stakeholders 
and having traceability and visibility into upstream and downstream supply 
chain operations. 
 
Figure 2.3 Four Supporting Facets of SCSM (adapted from Figure 2 in Carter and 
Rogers [2008]) 
Based on this conceptualization of SCSM, Carter and Rogers (2008, p. 368) defined 
SCSM as,  
The strategic, transparent integration and achievement of an 
organization’s social, environmental, and economic goals in the 
systemic coordination of key inter-organizational business processes 
for improving the long-term economic performance of the individual 
company and its supply chains.  
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This definition integrates some of the key theoretical perspectives into a 
comprehensive framework for SCSM, which can be tested in different contexts 
(Touboulic & Walker, 2015). 
Carter and Rogers (2008) defined SCSM in a very broad way. The different 
orientations and functions of SCSM (e.g., actor, process, and relation) are covered in the 
definition, possibly because of the broad scope that SCSM originates from (Ashby et al., 
2012). Researchers have commonly adopted this theoretical framework and subsequently 
focused on some of the specific aspects in SCSM. Touboulic and Walker (2015) 
distinguished two major perspectives in defining SCSM: the supply chain perspective and 
the procurement/purchasing perspective. The supply chain perspective of SCSM focuses 
on supply chain management for sustainable products (Seuring & Müller, 2008), 
indicating a focus on the closed-loop, life cycle analysis, and reverse logistics angle of 
SCSM (Ashby et al., 2012). In contrast, the procurement/purchasing perspective 
emphasizes supplier management in terms of the risks and the performance of 
sustainability (Seuring & Müller, 2008). This research focuses on the 
procurement/purchasing perspective of SCSM. 
2.3.1 The procurement/purchasing perspective of SCSM  
The procurement/purchasing perspective of SCSM focuses on buyers’ management of 
their suppliers’ environmental and social performance. Buyers develop supplier 
evaluation schemes which integrate environmental and social criteria (Seuring & Müller, 
2008). Following Giunipero et al. (2012) and  Pagell et al. (2010), the present research 
defines SCSM from the procurement/purchasing perspective as “the management of all 
activities of the upstream components of a supply chain to maximize TBL performance, 
particularly through the selection, evaluation, and development of the supply base.”   
This definition illustrates new elements in the procurement/purchasing, suggests the 
important role of management on the supply base in TBL, and provides techniques for 
implementing SCSM. Historically, managers have focused almost exclusively on 
economic value when managing upstream components of the supply chains (Giunipero 
et al., 2012). However, the introduction of TBL changes the relationship of business firms 
with the natural environment and society. Managers are required to consider 
environmental and social values in procurement/purchasing in addition to economic 
value. Moreover, if the supply base is not incorporated, the buyers’ pursuit of TBL 
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performance is less likely to succeed and increases sustainability-related risks (e.g., 
reputation damage), because the components/material management is important in the 
process-sustainability that represents the truly sustainable development (Busse, 2016). 
Furthermore, this definition provides a clear set of techniques to implement SCSM from 
the procurement/purchasing perspective. The supplier selection, supplier evaluation, and 
supplier development are three processes in managing sustainability in the supply base 
(Zimmer et al., 2016). The three processes are independent but interrelated and thus 
provide multiple methods of managing the components of upstream supply chains.   
This research focuses on the procurement/purchasing perspective of SCSM. A firm’s 
sustainability efforts will not be successful without integrating goals with purchasing 
activities (Miemczyk et al., 2012). The implementation of SCSM beyond firms’ own 
boundary to their suppliers may have a high level of complexity and difficulty (Giunipero 
et al., 2012). The study of SCSM from a procurement/purchasing perspective of SCSM 
explores the relational aspects of SCSM (e.g., supplier relationships), which have been 
limited in the SCSM research (Ashby et al., 2012). This research attempts to cover the 
gap in the literature by studying SCSM from the procurement/purchasing perspective.  
Seuring and Müller (2008) discussed that one objective that buyers have when 
adopting SCSM is the avoidance of sustainability-related risk. In the next section, the 
present research uses stakeholder theory and RDT as theoretical lenses to explain what 
risk buyers try to avoid by adopting SCSM. Also, this research extends the discussions 
on the motives of SCSM adoption from suppliers’ perspective and explains why suppliers 
comply with their buyers’ SCSM, illustrating the systematic approach of SCSM.  
2.3.2 Transfer of stakeholder pressure on sustainability to 
suppliers – stakeholder theory and RDT in SCSM  
Firms without pressure may be hesitant to invest in sustainability because the 
investment does not necessarily improve their financial performance (Hall, 2000). 
Stakeholder pressure as discussed in stakeholder theory (section 2.1.3) is considered as 
the main driver of firms’ commitment to sustainability (Hoejmose & Adrien-Kirby, 
2012), which acquires firms’ stakeholder legitimacy and thus avoid damage to financial 
performance (Fan & Lo, 2012). Therefore, sustainability, to a large extent, is a response 
to stakeholder pressure (Lee et al., 2014).  
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However, stakeholder pressure on sustainability can vary greatly from one tier of the 
supply chain to the next (Busse, 2016; Schmidt et al., 2017). Upstream suppliers may not 
be exposed to the same type and extent of pressure as downstream buyers (Hall, 2000).  
By applying stakeholder theory and RDT in the supply chain context as theoretical 
lenses, the present research discusses that the stakeholder pressure on sustainability is 
transferred by buyers from downstream stakeholders to upstream suppliers, where buyers 
avoid supply chain sustainability risk imposed by their downstream stakeholders. This 
transfer of stakeholder pressure in supply chains creates a systematic approach effectively 
operationalizing SCSM (Hall, 2000). The next sections discuss this systematic approach 
of SCSM in detail.  
2.3.2.1 The difference in stakeholder pressure on sustainability between 
buyers and suppliers  
In the SCSM context, primary stakeholder pressures are mostly from the downstream 
supply chain at the ‘point of sales’ (e.g., end consumers, NGOs, and regulators), or 
‘downstream stakeholders’ (Seuring & Müller, 2008). Buyers (e.g., original equipment 
manufacturer [OEM], distributor, retailers) are positioned in the downstream supply chain 
close to the point of sales (discussed in section 2.2.1). Buyers, therefore, are under a high 
level of stakeholder pressure to commit to sustainability, as the commitment ensures 
buyers’ legitimacy and thus continuous sales in the end markets (Hall, 2000). 
From suppliers’ perspective, there are two categories of stakeholders. The primary 
stakeholders are buyers. Buyers have contractual relationships with suppliers. This 
relationship is important for suppliers to create business success. Any failure of adherence 
to the buyers’ demands may create contractual losses (Busse, 2016). 
The secondary stakeholders to suppliers are the actors in the downstream supply chains 
at the ‘point of sales’ (e.g., end consumers and NGOs) (Foerstl et al., 2015). Due to the 
positions in the upstream supply chains, suppliers rarely have direct contact with the point 
of sales, and therefore have a low profile at the end markets. The secondary stakeholders, 
thus, have a low level of stakeholder legitimacy and power from suppliers’ perspective 
as suggested by descriptive stakeholder theory (section 2.1.3). Suppliers, in turn, have 
few incentives to meet the requests from these secondary stakeholders. Consequently, the 
stakeholder pressure on sustainability without additional force is exposed at a low level 
to suppliers, as the pressure is primarily from the suppliers’ secondary stakeholders. 
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Additionally, government regulations have been historically targeted at buyers; suppliers 
have little regulatory pressure (Lee et al., 2014; Schmidt et al., 2017). However, the 
concern with “supply chain sustainability risk” develops buyers’ motivations to add force 
and transfer the sustainability responsibilities to their suppliers. 
2.3.2.2 Supply chain sustainability risk to buyers 
The supply chain sustainability risk is defined as the risk that buyers’ downstream 
stakeholders could punish buyers because of their suppliers’ poor sustainability 
performance (Busse, 2016). These downstream stakeholders hold the buyer accountable 
for its suppliers’ sustainable operations because of buyers’ high profile at the point of 
sales (Hofmann et al., 2014). The punishment can be the withdrawal of important 
resources from buyers (e.g., stopping buying products) or costly legal obligations (Foerstl 
et al., 2010).  
Two forces contribute to the supply chain sustainability risk. First, buyers’ operations 
are largely outsourced to suppliers. The outsourced or purchased materials and 
components from suppliers constitute the majority of value-added production in the 
buyers’ operations (Duan et al., 2000). Thus, a buyer’ s truly sustainable development is 
primarily a function of the sustainable operations that the suppliers engage with (Tate et 
al., 2012). Moreover, in recent years, societal awareness of suppliers’ sustainability has 
been raised by the disclosure of many suppliers’ environmental and social misconducts, 
such as in the Rana Plaza disaster (Jacobs & Singhal, 2017). Buyers have higher visibility 
of these misconducts relative to their downstream stakeholders, due to the supply chain 
positions. These facts increase stakeholder pressure on buyers’ engagement in their 
suppliers’ sustainable operations.  
Second, buyers, in general, are more powerful than suppliers (see section 2.2.3.1) and 
suppliers’ primary stakeholder (see section 2.3.2.1). As discussed in RDT (see section 
2.2.3.1), buyers’ power enables them to make positive changes to the perspective of the 
sustainable operations in their supply chains. Buyers are able to influence suppliers’ 
operations by using purchasing power; suppliers are willing to comply with buyers’ 
mandates to retain the legitimacy in the relationships. Thus, buyers are capable of shaping 
their suppliers’ sustainability performance through SCSM practices at their discretion 
(Busse, 2016).  
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Buyers’ downstream stakeholders perceive the legitimacy and power of buyers’ 
management of their suppliers’ sustainable operations and thus hold buyers accountable 
for their suppliers’ sustainability performance by imposing the supply chain sustainability 
risk (Caniëls et al., 2013). Supply chain sustainability risk creates a substantial cost to 
buyers (Hajmohammad & Vachon, 2016; Hofmann et al., 2014). These costs can be actual 
monetary costs due to the adverse publicity and lasting damage to buyers’ brand and its 
trading revenue (Zorzini et al., 2015), opportunity costs, such as unrealized profits 
resulting from lost revenue (Busse, 2016), and most importantly, capital costs in the stock 
market due to investors’ risk aversion (Wood et al., 2018).  
Buyers, in turn, adopt SCSM to improve their suppliers’ environmental and social 
performance, which avoids the supply chain sustainability risk. The assessment, audit, 
and evaluation of suppliers’ sustainability performance can diminish the probability of 
suppliers’ sustainability misconducts and prevent the contagion effect on buyers’ 
credibility. Buyers are less prone to an outcry of negligence on supply chain sustainability 
issues, and therefore, lower the costs of dealing with their downstream stakeholders 
(Cruz, 2009; Foerstl et al., 2010). 
In summary, the systematic approach of SCSM is built by buyers’ transfer of 
stakeholder pressure on sustainability from downstream stakeholders to upstream 
suppliers (Hall, 2000). Figure 2.4 visualizes the systematic approach of SCSM. It has 
been consistently found that buyers’ SCSM is the most effective approach to improving 
supply chain environmental and social performance (Busse, 2016; Hall, 2000; Lee et al., 
2014; Touboulic et al., 2014). The lack of pressure and incentives is the main limitation 
for decision making on SCSM for upstream suppliers. The stakeholder pressure on 
sustainability and buyers’ power are two forces that work interactively to overcome the 
problem (van Hoof & Lyon, 2013).  
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Figure 2.4 Transfer of Stakeholder Pressure for Sustainability in the Supply Chains  
SCSM is operated and maintained by different practices which aim at specific 
environmental or social performance. The effectiveness of SCSM from the perspective 
of environmental and social performance is ensured by governance mechanisms. In the 
next sections, SCSM dimensions, (i.e., environmental and social), practices, and 
governance mechanisms will be introduced, which provides background information to 
develop the hypothesized relationships with financial performance.  
2.3.3 SCSM dimensions  
TBL consists of three dimensions of sustainability: environmental, social, and 
economic/financial performance (Marshall & Toffel, 2005). SCSM extends TBL by 
including the improvement of these three dimensions in a supply chain context (Carter & 
Rogers, 2008). Financial performance is firms’ primary business objective (Jeurissen, 
2000). The SCSM literature primarily focuses on environmental and social dimensions 
and the links of these two dimensions to financial performance (Hoejmose & Adrien-
Kirby, 2012; Seuring & Müller, 2008; Touboulic & Walker, 2015). In line with the 
literature, this research focuses on the financial performance of the firms that adopt SCSM 
to improve supply chain environmental and social performance. Thus, with regards to 
SCSM dimensions, the focus is on the environmental and social dimension.  
The social dimension of SCSM in this research is based on the study of Zorzini et al. 
(2015) and includes the following:  
Chapter 2 Literature Review 
39 
 human rights and labor conditions, such as child and forced labor, working 
hours, and freedom of association; 
 workplace safety, such as the provision of safe working environments and 
occupation health management systems; 
 diversity and equity in employment, such as minority/female employment; 
 animal welfare concerns, such as cage-free eggs, gestation crate-free pork; 
 social impact on customers, such as food safety, level of hazardous chemicals 
contained in products; 
 respect for local democratic intuitions, such as conflict-free smelters (requiring 
smelter suppliers to be certified not to source minerals from Democratic 
Republic of Congo, where the financial resources may be used to fund armed 
groups in a civil war). 
The environmental dimension of SCSM has been widely studied in the SCSM 
literature (Miemczyk et al., 2012; Tate et al., 2012; Vachon & Klassen, 2006). This 
research focuses on the following:  
 pollution prevention, such as air or water pollution-control activities; 
 the measure and control of energy consumption/carbon emission/green-house-
gas;  
 recycling/reusing of materials, components, and waste; 
 hazardous/restricted materials elimination/reduction; 
 deforestation prevention; 
 packaging reduction; 
There is general agreement that the SCSM is mostly environmental-based while there 
is a deficit on the social dimension of SCSM (Ashby et al., 2012; Hoejmose et al., 2013; 
Miemczyk et al., 2012; Seuring & Müller, 2008; Touboulic & Walker, 2015; Walker et 
al., 2012). There are two reasons the SCSM literature is fragmented, particularly on 
environmental SCSM.  
First, environmental SCSM has been developed over the years, where tangible, mature, 
and diverse measures/practices of environmental elements have been attained (Ashby et 
al., 2012; Miemczyk et al., 2012). These well-developed measures/practices encourage 
researchers and practitioners to explore environmental SCSM. Second, environmental 
and social dimensions of SCSM have different attributes in the supply chain context. 
Supply chain operations have a product focus, and thus are environmental in nature 
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(Miemczyk et al., 2012). Adding environmental elements in operations (e.g., 
recyclability) is more likely to change the physical materials flow in supply chains than 
social elements (e.g., workplace safety). Multiple environmental SCSM elements are 
embedded in products/production; this close link to the daily-operations increases 
managers’ interest in the environmental dimension of SCSM. The social dimension of 
SCSM, however, has not specifically identified its influence on product 
specification/development, order fulfillment, inventory management (Miemczyk et al., 
2012).  
The different attributes between the environmental and the social dimension of SCSM 
in supply chains create different impacts on firms’ operations and thus on their financial 
performance when firms adopt SCSM. In this research, this difference in financial 
performance (for both buyers and suppliers) will be analyzed, providing a strategic choice 
that buyers can adopt in their SCSM,  while identifying business risks that suppliers need 
to deal with in their SCSM compliance. Detailed discussions will be presented in section 
2.5.1.6 from the buyers’ perspective and 2.5.2.3 from the suppliers’ perspective.  
2.3.4 SCSM practices and governance mechanisms 
SCSM practices are the additional requirements regarding sustainability issues in 
buyers’ purchasing of inputs on top of traditional criteria (e.g., cost, quality, speed, and 
flexibility) (Zailani et al., 2012). The following SCSM practices are summarized 
according to the literature (Miemczyk et al., 2012; Tate et al., 2012; Zailani et al., 2012; 
Zorzini et al., 2015):  
 supplier auditing, monitoring, evaluating, assessing: buyers audit, monitor, 
evaluate, assess suppliers’ operations to determine their level of compliance 
with environmental and/or social conditions; 
 production/product labeling or disclosure: buyers require suppliers to disclose 
the environmental or safety attributes in production (e.g., carbon emission) or 
in the product (i.e., the use of unsafe paint in toys); 
 product content restriction: buyers specify that purchased products must not 
contain undesirable attributes, such as hazardous chemicals; 
 recyclable or reusable materials/components: buyers specify that purchasing 
products must have desirable recyclable or reusable attributes; 
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 sustainability management system: buyers require suppliers to develop 
environmental/social management systems to reduce, for example, the energy 
use/pollution or ensure workplace safety, where the management systems can 
be required to be either certified by third-party organizations or evaluated by 
the buyers; 
 supplier selection criteria: buyers select only to purchase from suppliers that 
can meet certain environmental and social conditions.  
While these SCSM practices are in place, there is uncertainty about their effectiveness 
in improving supply chain environmental and/or social performance (Tachizawa & 
Wong, 2015). Suppliers may have low commitments to these practices, and perform 
opportunism as discussed in TCE (see section 2.2.3.2). Bounded rationality restricts the 
buyers’ awareness of their suppliers’ commitment to these SCSM practices. 
Opportunistic propensities in the inter-organizational relationship indicate that suppliers 
are highly likely to perform opportunism if there is no control on the commitments to 
these SCSM practices (Jiang, 2009b). Buyers commonly adopt governance mechanisms 
to ensure suppliers’ commitment to SCSM practices. Thus these practices can effectively 
be used to improve supply chain environmental and social performance (Gimenez & 
Tachizawa, 2012).  
2.3.4.1 SCSM governance mechanisms to ensure the improvement of 
environmental and social performance 
In the SCSM context, two broad types of SCSM governance mechanisms are market 
governance and relational governance (Jiang, 2009a). There are different terms used in 
the literature in the typology of the SCSM governance mechanism, such as assessment 
and collaborative (Gimenez & Sierra, 2013; Gimenez & Tachizawa, 2012), formal and 
informal (Tachizawa & Wong, 2015), buyer-to-supplier and peer-to-peer (Jiang, 2009b), 
and assessment and development (Foerstl et al., 2010). These terms, in general, represent 
the same attributes as market governance and relational governance. Market governance 
is the “structural arrangements designed to influence the behaviors of trading partners in 
an explicit way, which explicitly specifies the expected roles, responsibilities, processes, 
and output standards and is often based on hierarchical controls” (Tachizawa & Wong, 
2015, p. 22). Market governance is standardized and straightforward. It relies on 
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administrative authority and thus does not require significant investments from the buyers 
enforcing these SCSM practices (Jiang, 2009a).  
 Relational governance represents “the structure arrangement designed to influence the 
behaviors of trading partners based on social control and trust” (Tachizawa & Wong, 
2015, p. 22). Buyers collaborate with suppliers to improve environmental and social 
performance. Relational governance requires buyers’ significant investments in their 
SCSM (Gimenez & Sierra, 2013). Some of the buyers’ investment may turn to asset-
specific investments (Jiang, 2009a).  
This research focuses on market governance. Buyers are most likely to use market 
governance in their SCSM (Hoejmose & Adrien-Kirby, 2012). Market governance 
creates low costs to the buyers that manage their suppliers’ SCSM compliance relative to 
relational governance (Jiang, 2009a). Also, buyers, in general, have higher supply chain 
power than their suppliers (Kim & Wemmerlöv, 2015). Therefore, buyers are able to 
mandate their suppliers’ compliance by hierarchical controls through market governance.  
Gimenez and Sierra (2013) found that market governance is an enabler of relational 
governance. Assessment and evaluation by using market governance enable buyers to 
gain the identification of suppliers’ commitment to SCSM and the sustainability 
knowledge in designing their SCSM (Foerstl et al., 2010). The study on market 
governance as the most commonly used governance provides practical business 
strategies.  
Two most common mechanisms of market governance are third-party certification and 
code of conduct (Gimenez & Tachizawa, 2012; Hoejmose & Adrien-Kirby, 2012). 
Buyers and suppliers have a different scale of engagement when these two governance 
mechanisms are used. In this research, these two governance mechanisms are discussed 
in link with buyers’ and suppliers’ financial performance. Detailed discussions will be 
given in sections 2.5.1.4 and 2.5.2.4 respectively.  
In general, SCSM governance mechanisms ensure the improvement of supply chain 
environmental and social performance, while the scale of the improvement may vary 
between governance mechanisms (Foerstl et al., 2015; Gimenez & Sierra, 2013; 
Tachizawa & Wong, 2015). In the definitions of broad SCSM given by Carter and Rogers 
(2008) (see section 2.3) and SCSM from the procurement/purchasing perspective (see 
section 2.3.1), this improvement of environmental and social performance is predicted to 
increase firms’ financial performance. However, there remains debate in the SCSM 
literature over the value of SCSM from the financial performance perspective (Pagell & 
Chapter 2 Literature Review 
43 
Shevchenko, 2014). The next section will discuss the financial performance in SCSM, 
leading to the focus of this research.  
2.3.5 The financial performance in SCSM 
It remains uncertain if financial performance improves with the adoption of SCSM. 
The synergy of TBL has been largely discussed in the SCSM studies, where the firms 
(both buyers and suppliers) are predicted to improve financial performance when they 
adopt SCSM to improve environmental and social performance (Carter & Rogers, 2008; 
Golicic & Smith, 2013; Schmidt et al., 2017; Seuring & Müller, 2008). However, there 
has been a lack of consistent empirical evidence to support firms’ positive financial 
performance in SCSM (Dam & Petkova, 2014; Wang & Sarkis, 2013; Wu & Pagell, 2011). 
Pagell and Shevchenko (2014) discussed that previous research has often focused on the 
synergy of TBL while overlooking trade-offs. Pagell and Shevchenko (2014) discussed 
from a theoretical perspective the reason that the literature has often proposed the synergy 
of TBL. Addressing the positive impact of environmental and social issues on financial 
performance is a way to gain the legitimacy of the SCSM field, where it is assumed that 
such business actions regarding environmental and social issues often harm financial 
performance (Pagell & Shevchenko, 2014). There has been a long debate and thus an 
uncertainty on the financial performance relating to SCSM (Hall, 2000; Hoejmose & 
Adrien-Kirby, 2012; Pagell & Shevchenko, 2014; Touboulic & Walker, 2015). This 
uncertainty seems to indicate that the assumption of synergy is unlikely to be realistic.  
Pagell and Shevchenko (2014) discussed the possible trade-off with financial 
performance in SCSM using the theoretical lens of stakeholder theory. Sustainability 
research is grounded in stakeholder theory, where firms’ adoption of SCSM is in response 
to their stakeholders’ requests (as discussed in section 2.3.2). However, stakeholder 
theory does not predicate the introduction of environmental and social practices based on 
firms’ positive financial impact (Pagell & Shevchenko, 2014). Supply chains often have 
no choice but to adopt environmental and social practices to satisfy the demand and needs 
of their stakeholders, such as NGOs, governments, and environmental/social-conscious 
consumers (Monika, Jonatan, & Lydia, 2012; Pagell & Shevchenko, 2014; Wu & Pagell, 
2011). These stakeholders are not interested in financial performance in the supply chains 
but rather focus on the supply chain impact on society and the natural environment (Wu 
& Pagell, 2011). There may exist a trade-off in TBL, where financial performance may 
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not be ensured following the adoption of SCSM and its emphasis on improving 
environmental and social performance. SCSM studies have solely focused on the synergy 
of TBL and provided limited insight into what to do when a trade-off is required, resulting 
in greater business risk to the firms in practice (Pagell & Shevchenko, 2014).  
There are studies that support the congruence between lean and green (i.e., 
environmental management) (Hajmohammad et al., 2013; King & Lenox, 2001), 
discussing how the pursuit of waste minimization is the common goal for lean and green 
and the profits of going green. However, this connection relies on the link of lean 
management with cost reduction; the primary reason for firms to implement the initiatives 
of ‘green-lean’ is to reduce costs (Drohomeretski et al., 2014). While these green-lean 
initiatives have some environmental benefits, they are not in the context of SCSM, where 
stakeholder pressure on environmental performance is the primary reason for both buyers 
and their suppliers to engage sustainable operations as discussed in section 2.3.2. There 
is, therefore, a gap between lean and environmental management in SCSM (Kumar et al., 
2016). For example, waste is considered differently in SCSM and lean (Johansson & 
Sundin, 2014). While lean considers unnecessary activities as waste and advocates the 
standardization in processes to reduce waste, SCSM focuses on reducing physical wastes 
to the natural environment and requires additional activities to be undertaken (e.g., 
additional evaluation and changes of operations to reduce pollution) in product 
development process. Therefore, firms that use only a lean-green approach cannot fully 
meet their stakeholder demand in the SCSM context as SCSM often requires more 
disruptive changes that may go beyond merely ‘reducing wastes’ as lean focuses on. 
The present research critically discusses the trade-off with financial performance when 
buyers and suppliers adopt SCSM. While the buyers and the suppliers that adopt SCSM 
may have benefits (e.g., reputation and competitive advantages) (Golicic & Smith, 2013; 
Markley & Davis, 2007), there are also substantial costs relating to SCSM (e.g., 
transaction costs and the disruptions to the even flow of their operations) (Dam & 
Petkova, 2014; Wang & Sarkis, 2013). Will these costs outweigh benefits, leading to 
negative financial performance for buyers and their suppliers? What strategies that 
managers can adopt to balance the trade-off in SCSM? This research aims at answering 
these questions with empirical evidence, contributing to the SCSM research by revealing 
the financial performance in SCSM in a supply chain context (both buyers and suppliers) 
and providing business strategies for SCSM adoption and compliance, focusing on the 
nature of SCSM and firm-specific characteristics.  
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Transaction cost economics (TCE) is the mostly used theoretical lens in the analysis 
of the financial performance in SCSM, referring to the changes in transaction costs when 
SCSM is adopted. In the next section, the application of TCE in SCSM will be introduced.  
2.3.6 The application of transaction cost economics in SCSM 
TCE has been widely applied to understand the relationship between financial 
performance and sustainability in the context of transactions (Touboulic & Walker, 
2015). SCSM is a transaction term in addition to the traditional conception of business in 
buyer-supplier relationships (Touboulic & Walker, 2015) and has different performance 
measures from traditional SCM (Tachizawa & Wong, 2015). The additional negotiation, 
inspection, and evaluation in supplying criteria based on environmental and social 
performance raise the transaction costs. These transaction costs include both direct costs 
of managing the relationship with additional supply criteria and opportunity costs driven 
from poor SCSM governance decisions (Gimenez & Sierra, 2013).  
TCE suggests that individual bounded rationality, opportunism, and asset specificity 
influence transactions costs, and firms should choose “make” or “buy” mechanism to 
economize transactions costs (Jiang, 2009b; Williamson, 1981). This bounded rationality 
is particularly high in SCSM. Environmental and social performance are different from 
traditional operational performance (e.g., quality, cost, speed, flexibility) in daily business 
activities (Tachizawa & Wong, 2015). Sustainability problems are commonly hidden in 
suppliers’ operations (Jacobs & Singhal, 2017). Thus, buyers often have the insufficient 
expertise and low visibility of sustainability issues in suppliers’ operations, leading to a 
high level of bounded rationality in managing suppliers’ compliance with SCSM, thus 
increasing transaction costs.  
Moreover, suppliers’ opportunism in their SCSM compliance may develop, where 
suppliers violate the pre-agreed environmental and/or social conditions in operations 
(Gimenez & Sierra, 2013). Buyers, however, have to bear substantial costs from the 
suppliers’ opportunistic behavior (e.g., supply chain sustainability risk), as downstream 
stakeholders hold buyers responsible for their suppliers’ sustainability performance.  
The suppliers’ opportunism in SCSM can be controlled through buyer monitoring, 
audit, assessment, and evaluation (Jiang, 2009a). Buyers may conduct plant visits to 
investigate the suppliers’ compliance with SCSM practices and provide training on 
SCSM guidelines. Suppliers may be required to validate SCSM compliance with self-
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reported documents or certification, while buyers may set pre-requisitions on 
sustainability conditions for selecting suppliers. Nonetheless, these efforts involve the 
buyers’ investment in human, financial, time, and technological resources to, for example, 
negotiate SCSM conditions, develop sustainability expertise, and identify compliant 
suppliers. Moreover, it is likely that some of the buyers’ investments in SCSM 
enforcement may turn out to be asset-specific (e.g., suppliers’ training and auditing 
efforts) (Jiang, 2009a). These investments refer to the transaction costs relating to SCSM 
(Hill, 1995). As discussed in TCE, buyers can keep ‘buying’ from suppliers while bearing 
the transaction costs, if these transaction costs are manageable, where the overall benefits 
of SCSM (e.g., reduction of supply chain sustainability risk and associated costs) 
outweigh these transaction costs. Nonetheless, if these transaction costs are substantially 
high, it is necessary to replace the buyer-supplier transactions with a formal hierarchy 
(Hill, 1995). For example, Unilever built a $100 million palm-oil plant in Indonesia to 
produce traceable and certified palm-oil, rather than enforce its suppliers to prevent 
deforestation caused by palm-oil production. The reason is that Unilever “struggles to 
keep tabs on where each batch of palm oil originates” (Evans, 2013, p. 1). 
Consequently, the effective management of transaction costs is important in SCSM. In 
this research, TCE is adopted as one theoretical lens to analyze the transaction costs in 
SCSM. These transaction costs are expected to influence the overall financial 
performance that buyers and suppliers may have in SCSM.  
2.3.6.1 Governance mechanisms and financial performance 
In section 2.3.4, it was discussed that SCSM governance mechanisms ensure the 
improvement of environmental and social performance. From the financial performance 
perspective, TCE suggests that the correct choice of governance mechanisms offer a way 
to minimize transaction costs (Grover & Malhotra, 2003). An effective SCSM 
governance mechanism ensures suppliers’ compliance and meanwhile reduces the 
associated transaction costs by curbing suppliers’ opportunism and reducing SCSM 
enforcement costs (Tachizawa & Wong, 2015). The scale of reducing suppliers’ 
opportunism and enforcement costs may vary between governance mechanisms that 
buyers adopt and thus influences buyers’ and suppliers’ financial performance in SCSM. 
This research focuses on two of the most common governance mechanisms: third-party 
certification and code of conduct (Hoejmose & Adrien-Kirby, 2012). In sections 2.5.1.4 
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and 2.5.2.4, these two governance mechanisms and their link with buyers’ and suppliers’ 
financial performance will be discussed in detail.  
An additional governance mechanism in the modern SCSM model is that a group of 
buyers collaboratively enforce SCSM on their suppliers. This governance mechanism is 
named ‘group SCSM’ in this research. This SCSM governance mechanism was briefly 
discussed by Carter and Rogers (2008) and Jacobs and Singhal (2017). However, the 
theoretical perspective and empirical evidence of group SCSM and its link with financial 
performance have not been provided in the literature. In this research, the discussions in 
the group purchasing literature are followed to analyze group SCSM (which is why this 
governance mechanism is named ‘group SCSM’ in this research) (Nollet & Beaulieu, 
2005; Sandberg & Mena, 2015; Tella & Virolainen, 2005). Group SCSM is a hybrid form 
between ‘buy’ and ‘make’, where buyers can manage the transaction costs of SCSM while 
remaining efficient in utilizing other critical resources in markets as independent firms 
(Hawkins et al., 2008; Tella & Virolainen, 2005). This hybrid form extends to TCE which 
provides the dichotomy between ‘buy’ and ‘make’. The findings on the effect of group 
SCSM enable this research to provide a theoretical contribution to TCE. Group SCSM 
will be discussed in detail regarding buyers’ and suppliers’ financial performance in 
sections 2.5.1.5 and 2.5.2.5 respectively.  
An additional theory used in the SCSM literature is the natural resource-based view 
(NRBV), which suggests the sources of competitive advantages may be developed from 
SCSM, and thus improve financial performance (Carter & Rogers, 2008; Hart, 1995; 
Touboulic & Walker, 2015). Nonetheless, the studies that have adopted NRBV show 
controversial findings on financial performance in relation to SCSM (e.g., Pullman et al.. 
2009; Schmidt et al., 2017; Vachon & Klassen, 2008). The next section will discuss the 
previous SCSM studies on buyers’ and suppliers’ financial performance and identify the 
research gaps. It will also present the research objectives and questions of this research.  
2.4 The research objectives and questions – the impact 
of SCSM on the financial performance in a supply 
chain context 
Prior sections introduced the background and theories of SCSM. In this section, the 
research objectives are introduced, focusing on the financial performance of both buyers 
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and suppliers in relation to SCSM. Previous studies have investigated firms’ financial 
performance in SCSM (mostly focus on buyers) (Dam & Petkova, 2014; Golicic & Smith, 
2013; Schmidt et al., 2017; Wang & Sarkis, 2013;  Zhu & Sarkis, 2004). However, the 
findings of these previous studies are contested, most likely due to the use of a perceptual 
measure and a small sample size, as well as their focus on single firms while SCSM is a 
supply chain practice influencing multiple firms (Carter & Easton, 2011). This research 
is designed to extend the literature, where objective measures and a relatively large 
sample are used, and the financial performance in SCSM is investigated in a supply chain 
context. Specifically, this research focuses on three groups of financial performance 
relating to SCSM. The first group is the financial performance of the buyers that adopt 
SCSM and who require their suppliers to improve their environmental and social 
performance. The second group is the suppliers that are required by their buyers to comply 
with SCSM. The third group is the different impacts of SCSM on the financial 
performance of the buyers and their paired suppliers. In the next sections, the research 
objectives relating to each group of financial performance will be introduced in detail by 
reviewing the literature.  
2.4.1 The buyers’ perspective on SCSM and their financial 
performance  
The first group is the financial performance from the perspective of buyers. The SCSM 
literature has widely studied buyers’ financial performance, but the findings remain 
contested (Dam & Petkova, 2014; Golicic & Smith, 2013; Schmidt et al., 2017; Wang & 
Sarkis, 2013). There are prior studies that have argued that SCSM has a positive impact 
on buyers’ financial performance (e.g., Pullman et al., 2009; Schmidt et al., 2017; Vachon 
& Klassen, 2008). These previous studies have mostly referred to NRBV theory.  
NRBV was developed from a classic resource-based view which identifies the 
properties of the resources that are required to develop firms’ competitive advantages: (i) 
valuable, (ii) having only a few substitutes, (iii), difficult to replicate (Vachon & Klassen, 
2008). NRBV illustrates the three strategies in the sustainability context that firms may 
adopt to create these resources (Hart, 1995; Pullman et al., 2009; Russo & Fouts, 1997; 
Vachon & Klassen, 2008). First, pollution prevention technologies imply more tacit 
knowledge through skill development and a “green” team, which creates casual 
ambiguity, and thus competitors may find it difficult to replicate. Second, product 
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sustainability management through life-cycle analysis and reserve logistics may create a 
web of information interaction and knowledge exchange between different stakeholders 
in the supply chain, which develops the product stewardship. Third, the innovation of 
cutting-edge technologies and the transfer of these technologies particular to emerging 
and developing economies can lead to sustainable development that is firm-specific.  
The findings of the studies that have adopted NRBV, however, provide an unclear 
impact of SCSM on buyers’ financial performance. These studies mostly used survey-
based methods. Schmidt et al. (2017) found positive financial performance when firms 
adopt environmental supply chain management. However, Pullman et al. (2009) found 
both social and environmental supply chain practices are not significantly related to 
buyers’ cost performance in the food industry. Vachon and Klassen (2008) found that 
environmental collaboration with suppliers (i.e., buyers working with suppliers to 
improve environmental performance) improves buyers’ operational performance by using 
a perceptual measure (i.e., cost, quality, delivery, flexibility). However, the authors found 
by using objective measures of buyers’ operating performance (i.e., scrap rate, on-time 
delivery, cycle time, and set-up time), three of the four measures were insignificant. 
Carter (2005) found an indirect relationship between purchasing social responsibility and 
buyers’ cost reduction, which is mediated by organizational learning.  
Further studies, where the authors did not rely on NRBV, do not reduce the ambiguity 
for buyers’ financial performance relating to SCSM. These studies have been mainly 
survey-based research. Carter et al. (2000) found that environmental purchasing is 
positively related to buyers’ net income and negatively related to the cost of goods sold. 
Hollos et al. (2012) found that buyers’ co-operation with suppliers on sustainability is not 
significantly related to buyers’ cost reduction and operational performance. Zailani et al. 
(2012) found that environmental purchasing has a positive effect on buyers’ economic 
and operational performance in Malaysia. Zhu et al. (2005) found that environmental 
supply chain practices do not improve buyers’ economic performance in Chinese 
manufacturing industries. Rao and Holt (2005), however, found green inbound (i.e., 
environmental purchasing from suppliers) increases buyers’ economic performance in 
South East Asia. By using case study, Worthington (2009) found that large purchasing 
organizations can benefit from supplier diversity practices, such as improved service 
delivery and better stakeholder relationships. However, by using event study 
methodology, Dam and Petkova (2014) found buyers’ negative financial performance 
when buyers adopt environmental supply chain management.  
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2.4.1.1 The reasons for the contested findings of buyers’ financial 
performance in SCSM 
Within the literature, the findings of buyers’ financial performance in SCSM have 
remained contested. These contested findings are mainly caused for two reasons as 
discussed below.  
First, the substantial costs are hardly analyzed in the studies that adopt NRBV. NRBV 
provides a conceptual framework that supports intangible resources such as sustainability 
know-how, culture, and reputation, which can also be strategic resources. However, the 
relationship between intangible resources and performance outcomes is often difficult to 
detect and causally ambiguous (Pullman et al., 2009). In particular, the huge costs relating 
to developing these intangible resources commonly outweigh the potential benefits. 
SCSM practices are not the same as these traditional operational practices used for 
assuring costs, quality, speed, and flexibility in a supply chain (Tachizawa & Wong, 
2015), which implies that SCSM will lead to variability in buyers’ operations and thus 
disrupt the even flow of their operations as suggested by the theory of SEF (discussed in 
section 2.2.3.3). Moreover, SCSM involves the management of suppliers’ operations. 
Buyers, however, do not always have visibility or accountability to their suppliers’ 
operations (Hendricks et al., 2017). In particular, sustainability problems are more hidden 
in operations than cost/quality/speed/flexibility issues, which increases buyers’ 
transaction costs in the inter-organizational relationship under the discussion of TCE 
(Gimenez & Sierra, 2013). Additionally, as SCSM focuses on process sustainability 
rather than product sustainability (Busse, 2016), it is questionable that the extent of SCSM 
practices can improve buyers’ reputation. It is likely that considerable costs may offset 
these benefits proposed by NRBV, while the studies adopting NRBV seems merely 
focusing on the benefits.  
Second and perhaps even more important, through the use of a systematic literature 
review, many scholars have found that the dominant methodologies in SCSM research 
are survey-based methods and case studies (Ashby et al., 2012; Carter & Easton, 2011; 
Hoejmose & Adrien-Kirby, 2012; Seuring & Müller, 2008; Touboulic & Walker, 2015); 
however, social desirability bias has rarely been addressed in these studies (Carter & 
Easton, 2011; Walker et al., 2012). In this context, social desirability bias refers to the 
use of perceptual measures (mainly in survey-based research and cases studies) to 
investigate sustainability issues, where the respondents may feel pressured to be 
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perceived in a socially acceptable way with regard to sustainability and the findings on 
financial performance may be more positive that they are in reality (Carter & Easton, 
2011; Walker et al., 2012). Carter and Easton (2011) found a large majority of survey-
based research does not assess social desirability bias or discuss the potential limitations 
associated with this bias. Social desirability bias was also not evaluated in the meta-
analysis by Golicic and Smith (2013), even though their finding of positive buyer 
financial performance in environmental supply chain management was largely based on 
survey-based research.  
Therefore, SCSM research requires the application of a methodology to objectively 
explore buyers’ financial performance, especially the associated costs of SCSM. The 
present research, therefore, uses event study methodology (Kothari & Warner, 2007) to 
investigate buyers’ financial performance in SCSM. Event study methodology estimates 
financial performance by using the stock market reaction to announcements. The 
announcements in this research are the SCSM announcements made by buyers that 
require their suppliers to improve their environmental and social performance. The stock 
market reaction to the SCSM announcements is the component of the stock return of 
buyers adjusted for market factors (i.e., confounding factors), referred to as ‘abnormal 
return to the SCSM announcements’ (Wood & Wang, 2018). By using event study 
methodology, the findings in this research do not suffer social desirability bias. Also, the 
stock market reaction is a more encompassing measure than perceptual measures (e.g., 
by including intangible assets), where the holistic perspective that includes both the 
benefits and costs relating to SCSM is more likely to be captured (Dam & Petkova, 2014; 
Hendricks et al., 2017), leading to this research discovering the overall financial 
performance in SCSM.  
2.4.1.2 The influential factors in buyers’ financial performance in 
SCSM 
This research is designed to explore the factors that influence buyers’ financial 
performance, focusing on the nature of SCSM and firm-specific characteristics. Pagell 
and Shevchenko (2014) critically discussed that the present SCSM research remains 
focusing on searching for evidence of improved financial performance when firms adopt 
SCSM; however, SCSM research provides no insight into what to do when SCSM 
decreases financial performance. The influential factors to buyers’ financial performance 
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explored in this research can be provided as the business strategies to mitigate the 
negative impact of SCSM in business, thereby providing managers with insight on what 
to do when they face business risks caused by SCSM adoption.  
The factors relating to the nature of SCSM have been discussed in the SCSM literature 
in connection with environmental and social performance; however, they have not been 
widely explored in relation to buyers’ financial performance, such as buyers’ SCSM 
governance mechanisms (Tachizawa & Wong, 2015) and SCSM dimensions (Miemczyk 
et al., 2012). Group SCSM as a new SCSM model, where buyers collaborate in their 
SCSM mandates with their suppliers, has not been widely studied.  
The factors relating to firm-specific characteristics have not been widely studied in 
SCSM research in connection with buyers’ financial performance. SCSM is a supply 
chain practice (Touboulic & Walker, 2015). Thus the abilities of buyers’ coordination 
and control of their supply chain operations have substantial effects on the effectiveness 
of buyers’ SCSM and thus influence their financial performance (Dam & Petkova, 2014). 
This research focuses on buyers’ supplier relationship management (SRM) and growth 
prospects (buyers with high growth prospects are required to have a highly reliable and 
responsive supply chain [Fisher, 1997]).  
Dam and Petkova (2014) used event study methodology to investigate buyers’ 
financial performance in SCSM. However, they focused on a single environmental supply 
chain sustainability program with a small sample size (66 observations). Importantly, the 
factors that influence buyers’ financial performance in SCSM were not explored in their 
study. The present research extends their study with a relatively large sample and tests 
the impacts of influential factors on buyers’ financial performance. The first research 
objective, therefore, is,  
Research objective one: to investigate the impact of buyers’ SCSM on their 
financial performance, using objective measures.  
Research question 1.1: What is the impact of buyers’ SCSM on their financial 
performance?  
Research question 1.2: What factors influence this impact?  
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2.4.2 The suppliers’ perspective on SCSM and their financial 
performance 
The second group of financial performance in SCSM is suppliers’ financial 
performance. Suppliers are the firms that are required by their buyers to comply with 
SCSM. From suppliers’ perspective, previous SCSM studies have remained focused on 
how to manage suppliers’ compliance in SCSM (Caniëls et al., 2013; Hoejmose et al., 
2013; Touboulic et al., 2014) and how suppliers can improve their environmental and 
social performance (Foerstl et al., 2015; Giunipero et al., 2012). Suppliers’ financial 
performance in SCSM has not been widely studied.  
Multiple conceptual studies have emphasized the importance of suppliers’ 
commitment to the success of SCSM (Gimenez & Tachizawa, 2012; Hoejmose et al., 
2013; Seuring & Müller, 2008). However, suppliers’ commitment to SCSM is mostly 
motivated by its financial performance, or at least its non-detrimental impact on financial 
growth (Foerstl et al., 2015). The lack of empirical evidence on suppliers’ financial 
performance leads to uncertainty amongst suppliers’ managers on the business decisions 
regarding SCSM.  
Moreover, previous studies have mainly focused on the financial performance of single 
firms (i.e., buyers) in SCSM, providing a limited impact of SCSM in a supply chain 
context. SCSM is a supply chain practice (Touboulic et al., 2014). Focus on single firms 
in SCSM does not capture supply chain impact (Pagell & Shevchenko, 2014). In the 
SCSM context, buyers mandate their suppliers (Hall, 2000; Touboulic et al., 2014). 
Buyers’ positive financial performance may be caused by retaining the benefits (e.g., the 
reduction of supply chain sustainability risk), while letting their suppliers bear substantial 
costs in the process of mandates. The substantial costs of SCSM in supply chains can be 
overlooked if one assumes the positive financial performance in SCSM by merely relying 
on the finding from the buyers’ perspective. Carter and Easton (2011) and Pagell and 
Shevchenko (2014) called for studying SCSM at least in a dyadic relationship to explore 
the supply chain impact of SCSM.  
This research fills the gap in the literature by exploring suppliers’ financial 
performance when they are required to comply with their buyers’ SCSM. The clarity of 
suppliers’ financial performance provides insight into business risks that suppliers may 
have in their SCSM compliance. Also, the investigation of both buyers’ and suppliers’ 
financial performance answers the calls of Carter and Easton (2011) and Pagell and 
Chapter 2 Literature Review 
54 
Shevchenko (2014) by revealing the impact of SCSM in a supply chain context (with 
dyadic relationships).  
2.4.2.1 The influential factors in suppliers’ financial performance in 
SCSM 
This research is also designed to explore the factors that influence suppliers’ financial 
performance, focusing on the nature of SCSM and firm-specific characteristics. Since 
suppliers’ financial performance has not been widely examined, there is a lack of studies 
exploring the influential factors from suppliers’ perspective in SCSM research. This 
research fills this gap. These influential factors can be developed as suppliers’ strategies 
in SCSM to reduce the negative impact of SCSM on their financial performance, while 
also providing suppliers’ managers with insight into what they can do when they face the 
business risk caused by SCSM compliance. 
The factors relating to the nature of SCSM refer to SCSM governance mechanisms, 
SCSM dimensions, and group SCSM. Governance mechanisms and dimensions are the 
SCSM specifications of buyers in their suppliers’ compliance (Gimenez & Sierra, 2013; 
Jiang, 2009b). Suppliers are required to commit to different investments and change 
different elements in operations in various SCSM governance mechanisms and 
dimensions, suggesting different impacts on suppliers’ financial performance. Group 
SCSM indicates that suppliers are required to comply with SCSM that a group of buyers 
collaboratively enforce. The additional coercive force that group SCSM creates may 
result in more costs in suppliers’ compliance.  
The factors relating to firm-specific characteristics are supply chain power, operational 
slack, and financial slack. Supply chain power influences suppliers’ negotiation positions, 
thus the conditions in their compliance with buyers’ SCSM (Dabhilkar et al., 2015; 
Hoejmose et al., 2013; Touboulic et al., 2014). The associated transaction costs in the 
negotiation and compliance conditions are expected to influence suppliers’ financial 
performance in SCSM. Moreover, in SCSM compliance, suppliers are required to 
substantially change their operations by adding environmental and social elements into 
their manufacturing processes. While capital investment and resources are largely 
demanded (Giunipero et al., 2012), this change in operations creates a variability and thus 
disrupts the even flow of suppliers’ operations as suggested by the theory of 
SEF(discussed in section 2.2.3.3.). Thus, financial slack that provides capital resources 
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and buffering mechanisms in the form of operational slack in line with the theory of VUB 
(discussed in section 2.2.3.3.) may effectively reduce the costs that suppliers may have in 
SCSM.  
In their study, Schmidt et al. (2017) found that suppliers have a positive financial 
performance when implementing green supply chain practices (e.g., the design of 
disassembly, reuse, recycling of materials and environmental packaging). However, they 
focused on suppliers’ self-selected environmental practices. While these practices have 
some environmental impact, suppliers’ self-selected practices are more likely to be 
concerned with reducing costs. In this research, the focus is on the suppliers that are 
mandated by their buyers’ SCSM in line with the SCSM literature (Hall, 2000; Touboulic 
et al., 2014). The costs and benefits may be different between self-selected and buyer 
mandated practices. The finding in this research may provide a meaningful contrast with 
that of Schmidt et al. (2017) from a different focus.  
Moreover, perceptual measures were used in the study of Schmidt et al. (2017), 
without addressing social desirability bias in their study. The use of event study 
methodology enables the objective measures in this research, where suppliers’ abnormal 
return to their buyers’ SCSM announcements is used to estimates the suppliers’ financial 
performance in SCSM. The findings in this research do not suffer social desirability bias.  
Most importantly, this research explores the factors that influence suppliers’ financial 
performance in SCSM. A review of the literature has shown that there have been no such 
factors found in previous studies. This research contributes to the literature by providing 
knowledge of mitigating strategies that suppliers can have in their SCSM compliance. 
Therefore, the second research objective is, 
Research objective two: to investigate the impact of buyers’ SCSM on their 
suppliers’ financial performance by using objective 
measures, providing a supply chain impact of SCSM. 
Research question 2.1: What is the impact of buyers’ SCSM on their suppliers’ 
financial performance?  
Research question 2.2: What factors influence this impact?  
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2.4.3 The different impact of SCSM on buyers’ and suppliers’ 
financial performance 
The third group of financial performance that this research focuses on is the different 
impact of SCSM on the financial performance of buyers and their suppliers. The 
investigation on this difference in the financial performance further explores the supply 
chain impact of SCSM by identifying whether suppliers bear more costs as a result of 
their buyers’ shift of the costs in SCSM mandates.  
The exploration of the financial performance in SCSM is linked with the ‘green 
bullwhip effect’ (Lee et al., 2014). The green bullwhip effect indicates buyers distort the 
information of the requirements from downstream stakeholders to their suppliers by 
adding stringent practices and compressing the timeline of compliance. Buyers, therefore, 
create a buffer on the potential business risks (e.g., supply chain sustainability risks) that 
are caused by the delay in suppliers’ compliance. Suppliers, however, have to bear more 
costs due to this buffer, suggesting buyers’ shift of the costs to their suppliers. The green 
bullwhip effect is further supported by Seles et al. (2016).  
In this research, the buyers and their paired suppliers (i.e., direct trading partners in 
the same supply chain) were used to test the difference in financial performance in line 
with the green bullwhip effect (Lee et al., 2014; Seles et al., 2016). This research 
contributes to the literature by providing the first empirical evidence that buyers shift the 
costs to their suppliers in SCSM. Therefore, the third research objective is, 
Research objective three: to investigate the different impact of buyers’ SCSM 
on the financial performance of buyers and suppliers.  
Research question 3: Is there a difference in financial performance between 
buyers and their paired suppliers relating to buyers’ 
SCSM?  
This section discussed the research gaps in the SCSM literature, leading to the research 
objectives and questions in this research. In the next section, the research questions will 
be developed as hypotheses through reviewing the previous studies. The hypotheses 
testing will provide answers to the research questions and therefore achieve the research 
objectives.  
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2.5 Hypotheses development 
The supply chain positions of buyers and suppliers are different (i.e., downstream 
versus upstream). The nature of SCSM for buyers and suppliers is not the same (i.e., 
managing versus complying). Buyers and suppliers perceive SCSM and are affected in 
different ways. Therefore, the impacts of SCSM on buyers and suppliers are separately 
discussed in the next sections. Figure 2.5 gives an overview of this section. The financial 
performance and the influential factors in SCSM are first examined in relation to buyers 
and secondly to suppliers. Finally, the difference in the financial performance of buyers 
and suppliers is explored in connection with the green bullwhip effect.   
Suppliers  financial performance and 
influential factors in SCSM compliance
(Section 2.5.2)
Buyers  financial performance and 
influential factors in SCSM adoption
(Section 2.5.1)
Different financial performance of buyers 






Figure 2.5 Overview of the Hypotheses Development Section 
2.5.1 Buyers’ financial performance and influential factors in 
SCSM adoption 
This section focuses on developing the hypotheses regarding buyers’ financial 
performance in SCSM. Buyers’ negative financial performance is hypothesized. SCSM 
adds substantial transaction costs and disrupts the even flow of buyers’ operations. The 
associated costs are predicted to outweigh the potential benefits that buyers may have 
when they adopt SCSM. Section 2.5.1.1 develops the hypothesis of buyers’ negative 
financial performance in SCSM through the review of the relevant literature.  
There are factors that influence buyers’ negative financial performance. From buyers’ 
perspective, this research focuses on two categories of factors: the nature of SCSM and 
firm-specific characteristics. The factors relating to the nature of SCSM are SCSM 
governance mechanisms, the group SCSM approach (i.e., buyers’ collaboration in SCSM 
mandates), and the SCSM dimension (i.e., mandating the environmental or social 
dimension of SCSM). The factors regarding firm-specific characteristics are supplier 
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relationship management (SRM) and growth prospects. These factors are developed as 
strategies for mitigating the negative financial performance or analyzed as particular 
business risks that buyers need to deal with. Sections 2.5.1.2 – 2.5.1.6 present the 
hypotheses regarding these influential factors.  
2.5.1.1 The impact of SCSM adoption on buyers’ financial performance 
Buyers are pressured by their downstream stakeholder to adopt SCSM, which aims at 
improving suppliers’ environmental and social performance (Hall, 2000; Touboulic et al., 
2014). SCSM is additional to the traditional business activities that buyers primarily rely 
on to improve financial performance (Touboulic & Walker, 2015). In this research, 
SCSM is discussed as it represents an increase in buyers’ transaction costs and a 
disruption to the even flow of buyers’ operations. There are potential benefits to buyers 
that adopt SCSM, such as reputation, competitive advantages, and reduction of supply 
chain sustainability risk. However, these benefits are unlikely to offset the costs increased 
by SCSM adoption, which leads to hypothesizing the negative impact of SCSM on 
buyers’ financial performance.  
2.5.1.1.1 The increased transaction costs  
Buyers’ transaction costs are increased by the additional governance of environmental 
and social performance in buyer-supplier relationships. Currently, most supply chains are 
not sustainable from the perspective of environmental and social performance (Pagell & 
Shevchenko, 2014). Unsustainable conditions are mostly hidden in suppliers’ operations, 
and thus the problems may be invisible to buyers and suppliers (Busse, 2016). Buyers are 
required to make a great effort to upgrade their suppliers’ environmental and social 
performance. SCSM governance must be created by buyers to effectively improve 
suppliers’ environmental and social performance and meanwhile to curb suppliers’ 
opportunism in their SCSM compliances (Gimenez & Sierra, 2013). Buyers are required 
to undertake educational programs, set up teams to guide suppliers’ sustainability 
development, and to conduct screening, inspection, evaluation, and site visits (Rao & 
Holt, 2005). The SCSM governance requires additional expenses of time, human, and 
financial resources (Adobor & McMullen, 2014), which increases buyers’ transaction 
costs.  
These transaction costs cannot be offset in daily business activities. The traditional 
SCM governance that buyers use in daily business activities focus on the traditional 
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evaluation frame of supply chain performance (e.g., cost/speed/quality/flexibility). 
Environmental and social performance has different specifications from traditional 
supply chain performance (Tachizawa & Wong, 2015). Thus, the expertise of SCM 
buyers has developed in daily business activities with suppliers and cannot be effectively 
converted into SCSM governance to save these additional transaction costs. In turn, the 
additional transaction costs that are spent on developing SCSM expertise and governance 
cannot be effectively used to improve traditional supply chain performance that primarily 
contributes to buyers’ financial growth (Wu & Pagell, 2011).   
2.5.1.1.2 The disruption to the even flow of buyers’ operations 
The theory of swift, even flow (SEF, discussed in section 2.2.3.3) proposes that firms 
should keep even flow of their operations so that “each day of production resembles every 
other day of production” (Schmenner, 2015, p. 345). The even flow of operations can 
ensure productivity, which enables firms to meet the market demands with the lowest 
costs (Schmenner, 2001). Any variability in operations that disrupts firms’ even flow of 
operations degrades their financial performance (Stratton, 2008).  
SCSM adds environmental and social performance as supplying criteria in buyers’ 
supply chains, thus disrupting the even flow of buyers’ operations. SCSM requires 
substantial manufacturing and process changeovers in operations, which increases the 
variability of suppliers operational competence (e.g., flexibility, speed, costs, and 
delivery) that buyers require to keep competitive in the marketplaces (Dam & Petkova, 
2014; Handfield & Bechtel, 2002; Zhu & Sarkis, 2004). SCSM is a buyers’ supply chain 
practice on suppliers. Buyers have to tolerate the variability of operational competence 
from suppliers. This variability subsequently transfers onto buyers’ operations, and thus 
disrupts the even flow.  
Second, there is a risk of a supply chain glitch for buyers that adopt SCSM, which 
creates a persistent disruption to the even flow of buyers’ operations. SCSM creates a 
rigorous procurement policy (Busse, 2016) and requires suppliers’ investment in 
considerable capabilities and resources (Lee et al., 2014). The vulnerable suppliers may 
not be able to keep sufficient supply when implementing SCSM practices into their 
operations, which increases the risk of a supply chain glitch to buyers. When oil suppliers 
were required to modify their refineries to produce cleaner-burning diesel fuel, some 
suppliers were given extra time by the authority to meet the compliance in order to ensure 
an adequate supply to meet the demand (Business Wire, 1993). While Unilever 
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committed to enforcing their palm oil suppliers to provide environmental certification, 
because of the concern over sufficient supply Unilever planned to insource the production 
by investing in building their own palm-oil plants (Evans, 2013). Although pressured by 
environmental groups to enforce SCSM practices amongst their wood suppliers, Home 
Depot was concerned at meeting market demand, as “if we bought all the certified wood 
on the market today, it would supply our 50 Los Angeles stores for a year […] let alone 
800 stores” (Dow Jones Business News, 1999). These business cases demonstrate the 
concern and risk of a supply chain glitch associated with SCSM adoption. Supply chain 
glitches have been widely found to create a substantial cost to buyers (Hendricks & 
Singhal, 2003, 2005, 2008b; Hendricks et al., 2009; Zsidisin et al., 2015), and the cost is 
persistent over the long term due to the severe loss of market share (Craighead et al., 
2007). In ordinary business practices (i.e., in the absence of SCSM), the glitch could be 
solved by, for example, switching to alternative suppliers. In SCSM, the buyers’ 
commitment to the buyer-supplier relationship is the motive to ensure suppliers’ 
compliance (Busse, 2016). Buyers, hence, have to bear the severe and persistent 
disruption to the even flow of their operations caused by supply chain glitches.  
In summary, SCSM increases the variability in buyers’ supply chains by adding 
environmental and social supplying criteria. This variability disrupts the even flow of 
buyers’ operations. In particular, the increased risk of a supply chain glitch caused by 
SCSM creates a high scale of disruption and more costs to buyers who adopt SCSM.  
2.5.1.1.3 Benefits versus costs 
There are benefits that buyers can achieve in SCSM adoption. Reputational assets are 
mostly discussed as an important benefit to firms that adopt sustainability (Carter & 
Rogers, 2008; Orlitzky et al., 2003). Firms can also have SCSM-related competitive 
advantages (Golicic & Smith, 2013; Thornton et al., 2013). Supply chain sustainability 
risk and associated costs can be reduced by SCSM (Busse, 2016). In this research, these 
benefits are predicted not to be sufficient enough to offset buyers’ costs associated with 
SCSM. In this section, a discussion on each benefit is given, and an explanation is 
provided on why these benefits are unlikely to outweigh the costs.  
Reputational assets are discussed as the most important benefit for firms in the 
sustainability literature (Carter & Rogers, 2008; Orlitzky et al., 2003). Firms’ 
sustainability reflects the stakeholders’ expectations and thus earns firms positive brand 
image (Schmidt et al., 2017). The increased reputation creates assets, such as access to a 
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new market, the charge of premium prices, and increasing sales (Roberts & Dowling, 
2002; Thornton et al., 2013; Zhu & Sarkis, 2004).  
Reputational assets are more relevant to product-based sustainability, where 
downstream stakeholders have high visibility of the outcome of firms’ sustainability 
efforts (Orlitzky et al., 2003). However, SCSM is process-based sustainability (Busse, 
2016), which refers to buyers’ management in the operations of their upstream supply 
chains. There is an uncertainty that buyers’ downstream stakeholders have clear visibility 
to buyers’ efforts (Dam & Petkova, 2014). The low visibility to the operations relating to 
SCSM reduces the opportunity that buyers can offset their costs of SCSM by reputational 
assets.  
Buyers may develop competitive advantages in their SCSM adoption. Mainly 
grounded by NRBV (discussed in section 2.4.1), these practices that buyers use in their 
SCSM can develop valuable and inimitable capabilities, such as sustainability know-how 
and innovation (Golicic & Smith, 2013; Schmidt et al., 2017). These capabilities 
contribute to the competitive advantages and thus create a heterogeneous performance of 
the buyers that adopt SCSM (Schmidt et al., 2017).  
In the SCSM context, the performance outcome of these competitive advantages 
associated with SCSM is uncertain (Wu et al., 2008). Pullman et al. (2009) discussed that 
the competitive advantages developed from SCSM are mostly intangible assets (e.g., 
sustainability know-how), but the relationship between intangible assets and performance 
outcome are often causally ambiguous. There are additional investment and resources 
required to convert the intangible assets into useful resources, such as organizational 
learning (Carter, 2005). The scale of improvement in the financial performance relating 
to these intangible assets may not be large (Wang & Sarkis, 2013). Most importantly, 
these intangible assets are acquired by the increased transaction costs and the costs 
associated with the disruption to the even flow of buyers’ operations. 
SCSM is effective in reducing buyers’ costs associated with supply chain sustainability 
risk (discussed in section 2.3.2.2). Downstream stakeholders hold buyers responsible for 
their suppliers’ environmental and social performance. Suppliers’ environmental and 
social misconduct can result in buyers’ monetary costs due to the adverse publicity 
(Foerstl et al., 2010), opportunity costs of the lost sales (Busse, 2016), and capital costs 
due to investors’ risk aversion (Wood et al., 2018). SCSM is consistently found to 
improve supply chain environmental and social performance, thus reducing buyers’ 
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supply chain sustainability risk and costs (Gimenez & Sierra, 2013; Hajmohammad & 
Vachon, 2016; Hoejmose et al., 2013).  
However, SCSM merely ensures the reduction of the costs associated with supply 
chain sustainability risk but not the increase in any financial benefit. The transaction costs 
are increased, and the costs associated with disruption to the even flow of operations are 
created by buyers’ SCSM adoption. Thus, the overall financial performance is negative. 
According to Pagell and Shevchenko (2014), in the SCSM context, buyers simply have 
to comply with stakeholder expectations in order to avoid pain (e.g., supply chain 
sustainability risk), but they adopt practices that have a negative impact on their financial 
performance.   
In summary, buyers’ transaction costs are increased by additional governance on 
environmental and social performance. SCSM increases the variability in buyers’ supply 
chains, and thus disrupts the even flow of buyers’ operations. While there are benefits, 
such as reputation, competitive advantages, and the reduction of costs relating to supply 
chain sustainability risk, these benefits cannot sufficiently offset the increased costs when 
buyers adopt SCSM.  
In this research, event study methodology was used, where the abnormal return to 
SCSM announcements is used to estimate the financial performance of firms (both buyer 
and suppliers) relating to SCSM. (Event study methodology was briefly discussed in 
section 1.4 and will be discussed in detail in section 3.2). SCSM announcements are the 
announcements made by buyers mandating their suppliers’ improvement in 
environmental and social performance. The abnormal returns associated with SCSM 
announcements are the component of stock return adjusted for market factors (i.e., 
confounding factors), estimating the financial performance relating to SCSM. This 
research follows the standard style of hypotheses in event studies in the literature (Jacobs 
& Singhal, 2017; Wood et al., 2017). The buyers’ financial performance is predicted to 
be negative when they adopt SCSM. Therefore, it is hypothesized: 
(B)H1.  Buyers’ abnormal return will be negatively related to their SCSM announcements 
that require their suppliers to improve environmental and social performance.  
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2.5.1.2 Buyers’ supplier relationship management  
Buyers’ ability in supplier relationship management (SRM) is an essential factor in 
SCSM relating to buyers’ financial performance (Seuring & Müller, 2007; Tidy et al., 
2016).  
SRM is a critical component of SCM (Johnston, McCutcheon, Stuart, & Kerwood, 
2004). SRM is defined as the comprehensive management to enhance cooperation in 
business relationships, coordination in production processes, and communication in 
information systems between a buyer and its suppliers to continuously improve the 
efficiency and effectiveness in the supply chains (Cho et al., 2012). Good SRM indicates 
that a buyer is able to have a high level of flexibility in arrangements, shared planning, 
and joint responsibility in the partnership with its suppliers (Johnston et al., 2004), which 
increases supply chain responsiveness (Handfield & Bechtel, 2002). In the SCM research, 
good SRM has been widely found to contribute to the improvement of financial 
performance (Forkmann, Henneberg, Naudé, & Mitrega, 2016; Lambert & 
Schwieterman, 2012; Tseng, 2014).  
In the SCSM context, SRM is found to be closely related to supply chain 
environmental and social performance. Seuring and Müller (2007) by a Delphi study 
found supplier management is one of four core issues in SCSM. SCSM requires the 
management of environmental and social performance outside the direct control of 
buyers, where buyers’ ability in SRM substantially influences suppliers’ engagement in 
SCSM implementation (Tidy et al., 2016). Previous studies have provided empirical 
evidence that good SRM can effectively transfer SCSM practices to good environmental 
and social performance (Hajmohammad et al., 2013; Simpson & Power, 2005; Tidy et 
al., 2016; Vachon & Klassen, 2006). However, there is little known from the financial 
performance perspective what the effect of SRM is in buyers’ SCSM adoption. In this 
research, three reasons are discussed below to support that good SRM is expected to 
reduce buyers’ negative financial performance. 
First, good SRM provides buyers with additional assets and resources. SCSM disrupts 
the even flow of buyers’ operations. Buyers are forced to make multi-criteria business 
decisions on supply chain designs, which evaluates not only traditional operational 
performance (e.g., quality, cost, delivery) but also sustainability performance (Cruz, 
2009). This disruption can be reduced by good SRM. Buyers’ SRM is an important 
relational asset (Liou & Gao, 2011). Good SRM can increase suppliers’ commitment to 
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vendor managed inventory, just-in-time delivery, and inventory positioning within the 
supply chain, which can substantially improve buyers’ flexibility and response to the 
markets, and reduce inventory costs (Handfield & Bechtel, 2002). Also, good SRM 
provides a low cost of capital. The relationship asset built from the management of 
suppliers empowers buyers with a preferential payment schedule, and therefore, allows 
buyers to hold more liquidity (Liou & Gao, 2011). Buyers then have spare resources for 
core business activities. In the SCSM context, the additional resources created by buyers’ 
good SRM can reduce the disruption to the even flow that SCSM adoption may create.   
Second, good SRM improves buyers’ operational competence through suppliers’ 
asset-specific investments. Suppliers’ willingness to deploy asset-specific investments is 
increased with buyers’ excellence in SRM (Hawkins et al., 2008). Asset-specific 
investments motivate suppliers to include buyers’ value and benefits as well as support 
buyers’ operations (Corsten et al., 2011). The suppliers’ asset-specific investment creates 
the buyers’ idiosyncratic assets which are tailored to the buyers’ operations but not 
available to the buyers’ competitors. The buyers that have good SRM are able to better 
secure the resources generated in the buyer-supplier relationship than their competitors. 
While SCSM requires additional investment in buyers’ supply chain operations, good 
SRM provides buyers with sources for retaining the competitiveness and meanwhile 
undertaking SCSM projects.  
Third, good SRM decreases buyers’ transaction costs by reducing suppliers’ 
opportunism in SCSM compliance. Simpson and Power (2005) discussed that the 
management of suppliers’ environmental and social performance is at extreme risk of 
opportunism without the protection of appropriate safeguards and monitoring, as the 
bounded rationality may restrict the buyers’ SCSM specifications and identification of 
the suppliers’ compliance. The potential risks of inappropriate SCSM practices and 
suppliers’ behavioral uncertainty increase the buyers’ enforcement and monitoring costs 
and may create reputational damage for buyers while the SCSM efforts are made. 
However, good SRM provides buyers with the ability to diminish the costs. Suppliers’ 
asset-specific investment is increased by buyers’ ability in SRM (Hawkins et al., 2008), 
where there is a high cost to suppliers to switch to other buyers (Yigitbasioglu, 2010). 
The suppliers, therefore, are engaged in continuously meeting and exceeding the buyers’ 
requirements in order to secure the investment (Corsten et al., 2011), which reduces the 
possibility of suppliers’ opportunistic behaviors and thus decreases the buyers’ 
transaction costs.  
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Moreover, good SRM represents either the buyers’ power to suppliers or trust in buyer-
supplier relationships (Simpson & Power, 2005). Both power and trust are found to 
improve the suppliers’ compliance with buyers’ SCSM practices (Dabhilkar et al., 2015; 
Hoejmose et al., 2013). Buyers can, therefore, reduce the risk of suppliers’ opportunism 
in SCSM.  
Fourth, the knowledge of suppliers’ operations is increased through buyers’ SRM 
ability (Cho et al., 2012). Buyers are able to develop appropriate SCSM specifications 
and practices, which reduces the disruption to the even flow of their operations and 
provides cost-efficient SCSM solutions. A buyer with a high level of SRM may have a 
constant import of new and critical knowledge over suppliers’ operations (Simpson & 
Power, 2005). The transparency of suppliers’ operations increases the buyers’ precision 
in SCSM specifications and practices. For instance, the shorter lead times of a just-in-
time system allows buyers to uncover the suppliers’ genuine capacity and related 
efficiency. Buyers, thus, are able to mandate the appropriate measures of, for example, 
suppliers’ carbon emission reduction or improvement on labor conditions, to reduce the 
disruption to the even flow of their operations while mandating SCSM practices. 
Moreover, precise SCSM specifications and practices target the suppliers’ core 
sustainability incompetence, which makes sure there is an efficient use of buyers’ 
resources in SCSM efforts and provides a high return on the investment by effectively 
reducing the supply chain sustainability risk.  
By using principal component analysis, Tang and Liou (2010) identified three 
measures of SRM: the ratio of cost of goods sold (COGS) to sales, accounts payable 
turnover, and inventory turnover. Liou and Gao (2011) used these measures for SRM and 
found SRM is positively related to firms’ financial performance 1 . In this research, 
previous studies are followed by using the three measures to test the relationship between 
buyers’ SRM and their financial performance in SCSM.  
A low ratio of COGS to sales indicates the buyers’ ability to generate a high gross 
profit margin through low purchasing costs from suppliers. It is, therefore, hypothesized,  
(B)H2a.  The buyers with a low ratio of COGS to sales will experience a less negative 
abnormal return to the SCSM announcements. 
                                                          
1 Inventory turnover was not measured in the study by Liou and Gao (2011), as they focused on the 
online game industry, where few physical inventories exist. 
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A low level of accounts payable turnover indicates the buyers’ ability to hold more 
financial resources through a preferential payment schedule with suppliers. It is, 
therefore, hypothesized, 
(B)H2b.  The buyers with a low level of accounts payable turnover will experience a less 
negative abnormal return to the SCSM announcements. 
A high level of inventory turnover indicates the buyers’ high inventory efficiency 
through high supplier responsiveness. It is, therefore, hypothesized, 
(B)H2c.  The buyers with a high inventory turnover will experience a less negative 
abnormal return to the SCSM announcements. 
2.5.1.3 Growth prospects  
Previous studies have consistently found that high growth prospects increase firms’ 
negative financial performance when a disruption to the even flow of operations incurs, 
such as in the study of demand-supply mismatches by Hendricks and Singhal (2008a), 
the study of supply chain glitches (Hendricks & Singhal, 2003) , and the study of medical 
device recalls by Thirumalai and Sinha (2011). SCSM disrupts the even flow of buyers’ 
operations by adding environmental and social performance in supplying criteria. In this 
research, the interest is to investigate whether buyers with high growth prospects have 
more costs in their SCSM adoption in line with these previous studies.   
Buyers with high growth prospects require highly reliable and responsive supply 
chains to keep producing a steady stream of innovative products. A high level of growth 
prospects indicates the high market expectation of a firm’s growth, because the firm is 
likely to implement new projects, has high innovativeness, and thus can achieve high 
profit margins (Bose & Pal, 2012; Thirumalai & Sinha, 2011; Xia et al., 2016). High 
innovativeness is a typical attribute of firms with high growth prospects (Ni et al., 2016). 
However, innovative products are likely to have a short life cycle and a high level of 
demand uncertainty, because the high profit margin attracts competitors to erode 
competitive advantages by imitation (Fisher, 1997; Hendricks & Singhal, 2008a). In order 
to retain a high profit margin, the firms with high growth prospects are forced to introduce 
a steady stream of innovations and keep early sales in establishing market share. In the 
SCM context, buyers with high growth prospects, therefore, require highly reliable and 
responsive supply chains, where the suppliers’ high flexibility in capacity and inventory, 
Chapter 2 Literature Review 
67 
and high production speed can hedge buyers’ risks of shortage and demand forecast errors 
(Fisher, 1997).  
SCSM disrupts the even flow of buyers’ operations. This disruption creates more costs 
to the buyers with high growth prospects due to the requirement for highly reliable and 
responsive supply chains. Most of the supply chains are currently not sustainable from 
the environmental and social perspectives (Pagell & Shevchenko, 2014). SCSM requires 
substantial changes in the current supply chain designs. Additional requirements for 
environmental and social performance in supplying changes buyers’ production 
specifications and planned throughput time, which disrupts the even flow of buyers’ 
operations. Buyers with high growth prospects have a relatively high requirement for 
supply chains to be reliable and responsive, and to meet quantity changes, provide timely 
delivery at short notice, and produce small production runs at more frequent intervals 
(Fisher, 1997; Xia et al., 2016). The disruption caused by SCSM decreases supply chain 
reliability and responsiveness required by buyers with high growth prospects. Low 
reliability and responsiveness decreases buyers’ competitiveness, and could easily cause 
loss of current and future sales to the competitors (Hendricks & Singhal, 2008b). Hence, 
buyers with high growth prospects have additional costs when they adopt SCSM.  
Buyers with high growth prospects are often characterized as having high 
innovativeness (Fisher, 1997; Ni et al., 2016). Klassen and Vereecke (2012) used case 
studies and found that innovativeness is a valuable capability to develop a good 
management system in SCSM and thus improve sustainability and financial performance. 
Innovative firms may creatively develop new traceable systems with suppliers to ensure 
safety management and develop new retail partnerships that include NGOs (Klassen & 
Vereecke, 2012). However, in the study of Klassen and Vereecke (2012), the substantial 
costs that SCSM causes from the operations perspective was not considered (disruption 
to the even flow of buyers’ operations). SCSM disrupts steady supply chain operations 
that buyers with high growth prospects highly rely on to make profits. Buyers with high 
growth prospects thus have more costs in their SCSM adoption. Therefore, it is 
hypothesized,  
(B)H3. The buyers with a high level of growth prospects will experience a more negative 
abnormal return to the SCSM announcements.  
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2.5.1.4 Governance mechanism  
Section 2.3.4 introduced buyers’ governance mechanisms in SCSM. In this section, 
the governance mechanisms are linked to buyers’ financial performance, focusing on 
third-party certification and code of conduct. The choice of using governance 
mechanisms could be a buyer strategy to reduce negative financial performance.  
This research focuses on market governance mechanisms. Two major market 
governance mechanisms are commonly used by buyers to manage suppliers’ SCSM 
compliance, namely third-party certification and code of conduct. The compliance with 
third-party certification indicates that the suppliers are required to meet mandatory 
practices and make certified SCSM achievements (Hoejmose & Adrien-Kirby, 2012). 
The common third-party certifications are ISO 14001 (environmental management), SA 
8000 (social management), and OHSAS 18001 (occupational health and safety 
management). Besides commercial certifiers, NOGs, for example, Carbon Disclosure 
Program, also certify SCSM. Code of conduct addresses buyers’ expectations that 
suppliers will have responsible behaviors of a social and environmental nature (Preuss, 
2009). By using a code of conduct, buyers set the SCSM goals and monitor the suppliers’ 
compliance (Gimenez & Tachizawa, 2012). 
The SCSM literature mostly focuses on the effect of governance mechanisms on 
suppliers’ environmental and social performance (Foerstl et al., 2015; Gimenez & 
Tachizawa, 2012; Jiang, 2009a, 2009b). In general, scholars have concluded that different 
governance mechanisms can improve suppliers’ commitment and thus environmental and 
social performance, while the scale of improvement in environmental and social 
performance is different across governance mechanisms (Gimenez & Sierra, 2013; Jiang, 
2009b, 2009a; Tachizawa & Wong, 2015). This research extends these previous studies 
by investigating the effect of governance mechanisms on financial performance.  
The use of third-party certification is likely to reduce buyers’ costs relative to the use 
of code of conduct for two reasons. First, buyers acquire more legitimacy from 
stakeholders through third-party certification. Third-party certifiers, as independent and 
legitimate organizations, provide credibility for buyers’ SCSM efforts (Adobor & 
McMullen, 2014). The standardized SCSM procedures by third-party certifications create 
comparable measures of buyers’ efforts and their suppliers’ SCSM performance 
(Hoejmose & Adrien-Kirby, 2012). Meeting a code of conduct is voluntary and less 
rigorous than third-party certification (Preuss, 2009). Lack of transparency reduces the 
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credibility of buyers’ efforts (Hoejmose & Adrien-Kirby, 2012). The main motive of 
buyers’ SCSM enforcement is the response to stakeholder pressure, and thus to acquire 
legitimacy (Busse, 2016). The higher level of credibility through third-party certification 
improves the buyers’ legitimacy to stakeholders and reduces the supply chain 
sustainability risk.  
Second, buyers reduce transaction costs through third-party certification. Suppliers’ 
environmental and social performance is difficult to measure (Tachizawa & Wong, 2015). 
Buyers, therefore, have to invest in capacity to monitor and audit the suppliers’ 
compliance with the code of conduct. Through third-party certification, buyers, however, 
outsource the monitoring process in the marketplace (Adobor & McMullen, 2014), which 
creates economies of scale and scope in managing suppliers’ SCSM compliance. In 
particular, buyers’ internal competence in SCSM may be insufficient to conduct the 
required audits that are effective and economical. A third-party certifier provides the 
buyers with the support of their SCSM expertise, which effectively reduces the costs 
associated with the assessment of suppliers’ compliance. Therefore, it is hypothesized, 
(B)H4.  The buyers that use third-party certification as a governance mechanism in 
SCSM will experience a less negative abnormal return to the SCSM announcements. 
2.5.1.5 Group SCSM  
A recent business approach of ‘group SCSM’ has emerged in response to stakeholder 
pressure on SCSM, where buyers collaborate in a group to mandate the standardized 
SCSM practices to the suppliers that they source from. In the SCSM literature, group 
SCSM has not been widely researched. This research follows the discussion of the group 
purchasing literature, where group SCSM shares similar attributes (e.g., Hu et al., 2011; 
Nollet & Beaulieu 2005; Nollet et al., 2016; Sandberg & Mena 2015; Schotanus et al., 
2010). In this research, buyers that use the group SCSM approach are predicted to have 
less negative financial performance in their SCSM adoption in line with the discussion of 
the group purchasing literature.  
2.5.1.5.1 The introduction of group purchasing as a general background  
To validate the link between group purchasing and group SCSM, the concept of group 
purchasing is introduced. Group purchasing is defined as “a formal or virtual structure 
that facilitates the consolidation of purchases for many firms. Consolidation includes 
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bidding, suppliers’ evaluation, negotiation, and contract management” (Nollet & 
Beaulieu, 2005, p. 12). The core construct of group purchasing is the centralization of 
purchasing functions between buyers (Sandberg & Mena, 2015). Members in the groups, 
therefore, increase the bargaining power of their suppliers, which enables the reduction 
of purchasing costs and transaction costs with suppliers, and the transfer of know-how on 
supply markets between members (Bakker et al., 2006; Schotanus & Telgen, 2007; Tella 
& Virolainen, 2005). The two most common typologies of group purchasing are third-
party group purchasing and consortium group purchasing (Bakker et al., 2006; Nollet & 
Beaulieu, 2005; Schotanus & Telgen, 2007). Third-party group purchasing is where a 
third-party organization negotiates and writes contracts according to the mandates given 
by members. Consortium group purchasing is where the purchasing function is performed 
by group discussion among members through a collaborative form.  
The group purchasing literature has shown that group purchasing provides a hybrid 
form between market and hierarchy, which is the extension of traditional TCE (Tella & 
Virolainen, 2005). TCE presents the dichotomy of market versus hierarchy, which 
illustrates that buyers may balance transaction costs with suppliers by either market 
trading or integration (Williamson, 1981). However, if the transaction costs fluctuate 
between a moderate and high level, organizations may not want to integrate vertically; 
instead, they will search for an alternative solution to reduce the transaction costs. Group 
purchasing provides an “in-between” strategy to solve the dilemma (Schotanus et al., 
2010). The collaboration enables buyers to efficiently adjust their negotiation positions 
with suppliers to reduce transaction costs, while continuously operating as separate 
companies to benefits from outsourcing (Tella & Virolainen, 2005).  
Group SCSM has similar attributes to group purchasing. As stated by a group SCSM 
announcement, group SCSM’s primary objective is to “enhance collaboration of the 
buyers in the area of sustainability in the supply chains […] with a singularity of purpose 
and a common voice” (PR Newswire, 2014). Centralized SCSM to suppliers “promotes 
industry standards […], potentially reduces inefficiency and duplications, and makes 
(suppliers’ environmental and social) performance easier to audit and verify” (Business 
Wire, 2004). Similar to the typologies of group purchasing, group SCSM can be a form 
of a consortium, where members jointly discuss the standardized and specific SCSM 
practices that are required to suppliers, such as the Electronics Industry Citizenship 
Coalition (Business Wire, 2004), or members can outsource a part of SCSM monitoring 
and evaluation to a third-party; for instance, the Supply Chain Leadership Coalition was 
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formed in partnership with Carbon Disclosure Project which surveys the suppliers about 
their carbon emission on behalf of the members (Spencer, 2007). Similar to group 
purchasing, group SCSM, as a hybrid form, enables the collaboration between buyers in 
SCSM and meanwhile keeps buyers’ core business activities independent. The similar 
attributes support the use of the group purchasing literature to discuss group SCSM in 
this research.  
2.5.1.5.2 Group SCSM  
The present research defines group SCSM as ‘a form of horizontal cooperation 
between buyers that facilitates the consolidation of sustainability practices over their 
suppliers; the activities can include supplier selection, evaluation, and negotiation from 
the perspective of environmental and/or social performance’. Group SCSM, therefore, 
adds collaboration in buyer-buyer relationships to the traditional vertical mandates of 
SCSM from buyers to suppliers. Group SCSM is often formed by industry peers who 
have similar product specifications and shared supply markets.  
The term ‘group SCSM’ has not been widely used in the literature, as the main focus 
of SCSM has remained on buyer-supplier relationships (Gimenez & Sierra, 2013; Jiang, 
2009b; Tachizawa & Wong, 2015). Few studies have implicitly discussed the aspects of 
this form of buyer-buyer relationship in SCSM adoption. Carter and Rogers (2008, p. 
367) suggested  
common auditing procedures adopted by an industry coalition can 
allow a single, effective supplier sustainability audit to be 
performance, which increases the transparency and supplier 
sustainability while lowering transaction costs for both supplier and 
the multiple buying organizations that might do business with that 
supplier. 
Jacobs and Singhal (2017) empirically investigated the financial performance of firms 
that formed two groups after the 2013 Rana Plaza disaster to manage their suppliers’ 
social performance in Bangladesh. However, the authors found no significant impact on 
these firms’ financial performance. There is a lack of empirical evidence on whether this 
form of buyer-buyer relationship may be related to the buyers’ financial performance. 
This research follows the group purchasing literature and discusses four benefits that 
buyers can have by using the group SCSM approach as in the next section.  
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2.5.1.5.3 The benefits to buyers that use the group SCSM approach 
First, group SCSM increases buyers’ bargaining power, and thus reduces transaction 
costs with regard to negotiation costs and suppliers’ opportunism. Group SCSM enables 
the consolidation and standardization of SCSM amongst a large number of suppliers that 
the buyers in groups source from (Carter & Rogers, 2008). The consolidated and 
standardized SCSM provides the members in SCSM groups with high bargaining power 
against their suppliers that buyers may not obtain individually (Schotanus & Telgen, 
2007). The high bargaining power indicates the great importance of the transaction with 
the buyers in the suppliers’ overall business (Deitz et al., 2009). Thus, by using the group 
SCSM approach, buyers improve their capabilities in the negotiation of SCSM 
compliance with the suppliers. The centralized SCSM enforcement of multiple buyers as 
one unit lowers the costs of providing incentives to the suppliers complying with SCSM 
practices (i.e., negotiation costs) (Adobor & McMullen, 2014). Also, buyers’ high 
bargaining power deters suppliers’ opportunistic behaviors. The joint monitoring and 
evaluation across members improve suppliers commitments to SCSM. Members can use 
the joint forces to develop alternative suppliers if opportunism is discovered (Schotanus 
et al., 2010). As discussed in the group purchasing literature, the primary benefit to buyers 
is the increased bargaining power which reduces transaction costs (Tella & Virolainen, 
2005).  
Second, group SCSM creates economies of scale and scope. The buyers have 
monitoring and enforcement costs in SCSM, which are caused by investment in capacity 
to inspect and improve the compliances of the suppliers. SCSM groups commonly 
stipulate the standardized SCSM practices and monitoring programs. The centralized and 
standardized SCSM operations allow the buyers’ recurrent use of the same investment in 
managing the compliance of multiple suppliers and even potential suppliers (Sandberg & 
Mena, 2015). Moreover, group SCSM commonly covers a large scope of environmental 
and social management. As stated by Electric Utility Industry Sustainable Supply Chain 
Alliance, the group engages the suppliers in improving impacts on “air emissions, water 
consumption, landfill reduction, and energy efficiency. The Alliances’ scope could 
eventually widen to include other societal impacts” (PR Newswire [U.S.], 2011). The 
single investment of the members is utilized in multiple SCSM categories through group 
SCSM and creates the economies of scope. Additionally, the collaborative force reduces 
the members’ workload in managing suppliers’ compliance; the buyers, therefore, may 
spare the resources on core business activities.  
Chapter 2 Literature Review 
73 
Third, group SCSM improves buyers’ sustainability expertise. Individual buyers may 
not have sufficient knowledge and capabilities in supply management (Bakker et al., 
2006); in particular, SCSM requires specific expertise, such as the measure of suppliers’ 
environmental performance (Tachizawa & Wong, 2015). Group SCSM facilitates the 
formation of a closed and strategic bond in buyer-buyer relationships, and thus the 
exchange of the scarce resources and information by inter-organizational ties (Yu, 2014). 
The information sharing in SCSM groups helps individual buyers identify SCSM tools 
and methods and develop negotiation capabilities with suppliers. In particular, some 
SCSM groups work with professional organizations in environmental/social management 
to enforce and review SCSM compliance. The expertise of these professional 
organizations further improves the buyers’ learning of know-how.  
Fourth, SCSM groups work with downstream stakeholders (e.g., NGOs) on SCSM 
operations, which provides an opportunity to create a connected SCSM operation among 
supply chain partners. For example, Automotive Industry Guiding Principles works with 
CSR Europe (an NGO) which represents 38 National Partners (PR Newswire, 2014), and 
Supply Chain Leadership Coalition partners with the NGO, Carbon Disclosure Project 
(Spencer, 2007). The joint work creates a link between these buyers and downstream 
stakeholders, and thus effectively increases the buyers’ reputation. It is uncertain if the 
downstream stakeholders are able to see the importance of buyers’ efforts in SCSM (Dam 
& Petkova, 2014). The pooled buyers in SCSM groups, however, increase the willingness 
of downstream stakeholders’ participation in SCSM operations. The direct propagation 
of buyers’ SCSM efforts gains buyers reputation in end markets, which increases sales 
(Fan & Lo, 2012) and attracts capital investment (Barnett & Salomon, 2006). 
In summary, the increase in barraging power, economies of scale and scope, 
sustainability expertise, and connected SCSM work with downstream stakeholders 
effectively reduce the buyers’ costs in SCSM. Therefore, it is hypothesized,  
(B)H5.  The buyers that use the group SCSM approach will experience a less negative 
abnormal return to the SCSM announcements. 
2.5.1.6 SCSM dimensions 
In SCSM, buyers can choose to adopt the environmental or the social dimension of 
SCSM (Wang & Sarkis, 2013). The environmental dimension of SCSM (eSCSM)  and 
the related practices include measurement and control of suppliers’ energy use and 
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greenhouse gas emission, air or water pollution-control activities, waste management, and 
recycling. The social dimension of SCSM (sSCSM) and the related practices include 
equality in employment regarding diversity and gender, working conditions health and 
safety imperatives, labor rights, and wages (Hoejmose et al., 2013; Miemczyk et al., 
2012). In this section, the difference between sSCSM and eSCSM in relation to the 
buyers’ financial performance is analyzed. Buyers can make a strategic choice between 
sSCSM and eSCSM to mitigate the negative financial performance. 
Academic and managerial attention is higher on eSCSM than on sSCSM (Hoejmose 
& Adrien-Kirby, 2012; Seuring & Müller, 2008; Walker et al., 2012). The reason is that 
eSCSM is more developed and shows more maturity and diversity in term of the used 
measures than sSCSM (Miemczyk et al., 2012). Also, firms’ supply chain operations have 
a product focus, where the physical product flow in the supply chain contains more 
environmental elements than social elements (Miemczyk et al., 2012). Many scholars 
have pointed out the deficit in the literature exploring the social dimension of 
sustainability (in both firms’ internal sustainability and SCSM) and suggested more 
research focusing on sSCSM (Seuring & Müller, 2008; Touboulic & Walker, 2015; 
Zorzini et al., 2015). This research tries to answer their calls by exploring the benefits 
that buyers may have when they adopt sSCSM relative to eSCSM.  
The choice between sSCSM and eSCSM can be buyers’ strategy in SCSM. Klassen 
and Vereecke (2012) discussed that the improvement in social and environmental 
performance in supply chains can occur in a sequential wave. Busse (2016) further 
discussed that firms may measure the costs relating to SCSM practices (e.g., between 
eSCSM and sSCSM practices) and start with lower costs and incrementally move forward 
to higher cost practices, which reduces the negative impact of SCSM on operations.  
The different effect of sSCSM and eSCSM on buyers’ financial performance remains 
unclear in the literature. Wang and Sarkis (2013) found eSCSM practices are negatively 
related to lagged financial performance (measured by return on assets and return on equity 
two years after adopting SCSM practices), but sSCSM practices are insignificant. By 
using survey-based research, Pullman et al. (2009) found both eSCSM and sSCSM 
practices are insignificantly related to firms’ cost performance in the food industry. The 
insignificant findings of these previous studies are probably because of the used measures 
(e.g., lagged financial performance) and methodology (i.e., survey-based research). In 
this research, event study methodology was used, where concurrent and objective 
measures are used in contrast to these previous studies. In this research, sSCSM is 
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believed to reduce the buyers’ negative financial performance in contrast to eSCSM for 
two reasons as discussed below. 
First, the buyers that adopt sSCSM have a smaller scale of disruption to the even flow 
of their operations than those that adopt sSCSM. Supply chains have a product focus and 
are thus environmental in nature (Miemczyk et al., 2012), where adding environmental 
elements into operations (e.g., demands on recyclability) are more likely to change the 
physical materials flow in supply chains than adding social elements (e.g., workplace 
safety). The buyers’ eSCSM practices change the suppliers’ product specifications, 
which, in turn, requires buyers to upgrade the product specifications, order fulfillment, 
and sourcing strategies (Miemczyk et al., 2012). Hence, eSCSM is likely to create a 
higher scale of disruption in the buyers’ operations than sSCSM. A practical business 
case is Home Depot’s eSCSM. While Home Depot used “the power of its purchasing 
dollar to buy only certified woods”, bowing to the pressure from stakeholders, it was 
concerned that with this eSCSM practice, only “50 Los Angeles stores would be 
supplied”, “let alone 800 stores which could not meet customer demand” (Dow Jones 
Business News, 1999). In contrast, sSCSM (e.g., the demand for suppliers’ improvement 
of labor rights and equality of employment) is less connected to the physical material flow 
in the supply chains. Thus, the scale of the disruption to buyers’ operations is relatively 
low when buyers adopt sSCSM.  
Second, sSCSM is connected to quality improvement and organizational learning. 
sSCSM refers to the management of human resource elements in operations. Buyers’ 
sSCSM can increase suppliers’ employee satisfaction and knowledge-enhancement, 
which are closely related to the sources required for successful quality management 
(Adam et al., 1997). Pullman et al. (2009) found sSCSM is positively related to quality 
performance in supply chains. sSCSM may indirectly facilitate the buyers’ operations by 
reducing the waste and obsolete products offered by the suppliers. Also, Carter (2005) 
found that sSCSM can increase buyers’ organizational learning. The knowledge of supply 
chain processes and supplier relationships is more likely to improve with the adoption of 
sSCSM. The increased organizational learning reduces the buyers’ coordination costs in 
the supply chain operations.  
In summary, sSCSM disrupts the even flow of buyers’ operations on a relatively 
smaller scale than eSCSM, and contributes to quality improvement and organizational 
learning. Therefore, the buyers that adopt sSCSM are predicted to have less negative 
financial performance. It is hypothesized,  
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(B)H6.  The buyers that require suppliers’ compliance with the social dimension of SCSM 
will experience a less negative abnormal return to the SCSM announcements.  
2.5.1.7 Summary of the hypotheses in buyer analysis 
The section finishes the hypothesis development in buyer analysis. A summary of 
these hypotheses is given in Table 2.1. The present research hypothesizes that buyers, in 
general, have a negative financial performance when they adopt SCSM. However, this 
negative relationship is moderated by buyers’ supplier relationship management, growth 
prospect, governance mechanism, group SCSM, and social SCSM. 
In the next sections, the relationship between SCSM compliance and suppliers’ 
financial performance will be discussed.  
Table 2.1 Summary of the Hypotheses in Buyer Analysis 
Hypothesis Hypothesis number Predicted sign Section number 
Buyers’ financial performance when they adopt 
SCSM 
(B)H1 Negative 2.5.1.1 
The factors that influence buyers’ financial performance when they adopt SCSM 
Hypothesis Hypothesis number Predicted sign Section number 
The ratio of COGS to sales (the measure of 
supplier relationship management) 
(B)H2a Negative 2.5.1.2 
Accounts payable turnover (the measure of 
supplier relationship management) 
(B)H2b Negative 2.5.1.2 
Inventory turnover Accounts payable turnover (the 
measure of supplier relationship management) 
(B)H2c Positive 2.5.1.2 
Growth prospect (B)H3 Negative 2.5.1.3 
Third-party certification (governance 
mechanisms) 
(B)H4 Positive 2.5.1.4 
Group SCSM (B)H5 Positive 2.5.1.5 
sSCSM (SCSM dimensions) (B)H6 Positive 2.5.1.6 
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2.5.2 Suppliers’ financial performance and influential factors 
in SCSM compliance 
This section focuses on developing the hypotheses regarding suppliers’ financial 
performance when they comply with their buyers’ SCSM. SCSM disrupts the even flow 
of suppliers’ operations by a substantial change-over in manufacturing, suggesting large 
compliance costs to suppliers. The compliance costs are unlikely to be offset by charging 
higher purchasing prices from buyers, as environmental and social performance has only 
been an order qualifying rather than an order winning attribute for suppliers. The suppliers 
that comply with buyers’ SCSM have high implementation costs due to the continuous 
investment in improving and maintaining environmental and social performance. These 
compliance and implementation costs are higher than the benefits that suppliers may have 
in SCSM. In this research, the negative financial performance of suppliers that comply 
with their buyers’ SCSM is predicted. Section 2.5.2.1 develops this hypothesis.  
There are a number of factors that influence suppliers’ negative financial performance. 
This research focuses on two categories of factors: the nature of SCSM that suppliers 
comply with and firm-specific characteristics. The factors relating to the nature of SCSM 
that suppliers comply with include buyers’ SCSM governance mechanisms (i.e., third-
party certification and code of conduct) that suppliers are required to commit, SCSM 
dimensions (eSCSM and sSCSM) that suppliers are required to comply with, and the 
group SCSM approach. The factors regarding firm-specific characteristics are supply 
chain power, operational slack, and financial slack. These factors are developed as 
strategies that suppliers can use to buffer their negative financial performance in SCSM 
or analyzed as particular business risks that suppliers are required to deal with. Sections 
2.5.2.2 – 2.5.2.8 develop the hypotheses concerning these influential factors.  
2.5.2.1 The impact of buyers’ SCSM on suppliers’ financial 
performance 
Suppliers’ sustainability engagement is reactively rather than proactively and 
altruistically developed (Hoejmose & Adrien-Kirby, 2012). The systematic approach 
discussed in section 2.3.2 illustrates that the stakeholder pressure on sustainability is 
transferred by buyers’ SCSM to their suppliers and thus changes suppliers’ operations. 
From the perspective of suppliers, the implementation decisions on SCSM practices are 
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made under external pressure (Fan & Lo, 2012), in order to keep legitimacy with buyers 
(Lee et al., 2014; Schmidt et al., 2017). Thus, suppliers have a nature of compliance in 
SCSM.  
2.5.2.1.1 Compliance costs of SCSM to suppliers 
The compliance with SCSM requires substantial changes in suppliers’ operations by 
adding environmental and social elements into manufacturing processes. These changes 
disrupt the even flow of suppliers’ operations as suggested by the theory of SEF 
(discussed in section 2.2.3.3) and add compliance costs to suppliers. SCSM compliance 
requires suppliers to implement environmental and social practices in operations, which 
are beyond the traditional conception of suppliers’ business (Touboulic & Walker, 2015). 
These practices may not align with the operational effectiveness and efficiency that 
suppliers have developed (Fan & Lo, 2012; Hoejmose & Adrien-Kirby, 2012), thus 
disrupting the even flow of suppliers’ operations. In labor-intensive industries (e.g., in the 
textiles industry), the suppliers with abundant labor resources gain competitive 
advantages with low labor costs. sSCSM, however, is often imposed on the suppliers 
operating in labor-intensive industries due to the high risk of social misconduct (Yu, 
2008). The investment in the improvement in labor conditions and reduction in working 
hours can substantially increase suppliers’ labor costs and thus disrupt the operations by 
extending lead time. A buyer’s requirement for reducing carbon emissions requires 
significant investment and considerable modifications in the production. The reduction in 
energy consumption and change of energy sources may decrease the utilization of 
capacity and disrupt the existing operations. While suppliers commonly compete fiercely 
with low cost and timely delivery (Jiang, 2009a), SCSM compliance is likely to reduce 
the operational effectiveness and efficiency that suppliers have built towards with cost 
reduction and high delivery speed. Moreover, environmental and social performance may 
take time to come to fruition (Giunipero et al., 2012). Suppliers must adapt to the 
disruption to the operations caused by SCSM compliance over a long-time horizon. In 
SCSM compliance, suppliers often operate sub-optimally from a competitive advantage 
perspective to maximize the value of the entire supply chains (Linton et al., 2007). While 
buyers can retain benefits such as reducing supply chain sustainability risk, suppliers 
often have to bear substantial compliance costs.  
The compliance costs are unlikely to be compensated for by buyers. SCSM compliance 
is assumed to bring greater financial benefits, for example, increased selling prices to 
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buyers (Busse, 2016). However, for suppliers, compliance with the buyers’ SCSM 
mandates may only enable them to maintain their current business rather than develop 
new opportunities or enable them to win a greater volume or more valuable business from 
their buyers. While compliance may gain legitimacy from buyers, it is unlikely that the 
buyers will financially reward suppliers. SCSM compliance represents for the supplier an 
order qualifying (i.e., compliance with changing buyer mandates to allow for continuous 
sales) rather than an order winning attribute for suppliers (Dabhilkar et al., 2015; Dam & 
Petkova, 2014; Seuring & Müller, 2008). Buyers’ SCSM is in response to stakeholder 
pressure (Pagell, Wiengarten, & Fynes, 2013; Zhu & Sarkis, 2007). There is still 
uncertainty as to whether buyers can improve their own financial performance in this 
manner as discussed in this research (section 2.5.1.1) and the literature review by 
Touboulic & Walker (2015a). Buyers are likely to deemphasize financially rewarding 
suppliers’ compliance with improved SCSM performance (Dabhilkar et al., 2015). 
Sustainability compliance is often seen as a prerequisite for the supply relationship, 
whereas operational competence (e.g., superior quality or low cost), is still the key order 
winning strategy (Dabhilkar et al., 2015; Seuring & Müller, 2008). Consequently, there 
is little likelihood of financial benefits accruing from SCSM compliance.  
2.5.2.1.2 Benefits and implementation costs of SCSM to suppliers 
There are certain gains from firms’ implementation of sustainable operations, such as 
competitive advantages from NRBV (Carter & Rogers, 2008; Schmidt et al., 2017) and 
reputation (Orlitzky et al., 2003). However, from suppliers’ perspective, the substantial 
implementation costs may outweigh the benefits, and the distance to the point of sales 
may restrict suppliers’ gain on reputation.   
Although firms may develop tangible and intangible assets through improved 
sustainability performance (Albertini, 2013; Carter & Rogers, 2008; Giunipero et al., 
2012; Markley & Davis, 2007; Srivastava, 2007), these benefits may not outweigh 
suppliers’ substantial implementation costs in SCSM. NRBV (section 2.4.1) discusses the 
competitive advantages that suppliers may develop through sustainable development. 
Staff motivation and organizational learning may also be improved with SCSM 
compliance (Carter, 2005; Carter & Rogers, 2008). While these benefits are causally 
ambiguous in terms of performance outcome (Pullman et al., 2009), capital and cultural 
costs are increased to create new models and manufacturing-changeover, and suppliers 
have to continuously invest in maintaining environmental control and safety standards on 
Chapter 2 Literature Review 
80 
operations (Giunipero et al., 2012). These investments also generate opportunity costs in 
which resources are not in core business activities in lieu of sustainability investment 
(Dam & Petkova, 2014), and, therefore, the traditional operational competence becomes 
compromised (Dabhilkar et al., 2015).  
Reputation gains have been discussed as a great benefit to the firms implementing 
sustainable operations (Ellen et al., 2006; Orlitzky et al., 2003). However, the supply 
chain position of suppliers is distant from the point of sales, and thus many upstream 
suppliers have low public visibility and brand recognition (Schmidt et al., 2017). The gain 
of reputation may have less impact on improving the financial performance of suppliers. 
Moreover, suppliers’ sustainable operations may be perceived as an effort of buyers’ 
SCSM. Reputation is likely to accrue to the buyers. Suppliers may be swept up in their 
buyers’ “window-dressing”, where buyers pretend to be concerned with sustainability 
issues in order to gain reputation, leaving their suppliers to bear the costs associated with 
SCSM (Jo & Na, 2012; Thornton et al., 2013). Suppliers’ outcry in response to Wal-Mart’ 
SCSM as a buyer is an example of this window-dressing. While Wal-Mart developed a 
reputation for sustainability amongst consumers and stakeholders, their suppliers paid for 
the environmental gains (PR Newswire, 2007). In general, it is unlikely that compliance 
with a buyer’s SCSM will develop valuable assets. Instead, it is likely to represent 
compliance and implementation costs to suppliers.  
Given the compliance and implementation costs relative to the relatively marginal 
expected positive benefits as outlined, it is possible that SCSM compliance may have a 
negative impact on suppliers’ financial performance.  
In this research, the methods of studying ‘related firms’ in event study methodology 
were used (the methods were briefly discussed in section 1.4. and will be discussed in 
detail in section 3.2), where supplier’s financial performance was estimated by using 
suppliers’ abnormal return associated with their buyers’ SCSM announcements. Buyers’ 
SCSM announcements are the announcements made by buyers that require their 
suppliers’ compliance with SCSM. The suppliers’ abnormal return is the component of 
the stock return associated with the SCSM announcement, adjusted for market factors 
(i.e., confounding factors). This research follows the style of hypotheses in event studies 
that investigated related firms (Brown et al., 2009; Deitz et al., 2009; Fee & Thomas, 
2004; Hertzel et al., 2008). Suppliers’ financial performance is predicted to be negative 
when they are required to comply with buyers’ SCSM. It is hypothesized, 
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(S)H1.  Suppliers’ abnormal return will be negatively related to their buyers’ SCSM 
announcements that require suppliers to improve environmental and social performance.  
2.5.2.2  Supply chain power 
Supply chain power is a key element in SCSM, where firms’ bargaining positions are 
changed in the negotiation of SCSM commitments in addition to standard exchange terms 
(Dabhilkar et al., 2015; Hoejmose et al., 2013; Touboulic et al., 2014). The present 
research follows Kim and Wemmerlöv (2015) in using the symmetric interpretation of 
power and dependence. A supplier’s power over its buyer is equal to and based upon the 
dependence of its buyer on the supplier. Suppliers tend to have lower power than buyers, 
and thus more dependence on buyers than vice versa (Kim & Wemmerlöv, 2015). While 
the monopolistic power of buyers enforces the general compliance of suppliers in SCSM 
(Hall, 2000; Hoejmose & Adrien-Kirby, 2012), the specific balance of power between 
suppliers and their buyers may influence the negativity of suppliers’ financial 
performance.  
There are two perspectives in the analysis of supply chain power in SCSM. First is the 
supplier’s dependence on the buyer (SDB). Second is the buyer’s dependence on the 
supplier (BDS). TCE and RDT provide theoretical lenses to understand the influence of 
these two dependence perspectives on the suppliers’ transaction costs and the proportion 
of value shared in SCSM compliance.  
2.5.2.2.1 Transaction costs and supply chain power 
On the one hand, the high dependence on a buyer increases the transaction costs of a 
supplier. A high dependence indicates the high level of asset-specific investment in the 
buyer by the supplier, which is a nontransferable investment whose unity is unique to the 
specific relationship with the buyer (Hawkins et al., 2008). The asset-specific investment 
may lock the supplier into the transaction and lead to the buyer’s opportunistic behavior 
as discussed in TCE (section 2.2.3.2). The buyer that observes the supplier’s vulnerability 
due to the asset-specificity investments can demand overly tough conditions in the 
supplier’s SCSM compliance (Hoejmose et al., 2013), such as short-time length of 
implementation and stringent sustainability performance improvement, which, therefore, 
increases the suppliers’ transaction costs.  
In contrast, a high level of buyer’s dependence on supplier reduces the supplier’s 
transaction costs. A high level of buyer’s dependence increases the buyer’s loyalty, which 
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may promote a deep or genuine buyer-supplier relationship (Kim & Wemmerlöv, 2015). 
The strong norm of solidarity in the relationship, in fact, reduces the buyer’s opportunistic 
behavior (Hawkins et al., 2008). The buyer is more likely to provide supplier development 
aid and share information to support SCSM compliance. The supplier’s transaction costs 
can be substantially decreased, or shared over the dyad, through the buyer’s support for 
inventory flexibility, reduction of product obsolescence, or quick responsiveness to 
market demands (Markley & Davis, 2007).  
2.5.2.2.2 The proportion of shared value and supply chain power 
The dependence on a buyer-supplier relationship may determine the proportion of 
value shared by the parties, as discussed in RDT in section 2.2.3.1. There are potential 
benefits from SCSM, for example, the reduction on buyers’ supply chain sustainability 
risk (Busse, 2016) and premium prices charged in end markets (Zhu & Sarkis, 2004). 
These benefits from SCSM are created by the joint force or even largely created by a 
supplier. However, suppliers that are highly dependent on buyers may merely capture a 
small number of benefits and have to bear substantial business risks and costs through 
SCSM compliance as their buyers can utilize its power to gain a disproportionate share 
of the value created through SCSM (Hawkins et al., 2008; Touboulic et al., 2014). For 
example, in the criticism of Wal-Mart’s window-dressing, suppliers found it “especially 
galling that Wal-Mart…[was] forcing higher costs on them in the name of 
environmentalism”; Wal-Mart, however, was able to enhance its public image through its 
supply chain power (PR Newswire, 2007).  
In contrast, suppliers that have a high level of buyers’ dependence may be able to 
motivate buyers to equally share the value created by SCSM compliance. The high 
buyer’s dependence on supplier (BDS) increases the importance of suppliers’ operations 
in the buyers’ overall business success. Buyers, thus, are more willing to pursue mutual 
benefits in the relationships (Touboulic et al., 2014). For example, the saved costs from 
reducing supply chain sustainability risk may be used to strengthen information sharing 
in the buyer-supplier relationship.  
By using event study methodology, Deitz et al. (2009) found that suppliers that were 
mandated by Wal-Mart (i.e., the buyer) to conduct technology integration had positive 
financial performance, and the financial performance was more positive for the suppliers 
that were highly dependent on Wal-Mart. The authors discussed technology integration 
as a favorable supply chain practice mandated by buyers (i.e., improve suppliers’ 
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operational competence). Higher dependence on buyers indicates a greater positive 
impact on suppliers’ overall business, thus more positive financial performance. In 
contrast, SCSM is a disruptive supply chain practice, where suppliers’ even flow of 
operations is disrupted by additionally required environmental and social criteria in 
manufacturing. Thus, the suppliers that have a high dependence on buyers may suffer 
more disruption in operations, due to the high percentage of suppliers’ overall business 
reliance on buyers. The finding in this research may provide an interesting comparison 
with the study of Deitz et al. (2009) by presenting a different impact of supply chain 
power on suppliers’ financial performance in favorable (i.e., technology integration) and 
disruptive (i.e., SCSM compliance) supply chain practice.  
In summary, a high supplier’s dependence on buyer (SDB) increases suppliers’ 
transaction costs and reduces the proportion of shared value in SCSM. Therefore, a high 
supplier’s dependence on buyer (SDB) increases suppliers’ negative financial 
performance in SCSM. Therefore, it is hypothesized,  
(S)H2a.  The suppliers with higher dependence on their buyers will experience a more 
negative abnormal return to buyers’ SCSM announcements. 
A high buyer’s dependence on supplier (BDS) reduces suppliers’ transaction costs and 
provides an opportunity to have equally shared value in SCSM. Therefore, it is 
hypothesized, 
(S)H2b. Where there is higher buyer’s dependence on supplier (BDS), the suppliers will 
experience a less negative abnormal return to buyers’ SCSM announcements. 
2.5.2.2.3 Relationship length 
Relationship length is a factor that influences the power and dependence in a buyer-
supplier relationship (Brown et al., 2009). Relationship length in this research means 
consecutive years that a supplier has a significant portion of annual sales (i.e., more than 
10%) to a buyer. A long-term relationship with a buyer indicates the supplier’s 
considerable asset-specific investment and thus a high degree of dependence on the buyer 
as discussed in TCE (Hawkins et al., 2008).  
There is an ambivalent view on the long-term relationship in the analysis of suppliers’ 
financial performance. On the one hand, trust is built in a long-term relationship (Coulter 
& Coulter, 2002; Johnston et al., 2004). Trust curbs buyers’ willingness to utilize the 
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suppliers’ asset-specific investment in a long-term relationship to perform opportunistic 
behavior (Hawkins et al., 2008), as buyers are more likely to focus on joint success with 
the trust built in the relationship (Gulati & Sytch, 2007). Suppliers may reduce their 
transaction costs due to decreased buyer opportunism, thus improving their financial 
performance as the length of the relationship with buyers increases (Liu et al., 2009).  
On the other hand, a supplier in a long-term relationship with its buyer is vulnerable 
to changes in power. The supplier’s asset-specific investment is substantially developed 
in a long-term relationship. The asset-specific investment increases the supplier’s 
dependence on a buyer, because of switching costs and holding up costs to the supplier 
(Yigitbasioglu, 2010). The supplier will have high costs if it seeks to switch to a new 
buyer, as the supplier’s asset-specific resources are tailored to the buyer (Grover & 
Malhotra, 2003). The supplier will also have hold-up costs, where the buyer 
opportunistically requires the supplier’s compliance with additional terms in the 
transactions (e.g., price reduction), because the buyer observes that the supplier is locked 
into the relationship due to the asset-specific investment in the long-term relationship 
(Hill, 1995). While suppliers have these costs in a long-term relationship, buyers may not 
face the same costs. Kim and Wemmerlöv (2015) found that in a long-term relationship 
the suppliers’ asset-specific investment is substantially increased, but buyers do not have 
the same investment despite the increase in the length of the relationship with suppliers. 
The reason may be the dominant power of buyers in the relationship, and that buyers are 
more likely to manipulate the asset-specific investments (Kim & Wemmerlöv, 2015). 
Therefore, a long-term relationship is likely to create more costs for suppliers rather than 
for buyers. By using event study methodology, Brown et al. (2009) found that the 
suppliers in a long and dependent relationship with their buyers have significant and 
negative financial performance when their buyers conduct leveraged buyouts, providing 
empirical evidence that suppliers’ costs increase with relationship length.  
In the SCSM context, the negative impact of a long-term relationship is likely to affect 
suppliers’ financial performance. Suppliers are required to comply with the buyers’ 
SCSM. A long-term relationship increases the asset-specific investment of suppliers but 
not that of buyers (Kim & Wemmerlöv, 2015). SCSM adoption increases the buyers’ 
transaction costs and creates a risk of disruption to the even flow of its operations (as 
discussed in section 2.5.1.1.2). Buyers may proactively leverage the power generated 
from the long-term relationship to claim benefits, but suppliers may not do this in the 
same way. For example, buyers may utilize their power to require stringent sustainability 
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practices and compress the timeline of the suppliers’ SCSM compliance, which may 
allow for maximum time to adjust buyers’ operations process and buffer for a potential 
delay in suppliers’ SCSM compliance (Lee et al., 2014). Hence, in a long-term 
relationship, more costs are likely to be imposed on the suppliers who are required to 
comply with buyers’ SCSM. Hence, it is hypothesized, 
(S)H2c. The suppliers with a long relationship with their buyers will experience a more 
negative abnormal return to buyers’ SCSM announcements. 
2.5.2.3 SCSM dimensions  
Section 2.3.3 discussed the environmental (eSCSM) and social dimension (sSCSM) of 
SCSM. In this section, the different impacts of eSCSM and sSCSM on suppliers’ financial 
performance are explored. The present research predicts that a supplier’s sSCSM 
compliance (e.g., labor rights and safety) creates less negative financial performance than 
eSCSM compliance (e.g., the production of recyclable materials). There are three reasons.  
First, suppliers’ sSCSM compliance may be less stringent than that of eSCSM, which 
reduces suppliers’ operational burden. The social elements of sustainability have not 
revealed its influences on product specification, new product development, order 
fulfillment, and supply chain collaboration (Miemczyk et al., 2012); thus, suppliers’ 
improvement in social performance (e.g., labor conditions) may be less related to buyers’ 
internal sustainable development. Therefore, suppliers’ sSCSM compliance may be 
granted greater tolerance or leniency by buyers. The flexibility in the negotiation with 
buyers on resources allocation, compliance schedule, and specific practices reduces 
suppliers’ operational difficulty. In contrast, buyers’ environmental elements of 
sustainability require a high level of supplier responsiveness; for example, the success of 
buyers’ total carbon emission reduction and recyclable products is closely associated with 
pollution management and material/components recyclability in suppliers’ operations. If 
the supplier fails altogether or cannot supply products to specification, this may impact 
the buyer’s business and reputation. The required responsiveness reduces suppliers’ 
flexibility to coordinate resources, and therefore, increases costs.  
Second, the compliance with sSCSM may improve suppliers’ quality performance 
which, as one of the suppliers’ key operational competences, may reduce the suppliers’ 
compliance costs. Pullman et al. (2009) provided empirical evidence that social 
sustainability practices are positively related to quality performance; the relationship 
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between environmental sustainability practices and quality performance is uncertain. 
Successful quality management requires human resource elements provided directly 
through sSCSM, where the improvement in employee satisfaction, attitude, motivation, 
knowledge, and skill effectively create a better quality performance (Pullman et al., 
2009). A good quality performance maintained with the compliance of sSCSM may keep 
suppliers’ operational competence in the view of buyers, thus increase suppliers’ sales to 
their buyers, and reduce suppliers’ compliance costs.   
Finally, it is a reasonable conjecture that the capital costs of improving environmental 
performance are much higher than in improving social performance. eSCSM requires the 
application of new production technologies and manufacturing changeover, which 
demands greater investments. eSCSM may also generate increased labor costs, because 
the upgraded operations request additional labor training (van Hoof & Lyon, 2013).  
Taken together, the evidence suggests that compliance with sSCSM has a smaller 
negative impact than compliance with eSCSM. Therefore, it is hypothesized,  
(S)H3.  When suppliers are required to comply with the social dimension of SCSM, the 
suppliers will experience a less negative abnormal return to buyers’ SCSM 
announcements. 
2.5.2.4 Governance mechanisms 
Suppliers’ SCSM compliance is ensured by buyers’ SCSM governance mechanisms 
(Gimenez & Sierra, 2013). As discussed in section 2.3.4.1, the present research focuses 
on two governance mechanisms: third party-certification and code of conduct. These two 
mechanisms may impose a different impact on suppliers’ financial performance.  
These two mechanisms have different impacts on suppliers’ financial performance for 
three reasons. First, third-party certification is more rigorous than a code of conduct 
(Hoejmose & Adrien-Kirby, 2012). The third-party certifiers have professional 
knowledge and tools to identify the compliance of suppliers, which commonly requires 
radical improvement in suppliers’ environmental and social performance over a relatively 
short term. Globally, it takes most companies, making the greatest efforts, between 8 and 
19 months to obtain ISO 14001 certification (Babakri et al., 2003). Nevertheless, a code 
of conduct involves a progressive development lasting years. The suppliers’ compliance 
is less stringent (Hoejmose & Adrien-Kirby, 2012).  
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Second, the compliance with third-party certification adds one supply chain link 
between suppliers and buyers, thus reducing suppliers’ opportunities in their search for 
buyer support. Third-party certification is an independent and formalized procedure, and 
thus reduces suppliers’ contact with buyers in SCSM compliance. Suppliers are less likely 
to receive information sharing, relationship development, or organizational learning from 
buyers. In contrast, the development of an action plan, plant visits, and meetings with 
buyers as activities in the code of conduct are more likely to facilitate the inter-
organizational flow of knowledge and improve relationships (Tachizawa & Wong, 2015). 
Also, the decreasing contact with buyers in third-party certification prevents suppliers’ 
exposure to the difficulties in implementation; thus, suppliers are unlikely to negotiate a 
flexible adjustment on SCSM requirements according to the available resources.  
Third, compliance with the more rigorous third-party certification adds greater cost to 
the supplier than compliance with a code of conduct would. Besides implementation and 
maintenance costs, suppliers have to pay an accredited auditor for registration and 
renewing cost for third-party certification (e.g., ISO 14001 certification [Nishitani, 
2009]). Also, due to the complex implementation of environmental and social 
management systems, suppliers have to pay for a consulting service (Babakri et al., 2003). 
In contrast, a code of conduct monitored by buyers reduces the links of compliance along 
the supply chains, and, therefore, decreases suppliers’ transaction costs. The above 
discussion suggests that compliance with third-party certification may increase suppliers’ 
negative financial performance in SCSM. It is, therefore, hypothesized,  
(S)H4.  The suppliers that are required to comply with SCSM through third-party 
certification will experience a more negative abnormal return to buyers’ SCSM 
announcements. 
2.5.2.5 Group SCSM  
Section 2.5.1.5 discussed group SCSM, where buyers collaborate in a group to 
mandate SCSM practices to suppliers. This section focuses on the impact of group SCSM 
on suppliers’ financial performance. The relevant concepts from the group purchasing 
literature (Anand & Aron, 2003; Li, 2012; Nollet & Beaulieu, 2005; Walker et al., 2013; 
Yang et al., 2017) are still referred to in the discussion. Group SCSM may increase the 
bargaining power of buyers, add stringency in suppliers’ compliance, and create 
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institution pressure in supply markets. Therefore, a negative impact is posed by group 
SCSM on suppliers’ financial performance.  
The centralized SCSM mandates from multiple buyers in a group increase buyers’ 
bargaining power, which raises costs to suppliers. It is not surprising that the formation 
of group SCSM is to increase buyers’ bargaining power, as discussed in the group 
purchasing literature (Nollet & Beaulieu, 2003). In the SCSM context, the effect of power 
is important in buyers’ mandates, as suppliers’ resistance may be high due to the possible 
financial loss (see section 2.5.2.1). The increase in buyers’ bargaining power puts 
suppliers in an unfavorable negotiation position in SCSM compliance (Hoejmose et al., 
2013). The implementation of SCSM is a costly process, and suppliers undertake most of 
the investment (Hoejmose et al., 2013). In compliance with buyers’ business practices, 
suppliers commonly expect technological and financial support in the implementation of 
SCSM and share the possible benefits with improved sustainability performance. 
Nonetheless, the increasing bargaining power enables buyers to utilize coercive forces 
(e.g., threat to terminate the relationship) rather than to provide incentives to suppliers in 
their SCSM mandates. 
Moreover, increasing SCSM expertise together with bargaining power enables buyers 
to impose overly stringent SCSM conditions, such as a short timeline and multiple tasks. 
In fear of suppliers’ failure in SCSM compliance, either due to lack of resources or 
opportunism, buyers may deliberately push SCSM compliance to a higher standard and 
with a shorter schedule (Lee et al., 2014). While the increasing bargaining power provides 
buyers with the first condition, the developed expertise through group SCSM enables 
buyers to impose stringent SCSM compliance on suppliers. The lack of SCSM expertise 
is a common problem in buyers’ mandates (Adobor & McMullen, 2014). In SCSM 
groups, buyers mostly share similar product specifications and market bases (Nollet et 
al., 2016); thus, their required SCSM expertise is comparable. The spill-over of know-
how from other buyers in the same groups may improve a buyer’s capabilities in the 
negotiation of specific SCSM requirements and the resources allocated to the suppliers 
(Schotanus & Telgen, 2007). Suppliers’ investments heavily increase with the stringent 
SCSM mandates.  
Furthermore, Group SCSM creates institutional pressure and cause suppliers long-
term loss. Individual buyer mandates may merely cover a limited amount of suppliers. 
Group SCSM mandates, however, create an institutional pressure through the joint force 
between buyers, where the SCSM requests occur over entire supply markets, as pointed 
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out in the discussion in the group purchasing literature (Nollet & Beaulieu, 2005; 
Schotanus et al., 2010). Group SCSM is likely to constantly push sustainability 
performance required of suppliers in the competition. Suppliers may have to maintain 
operations in a long-term struggle with substantial costs in SCSM compliance.  
Carter and Rogers (2008) and Jacobs and Singhal (2017) discussed that the 
consolidation and standardization in SCSM compliance through the group approach of 
SCSM may reduce suppliers’ costs by otherwise meeting different requirements from 
individual buyers. However, there are substantial costs that may offset the potential 
benefit. The increase in buyers’ bargaining power, the stringency of SCSM compliance, 
and institutional pressure in supply markets add substantial costs to suppliers, suggesting 
a more negative financial performance for suppliers that comply with buyers using the 
group SCSM approach. It is, therefore, hypothesized,  
(S)H5. The suppliers that are required to comply with buyers by using the group SCSM 
approach will experience a more negative abnormal return to buyers’ SCSM 
announcements.  
2.5.2.6 Operational slack  
The theories of Swift, Even Flow (SEF) and Variation and Uncertainty Buffering 
(VUB) were introduced in section 2.2.3.3. In this section, drawing on the two theories, 
the buffer effect of operational slack on mitigating suppliers’ negative financial 
performance is discussed.  
Operational slack is defined as operational resources in excess of what is required to 
fulfill expected demand (Kovach et al., 2015). These operational resources are mainly 
firms’ physical assets, for example, machines and inventory. SEF and VUB have a 
contradictory view of operational slack. SEF maintains that operational slack degrades 
financial performance by adding variabilities in the even flow of operations. Lean 
management is very much in tune with SEF in reducing operational slack. However, VUB 
supports that the buffering mechanisms in the form of operational slack reduce the 
negative impact of variation and uncertainty on the even flow of operations. Previous 
studies have also provided empirical evidence on the mitigating effect of operational slack 
when various disruptions occur (Hendricks et al., 2009; Wood et al., 2017).  
The present research attempts to address the discussion in the literature while 
considering the effect of operational slack on suppliers’ financial performance in SCSM 
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compliance. The present research predicts that operational slack as a cushion upholds the 
even flow of suppliers’ operations in their compliance with SCSM, and thus reduces 
suppliers’ negative financial performance.  
2.5.2.6.1 The contradictory view on operational slack  
The theory of SEF suggests that high productivity is the best mechanism to improve 
firms’ financial performance, where productivity is defined as “getting more outputs from 
a given set of inputs” (Schmenner, 2015, p. 341). High productivity is ensured by a swift 
and even flow of materials and information in operations (Schmenner & Swink, 1998). 
Therefore, any disruption to the even flow of operations may degrade financial 
performance (Schmenner, 2001). Firms should continuously reduce variabilities to ensure 
the even flow of operations. These variabilities are mainly the additional resources in 
productions, such as spare inventory and overproduction (i.e., operational slack), so that 
“each day of production resembles every other day of production” (Schmenner, 2015, p. 
345).  
Lean management is very much in line with the theory of SEF (Seuring, 2009). Lean 
management proposes reducing ‘waste’ in search of operational efficiency (Hopp & 
Spearman, 2004); thus lean practitioners have a negative view of operational slack (Modi 
& Mishra, 2011). Lean management arose from the study of Japanese manufacturing 
techniques, particularly in the automobile industry (Womack et al., 1990). Lean 
management formulated the managerial philosophy that the operational problem is  an 
unceasing battle against ‘waste’, which represents non-value-added activities throughout 
a product’s entire value stream (Hajmohammad et al., 2013) and relates to a number of 
techniques (e.g., just-in-time [JIT]) and practices (e.g., inventory reduction ) to minimize 
the waste (Shah & Ward, 2007). Lean management is an integrated system that 
accomplishes the production of goods/services with minimal buffering costs in search of 
operational efficiency (Hopp & Spearman, 2004). The variability in supply, delivery time, 
and demand is managed through the integrated social-technical system (Shah & Ward, 
2007). In line with the theory of SEF, lean management views operational slack as an 
inefficient use of resources, which adds production costs to firms (Modi & Mishra, 2011).  
In contrast, the theory of VUB was developed from SEF and further discusses that 
there is still residual variation and uncertainty which disrupt the even flow of operations, 
given that firms have made efforts to ensure productivity by reducing variabilities in their 
operations (Stratton, 2008). Therefore, the extreme leanness in operations (e.g., 
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continuously cutting inventory) is harmful to financial performance. Buffering 
mechanisms as operational slack are effective in restoring the even flow following a 
disruption. Thus productivity and the negative impact of the disruption on the financial 
performance can be reduced (Stratton, 2012). VUB suggests three sources of buffering in 
the operational perspective are forward load (lead time buffer), inventory, and capacity 
(Stratton, 2008).   
The rapid change in markets and many external risks often result in unavoidable 
disruptions to the even flow of firms’ operations (Craighead et al., 2007). There is 
increasing recognition of the value of operational slack in response to the disruptions 
caused by residual variation and uncertainty. Kovach et al. (2015) discussed that there is 
growing demand instability in the market; managers should develop a response strategy 
through operational slack to hedge against the negative impact on firm performance. 
Azadegan et al. (2013) studied the role of operational slack on firm survival during the 
venture stage. They maintained that market uncertainty strongly threatens venture 
survival; firms, therefore, even in their early stages, must create operational slack to avoid 
failure. The studies of Hendricks et al. (2009) and Wood et al. (2017) investigated the 
effect of operational slack on firm performance in the case of stringent external risks. 
Hendricks et al. (2009) discussed the firms’ vulnerability under lean operations in supply 
chain disruptions. The authors found that operational slack is the most straightforward 
and effective strategy for dealing with operational disruption. Other practices (e.g., 
outsourcing, single sourcing, reducing the supplier base, and focusing on improving the 
efficiency of the supply chain) may create substantial costs in dealing with disruptions to 
the even flow of operations. Wood et al. (2017) studied the effect of operational slack in 
toy recalls and found operational slack mitigated the firms’ negative financial 
performance. Moreover, Wood et al. (2017) found that operational slack is more effective 
in reducing negative financial performance than financial slack (e.g., cash or cash 
equivalent), while financial slack was predicted to have a higher buffering effect due to 
its discretionary nature. In line with the theory of VUB, operational slack is a strategic 
reserve with operational flexibility to reallocate resources as necessary (Wood et al., 
2017), which provides a buffering effect to the disruption of the even flow of operations.  
2.5.2.6.2  The effectiveness of operational slack in the SCSM context 
In the SCSM context, SCSM compliance creates a disruption to the even flow of 
suppliers’ operations. Suppliers are forced to develop multi-criteria in their operations 
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(Cruz, 2009). It is necessary to implement environmental and social elements in 
operations in addition to the ordinary supplying criteria required by buyers (e.g., costs, 
quality, flexibility, and delivery), which substantially changes the manufacturing 
processes and schedules.  
In line with the propositions of the theory of VUB and previous studies (Hendricks et 
al., 2009; Kovach et al., 2015; Wood et al., 2017), this research maintains that strategic 
buffering mechanisms in the form of operational slack can mitigate the disruption to 
suppliers’ operations caused by SCSM compliance. Operational slack provides suppliers 
with the operational flexibility to allocate the necessary resources for absorbing the 
imposed costs of SCSM compliance. The cash flow through continuous sales to buyers 
supported by operational slack ensures rolling capital in existing and future operations. 
Suppliers, hence, are able to better cater to multiple competitive priorities (e.g., high 
environmental performance and flexibility) simultaneously without sacrificing financial 
performance. 
There are three major forms of operational slack that effectively mitigate negative 
financial performance in the face of a disruption to the even flow of firms’ operations: 
capacity slack, inventory slack, and supply chain slack2 (Hendricks et al., 2009; Kovach 
et al., 2015). Surplus capacity in the form of flexible machinery may strengthen suppliers’ 
ability to maintain the constant production of routine business and to update operations 
according to SCSM commitments. Inventory reserves, from raw materials to finished 
goods, reduce the production lead time and ensure continuous supply to various 
customers. There is broad consensus that higher levels of inventory slack buffer a firm 
from adverse conditions (Azadegan et al., 2013; Wood et al., 2017). Supply chain slack 
is estimated by the cash-to-cash cycle (Kovach et al., 2015), indicating the period between 
when suppliers pay their next tier suppliers and receive payment from their buyers. A 
high level of supply chain slack shows a positive cash flow in suppliers’ supply chain 
operations, which may provide a buffer for the SCSM investment. Therefore, it is 
hypothesized,  
(S)H6a. The suppliers with a higher level of capacity slack will experience a less negative 
abnormal return to buyers’ SCSM announcements. 
                                                          
2 The theory of VUB suggests forward load (i.e., lead time buffer) is also a form of buffering mechanism. Due to 
the constraint of secondary data used, forward load is not included in this research. Section 6.3 discuss this limitation 
for future research.  
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(S)H6b. The suppliers with a higher level of inventory slack will experience a less 
negative abnormal return to buyers’ SCSM announcements.  
(S)H6c. The suppliers with a higher level of supply chain slack will experience a less 
negative abnormal return to buyers’ SCSM announcements. 
2.5.2.7 Financial slack 
The buffering mechanisms discussed in the theory of VUB focus on operational slack 
(i.e., forward load, inventory, capacity). This research extends the theory of VUB by 
including financial slack as a form of buffering mechanism which mitigates suppliers’ 
negative financial performance.  
The slack may also be related to financial factors in firms, for example, working 
capital, borrowing capacity, or cash reserves (Bourgeois & Singh, 1983; Voss et al., 
2008), which refer to the firms’ ‘financial slack’ (Daniel et al., 2004). Prior studies have 
acknowledged the buffering effect of financial slack on business risks (Bourgeois & 
Singh, 1983; Bromiley, 1991). The meta-analysis by Daniel et al. (2004) found firms’ 
financial slack is positively related to financial performance. 
Financial slack provides additional resources for buffering suppliers’ negative 
financial performance in SCSM compliance. Tan and Peng (2003) discussed that financial 
slack is unabsorbed in operational activities and easy to redeploy. Financial slack is more 
generic and therefore a relatively less rare resource, which can be generated from external 
sources in relatively short order (Voss et al., 2008). As discussed earlier (see section 
2.5.2.1), SCSM compliance increases suppliers’ operational complexity. Therefore, when 
a buyer imposes SCSM, the concern is whether the supplier has quick access to additional 
financial resources to provide a buffer to maintain operational competence. A low level 
of financial slack indicates that there is reduced availability of capital resources, which 
will constrain the choices a supplier has while investing in making the changes required 
to comply with the buyers’ requirements. In contrast, if a supplier has a high level of 
financial slack, they will be more flexible in how they approach implementation changes 
required to comply with SCSM.  
Firms’ leverage is used to measure the financial slack in this research. A firm’s 
leverage indicates the ratio of total debt to total assets and is often used to evaluate firms’ 
borrowing capacity (Daniel et al., 2004). A low level of leverage indicates a high level of 
financial slack, which “consists of future resources that can be generated from the markets 
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by raising additional debt or equity capital”(Cheng & Kesner, 1997, p. 2). A low level of 
leverage is found to be an effective form of financial slack relating to financial 
performance (Daniel et al., 2004).  
The use of leverage as the alternative form of financial slack in this research 
complements the studies of Voss et al. (2008) and Wood et al. (2017). In both studies, the 
buffering effect of financial slack was tested using different measures (i.e., inventory-
adjusted working capital and cash reserves) when a disruption to the even flow of 
operations occurred (i.e., toy recalls and product exploration and exploitation). However, 
both studies found an insignificant effect of financial slack. Wood et al. (2017) called for 
future research to use an alternative form of financial slack to further test the mitigating 
effect. This research answers that call by using leverage as the form of financial slack and 
provides additional evidence on the effect.  
Buyers’ SCSM creates a disruption to suppliers’ operations due to the additional 
requirements on environmental and social performance. A high level of suppliers’ 
leverage reduces the financial slack that suppliers may deploy to maintain operational 
competence. Thus, it is hypothesized,  
(S)H7. The suppliers with a high level of leverage (a low level of financial slack) will 
experience a more negative abnormal return to buyers’ SCSM announcements.  
2.5.2.8 The interaction between financial slack and supplier’s 
dependence on buyer 
Financial slack is generic and discretionary resources, which can be generated 
internally via multiple means or from many external sources in relatively short order 
(Voss et al., 2008). While the discretionary nature enables firms to deploy financial slack 
easily and quickly, financial slack (e.g., low leverage) may also represent the firms’ 
underinvestment and inefficient use of these unabsorbed resources to expand the firms’ 
current routines and thus create opportunity costs (Mishina et al., 2004). Therefore, the 
benefits of financial slack may be offset by these opportunity costs.  
Some studies have found that the mitigating effect of financial slack is not strong 
unless additional disruptive conditions increase the requirement of buffering resources. 
Voss et al. (2008) found that financial slack alone is not significantly effective in 
supporting product exploration and exploitation, but the interaction effect of financial 
slack with a high level of environmental threat (i.e., an additional disruptive condition) is 
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significant in reducing business risks in product exploration and exploitation. Similar 
results were found by Mishina et al. (2004) who studied firms’ pursuit of sales growth. 
The authors found financial slack alone does not have a significant effect in upholding 
sales growth, but financial slack has as a significant buffering effect when the sales 
growth is pursued additionally through product expansion (i.e., developing new products 
for an existing market). These previous studies indicate that the buffering effect of 
financial slack is conditional. The additional disruptive conditions trigger the necessity 
of the buffer by using financial slack.  
In this research, the interaction effect of financial slack and supplier’s dependence on 
buyer is tested to capture the effectiveness of financial slack under additional disruptive 
conditions. A high level of dependence on a buyer indicates that the transaction with the 
buyer takes a greater percentage of a supplier’s overall business. The supplier, thus, has 
a greater need to comply with the buyer’s SCSM to ensure continuous sales, which 
increases the supplier’s transaction costs and creates additional disruption to the even 
flow of operations. The main concern is likely to be the availability of capital provided 
by financial slack to support the suppliers’ constant operations. The mitigating effect of 
financial slack in SCSM at a high level of dependence on buyers may outweigh the 
potential opportunity costs of holding the additional capital.  
A high level of leverage under a high level of a supplier’s dependence on buyer shows 
the supplier’s incapability from the perspective of financial resources in its SCSM 
compliance, which is likely to substantially increase the negativity of financial 
performance. Therefore, it is hypothesized,  
(S)H8. Where there is a high level of supplier’s dependency on buyer (SDB), the suppliers 
that have a high level of leverage (a low level of financial slack) will experience a more 
negative abnormal return to buyers’ SCSM announcements.  
2.5.2.9 Summary of the hypotheses in supplier analysis 
This section finishes the hypothesis development about suppliers’ financial 
performance. A summary of the hypotheses is given in  
Table 2.2. The present research hypothesizes that suppliers have negative financial 
performance when they comply with their buyers’ SCSM. However, the suppliers’ 
financial performance is influenced by supply chain power, operational and financial 
slack, governance mechanisms, group SCSM, and SCSM dimensions. Additionally, 
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financial slack and supplier’s dependence on buyer may interactively influence the 
financial performance.  
The next section uses the concept of the green bullwhip effect to provide a comparative 
analysis between paired buyers’ and suppliers’ financial performance. 
Table 2.2 Summary of the Hypotheses in Supplier Analysis 
Hypothesis Hypothesis number Predicted sign Section number 
Suppliers’ financial performance when they are 
required to comply with their buyers’ SCSM 
(S)H1 Negative 2.5.2.1 
The factors that influence suppliers’ financial performance when they comply with buyers’ SCSM 
Hypothesis Hypothesis number Predicted sign Section number 
Supplier’s dependence on buyer (the measure of 
supply chain power) 
(S)H2a Negative 2.5.2.2 
Buyer’s dependence on supplier (the measure of 
supply chain power) 
(S)H2b Positive 2.5.2.2 
Relationship length (the measure of supply chain 
power) 
(S)H2c Negative 2.5.2.2.3 
sSCSM (SCSM dimension) (S)H3 Positive 2.5.2.3 
Third-party certification (governance mechanisms) (S)H4 Negative 2.5.2.4 
Group SCSM (S)H5 Negative 2.5.2.5 
Capacity slack (the measure of operational slack) (S)H6a Positive 2.5.2.6 
Inventory slack (the measure of operational slack) (S)H6b Positive 2.5.2.6 
Supply chain slack (the measure of operational slack) (S)H6c Positive 2.5.2.6 
Leverage (the measure of financial slack)* (S)H7 Negative 2.5.2.7 
The interaction term of leverage (the measure of 
financial slack) and supplier’s dependence on buyer 
(S)H8 Negative 2.5.2.8 
Note*: Financial slack is measured by leverage. A high level of leverage indicates a low level of financial slack, leading 
to negative financial performance for suppliers in SCSM. 
2.5.3  Different financial performance of buyers and their 
suppliers in SCSM in link with the green bullwhip effect 
The ‘green bullwhip effect’ refers to the bullwhip effect from the perspective of 
environmental requirements transferred in supply chains. The green bullwhip effect 
suggests that buyers transfer environmental requirements to their suppliers with more 
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stringent practices and a compressed timeline than what is actually required by 
downstream stakeholders (Lee et al., 2014). In this research, the interest is in the financial 
consequences of the green bullwhip effect. The present research predicts the financial 
performance of suppliers is more negative than that of their buyers, as the green bullwhip 
effect from financial performance perspective indicates buyers’ shift of the costs to their 
suppliers.  
2.5.3.1 The classic bullwhip effect  
The classic bullwhip effect is introduced as the background before moving on to the 
discussion of the green bullwhip effect. The classic bullwhip effect refers to the 
phenomenon that “the orders to the supplier tend to have large variance than sales to the 
buyers (i.e., demand distortion), and the distortion propagates upstream in an amplified 
form (i.e., variance amplification)” (Lee et al., 1997a, p. 546). This phenomenon is costly 
to firms because it causes excessive inventories, poor product forecasts, insufficient or 
excessive capacities, poor customer service, and uncertain production planning (Lee et 
al., 1997a). Four causes of the bullwhip effect are the distortion of information, increasing 
batch size to reduce the setup costs, logistics delay, and rationing gaming (Lee et al., 
1997a, 1997b). Rationing gaming is the primary cause of the classic bullwhip effect and 
highly relevant to SCSM (Lee et al., 2014), indicating that the bullwhip effect is an 
outcome of strategic interaction among supply chain partners. Bounded rationality creates 
risks and uncertainty in buyers’ coordination of their supply chains (e.g., the possible 
delivery delay from suppliers). Buyers attempt to build a buffer to reduce risks and 
uncertainty by amplifying the order information to their suppliers (Croson et al., 2013).  
2.5.3.2 The green bullwhip effect 
Following the discussion of the classic bullwhip effect, Lee et al. (2014) used case 
studies to develop the concept of the ‘green bullwhip effect’. The green bullwhip effect 
supports that the requirements of environmental performance by upstream suppliers are 
effectively transferred from downstream stakeholders by buyers using supply chain 
power, as discussed in section 2.3.2. However, the environmental performance required 
by buyers of their suppliers do not need to match the requirements demanded by 
downstream stakeholders. Buyers attempt to distort the information to their suppliers, 
where the requirements of environmental performance are more stringent and compressed 
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in the timeline than what is actually demanded by downstream stakeholders. Support for 
the green bullwhip effect is provided by the study of Seles et al. (2016) who investigated 
a wider supply chain and a different industry.  
The main cause of the green bullwhip effect is the rationing gaming by buyers, which 
builds a buffer to reduce buyers’ business risks and costs (Lee et al., 2014). Suppliers are 
required to invest substantial resources and develop sufficient capabilities to meet the 
environmental performance expected by buyers (Giunipero et al., 2012). The 
improvement of environmental performance takes time and depends on suppliers’ 
capabilities and managerial motivations (Hoejmose & Adrien-Kirby, 2012). There is a 
high level of uncertainty on whether suppliers’ environmental performance can be 
improved within the time frame and conditions as required by buyers’ downstream 
stakeholders. The uncertainty increases buyers’ supply chain sustainability risk and 
associated costs. In order to reduce the uncertainty, buyers impose more rigorous 
compliance in a compressed timeline on their suppliers, which creates a buffer to the 
potential delay or low commitment that suppliers may have. The buffer can facilitate 
buyers to meet their downstream stakeholders’ demands on environmental performance, 
and reduce the costs associated with supply chain sustainability risks.  
From the perspective of environmental performance, Lee et al. (2014) discussed that 
the green bullwhip effect results in a positive change in supply chains. The green bullwhip 
effect speeds up and expands the adoption of environmental practices in supply chains. 
Spill-over benefits are created by the green bullwhip effect, which improves supply chain 
environmental performance.  
2.5.3.3 The financial consequence of the green bullwhip effect  
The present research investigates the financial performance in line with the green 
bullwhip effect, including both the environmental and social dimensions of SCSM. The 
green bullwhip effect in relation to the environmental dimension of SCSM was originally 
found by Lee et al. (2014). Lee et al. (2016) further applied their own finding of the green 
bullwhip effect in the context of both the environmental and social dimensions, providing 
support for the use of the green bullwhip effect in the social dimension of SCSM. The 
present research follows Lee’s studies to discuss the financial consequence of the green 
bullwhip effect in the SCSM context, where both environmental and social dimensions 
of SCSM are covered.  
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From the financial performance perspective, the green bullwhip effect indicates buyers 
shift of their SCSM costs to their suppliers, suggesting more negative financial 
performance for suppliers than their buyers in SCSM. As discussed in section 2.5.3.2, the 
main cause of the green bullwhip effect is the intention of buyers to build a buffer to 
reduce the uncertainty in suppliers’ SCSM compliance. The buffer reduces buyers’ two 
kinds of transaction costs in SCSM. First, a higher and earlier scale of sustainability 
requirements reduces the costs that buyers might have in terms of suppliers’ opportunism. 
Sustainability performance at the supplier level is process-based (Foerstl et al., 2015), and 
is, therefore, commonly hidden in suppliers’ operations (Tachizawa & Wong, 2015). This 
increases buyers’ bounded rationality and suppliers’ opportunism by violating the pre-
agreed environmental and social conditions. Suppliers’ opportunism increases buyers’ 
costs of supply chain sustainability risk. A higher and earlier scale of sustainability 
requirement ensures a certain level of supplier sustainability performance, and thus 
buffers the costs of suppliers’ opportunism that buyers may have.  
Second, buyers can reduce their costs in the negotiation of SCSM compliance with 
suppliers. Buyers distort the information of sustainability requirements to their suppliers. 
The highly rigorous requirements in a compressed timeline amplify the urgency of the 
demand from downstream stakeholders. Buyers have a favorable position in negotiation 
with their suppliers over SCSM compliance, which reduces the necessity to provide an 
incentive to suppliers (i.e., negotiation costs) (Adobor & McMullen, 2014).  
The reduction in buyers’ transaction costs is attributed to increased supplier 
compliance costs. From the perspective of suppliers, the variety of overly rigorous 
practices imposed by buyers forces suppliers to overinvest in improving sustainability 
performance. Upstream suppliers are expected to have substantial costs in responding to 
the green bullwhip effect (Seles et al., 2016). The green bullwhip effect is caused by 
buyers’ providing their suppliers with distorted information concerning SCSM, which 
reduces the buyers’ SCSM transaction costs but increases suppliers’ compliance costs. 
From a financial performance perspective, the green bullwhip effect indicates buyers’ 
shift of their SCSM costs to their suppliers by using distorted information. Therefore, in 
this research, the financial performance of suppliers is predicted to be more negative than 
that of their buyers in SCSM.  
By using survey-based research, Schmidt et al. (2017) applied the green bullwhip 
effect in the investigation of the financial performance of firms in different supply chain 
positions. Contrary to the predictions, the authors found the firms in downstream supply 
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chains (i..e, OEM, distributor/retailer) had worse financial performance than those in 
upstream supply chains (component and raw material supplier). Schmidt et al. (2017) 
named their finding the ‘supply chain paradox’.  
The possible reason for the supply chain paradox is that Schmidt et al. (2017) focused 
on generic supply chain positions rather than paired supply chain partners (buyers and 
their paired suppliers in the same supply chain). As noted in the methodology section in 
the study of Schmidt et al. ( 2017, pp. 9, 12), “A total 750 randomly selected companies 
from German-speaking Europe were contacted […]. Informants were asked to choose 
their business units’ position within the supply chain.” Thus, it is likely that these 
component and raw material suppliers may not have been the suppliers working in the 
same supply chains as these OEM, distributors, and retailers (i.e., buyers). However, the 
green bullwhip effect is consistently found between paired supply chain partners, because 
the closed partnership can facilitate buyers to effectively transfer the amplified 
sustainability requirements to their suppliers, as demonstrated in the studies of Lee et al. 
(2014) and Seles et al. (2016).  
The present research utilizes the sample of buyers and their paired suppliers working 
in the same supply chains. The analysis is grounded on this paired partnership and is 
likely to reveal the performance difference between buyers and suppliers in line with the 
green bullwhip effect. It is, therefore, hypothesizes that, 
(BS)H1. Suppliers will experience a more negative abnormal return than their buyers in 
response to buyers’ SCSM announcements.  
2.6 Chapter conclusion 
The literature has largely moved the discussion on sustainability to the supply chain 
context, with increasing understanding of the contribution of supply chain partners to 
overall sustainability performance. Drawing on the concepts of sustainability and SCM, 
SCSM has been developed. The procurement/purchasing perspective of SCSM has been 
largely discussed in the literature, where downstream buyers mandate their immediate 
suppliers to improve environmental and social performance.  
Developed from stakeholder theory and RDT, stakeholder pressure on SCSM as a 
systematic approach is transferred from downstream at the point of sales through buyers’ 
mandates to upstream suppliers (Hall, 2000).  
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It remains uncertain if buyers’ financial performance increases with the adoption of 
SCSM. This research hypothesized buyers’ negative financial performance from the view 
of the increased transaction costs and the disruption to the even flow of buyers’ 
operations. Moreover, the five factors that are predicted to influence buyers’ financial 
performance when they adopt SCSM focus on the nature of SCSM (e.g., SCSM 
dimensions) and firm-specific characteristics (e.g., supplier relationship management).  
There is a lack of studies on suppliers’ financial performance when they are required 
to comply with their buyers’ SCSM. Using the theory of SEF, suppliers’ compliance and 
implementation costs have been discussed, and thus negative financial performance for 
the suppliers that comply with SCSM is predicted in this research. Moreover, seven 
factors are predicted to influence suppliers’ financial performance in SCSM. These 
factors focus on the nature of SCSM (e.g., SCSM dimensions) from suppliers’ perspective 
and suppliers’ capabilities and resources such as operational slack in connection with the 
theory of VUB.  
The green bullwhip effect suggests that in transferring downstream stakeholders’ 
demand for sustainability to their suppliers, buyers impose more rigorous SCSM practices 
and a shorter timeline of compliance on their suppliers than what is actually demanded 
by downstream stakeholders. This research adopts the green bullwhip effect and discusses 
the more negative financial performance that suppliers may experience than do their 
buyers in SCSM, suggesting buyers’ shift of the costs of SCSM to their suppliers.  
Event study methodology is used in this research to test these hypotheses. In contrast 
to the dominant use of perceptual data in the literature, the concrete and objective 
financial performance data used in event study methodology avoids the social desirability 
bias and ensures robustness of the research findings.  
The underlying reasoning for the methodology and detailed research methods and 
steps will be described in the next chapter.  
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Chapter 3. Methodology  
In the preceding chapter, the review of SCSM literature identified the research gaps 
and formulated research objectives and questions. The impact of SCSM was hypothesized 
to be negative on buyers’ and suppliers’ financial performance; the different SCSM 
attributes (e.g., group SCSM) and firm-specific characteristics (e.g., operational slack) 
were discussed to influence the negativity of financial performance. 
This chapter illustrates how these research questions were investigated. Figure 3.1 
shows an overview of this chapter. Based on positivist thinking, event study methodology 
is utilized in this research. Event study methodology uses the change of stock returns in 
response to an SCSM announcement (i.e., abnormal returns) as the measure of financial 
performance. The different SCSM attributes and firm-specific characteristics can be 
tested in cross-sectional regression models as independent variables in relation to the 
change of stock returns. 
The sample data for buyers and suppliers were collected and tested by using different 
methods. While standard data collection methods in event study methodology were used 
for the buyer sample, the methods for ‘related firms’ were adopted for the supplier 
sample. Due to the nature of the sample, portfolio cumulative abnormal returns were used 
to test suppliers’ financial performance, and standard estimation methods were applied 
for analyzing buyers’ financial performance. The hypothesized variables were 
constructed to enable the tests in cross-sectional regression models. The difference in 
estimated abnormal returns for buyers and suppliers was tested by using paired sample t-
test to show the difference in financial performance, which is discussed at the end of this 
chapter.  




Event study methodology overview
(Section 3.2) 
Methods of collecting the data of sample firms
(Section 3.3)










Figure 3.1 Structure of Methodology Chapter 
3.1 Philosophical paradigm 
Researchers typically start with a real-life issue that needs to be addressed, a problem 
that needs to be solved, and a question that needs to be answered, as discussed in Chapter 
2 in this research. Subsequently, methodology and methods are considered to investigate 
the specific research questions. Thus, the research design is always driven by the research 
questions that the researchers want to answer (Crotty, 1998). Philosophy literature states 
that the choice of methodology and methods is influenced by ontological and 
epistemological stances, which is embedded and institutionalized in people’s common 
research schools (Gray, 2014). The congruent decisions made in each of these elements 
create a paradigm in research (Collis & Hussey, 2003). Therefore, it is necessary to 
demonstrate the philosophical paradigm in the present research to justify the methodology 
and methods used for investigating the research questions.  
Chapter 3 Methodology 
104 
A paradigm is a systematic set of beliefs, together with their accompanying methods 
(Lincoln & Guba, 1985). The four key elements are illustrated in the far left column of 
Table 3.1. Ontology deals with the nature of reality. Epistemology is concerned with the 
nature of knowledge and justification, in particular, the relationship between researchers 
and research objects. Ontology and epistemology tend to emerge together as the 
philosophical stance on the nature of reality and determine the methodology and methods, 
which are the ways researchers gain knowledge of the world (Steenhuis & Bruijn, 2006). 
Table 3.1 also provides two paradigms according to the different elements. The present 
research utilizes a positivist paradigm as discussed in the sections below.   
Table 3.1 Research Paradigm (adapted from Collis and Hussey [2003] and Gray 
[2014]) 
Element Positivist paradigm Interpretivist paradigm 
Ontology Reality is singular and objective 
Reality is subjective and 
multiple as seen by participants 
in a study 
Epistemology 
Researchers are independent of what 
is being researched 
Researchers interact with what 
is being researched 
Methodology 
Experimental/manipulative; 
verification of hypotheses; chiefly 
quantitative and deductive approach 
Hermeneutical/dialectical; 
chiefly qualitative and 
inductive approach 
Method 
Operationalizing concepts so that the 
concepts can be measured; using a 
large sample from which to generalize 
to the population; statistical tests 
Using small samples 
researched in depth or over 
time; interview 
3.1.1 Ontology 
Ontology is the fundamental base of all paradigms. It is the study of the nature being, 
existence, or reality (Crotty, 1998). In other words, ontology answers if people believe 
“real” reality exists and if and how it can be elucidated. The objectives of this research 
are to investigate the impact of firms’ SCSM on financial performance and provide firms 
with strategies to manage SCSM with the minimum financial loss. Thus, the present 
research posits a cause-effect relationship of the “true” reality which can be elucidated 
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through empirical inquiry (Gray, 2014). Moreover, the present research intends to provide 
the findings with a high level of generalizability, which suggests the belief of a singular, 
objective, and stable external reality. Consequently, the assumption of world reality 
utilizing a time- and context-free generalization puts this research’s ontological stance in 
the positivist paradigm, as shown in Table 3.1. 
3.1.2 Epistemology  
Epistemology refers to the validity and legitimacy of knowledge and involves an 
examination of the relationship between researchers and research object (Collis & 
Hussey, 2003; Gray, 2014). The epistemological stance must be consistent with the 
previously declared ontological stance (Grant & Giddings, 2002). Therefore, the 
epistemological stance taken in this research is “objective and detached observation” 
(Guba & Lincoln, 1994, p. 110), which indicates the observations of the financial 
consequence of the firms’ SCSM must not be influenced by the researcher; the researcher 
must also not be influenced by the observations. Hence, the validity and legitimacy of the 
findings in the present research can be ensured.  
3.1.3 Positivist paradigm 
The ontological and epistemological stances of the researcher result in the positivist 
paradigm that is applied in the present research. Such a paradigm is characterized by an 
objectivist view of organizations (Guba & Lincoln, 1994). In this perspective, the reality 
is stable and singular; there is a pre-existing pattern or order to the facts (Grant & 
Giddings, 2002). Therefore, a ‘cause-effect’ relationship can be established to study the 
facts in social science. By resting on this causal relationship, the search for the effects of 
those factors provides facts or evidence. Moreover, these facts or evidence are intended 
to be generalized to a large population, because the objective observations and measures 
owing to the stable reality avoid the bias of facts created by the researchers. Thus, the 
facts hold true across samples. The combined facts and evidence in causal relationships 
create a specific ‘body of knowledge’(Grant & Giddings, 2002).  
Positivists generate knowledge by deductive reasoning, where hypotheses are 
developed to confirm, refute, or modify the principle (Gray, 2014). These hypotheses 
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contain two or more concepts of the principle that attempts to be explained in the causal 
relationships. Since empirical observation or experiment is used to test these hypotheses, 
the operationalization of these concepts is important in deductive reasoning, which 
defines a way in which these concepts can be observed to confirm that they have occurred 
(Gray, 2014). 
Through the review of the existing literature in Chapter 2, there exists a theoretical 
framework to help the researcher understand the nature of SCSM and to develop and 
hypothesize the causal relationships between SCSM related attributes and firms’ financial 
performance. The tests on these relationships provide empirical evidence on the theories 
applied in the SCSM context. Moreover, the concepts in these hypothesized relationships 
can be measured through operational indicators. Conclusively, the positivist paradigm is 
used in the research, which defines the appropriate methodology and methods needed to 
examine the research questions in this research. 
Event study methodology is in line with a positivist paradigm (Coutts et al., 1994). 
Event study methodology is used to investigate the stock returns in response to SCSM 
announcements, which represents the cause (i.e., SCSM announcements) and the effect 
(i.e., stock returns). The stock returns are the objective measure of firms’ financial 
performance. Statistical and econometric techniques are employed to give the result an 
aura of credibility (Coutts et al., 1994); the moderating factors can be hypothesized and 
tested against the stock returns. These characteristics reflect the nature of a quantitative 
method with deductive reasoning. Given the fit to the positivist paradigm, event study 
methodology was chosen to achieve the three research objectives explicated in Chapter 
1. Next, the details of this methodology will be introduced.  
3.2 Event study methodology 
The purpose of an event study is to examine the behavior of firms’ stock returns around 
corporate events (Kothari & Warner, 2007). Event studies isolate the incremental impact 
of a corporate event (i.e., announcement) on stock returns; the component of stock returns 
due to firm-specific events is adjusted for market factors, and these adjusted returns are 
referred as to ‘abnormal returns’ (Hendricks & Singhal, 1996). The magnitude of 
abnormal returns at the time of an event provides a measure of the impact of this type of 
event on firms’ financial performance (Kothari & Warner, 2007). Subsequently, 
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researchers may relate the abnormal returns to firm characteristics in cross-sectional 
regression analysis, where the most important attributes for explaining the variation of 
abnormal returns across firms can be explored (Fisher-Vanden & Thorburn, 2011; 
McWilliams & Siegel, 1997). 
Event study has been extensively used in operations and supply chain research (e.g., 
Hendricks et al., 2009; Jacobs & Singhal, 2017; Wood & Wang, 2018; Wood et al., 2017). 
The operations and supply chain management practices (e.g., operations and production 
changes, forecasting and planning, inventory and capacity management) are 
positively/negatively related to firms’ operational competence, which results in the 
increase/decrease of the direct financial metrics (e.g., cash flow) and intangible assets 
(e.g., credibility). In turn, these changes in financial metrics and intangible assets flow to 
improved/deteriorated stock returns. There are several important steps in the causality 
incorporated by the measure of stock returns (Wood & Wang, 2018). Therefore, the value 
of the equity of a firm is the estimate of the overall impact of these operations and supply 
chain management practices on firms.  
Besides the usefulness in operations and supply chain research, event study 
methodology provides advantages in SCSM research over the use of other methodologies 
to answer the research questions in this research.    
3.2.1 Advantages of event study methodology in SCSM 
research 
There is a large methodological gap in the SCSM literature, where survey-based 
research and case study are dominant (Ashby et al., 2012). While the use of two 
methodologies in SCSM research is likely to create specific bias, event study 
methodology may provide advantages in correspondence to the focus of this research.  
First, case study as an inductive approach puts more focuses on theory developing and 
diffusion of sustainability discourses rather than a practical application (Ashby et al., 
2012). Case study is a valuable tool for the generation of theories (Eisenhardt, 1989). 
However, case studies have a limitation to provide explicit practical outputs such as 
models or tools associated with the implementation of SCSM practices (Ashby et al., 
2012). SCSM is a fundamentally practical discipline and based on “real world” supply 
chain situations; research needs to explicitly translate sustainability theories into 
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practices. Further, case study is criticized as merely illustrating the successful stories of 
SCSM (López-Gamero et al., 2010; Seuring & Müller, 2008) within a niche population 
(van Beurden & Gössling, 2008).  
The focus of this research is on theory testing rather than theory developing. Therefore, 
event study methodology is more fitting to this research than case study. Event study 
methodology is a deductive approach which uses statistical tests to assess the developed 
hypotheses. The impacts of SCSM and the related aspects identified by using the measure 
of stock returns provide managers with explicit evidence of what the best SCSM 
implementation tools are regarding firms’ financial benefits. Moreover, event study 
methodology often utilizes a large sample to provide generalized outcomes. The data 
(e.g., announcements and stock prices) used in event study methodology are available 
from public sources; the objectiveness of these public data reduces the bias of selecting 
any single dimension in the research.  
Second, survey-based research is criticized for not addressing the social desirability 
bias in SCSM research (Carter & Easton, 2011; Mullainathan & Bertrand, 2001; Walker 
et al., 2012). Social desirability bias refers to “the tendency of study participants to 
provide answers and share perspectives that they believe will be viewed favorably by the 
research” (Carter & Easton, 2011, p. 56). Survey-based research commonly uses 
perceptual measures on either firms’ SCSM or financial performance, where respondents 
are often asked their views on sustainability operations through either a questionnaire or 
interview. However, respondents are often compelled to give a positive impression of 
their own and their organization’s activities; the results may show a stronger effect  size 
than exists (Walker et al., 2012; Wood & Wang, 2018), because respondents want to 
avoid looking bad in the research relating to sustainability issues (Mullainathan & 
Bertrand, 2001). The subjective nature of questioning in survey-based research makes 
social desirability bias inevitable in the investigation of sustainability issues. Nonetheless, 
there is a large majority of survey research which has not addressed bias in the findings 
(Carter & Easton, 2011). This bias reflects the discussion on the epistemological stance 
of this research (section 3.1.2.). The closeness of researchers to the researched in survey-
based research with regard to SCSM issues creates a problem in terms of the objectiveness 
of the observations, and thus threatens the validity and legitimacy of the findings.  
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The secondary data used in event study methodology helps this research overcome 
social desirability bias. Stock returns provide an unbiased measurement of financial 
performance. The objective data does not suffer from a positive self-evaluation bias, thus 
avoiding social desirability bias (Dam & Petkova, 2014).  
Moreover, stock returns are a measure encompassing intangible assets (Hendricks et 
al., 2017). Intangible assets (e.g., reputation, stakeholder legitimacy) are discussed as the 
main benefits to firms adopting SCSM (Busse, 2016; Golicic & Smith, 2013). Investors 
incorporate these intangle assets if any in their evaluation of firms’ future cash flows, and 
thus, stock returns contain the changes of these intangle assets (Jacobs & Singhal, 2017; 
Jacobs et al., 2010). Hence, the holistic estimate of SCSM policies including firms’ 
intangible assets may be explored by using event study methodology (Dam & Petkova, 
2014).  
Finally, public policy decision-making is the interest of studies on firms’ SCSM issues; 
however, it has been difficult for researchers to research this area because of the problems 
involved in measuring the impact of managerial decisions (McWilliams & Siegel, 1997). 
Event study methodology can posit a relationship between the parties involved in SCSM 
issues and solve the difficulty of measures. Because firms’ SCSM decisions involve the 
relationship with shareholders (for profit enhancement) and society (for the benefits to 
other stakeholders), the impact of SCSM decisions measured by stock returns may 
directly reflect the relationship (McWilliams & Siegel, 1997).  
Event study methodology has a clear fit for the focus of this research and avoids social 
desirability bias common in SCSM research. While case study and survey-based research 
are currently dominant in SCSM research (Ashby et al., 2012; Touboulic & Walker, 
2015), the present research expects to explore the SCSM-firm performance link from a 
different methodological perspective. By using event study methodology, the findings of 
this research provide a meaningful comparison with different methodological 
perspectives by using case study and survey-based research for the triangulation of 
reliability and validity (Carter & Easton, 2011).  
The results from event study methodology can only be considered valid with three 
assumptions. The next sections discuss these assumptions.  
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3.2.2 The assumptions in event study methodology  
Three assumptions in event study methodology are the efficient market hypothesis, the 
unanticipated nature of the event being examined, and no confounding events biasing the 
abnormal returns.  
3.2.2.1 Efficient market hypothesis  
The first assumption underpinning event study is the efficient market hypothesis. It 
asserts that stock prices will respond rapidly to the information contained in public 
announcements and that the market’s response will include the capitalization of future 
costs and benefits associated with this event (Hendricks, Singhal, & Wiedman, 1995). 
This hypothesis highlights the two crucial sources of data in an event study: stock returns 
and public announcements. Given the rationality of the marketplace, a measure of the 
financial impact of an event (announcement) can be constructed using observed stock 
returns (MacKinlay, 1997).  
According to the scale of rationality in stock markets, Fama (1970) categorized three 
forms of market efficiency: weak, semi-strong, and strong. A weak market efficiency 
indicates that the information subset of interest is just past stock price (or return) histories, 
where the stock market movement is random. A semi-strong market efficiency asserts 
that stock prices reflect all the relevant information that is publicly available. A strong 
market efficiency asserts that information that is known to any participant is reflected in 
stock prices (Cohen & Frazzini, 2008). Strong market efficiency is believed to be a poor 
description of reality (Fama, 1970). In most event studies, semi-strong efficient markets 
are commonly accepted, as the stock market fluctuation can be tracked by public 
announcements.  
The U.S. stock markets are justified in having semi-strong market efficiency and are 
often used in event studies (Hendricks & Singhal, 2005, 2008a, 2009). Other stock 
markets commonly applied in event study methodology are European, Japanese, Korean, 
and Taiwan stock markets (Campbell, Cowan, & Salotti, 2010; Hendricks et al., 2017; 
Jacobs & Singhal, 2017; Park, 2004). The present research uses the data (e.g., 
announcements and stock returns) from these stock markets to ensure an efficient market 
hypothesis.  
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3.2.2.2 Unanticipated events 
The second assumption of event study methodology is ‘unanticipated events’. The 
events are the ‘announcements’ made by public firms to release new pertinent information 
to the public. Unanticipated events indicate these announcements are not available to 
investors until the announcement date. Investors, therefore, can immediately absorb the 
information in the announcements and interpret it through their collective actions, price, 
and their assumptions concerning stock returns for the firms (Wood & Wang, 2018). The 
dates of unanticipated events can ascertain the accuracy of observations on stock returns 
relating to the announcements of interest. 
To ensure unanticipated events, the present research followed the literature (e.g., 
Eroglu, Kurt, & Elwakil, 2016; Jacobs et al., 2010) by drawing the announcement sample 
from major business sources in the Factiva database. These business sources include PR 
Newswire, Business Wire, Wall Street Journal, Dow Jones Newswire, Financial Times, 
Nikkei News (Japanese Market), ENP Newswire (European Markets), and Maeli 
Business News (South Korean Market). The announcements collected from these major 
business sources were most likely the earliest available to the markets. Thus, the 
observations of daily stock returns on the announcement date may capture the genuine 
impact of the events.  
However, under some circumstances, an event may be anticipated, or information 
might otherwise find its way to the market before the formal announcement date, which 
is an ‘information leakage’. An event might also be visible to investors later than formal 
announcement date; which is an ‘information delay’ (Wood & Wang, 2018). Commonly, 
a short-term ‘event window’ is set to capture the overall stock returns to the 
announcements if there is information leakage or delay (Kothari & Warner, 2007). The 
window should be as small as practical to capture the unanticipated event while 
acknowledging the possibility that an event has been anticipated before the formal 
announcement date, or the impact of the event is delayed in the market after 
announcement date (McWilliams & Siegel, 1997).  
In this research, the announcement sample was collected from multiple business 
sources and various source countries (e.g., Japan, U.S., Germany). In order to cover the 
different time zones across countries/stock exchanges, a three-day event window was 
used to incorporate the overall stock returns. This event window is commonly used in 
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event studies to correct for information leakage and delay (Fisher-Vanden & Thorburn, 
2011; Klassen & McLaughlin, 1996; Kothari & Warner, 2007). The announcement day 
is defined as ‘day 0’. The trading day immediately prior to the announcement day is ‘day 
-1’ and the day immediately following the announcement day is ‘day 1’. The three-day 
event window in this research is (-1, 1).  
3.2.2.3 Confounding events 
The third assumption is that other events have been isolated from the event of interest. 
Other contemporaneous announcements made by the public firms within the event 
window (i.e., [-1,1] in this research) have a confounding effect on stock returns, which 
are, however, unrelated to the events of interest (i.e., SCSM relevant announcements). 
Thus, the observations in the sample (i.e., the public firms) must be excluded if 
confounding events are identified in the same event windows. 
In this research, confounding events (e.g., earnings announcements, dividend 
declaration, top management change, merger/acquisition) (Jacobs & Singhal, 2017) were 
searched in Factiva, and if any of these announcements fell in the three-day event window 
of the observations in the sample, the observations were excluded. In total, 16 
observations in the analysis of buyers and 120 observations in the analysis of suppliers 
were excluded by using this approach.  
By holding three assumptions, the sample data were collected with the methods 
discussed in the next sections.  
3.3 Sample collection methods 
The general description of sample data collection methods in an event study with 
relevance to this research is illustrated in Figure 3.2. While the buyer sample was 
generally collected following these standard methods, the supplier sample was collected 
using the method of ‘related firms’, which requires additional processes to the flow in 
Figure 3.2. In the next sections, each of these steps will be introduced in detail to validate 
the data in the analysis.   
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Identifying the announcements of interests (i.e., SCSM 
announcements)
Deriving public firms  identities and event dates from the 
announcement content
Retrieving stock return data based on the public firms  
identities and events date
 
Figure 3.2 Sample Data Collection Flow in a Standard Event Study 
3.3.1 SCSM announcement  
The interest of this research is to test the firm performance of buyers and their suppliers 
when buyers require their suppliers to comply with SCSM. Therefore, the announcements 
must clearly indicate the commitments of announcing firms (i.e., buyers) to audit, 
evaluate, assess, or develop their suppliers’ sustainability performance.  
By using the Factiva database, a preliminary search was first conducted to identify the 
ten most relevant announcements. Then, the full search strings (as shown in Table 3.2) 
were developed by thoroughly analyzing ten most relevant announcements. Factiva 
search syntaxes (e.g., hlp) and Dow Jones Intelligent Indexing (e.g., ccsr) were used to 
improve the search quality. 3 
                                                          
3 See, https://www.mzk.cz/sites/mzk.cz/files/souboryMZK/pdf/dj-factivacom-insideout-guide.pdf 
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Table 3.2 Search Strings in Factiva 
(hlp=(suppl* or procur* or purchas* or sourc* or supply chain$1 or material* or vendor* 
or contractor* or upstream* or ingredient* or first-tier or service provider$1 or value chain$1 
or supply base) Near15 (standard* or practic* or scorecard or polic* or guideline* or compl* 
or program* or certif* or accredit* or survey* or code of conduct or responsib* or conduct* or 
third party or glossar* or expect* or perform* or platform* or principle* or project* or report* 
or index or authori* or commit* or manag* or requir* or inspect* or monitor* or verif* or 
evaluat* or measur* or rat* or assess* or request* or audit* or code* or ISO or international 
standard organi?ation or ISO 14001 or SA 8000 or iso14000 or sa8000 or status or improv* or 
system* or scrutin* or engag* or goal* or achiev* or disclo* or initiative* or data or manner* 
or behavior* or condition* or score* or gaug* or regulat* or implement* or govern* or analy* 
or screen* or credential$1 or challeng*) near15 (ISO 14001 or SA 8000  or iso14000 or sa8000 
or emission* or emit* or carbon or green* or environment* or social* or societ* or climate or 
ethic* or ecolog* or clean* or waste or sustain* or eco-friendly or recycl* or CSR or corporate 
social responsibility or GHG or greenhouse gas or carbon disclosure project or CDP or 
environmental protection or well-being or conservat* or human rights or transparen* or 
supplier list$1 or labor or labour or workplace or toxic release inventory or pollut*)) OR 
(ns=ccsr and ns=(cscm and gsust)) 
 
The search on SCSM announcements was restricted to the period 1990 to 2016. The 
start of the period makes it possible to identify the impact of the Brundtland-report4, when 
the concern of ‘sustainable development’ began to rise in the international community 
(Seuring & Müller, 2008). An example of an SCSM announcement is provided in Figure 
3.3.  
                                                          
4 See “Our Common Future”, http://www.un-documents.net/our-common-future.pdf 
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Figure 3.3 An Example of SCSM Announcement (the highlighted portions indicate 
the clear requirement from the buyer for its suppliers’ compliance with SCSM) 
3.3.2 Firms’ identity and event dates  
Two primary pieces of information required from the announcements are event dates 
and firms’ identity.  
The event dates are clear in the announcement as circled in the left upper corner of 
Figure 3.3. The event date for this announcement was 21st September 1999.  
To derive firms’ identity from the announcements, two different methods were used 
to collect buyer data and supplier data. While the standard data collection process was 
applied to create the sample of buyers, the methods in the event studies of ‘related firms’ 
were used to collect the supplier data. In order to clarify these two samples and methods, 
two samples are introduced in separate sections.  
3.3.2.1 The sample of buyers 
The buyer data were straightforward as in the standard event study. The information 
in the rectangle in Figure 3.3 shows that the firm that announced SCSM to their suppliers 
was Ford Motor Company (NYSE: F); therefore, Ford Motor Company was the identified 
buyer from this announcement. Hence, in the analysis of buyers, one observation is Ford 
Motor Company’s stock return on 21st September 1999. The announcements articles from 
Factiva provided a clear identity of buyers (e.g., firm name, stock ticker). 
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The candidates in the sample of buyers must follow criteria in line with the literature 
(Brown et al., 2009; Fee & Thomas, 2004).  
 Buyers (i.e., announcing firms) must be public firms, where the daily stock 
returns are available.  
 Buyers’ Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) code is not 6000-6999, as 
this range covers the firms in the financial industry. The firms in the financial 
industry may be influenced by external factors (e.g., regulations) which may affect 
the nature of bargaining between buyers and suppliers, and estimated abnormal 
returns may not reveal the natural impact of SCSM announcements.  
By using these methods and criteria, there were 308 observations in the final sample 
of buyers.  
3.3.2.2 The sample of suppliers 
The sample of suppliers was collected by using the methods applied in the event 
studies of ‘related firms’ (Brown et al., 2009; Cheng & Eshleman, 2014; Cohen & 
Frazzini, 2008; Fee & Thomas, 2004; Hertzel et al., 2008; Oliveira, Kadapakkam, & 
Beyhaghi, 2017; Pandit, Wasley, & Zach, 2011; Zhu, 2014). The study on related firms 
indicates that the focus of these sorts of event studies is not on announcing firms, but 
rather on the firms related to the announcing firms (i.e., suppliers in this research).  
A brief description of the methods used to collect supplier data in this research is as 
follows: after identifying the announcing firms’ identities (e.g., buyers’ names) from the 
announcements, the suppliers which reported the announcing firms as significant 
customers (i.e., buyers) were collected as the sample of suppliers in this part of study. For 
example, as shown in Figure 3.3, Ford Motor Company is the buyer and requires ISO 
14001 certification from its suppliers. The suppliers of Ford Motor Company were 
identified by using the approach introduced below; all identified Ford Motor Company’s 
suppliers are included in the supplier sample for this announcement. Figure 3.4 gives an 
overview of the steps used to derive the supplier sample, as discussed in detail in the next 
section.  
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The buyer s identity derived from announcement
The buyer s identity clearly matched in Compustat 
The suppliers reporting the buyer in Compustat
The buyer s identity confirmed in reporting 
suppliers  annual reports?
Adding the supplier observations into the 
sample of suppliers 
YesNo
Yes
No The supplier observations excluded
Yes
An SCSM announcement from Factiva 
 
Figure 3.4 Flow Chart for Supplier Sample Data Collection  
The U.S. accounting regulations FASB No.14 (before 1998) and SFAS No.131 (after 
1998) require public firms (i.e., suppliers in this study) to disclose the identity of 
customers (i.e., buyers or announcing firms) representing more than 10% of total reported 
sales in a single fiscal year; these buyers are defined as significant buyers (Fee & Thomas, 
2004). The significant economic link (i.e., more than 10% of suppliers’ annual sales) 
between firms ensures that the announcement made by buyers will have a meaningful 
impact on suppliers’ operations and financial performance; the public documentation of 
this link ensures that the stock market will react to the announcement and adjust suppliers’ 
stock returns.  
This buyer-supplier information is contained in the Compustat Segment File. This file 
is oriented based on the information provided by reporting firms (i.e., suppliers). While 
the suppliers’ identifiers (e.g., firm name, Ticker, GVkey, CUSIP, and CIK codes) are 
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clearly presented, reported buyers are only identified by firm name. Furthermore, the 
buyers’ names may vary across reporting firms and years and may be listed in an 
abbreviation. For example, in the fiscal year 2003, Sanmina Corporation reported ‘IBM’ 
as a buyer, but in the same fiscal year, Volterra Semiconductor Corporation listed IBM 
as ‘International Business Mach’, and Mcdata Corporation named IBM as ‘Intl Business 
Machines Corp’. To rigorously produce the supplier sample from the Compustat Segment 
File, an algorithm was used, as outlined below, in order to be consistent with the literature 
(Cohen & Frazzini, 2008; Fee & Thomas, 2004).  
3.3.2.2.1 The Algorithm identifying the supplier data from Compustat segment file 
The algorithm outlined here avoids mismatched supplier data and is based on Fee and 
Thomas (2004).  
The reported buyers’ names were first matched according to the order and number of 
letters of announcing firms’ names. In the case that an almost certain match could be 
established, the supplier data (e.g., identifiers and the percentage of sales to the buyers) 
were collected from the file. For instance, most of the suppliers reported Ford Motor 
Company as ‘Ford MTR’.  
Second, if uncertainty in the match existed, an examination was conducted in annual 
reports (10-k form) of the supplier reporting the ambiguous buyer’s name in SEC EDGAR 
filing based on the CIK code5. Unless the annual report clearly described the same buyer’s 
identity as that of the announcing firm, the supplier was excluded from the sample. For 
example, the initial search on the announcing firm ‘Sprint Nextel’ yielded a firm ‘Telenav 
INC’ reporting ‘Sprint’ as its buyer. The annual report of Telenav in the most recent fiscal 
year ending date prior to the announcement date (i.e., 30th June 2012 in this case) stated 
that “Revenue related to services provided through Sprint Nextel Corporation, or Sprint, 
comprised 37%, 42%, and 55% of revenue for fiscal 2012, 2011 and 2010.” 
Consequently, Telenav was included as one of the suppliers for the announcing firm 
Sprint Nextel.  
Third, if an announcing firm is the subsidiary of a public-traded firm, only announcing 
firms’ (i.e., the subsidiary) names were searched in Compustat Segment File, because the 
                                                          
5  Central Index Key (CIK) is a number given to a company by the United States Securities and Exchange 
Commission (SEC) to identify the filings. Compustat Segment File gives a clear CIK number of each reporting firm 
(i.e., supplier). 
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impact of SCSM was likely to be only on the suppliers to the subsidiary rather than the 
overall suppliers to the parent company. For instance, the announcing firm Pratt & 
Whitney is a subsidiary of United Technologies. Suppliers who merely reported ‘Pratt & 
Whitney’ as buyer were included in the sample of suppliers, and the suppliers reporting 
‘United Technologies’ as the buyer were excluded.  
Fourth, if an announcing firm clearly indicated the SCSM announcement was applied 
to the overall suppliers including the suppliers of its subsidiaries, and the subsidiaries’ 
identities were given in the announcement, the suppliers reporting the subsidiaries were 
included in the sample. For example, since a Wal-Mart announcement stated, “The new 
program requires Walmart and Sam's Club beef suppliers to implement controls […],” 
the suppliers reporting Wal-Mart and Sam’s club respectively as the buyers were both 
included in the sample.  
Finally, few announcing firms specified that their SCSM announcements were 
applicable to the suppliers in certain industries rather than to all supplying partners, owing 
to either specific initiatives (e.g., food or consumer products) or issuing experimental 
initiatives before applying for overall supplies. Hence, it is assumed that their SCSM may 
influence only suppliers in these industries specified in the announcements. To rigorously 
identify the supplier sample in the specific industries, a two-step method was applied. 
First, the two-digit SIC codes were identified according to the information in the 
announcement which specified the suppliers’ industries. The first round search only 
included the suppliers whose two-digit SIC codes reported in Compustat Segment Files 
matched the ones identified through announcement content. Second, for each supplier, 
the annual report (i.e., 10-K form) found by using CIK code in the SEC EDGAR database 
was examined. The main business segment information in the annual report helped 
confirm or reject the match. For example, in a Wal-Mart announcement on food safety 
initiative standards relating to the suppliers of meat, fish, poultry, and ready to eat food, 
a two-digit SIC code for the food industries (i.e., 20) was defined. Then, in the Compustat 
Segment File, firms with a two-digit SIC code as 20 who reported Wal-Mart as a buyer 
were preliminarily selected as the suppliers. Finally, each of these suppliers’ 10-K forms 
was examined to justify the suppliers’ main business segment relevant to meat, fish, 
poultry, and ready to eat foods. One supplier, Tyson Food (SIC code 2011, CIK code 
0000100493), reported Wal-Mart as a buyer. The 10-K form disclosed the information 
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“Tyson Foods, Inc […], distribute and market chicken, beef, pork, prepared foods and 
related allied products […]” (Tyson Foods, 2007, p. 3). Therefore, Tyson Foods was 
included in the supplier sample of this announcement. Another supplier, Cott Corporation 
(SIC code 2086, CIK Code 0000884713), also reported Wal-Mart as a buyer. 
Nonetheless, the 10-K form revealed the business segment as, “We are one of world’s 
largest non-alcoholic beverage companies […]” (Cott Corporation, 2007, p. 5). Hence, 
Cott Corporation was excluded.  
The present research conservatively included supplier data from Compustat Segment 
File in the supplier sample, though discretion was applied to the match by using references 
mentioned above. While some reported buyer-supplier links were coded as a possible 
match, these data were excluded in the final sample. The principle of this research when 
collecting the supplier sample from Compustat Segment File was to reduce uncertainty 
by excluding supplier data, as the potential cost of mismatching a buyer-supplier link is 
greater than the potential cost of failing to match a link (Fee & Thomas, 2004).  
3.3.2.2.2 The fiscal year end dates for the supplier data  
An important condition in event studies of related firms is that the disclosure of the 
buyer-supplier link must have been revealed to the markets before the announcements, 
through which investors can analyze the impact of the announcements based on available 
economic links between buyers and suppliers. To satisfy this condition, the method 
suggested by Brown, Fee, and Thomas (2009) was adopted. Figure 3.5 gives an overview 
of the method as discussed in detail in the next section. 
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Figure 3.5 Flow Chart for Screening Fiscal Year Ending Dates in Supplier Sample 
Suppliers included in the final sample were required to report the announcing firms as 
buyer in either of the two fiscal year ending dates prior to the announcement dates. A 
two-step inspection was applied to this method.  
First, the suppliers were included in the sample if they reported the announcing firms 
as buyers in the most recent fiscal year ending dates before the announcement dates, and 
the most recent fiscal year ending dates were 90 days earlier than the announcement dates. 
The 90-day criterion was set because of the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission 
(SEC) filing rule for public firms. SEC filing rules give public firms a maximum of 90 
days to file the financial statements (e.g., annual report) after the fiscal year ending dates. 
If the most recent fiscal year ending date was not 90 days earlier than the announcement 
date, the economic link between a buyer and a supplier might not be available to investors. 
The 90-day criterion avoids bias by allowing “delays in the reporting of financial 
statements by corporations” (Barber & Lyon, 1997). However, this rule excludes some 
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supplier observations whose fiscal year ending dates fell into the 90-day gap while 
consecutively reporting the announcing firms as buyer with significant percentages of 
sales over the years.  
Second, if a supplier’s most recent fiscal year ending date before the announcement 
date fell in the 90-day gap, but the supplier also reported the buyer in the second most 
recent fiscal year ending date prior to the announcement date, the supplier’s data (e.g., 
annual sales to the buyer) in the second most recent fiscal year ending date were included 
in the sample. For example, the Ford Motor Company’s announcement was on 21st 
September 1999. A supplier, ‘Sheldahl INC’, reported Ford Motor Company as buyer 
with significant sales in both fiscal year ending dates: 31st August 1998 (the second most 
recent fiscal year ending date before the announcement date) and 31st August 1999 (the 
most recent fiscal year ending date before the announcement date). The reported buyer-
supplier link on 31st August 1999 was within the 90-day period prior to the announcement 
date (i.e., 21st September 1999). The data reported by Sheldahl INC on 31st August 1998 
were collected in the sample, which ensured that the information of the economic link 
between Sheldahl INC and Ford Motor Company had been disclosed to investors before 
the day of Ford Motor’s SCSM announcement.  
3.3.2.2.3 Additional supplier data  
Some of the supplier data were collected by using Factiva search and found directly in 
the announcements. The methods below were adopted and based on Brown et al. (2009). 
A comprehensive search on the Factiva database was also conducted. The method was 
to search for news reporting of buyer-supplier links in the Factiva database on any dates 
before the announcement dates and to include the suppliers into the sample.  
Moreover, if an announcing firm specified the suppliers’ identities in the 
announcements, only the suppliers mentioned in the announcements were included in 
order to gain supplier data for this announcement, as it can be reasonably assumed that 
only these suppliers were significantly affected by the announcing firms’ SCSM. The 
total supplier sample identified through Factiva search and announcement statement was 
2% of the overall sample.  
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3.3.2.2.4 Additional criteria for supplier data  
Consistent with the literature (Brown et al., 2009; Fee & Thomas, 2004), additionally, 
candidates in the supplier sample were required to meet the following criteria: 
 Suppliers must be listed in Center for Research in Securities Prices (CRSP) 
database, where the daily stock returns data are available.  
 Suppliers’ SIC code is not 6000-6999 as this range covers the financial 
industry. The firms in the financial industry may be influenced by external factors 
(e.g., regulations), which may affect the nature of bargaining between buyers and 
suppliers, and the estimated abnormal returns may not reveal the natural impact 
of SCSM announcements.  
By using these methods above, 2189 supplier data were derived from 219 
announcements.  
3.3.3 Methodological validation of event study on related firms 
in this research 
As demonstrated from the methods in collecting supplier data, the analysis of suppliers 
in this research followed event study methodology on related firms, where the research 
looked at the act of one company and its announcements and studied the impact of this 
on its suppliers. In the behavioral finance literature, there is a discussion on the ‘limited 
attention hypothesis’ of event study of the related firms (Hirshleifer & Teoh, 2003; Zhu, 
2014). However, the limited attention hypothesis is not compelling in this research for 
the following reasons.  
The limited attention hypothesis suggests that investors pay limited attention to the 
buyer-supplier link when a buyer’s announcement tends to be less salient to the buyer-
supplier relationship or distracted in its relevance to the suppliers. Therefore, the estimate 
of abnormal returns of suppliers may be biased (Cheng & Eshleman, 2014).  
The limited attention hypothesis is not a compelling hypothesis in the settings of this 
research. In this research design, buyers’ announcements had a direct, explicit, and salient 
operational and financial impact on the suppliers, where suppliers’ commitment to SCSM 
was clearly stated by their buyers as shown in Figure 3.3. Thus, investors can promptly 
derive clear information from the announcements and adjust stock prices accordingly. 
Those studies discussing the limited attention hypothesis, however, have mostly focused 
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on the generic covariance between buyers and suppliers, for example, the estimate of 
suppliers’ stock returns associated with buyers’ earning announcements (e.g., Cohen & 
Frazzini, 2008; Zhu, 2014). The buyers’ earnings announcements are unlikely to be as 
salient as SCSM announcements to suppliers’ operations. Investors, therefore, may not 
fully associate the earning announcements with suppliers’ future cash flow and adjust 
suppliers’ stock prices promptly.  
The literature supports the use of event study methodology in the study of related 
firms. Brown, Fee, and Thomas (2009) studied the suppliers’ short-run abnormal returns 
when their buyers conducted leverage buyouts. Hertzel et al. (2008) investigated the 
suppliers’ short-run stock returns associated with their buyers’ bankruptcy filings. Fee 
and Thomas (2004) examined the suppliers’ short-run stock performance in the events of 
buyers merging. Hendricks, Jacobs, and Singhal (2017) tested the abnormal returns of 
suppliers, competitors, and buyers associated with the supply chain disruption caused by 
the Great East Japan Earthquake of 2011. The present research adopted the methods given 
in the literature to analyze the suppliers’ abnormal returns.  
Firms’ daily stock prices/returns on the event dates are influenced by SCSM 
announcements and market factors. Thus, a technique must be used to isolate the stock 
return component that results from SCSM-specific announcements by adjusting them for 
market factors. The technique is the multiple models in event study methodology to 
estimate the abnormal returns associated with the SCSM announcements. The next 
section introduces these models.  
3.4 The estimate of abnormal returns  
There are multiple models in event study methodology (e.g., the market model and the 
Fama-French-Momentum-model) to estimate abnormal returns associated with 
announcements. Each of these models adjusts the stock returns associated with the 
specific announcements by a different set of factors. In order to provide a sensitivity test 
which avoids an estimate of abnormal returns to SCSM announcements by choice of 
model, the three most used models were used in this research in line with the literature 
(Hendricks et al., 2017; Jacobs & Singhal, 2017; Kothari & Warner, 2007; MacKinlay, 
1997; McWilliams & Siegel, 1997).  
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3.4.1 Market model 
The market model posits a linear relationship between the actual returns on a stock and 
the market’s return as in equation (1):  
𝐴𝑅𝑖𝑡 = 𝑅𝑖𝑡 − (?̂?𝑖 + ?̂?𝑖𝑅𝑚𝑡) ,  (1) 
 
 
where 𝐴𝑅𝑖𝑡 is the estimated abnormal return for firm 𝑖 on day 𝑡; 𝑅𝑖𝑡 is the actual return 
of stock 𝑖 on day 𝑡; 𝑅𝑚𝑡 is the market return on day 𝑡; 𝛼𝑖is the intercept of the relationship 
for stock 𝑖; 𝛽𝑖is the slope of the relationship for stock 𝑖 with respect to the market return; 
the term 𝛽𝑖𝑅𝑚𝑡 is the portion of the rate of return on a market portfolio to stock; using 
ordinary least squares (OLS) regression,  𝛼𝑖  and 𝛽𝑖  are estimated over an estimation 
window. The estimation window was set as below. 
In estimating buyers’ abnormal returns, the market return (i.e., 𝑅𝑚𝑡) was the local 
index of each firm (e.g., Topix for Japanese firms, Kospi for Korean firms).  𝛼𝑖 and 𝛽𝑖 
were estimated over an estimation window of 120 trading days ending 10 days before the 
announcement date. In buyer sample, firms are listed in multiple stock exchanges across 
nations. The trading days are different across stock exchanges. A 120-day estimation 
window ensured sufficient data for each firm in the sample of this research. A 120-day 
estimation window is statistically sound (Hendricks & Singhal, 2003) and ensured 
sufficient data to estimate the parameters in the market model as used in prior research 
(Wood et al., 2017; Zhao et al., 2013). 
In estimating suppliers’ abnormal returns, the market return was the CRSP value-
weighted index because all sample firms were U.S. public firms, as used by Hendricks et 
al. (2009). Also, by using a single market index across firms, the length of firms’ trading 
days was the same, and thus, a longer estimation window was allowed to estimate  𝛼𝑖 and 
𝛽𝑖, which was more likely to capture and reflect the normal returns experienced by the 
firms (Wood & Wang, 2018). The estimation window was 200 trading days ending 10 
days prior to the announcement date in the estimate of suppliers’ abnormal returns, in line 
with the event studies investigating U.S. firms (Hendricks et al., 2009; Jacobs et al., 2010; 
Mitra & Singhal, 2008).  
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3.4.1.1 Aggregation of abnormal returns 
To aggregate the abnormal returns across firms and event window (i.e., [-1, 1]), two 
different methods were used for buyer and supplier analysis due to the nature of the 
samples. The next sections introduce the methods.  
3.4.1.1.1 Buyers’ cumulative abnormal returns (CAR) 
The standard methods for aggregating the abnormal returns across firms was used in 
the buyer analysis. 
The mean abnormal return across firms at day 𝑡 was estimated as: 





𝑖=1  , (2) 
where 𝑁 is number of firms in the sample. 
The cumulative abnormal return (CAR) was estimated by aggregating the mean 
abnormal returns in the event windows (-1,1):  
CAR(−1,1) = ∑ 𝐴𝑅𝑡̅̅ ̅̅ ̅
1
t=−1 , (3) 
3.4.1.1.2 Suppliers’ portfolio cumulative abnormal returns  
In the analysis of suppliers, portfolio CARs were used to avoid ‘calendar time 
clustering bias’. The nature of the announcements and the supplier sample was that 
multiple supplies were collected over a single announcement on the same calendar date 
(i.e., event date), known as ‘calendar time clustering’ bias (Brown & Warner, 1980) 
leading to an underestimation of the standard deviation of the abnormal returns and an 
over-rejection of the null hypothesis where mean abnormal return  is zero (Hendricks et 
al., 2017; MacKinlay, 1997). 
To avoid this bias, portfolio CARs were used. The mean of equally weighted portfolio 
CAR is estimated in a three-step process (Brown et al., 2009; Fee & Thomas, 2004). First, 
the individual CAR in the event window (-1, 1) for each observation in a single 
announcement was estimated as in equation (4).  
CAR (−1,1)𝑎𝑖 = ∑ 𝐴𝑅𝑎𝑖𝑡
1
t=−1  , (4) 
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where CAR (−1,1)𝑎𝑖 is CAR of observation 𝑖 from announcement 𝑎 in the event window 
(-1, 1); 𝑡 is event day; 𝐴𝑅𝑎𝑖𝑡 is the abnormal return of observation 𝑖 from announcement 
𝑎 on day 𝑡. 
Second, an equally weighted portfolio CAR by each announcement (covering multiple 
observations) was calculated as equation (5): 
where 𝑃𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑎 is the portfolio CAR for announcement 𝑎; 𝐶AR𝑎𝑖 is CAR of observation 𝑖 
from announcement 𝑎  in event window (-1, 1); 𝑁  is number of the observations in 
announcement 𝑎.  
Third, the mean of portfolio CARs is the average of all portfolio CARs as in equation 
(6): 





a=1  , (6) 
where 𝑁 is number of announcements in the sample.  
Two additional models used were the Fama-French-Momentum model and the market-
adjusted model, which provided a sensitivity test on the results estimated by the market 
model. The event window, estimation window, and aggregation methods were the same 
as those in the market model. 
3.4.2 Fama-French-Momentum model 
The Fama-French-Momentum model was developed from the Fama and French (1993) 
three-factor model, further modified by Carhart (1997) to incorporate the momentum 
factor. The addition of the momentum factor includes more common factors in stock 
returns (Carhart, 1997).  
The estimates of abnormal returns of the Fama-French-Momentum model is shown in 
equation (7):  






i=1  ,    (5) 
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where ?̂?𝑖 , ?̂?1, ?̂?2, ?̂?3, 𝑎𝑛𝑑 ?̂?4 are OLS regression estimates of factors used in the model; 
the expected day 𝑡 rate of return for stock 𝑖 is assumed to be a function of the rate of 
return of market portfolio for day 𝑡 (R𝑚𝑡); the average returns of portfolios of small 
capitalization stocks over large capitalization stocks for day 𝑡 (𝑆𝑀𝐵); the average returns 
of portfolios of high book-to-market equity stocks over stocks with low book-to-market 
ratios for day 𝑡 (𝐻𝑀𝐿); and average returns of portfolios of high prior return stocks over 
stocks with low prior returns for day 𝑡 (𝑈𝑀𝐷).  
In the application of the Fama-French-Momentum model for the estimate of buyers’ 
abnormal returns, the present research followed the approach suggested by Hendricks et 
al. (2017).  
The buyer sample included firms across global stock exchanges (e.g., Korean, Taiwan, 
and Japanese stock exchanges). The Fama-French-Momentum model requires the data of 
factors (i.e., SMB, HML, UMD ) which, however, are less readily available in Non-
U.S./European markets, which could reduce the sample in the analysis for buyers. 
Hendricks et al. (2017) suggested using the market model and the Fama-French-
Momentum model to estimate abnormal returns for only the U.S. firms in the sample, and 
compare the results estimated by two models. Achieving similar results from the two 
models applied to U.S. firms only provides confidence in the results estimated by using 
the market model for the full sample.  
In the estimate of suppliers’ abnormal returns, all firms were U.S. listed public firms. 
Thus the data of all factors were readily available, and the Fama-French-Momentum 
model was fully applied.  
3.4.3 Market-adjusted model 
The market-adjusted model estimates abnormal returns by subtracting the observed 
market returns from the actual stock returns, as in equation (8): 
𝐴𝑅𝑖𝑡 = 𝑅𝑖𝑡 − 𝑅𝑚𝑡 ,          (8) 
Due to the technical difficulty, the market-adjusted model was used in supplier 
analysis but not in buyer analysis. The buyer sample contained firms from multiple stock 
exchanges; thus, the market index (i.e., 𝑅𝑚𝑡) was the local index for each firm listed, and 
different across firms. The statsitics package used for buyer analysis, 
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‘Eventstudymetrics’, only allows for running the market model but not for running the 
market-adjusted model by using multiple market indices. While the CARs determined by 
the market-adjusted model could be manually estimated, the multiple statistical tests were 
difficult to use manually. These multiple statistical tests evaluate the significance of the 
estimate of CARs and ensure the robusness of the finding as discussed in the next section. 
In summary, in the sensitivity test, the market model and the Fama-French-Momentum 
model were used in the buyer analysis. The market model, the Fama-French-Momentum 
model, and the market-adjusted model were used in supplier analysis.  
3.4.4 Evaluating the significance of CAR  
The statistic tests in event study analysis focus on the mean of the distribution of 
CARs, where the null hypothesis tests whether the mean CAR is equal to zero(Kothari & 
Warner, 2007). To ensure that the univariate test on mean CAR is not misspecified, it is 
common to adopt multiple tests in event study analysis. The present research used the 
joint tests in line with the literature (Kothari & Warner, 2007; McWilliams & Siegel, 
1997; Modi et al., 2015; Wood et al., 2017).  
In the test of significance of buyers’ mean CAR, following the statistic tests were used 
to avoid different external factors influencing the test of significance:  
 The Cross-sectional t-test is the standard t-test, where the variance estimator of 
this statistic is based on the cross-section of CAR over observations;  
 The Patell z test (Patell, 1976) corrects the bias of heteroscedastic event 
window abnormal returns, which is not covered by the cross-sectional t-test;  
 The t-BMP test (Boehmer et al., 1991) was developed from the Patell z test. 
Additionally, the t-BMP test adjusts cross-sectional variance to avoid over 
rejection on a null hypothesis because of increasing variance around event 
dates, which provides more robust test results; 
 The rank test (Corrado, 1989) was used in addition to these parametric tests 
above to best address the issue of non-normality. 
In the test of significance of suppliers’ abnormal returns, the main focus was to avoid 
the calendar time clustering bias on the test of significance. The following tests were used:  
 The t-BMP test (Boehmer et al., 1991) provides relatively robust test results 
due to covering multiple adjustments as discussed above; 
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 The Time-series Standard Deviation Test (Brown & Warner, 1980) is also 
called crude dependence adjustment, adjusting for clustering of security 
returns; 
 The Collins-Dent test (Collins & Dent, 1984) adjusts for cross-sectional 
correlation caused by identical event time and industry concentration; 
 The Generalized Least Squares test (Sanders & Robins, 1991) was developed 
from the Collins-Dent test but additionally adjusts for non-normality of stock 
returns;  
The Collins-Dent test and the Generalized Least Squares test are not applicable to 
multiple factor models (i.e., the Fama-French-Momentum model in this research).  
 The rank test, (Corrado, 1989) as a non-parametric test, was used to avoid the 
misspecification of these parametric tests above. 
While the estimate and test on CARs provided the measure of firms’ financial 
performance relating to SCSM, section 2.5 discussed and hypothesized the variables that 
influence the scale of the CARs. The next sections illustrate how these variables were 
constructed in this research.  
3.5 Variable construction in the cross-sectional 
regression analysis 
This section introduces how the hypothesized variables in Chapter 2 were constructed. 
These variables were used as the independent variables in the cross-sectional regression 
analysis against the CARs as the dependent variable. The variable constructions and 
definitions in the analysis of buyers and suppliers are introduced in separate sections.  
3.5.1  Variable construction and definition in the analysis of 
buyers 
In this section, the measures of five hypothesized variables in the analysis of buyers are 
introduced. Control variables were also used to decrease the confounding effects on the tested 
relationships. The control variables will be introduced at the end of this section. All data 
introduced in this section were collected from DataStream, which provides access to the data 
across countries/stock exchanges.  
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3.5.1.1 Supplier relationship management 
The three measures of buyers’ SRM developed by Liou and Gao (2011) and Tang and 
Liou (2010) were used in this research. These are the ratio of COGS to sales, accounts 
payable turnover, and inventory turnover. These measures were used in this research to 
ensure the overall effect of the buyers’ competence in SRM was captured.  
The first measure is the ratio of COGS to sales, which is COGS divided by annual 
sales by using the data of the most recent year ending dates prior to the announcement 
dates. A high level of the ratio of COGS to sales indicates more purchasing costs, and 
thus more negative financial performance of buyers. The predicted sign is negative.  
The second measure is accounts payable turnover as in equation (9):  





 ,            (9) 
where 𝐶𝑂𝐺𝑆𝑡,𝑖 is the cost of goods sold of buyer 𝑖 in the most recent fical year ending 
date prior to the announcement date 𝑡 ;  
1
2
∗ (𝐴𝑃𝑡,𝑖 + 𝐴𝑃𝑡−1,𝑖) is the average accounts 
payable between buyer 𝑖’s inventory at fiscal year ending date 𝑡 and t − 1. A high level 
of account payable turnover indicates more financial resources through a preferential 
payment schedule, and thus less negative financial performance of buyers. The predicted 
sign is negative.  
The third measure is inventory turnover as in equation (10): 





 ,    (10) 




(𝐼𝑡,𝑖 + 𝐼𝑡−1,𝑖) is the average inventory between buyer 𝑖’s inventory at fiscal year ending 
date 𝑡 and t − 1. A high level of inventory turnover indicates high inventory efficiency, 
and thus less negative buyer finanical performance. The predicted sign is positive.  
3.5.1.2 Growth prospects 
Market to book ratio was used to measure buyers’ growth prospects. The ratio is 
market value of equity over book value of equity (Bose & Pal, 2012; Hendricks & 
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Singhal, 2003; Zsidisin et al., 2015). The market value is the stock price at ten days before 
the announcement date times the number of ordinary shares on issues; the book value is 
the data at the most recent fiscal year ending dates before the announcement dates. A high 
market to book ratio indicates high growth prospects of buyers which are more vulnerable 
to the disruption of SCSM in operations, and thus more negative financial performance. 
The predicted sign is negative.  
3.5.1.3 Third-party certification 
This research identified buyers’ SCSM with the use of third-party certification 
according to the concept of market-based governance mechanisms in the literature 
(Gimenez & Tachizawa, 2012; Hoejmose & Adrien-Kirby, 2012). According to the 
announcement content, a dummy variable was set to 1 if a buyer required its suppliers’ 
SCSM compliance with a certification (e.g., ISO 14001 or SA 8000) or to be certified by 
any third-party organization (e.g., Carbon Disclosure Project or Forest Stewardship 
Council). Figure 3.6 gives an example of the announcement with the requirement of third-
party certification. Third-party certification increases the credibility of buyers’ SCSM 
efforts due to its rigorous procedures and reduces buyers’ monitoring costs; therefore, the 
negative impact of SCSM on financial performance is decreased. The predicted sign is 
positive.  
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Figure 3.6 An Example of SCSM Announcement That Requires Third-Party 
Certification (the component marked out highlights the requirement for a third-
party audit)  
3.5.1.4 Group SCSM  
Group SCSM is the approach that buyers collaborate in a group to mandate their 
suppliers’ SCSM compliance. A binary variable was created to code 1 for the buyer which 
participates in an SCSM group. Figure 3.7 gives an example of a group SCSM 
announcement. Group SCSM increases buyers’ bargaining power, creates economies of 
scale and scope in their SCSM mandates, provides organizational learning, and improves 
reputation. Hence, buyers that engage in group SCSM have less negative financial 
performance. The predicted sign is positive.  




Figure 3.7 An Example of Group SCSM Announcement (the component marked out 
highlights the group of buyers that mandate suppliers’ SCSM compliance together.)  
3.5.1.5 Social dimension of SCSM (sSCSM)  
This research identified the sSCSM from the announcement content based on the social 
sustainability measures given by Gimenez and Tachizawa, (2012), Hoejmose and Adrien-
Kirby (2012), and Miemczyk, Johnsen, and Macquet (2012). A binary variable was coded 
1 if the buyer required its suppliers’ commitment to diversity, safety, human rights, labor 
conditions, or equal pay. Figure 3.8 gives an example of sSCSM announcement. sSCSM 
creates less operational complexity for buyers, and thus less negative financial 
performance. The predicted sign is positive.  




Figure 3.8 An Example of sSCSM Announcement (the component marked out 
highlights the social dimension of SCSM [i.e., workers’ rights and labor conditions] 
required by the buyer in the announcement.)  
3.5.1.6 Control variables in buyer analysis 
Industry, country, and year effect were controlled in the analysis of buyers. The 
industry control was Fama-French 48 industry classification (Fama & French, 1997), 
where each observation was assigned to one of 48 industry dummies according to a four-
digit SIC code. Industries with a sample size below ten were removed to avoid singularity 
in the analysis.  
The announcement data were collected over 26 years from 1990 to 2016. There may 
have been significant changes in business, society, and legislation with regard to 
sustainability over the period. The control on year effect ensured the unbiased results on 
the tests of the variables of interest. The year effect was measured by the number of the 
year from the first announcement (i.e., 1990) to the year of the given announcement.  
The buyers’ countries were grouped according to the regions in which the buyers’ 
primary stock was traded. Three regions were created (i.e., Europe, North American, and 
Asia), and coded by dummy variables.  
The ratio of COGS to total sales accommodates the measure of firm size. No additional 
control on firm size was used for the analysis of buyers.  
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3.5.2 Variable construction and definition in the analysis of 
suppliers 
This section outlines the construction and definitions of these hypothesized variables 
in the analysis of suppliers. The control variables are introduced at the end of this section. 
Most of the accounting data introduced in this section were collected from Compustat, 
which provides access to the data of U.S. public firms. Only buyers’ cost of goods sold 
was collected from DataStream, which is explained in section 3.5.2.2.  
3.5.2.1 The supplier’s dependence on buyer 
The measure of the supplier’s dependence on buyer as suggested by Cheng and 
Eshleman (2014) and Pandit et al. (2011) was used as in equation (11) : 
      𝑆𝐷𝐵𝑐𝑖 =  
𝑆𝑐𝑖
𝑆𝑖
,     (11) 
where 𝑆𝐷𝐵𝑐𝑖 is the ratio of supplier 𝑖’s dependence on buyer 𝑐; 𝑆𝑐𝑖 is the sales of supplier 
𝑖 to buyer 𝑐 in the most recent or the second most recent (discussed in section 3.3.2.2.2) 
fiscal year ending date before the announcement date; 𝑆𝑖 is supplier 𝑖’s total sales at the 
same fiscal year ending date. A high level of dependence on buyer indicates suppliers’ 
high asset-specific investment and thus high transaction costs. Therefore, suppliers may 
have more negative financial performance. The predicted sign is negative.  
3.5.2.2 The buyer’s dependence on supplier  
The measure suggested by Cheng and Eshleman (2014) and Pandit et al. (2011) was 
used to estimate the buyer’s dependence on supplier as in equation (12): 
       𝐵𝐷𝑆𝑐𝑖 =  
𝑆𝑐𝑖
𝐶𝑂𝐺𝑐
,        (12) 
where 𝐵𝐷𝑆𝑖  is the the ratio of buyer 𝑐’s dependence on supplier 𝑖; 𝑆𝑐𝑖  is the sales of 
supplier 𝑖 to buyer 𝑐; 𝐶𝑂𝐺𝑐 is the cost of goods sold of buyer 𝑐 ; The data were at the 
most recent or the second most recent (discussed in section 3.3.2.2.2) fiscal year ending 
date before the announcement date. A high level of buyer’s dependence reduces buyers’ 
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opportunism and motivates buyers’ supplier development. Thus, the suppliers can have 
less negative financial performance. The predicted sign is positive.  
The data of cost of goods sold of buyers (i.e.,  𝐶𝑂𝐺𝑐  ) was collected from the 
DataStream database. The buyers (i.e., announcing firms) were from multiple 
countries/stock exchanges, and DataStream has more abundant data for international 
firms than Compustat. The value of the cost of goods sold of non-U.S. public firms was 
converted to U.S. dollars using the currency exchange rate at the most recent fiscal year 
ending date before the announcement date. However, the data of suppliers’ sales to buyers 
(i.e., 𝑆𝑐𝑖) were only available in Compustate database. To avoid the potential bias of data 
collection from two databases, a manual inspection was conducted to match the cost of 
goods sold data reported by U.S. firms which were available in both databases. It was 
found that the only difference is that Compustat reports the data using a unit of 1 million 
U.S. dollars, but DataStream reports using the unit of 1 thousand U.S. dollars. Therefore, 
the cost of goods sold data for all buyers collected from DataStream were converted to 
the unit of 1 million in the calculation of the buyer’s dependence on supplier. Except for 
the difference in unit, the same value of the cost of goods sold of U.S. firms was observed 
across Compustat and DataStream. Hence, it was unlikely that a bias would be created by 
using the cost of goods sold data from DataStream.   
3.5.2.3 Relationship length 
The relationship length indicates the number of years that a single supplier reports 
significant sales to the same buyer. By using Compustat Segment File, the buyer-supplier 
relationship years for each supplier in the sample was counted. As a long-term 
relationship with buyers increases suppliers’ switching costs and hold-up costs, suppliers, 
therefore, have more negative financial performance. The predicted sign is negative.  
3.5.2.4 Social dimension of SCSM (sSCSM)  
To investigate the impact of sSCSM on suppliers, a dummy variable was created 
according to the announcement content, based on social sustainability measures identified 
in the literature (Gimenez & Tachizawa, 2012; Hoejmose & Adrien-Kirby, 2012; 
Miemczyk et al., 2012). 
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It was coded 1 for a sSCSM announcement if the suppliers were required to commit 
to improving diversity, safety, human rights, labor conditions, or equal pay. It was coded 
0 if otherwise. Because the compliance with sSCSM creates less operational complexity, 
generates better quality performance, and requires fewer capital costs, suppliers can have 
a less negative financial performance. The predicted sign is positive.  
3.5.2.5 Third-party certification 
This research identified buyers’ SCSM requiring suppliers’ compliance with third-
party certification based on the announcement content, according to the market-based 
governance mechanism in the literature (Gimenez & Tachizawa, 2012; Hoejmose & 
Adrien-Kirby, 2012). A binary measure was used as an indicator of third-party 
certification. It was coded 1 for a third-party certified SCSM compliance if the suppliers 
were required to measure and certify their commitments through a third-party 
organization (e.g., ISO 14001 certifiers, Carbon Disclosure Project, Forest Stewardship 
Council). A third-party certification requires suppliers’ radical commitments and adds 
registration and consulting costs. Therefore suppliers have more negative financial 
performance. The predict sign is negative.  
3.5.2.6 Group SCSM 
A binary variable was created for the approach of group SCSM, where it was coded 1 
for the supplier whose buyer collaborates with other firms to require SCSM compliance, 
and 0 otherwise. Group SCSM increases buyers’ bargaining power and expertise to create 
overly stringent SCSM conditions, thus increasing suppliers’ costs of compliance. The 
predicted sign is negative.  
3.5.2.7 Operational slack  
Consistent with existing literature (Azadegan et al., 2013; Hendricks et al., 2009; 
Kovach et al., 2015), three forms of operational slack were used: capacity slack, inventory 
slack, and supply chain slack.  
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3.5.2.7.1 Capacity slack  
The capacity slack was measured as the ratio of property, plant, and equipment to 
annual sales as in equation (13): 




where 𝐶𝐾𝑖 is the capacity slack for supplier 𝑖; 𝑃𝑃𝐸𝑖 is property, plant, and equipment of 
supplier 𝑖; 𝑆𝑖 is the net sales of supplier 𝑖. All data were in the most recent fiscal year 
ending date prior to the announcement date. A higher ratio of PPE to sales indicates lower 
utilization of capacity, and therefore, higher capacity slack to buffer the suppliers’ 
negative financial performance. The predicted sign of capacity slack is positive. 
3.5.2.7.2 Inventory slack  
The inventory slack was measured by using the days of inventory, and this was 
calculated as: 





∗ 365, (14) 
where 𝐷𝐼𝑡,𝑖 is days of inventory for supplier 𝑖 in the most recent fiscal year ending date 
before the announcement date 𝑡; 𝐶𝑂𝐺𝑆𝑡,𝑖 is the cost of goods sold of supplier 𝑖 ; 𝐼𝑡,𝑖 is the 
inventory of supplier 𝑖  at fiscal year 𝑡 ; 𝐼𝑡−1,𝑖  is the inventory of supplier 𝑖  at fiscal 
year 𝑡 − 1;  
1
2
∗ (𝐼𝑡,𝑖 + 𝐼𝑡−1,𝑖) is the average inventory. A longer inventory holding period 
(i.e., more inventory days) indicates a greater inventory slack to reduce the suppliers’ 
negative financial performance. The predicted sign of inventory slack is positive. 
3.5.2.7.3 Supply chain slack 
Supply chain slack was measured by using cash-to-cash cycle (CTC): 
       𝐶𝑇𝐶𝑖 =  𝑑𝑎𝑦𝑠 𝑜𝑓 𝑎𝑐𝑐𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡𝑠 𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑒𝑖𝑣𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒 +
𝑑𝑎𝑦𝑠 𝑜𝑓 𝑖𝑛𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑦 − 𝑑𝑎𝑦𝑠 𝑜𝑓 𝑎𝑐𝑐𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡𝑠 𝑝𝑎𝑦𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒 , 
          (15) 
where 
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∗ 365, (16) 
where 𝐴𝑅𝐸𝑡,𝑖 is accounts receivable of supplier 𝑖 in the most recent fiscal year ending 
date 𝑡 ; 𝐴𝑅𝐸𝑡−1,𝑖  is accounts receivable of supplier 𝑖  at 𝑡 − 1 ; 𝑆𝑡,𝑖  is annual sales of 
supplier 𝑖;  
moreover, 





∗ 365, (17) 
 where 𝐴𝑃𝑡,𝑖 is accounts payable of supplier 𝑖 in the most recent fiscal year ending date 𝑡; 
𝐴𝑃𝑡−1,𝑖 is accounts payable of supplier 𝑖 at 𝑡 − 1; 𝐶𝑂𝐺𝑆𝑡,𝑖 is the cost of goods sold of 
supplier 𝑖. A longer cash-to-cash cycle indicates the low level of leanness of the supply 
chain, thus there is more supply chain slack to decrease suppliers’ negative financial 
performance. Thus the predicted sign is positive.  
In all three forms of operational slack, the industry-adjusted measures were adopted. 
The suppliers’ sample included firms across industries. The specific industry attributes 
may create bias in the estimate of overall operational slack on abnormal returns. 
Therefore, following the approach by Hendricks et al. (2009), the industry-adjusted 
operational slack was used in the regression analysis.  
In the estimation of capacity and inventory slack, industry mean slack for each supplier 
was calculated, where the industry mean was estimated by industry peers whose three-
digit SIC codes were the same as each sample supplier. Each sample supplier was 
excluded in the estimate of industry means. Then, the supplier’s industry-adjusted 
capacity and inventory slack were estimated by taking the difference between the sample 
supplier’s slack data and industry mean slack data, and dividing the difference by industry 
mean slack data.  
In the estimation of the industry-adjusted supply chain slack, the difference between 
the sample supplier’s cash-to-cash cycle and industry mean cash-to-cash cycle was used. 
Unlike the measures of capacity and inventory slack, the difference was not further 
divided by industry mean, because the negative values in the divisor (i.e., industry mean) 
may create bias in the calculation.  
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With some of the three-digit SIC codes, the industry peer sample size was small (e.g., 
two firms only), which is likely to bias the estimate of industry mean operational slack. 
Thus, the observations were excluded in the analysis where the industry peer sample size 
was below the 10th percentile of overall industry sample. Conservatively, the present 
research did not expand the industry peer sample size by using two-digit SIC codes, 
because these would include the firms in less relevant industries to the sample suppliers 
and undermine the industry-adjusted power.  
3.5.2.8 Financial slack 
Financial slack was measured by leverage. Leverage was estimated by total debt to 
total asset as in equation (18) (Oliveira, Kadapakkam, & Beyhaghi, 2017): 
       𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖 =  
𝐷𝐿𝐶𝑖+𝐷𝐿𝑇𝑇𝑖
𝐴𝑇𝑖
,    (18) 
where 𝐷𝐿𝐶𝑖 is the debt in current liability (i.e., the short-term debt) of supplier 𝑖; 𝐷𝐿𝑇𝑇𝑖 
is the long-term debt of supplier 𝑖; 𝐴𝑇𝑖 is the book value of assets of supplier 𝑖. All data 
were in the most recent fiscal year ending date before the announcement date. A high 
leverage ratio indicates a low level of financial slack to suppliers to reduce suppliers’ 
negative financial performance. The predicted sign is negative.  
3.5.2.9 Control variables in supplier analysis  
The industry and year effects were controlled in the regression analyses for suppliers. 
The industry control was applied by using the Fama-French 48 industry classification 
(Fama & French, 1997) which assigned the suppliers in the sample to 48 industries 
according to a four-digit SIC code. This approach improved the power of industry control 
as it covered a large range of specific industries.  
The announcement data were collected between 1990 and 2016. In those 26 years, 
there may have been changes in legislation and stakeholder pressure on firms’ 
sustainability. Thus, year effect was controlled in the regression analysis. The year effect 
was measured by taking the number of years from the first announcement year in the 
sample (i.e., 1990) to the year of given announcement.  
Chapter 3 Methodology 
142 
The firm size was not included as a control variable in the analysis of suppliers. The 
reason is twofold. First, supply chain factors are more important explanatory variables 
than firm size in the study of related firms (i.e., suppliers). In this part of the analysis, the 
focus was on the related firms’ (i.e., suppliers’) abnormal returns associated with the 
SCSM announcements rather than the announcing firms (i.e., buyers). In the event study 
of the related firms, supply chain factors (e.g., buyer-supplier dependence and 
relationship length) were likely to replace the firm size as the most influential explanatory 
variable, because investors refer to these supply chain factors to evaluate the impact of 
the announcements on the related firms (Pandit et al., 2011). Deitz et al. (2009) used 
similar event study analysis to study the impact of buyers’ supply chain technology 
mandates on suppliers’ stock returns, and they found that suppliers’ firm size as measured 
by total asset has no significant effect on suppliers’ CAR, which gives empirical evidence 
that firm size has little explanatory power in the related firms analysis.  
Second, the measures of the variables of interest in this research (i.e., the supplier’s 
dependence on buyer and leverage [financial slack]) accommodate the components of 
measures for firm size. The supplier’s dependence on buyer was measured by the 
supplier’s sales to the buyer divided by the supplier’s total sale; the supplier’s leverage 
was measured by the ratio of total debt to total assets. These measures include the 
components of common measures on firm size (i.e., total sales, total assets). An additional 
test on firm size may undermine the explanatory power of the statistical analyses, which 
may explain that the event studies on related firms (Brown et al., 2009; Cheng & 
Eshleman, 2014; Fee & Thomas, 2004; Hertzel et al., 2008; Pandit et al., 2011) commonly 
exclude firm size in their analyses. Consequently, in line with the literature (Cheng & 
Eshleman, 2014; Hertzel et al., 2008; Pandit et al., 2011), multiple supply chain variables 
were used, and firm size was excluded in the analysis. 
3.6 Regression models 
The constructs of these hypothesized variables and control variables were tested in 
regressions against the individual CARs. The individual CARs estimated by the market 
model were used across regression models. The market model provides the superiority of 
model specification and adjustment for systemic risk (Hendricks & Singhal, 2008b; Ni et 
al., 2016; Thirumalai & Sinha, 2011), while other models (e.g., Fama-French-
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Momentum) lack a sound economic rationale when including others factors (e.g., firms’ 
size) than the market factor (Kothari & Warner, 2007). Also, as shown later in Chapter 4, 
the estimated CARs by market model, in general, have similar mean and median values 
and are supported by the results of other models.  
Hierarchical multiple regression models were used to group the variables with similar 
attributes, which made it possible to determine the specific impact of these variables on 
the dependent variable and test the overarching effect of a group of variables. 
Additionally, the hierarchical approach allows documenting the proportion of variation 
that dependent variables in each model can explain as a group, and thus analyze the 
explanatory power across models (Jaccard et al., 2006). Model diagnostics were 
conducted to avoid potential bias in regression analysis. While OLS regression was used 
in buyer analysis, robust regression was used in supplier analysis to avoid the bias of 
influential observations on the estimated coefficients and significance (Cohen et al., 
2003). In the next sections, these models and diagnostics are presented for buyer and 
supplier analysis separately.  
3.6.1 Regression models for buyer analysis 
Four models were used to test the hypotheses in the analysis of buyers. All models 
were run with OLS regression. Model 1 includes all control variables as in equation (19).  
       𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑖 = 𝛽0 +𝛽1𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟 + ∑ 𝛽𝑗 𝑋𝑖 + ∑ 𝛽𝑘 𝑍𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖, (19) 
where Year is the difference of the first year in the announcement sample to the given 
announcement year. 𝑋𝑖 is industry fixed effect; 𝑍𝑖  is region fixed effect. 𝜀𝑖 is the error 
term. 
 Model 2 focuses on the effect of growth prospects while controlling all variables in 
model 1. The equation (20) shows model 1:  
       𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑖 = 𝛽0 +𝛽1𝐺𝑃𝑖 + 𝛽2𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟 + ∑ 𝛽𝑗 𝑋𝑖 + ∑ 𝛽𝑘 𝑍𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖, (20) 
where 𝐺𝑃𝑖 is buyers’ growth prospects measured by using the book to market ratio.  
Model 3 tests multiple SCSM governances in addition to the variables from prior 
models as in equation (21).  
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       𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑖 = 𝛽0+𝛽1𝑠𝑆𝐶𝑆𝑀𝑖 + 𝛽2𝑇ℎ𝑖𝑟𝑑_𝑃𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑦_𝐶𝑒𝑟𝑡𝑖+𝛽3𝐺𝑟𝑜𝑢𝑝𝑖 +
𝛽4𝐺𝑃𝑖 + 𝛽5year𝑖 + ∑ 𝛽𝑗 𝑋𝑖 + ∑ 𝛽𝑘 𝑍𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖, 
(21) 
where 𝑠𝑆𝐶𝑆𝑀𝑖 is a dummy set to 1 if a buyer requires its suppliers’ compliance with the 
social dimension of SCSM; 𝑇ℎ𝑖𝑟𝑑_𝑃𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑦_𝐶𝑒𝑟𝑡 is a binary variable equal to 1 when a 
buyer demands its suppliers’ compliance certified by a third party; 𝐺𝑟𝑜𝑢𝑝𝑖 is a dummy 
variable coded 1 if a buyer collaborates with other firms in a group to manage its 
suppliers’ SCSM compliance. All other variables are the same as in model 2. 
Model 4 presents the full model including three measures for SRM and all other 
variables in prior models. The equation (22) shows the model 4.  
       𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑖 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1(
COGS𝑖
sales 𝑖
)  + 𝛽2𝐴𝑃𝑇𝑖 + 𝛽3𝐼𝑇𝑖 + +𝛽4𝑠𝑆𝐶𝑆𝑀𝑖 +
𝛽5𝑇ℎ𝑖𝑟𝑑_𝑃𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑦_𝐶𝑒𝑟𝑡𝑖 + 𝛽6𝐺𝑟𝑜𝑢𝑝𝑖 + +𝛽7year𝑖 + ∑ 𝛽𝑗 𝑋𝑖 +





 is the ratio of COGS to sales; 𝐴𝑃𝑇 is accounts payable turnover; 𝐼𝑇  is 
inventory turnover. These three variables were used in the test for the buyers’ supplier 
relationship management. Other variables are the same as in the prior models.  
3.6.2 Model diagnostics in the analysis of buyers 
Linear models fit using OLS makes assumptions about the structure of the data. If 
these assumptions are violated, the estimates may misrepresent the data. The model 
diagnostics suggested by Fox and Weisberg (2010) was used in this research to test if 
these assumptions were met. OLS regression was conducted in the regression analysis for 
buyers based on the diagnostics in this section.  
The influential observations may substantially change the fit in the regression models. 
The hat-values were used to detect influential observations. The hat-value measures the 
distance of each observation to “the center of the regressor space, taking account of the 
correlation pattern among the regressors” (i.e., independent variables) (Fox & Weisberg, 
2010, p. 247), where the observations over three times the average hat-value are cause for 
concern (Fox & Weisberg, 2010). No observation over three times the average hat-value 
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was found in the dataset for buyer analysis. Thus, there was no concern on the influential 
observations. Next, heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation were tested using the Breusch-
Pagan test (Breusch & Pagan, 1979) and the Durbin-Watson test (Durbin & Watson, 
1950). The tests indicated a level of heteroscedasticity (BP= 36.148, p-value= 0.01012) 
and autocorrelation (DW= 1.7602, p-value= 0.01027) in the dataset. Therefore, robust 
standard errors with heteroscedasticity and an autocorrelation consistent (HAC) estimator 
(Zeileis, 2004) were used in buyer analysis. The variance inflation factor (VIF) across 
independent variables was below three, providing evidence of no concern with 
multicollinearity (Cohen, Cohen, West, & Aiken, 2003). These diagnostics and 
adjustments ensured that the estimates by OLS regression did not misrepresent the data 
in this research.  
3.6.3 Regression model for the analysis of suppliers 
The CARs used in the regression models were suppliers’ individual CARs rather than 
portfolio CARs. In the test of suppliers’ abnormal returns associated with SCSM 
announcements, portfolio CARs were used (219 portfolios) to avoid calendar time 
clustering bias (see section 3.4.1.1.2). However, in the regression analysis, suppliers’ 
individual CARs (2189 observations) were used as the dependent variable. Each 
supplier’s CAR as a single observation in the cross-sectional tests enabled the exploration 
of the firm-specific components that make the CARs different (Fee & Thomas, 2004).  
Four regression models were used to group the different aspects in the analysis. Robust 
regression was conducted across models. Model 1 tests the effect of supply chain power 
on suppliers’ financial performance as in equation (23):  
       𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑖 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑆𝐷𝐵𝑖  + 𝛽2𝐵𝐷𝑆𝑖 + 𝛽3𝑅𝑒𝑙_𝑙𝑒𝑛𝑔𝑡ℎ𝑖 + ∑ 𝛽𝑗 𝑋𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖,   (23) 
where 𝑆𝐷𝐵𝑖 is the supplier’s dependence on buyer; B𝐷𝑆𝑖 is the buyer’s dependence on 
supplier; 𝑅𝑒𝑙_𝑙𝑒𝑛𝑔𝑡ℎ𝑖  is the relationship length between supplier and buyer; 𝑋𝑖  is the 
industry fixed effect; 𝜀𝑖 is the error term.  
Model 2 focuses on the effect of the nature of SCSM on suppliers’ financial 
performance as in equation (24). The variables in model 1 remain in the model. 
Additionally, the year effect is controlled. 
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       𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑖 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑆𝐷𝐵𝑖  + 𝛽2𝐵𝐷𝑆𝑖 + 𝛽3𝑅𝑒𝑙_𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑖 +
𝛽5𝑠𝑆𝐶𝑆𝑀𝑖+𝛽6𝑇ℎ𝑖𝑟𝑑_𝑃𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑦_𝐶𝑒𝑟𝑡𝑖 + 𝛽7𝐺𝑟𝑜𝑢𝑝𝑖 + 𝛽8𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑖 +
∑ 𝛽𝑗 𝑋𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖, 
(24) 
where 𝑠𝑆𝐶𝑆𝑀𝑖 is a dummy set to 1 if the supplier must comply with the social dimension 
of SCSM (e.g., workplace safety); 𝑇ℎ𝑖𝑟𝑑_𝑃𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑦_𝐶𝑒𝑟𝑡𝑖 is a dummy variable equal to 1 
when the supplier must verify SCSM compliance through a third-party organization; 
𝐺𝑟𝑜𝑢𝑝𝑖 is the binary variable equal to 1 if the supplier is mandated by the buyers that 
using the group SCSM approach; 𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑖  is the difference of the first year in the 
announcement sample to the given announcement year. The year effect was controlled in 
this model for the potential changes in legislation and stakeholder pressure on 
sustainability issues over years. All other terms are the same as in model 1.  
Model 3 tests the supplier’s slack resources in addition to the variables tested in the 
previous two models. The equation (25) shows model 3:  
       𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑖 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑆𝐷𝐵𝑖  + 𝛽2𝐵𝐷𝑆𝑖 + 𝛽3𝑅𝑒𝑙_𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑖 +
𝛽4𝑠𝑆𝐶𝑆𝑀𝑖+𝛽5𝑇ℎ𝑖𝑟𝑑_𝑃𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑦_𝐶𝑒𝑟𝑡𝑖 +  𝛽6𝐺𝑟𝑜𝑢𝑝𝑖 +
𝛽7𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑖 + 𝛽8𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑎𝑐𝑖𝑡𝑦_𝑆𝑙𝑎𝑐𝑘𝑖 + 𝛽9𝐼𝑛𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑦_𝑆𝑙𝑎𝑐𝑘𝑖  +
𝛽10𝑆𝑢𝑝𝑝𝑙𝑦_𝐶ℎ𝑎𝑖𝑛_𝑆𝑙𝑎𝑐𝑘𝑖 + 𝛽11𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖 + ∑ 𝛽𝑗 𝑋𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖, 
(25) 
where 𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑎𝑐𝑖𝑡𝑦_𝑆𝑙𝑎𝑐𝑘𝑖  𝐼𝑛𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑦_𝑆𝑙𝑎𝑐𝑘𝑖 , and 𝑆𝑢𝑝𝑝𝑙𝑦_𝐶ℎ𝑎𝑖𝑛_𝑆𝑙𝑎𝑐𝑘𝑖  are the 
industry-adjusted capacity, inventory, and supply chain slack respectively; Leverage is 
the measure of financial slack; a high level leverage indicates a low level of financial 
slack.  
The interaction term between financial slack and the supplier’s dependence on buyer 
is tested in model 4 as in equation (26), including all variables in the last models: 
       𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑖 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑆𝐷𝐵𝑖  + 𝛽2𝐵𝐷𝑆𝑖 + 𝛽3𝑅𝑒𝑙_𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑖 +
𝛽4𝑠𝑆𝐶𝑆𝑀𝑖+𝛽5𝑇ℎ𝑖𝑟𝑑_𝑃𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑦_𝐶𝑒𝑟𝑡𝑖 + 𝛽6𝐺𝑟𝑜𝑢𝑝𝑖 + 𝛽7𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑖 +
+𝛽8𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑎𝑐𝑖𝑡𝑦_𝑆𝑙𝑎𝑐𝑘𝑖 + 𝛽9𝐼𝑛𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑦_𝑆𝑙𝑎𝑐𝑘𝑖  +
𝛽10𝑆𝑢𝑝𝑝𝑙𝑦_𝐶ℎ𝑎𝑖𝑛_𝑆𝑙𝑎𝑐𝑘𝑖+𝛽11𝐿𝑅𝑖 + 𝛽12(𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖 ∗
𝑆𝐷𝐶𝑖) + + ∑ 𝛽𝑗 𝑋𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖, 
(26) 
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where 𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖 ∗ 𝑆𝐷𝐶𝑖  is the interaction term of leverage and the supplier’s 
dependence on buyer. Leverage is the measure of financial slack; a high level leverage 
indicates a low level of financial slack. Both leverage and SDC were centered in the 
calculation of the interaction term to avoid multicollinearity in the regression analysis. 
All other terms are the same as in previous models. 
3.6.4 Model diagnostics in the analysis of suppliers 
An important assumption of OLS regression is the absence of influential observations 
in data, as the linear model fit by least squares can be significantly biased by these 
influential observations, which leads to misrepresentation of the estimated coefficients 
and standard errors. The methods suggested by Fox and Weisberg (2010) were followed 
to diagnose the regression models. The hat-values were estimated to detect influential 
observations. There were observations found in the dataset that had hat-values over three 
times the average hat-value, and thus there were influential observations, which raised 
the concern of possible bias by using OLS regression.  
Multiple methods were used to control these influential observations. A further 
diagnosis found that these observations were not caused by data entry error, and data 
transformation did not remove the effect of these influential observations. The dataset 
was trimmed by removing the observations below the first and above the 99th percentiles 
as following Barber and Lyon (1996); however, there were still observations that had over 
three times the average hat-value.  
The present research did not choose to remove these influential observations in the 
regression analysis. Discarding these observations may have decreased the sample size 
and created an additional bias in the estimation. Moreover, the inclusion of outlying 
influential observations, while minimizing the influence scale in the analysis, may result 
in valuable insights, as these outlying observations are no longer outliers but are 
accounted for by the models (Johnson, 2002).  
Robust regression was used in supplier analysis. Robust regression is an alternative to 
OLS regression when there are influential observations in datasets. Weighted least 
squares were used in robust regression, which minimizes the weight given to outlying 
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observations in the calculation of regression coefficients (Cohen et al., 2003); thus, the 
process effectively ensures the reliability of the estimated coefficients (Wright & London, 
2009).  
Cohen et al. (2003) suggested that robust regression should only reduce statistical 
power a small amount in comparison with OLS regression when influential observations 
are absent. OLS regression was also performed in supplier analysis to compare with 
robust regression (Appendix A shows the OLS regression results for supplier analysis, 
demonstrating that results by OLS regression have substantial differences from those by 
robust regression). In general, OLS regression showed higher coefficients of the 
hypothesized variables and additional statistical significance than robust regression. The 
differences supported the belief that in the presence of influential observations, the 
present research should conservatively use robust regression to ensure the reliability of 
the findings.  
Moreover, the buyer dataset provides an opportunity to detect a similar performance 
between OLS and robust regression. There was no influential observation detected in 
buyer dataset; thus, the estimated coefficients and significance of OLS and robust 
regression should only have a small scale of difference. Robust regression by using the 
buyer dataset was run, as shown in Appendix B. The results were almost the same as 
those reported by using OLS regression. These results validated the use of OLS regression 
in the buyer analysis.  
These trial tests provide evidence that reporting the results by using robust regression 
for supplier analysis is likely to provide reliable findings in this research. Hence, robust 
regression was used in the supplier analysis. Furthermore, the values of VIF were all 
below three, providing evidence of low multicollinearity (Cohen et al., 2003).  
3.7 Paired sample t-test on the difference in financial 
performance between buyers and suppliers 
It is hypothesized that the financial performance of suppliers is more negative than that 
of buyers as discussed in link with the green bullwhip effect (see section 2.5.3). The green 
bullwhip effect is found on the buyers and their paired suppliers working on the same 
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supply chains (S.-Y. Lee et al., 2014; Seles et al., 2016). The methods below were used 
to ensure the consistency with the literature.  
 The subsamples of buyers and suppliers were used in the analysis to ensure buyers 
were matched only with their paired-trading suppliers. It was required that the suppliers 
are the paired trading partners of the buyers in the same supply chains; thus, the amplified 
SCSM demand may effectively pass from buyers to their suppliers in link with the green 
bullwhip effect. Therefore, subsamples for buyers and suppliers were created where buyer 
and supplier were required to be generated from the same announcements. In the buyer 
subsample, those firms whose suppliers could not be found by using the methods outlined 
in section 3.3.2.2 were removed. In the supplier subsample, those firms whose buyers 
were non-public firms were removed. The subsample of buyers was generated from 180 
announcements which subsequently identified 1690 suppliers.  
The subsamples contained only buyers and their direct trading suppliers working on 
the same supply chains, thus enabling the use of a paired sample t-test in the analysis of 
the performance difference. A paired sample t-test compares the mean difference of the 
samples when those means have come from the same entities (i.e., SCSM announcements 
in this research) (Field, 2013). The buyers’ and suppliers’ financial performance are the 
CARs estimated by the market model. Suppliers’ portfolio CARs (i.e., 180 portfolio 
CARs) were used to run the paired sample t-test.  
3.8 Chapter conclusion 
This chapter introduced the event study methodology used in this research to test the 
firms’ financial performance. The objective measure of financial performance avoids 
social desirability bias and improves the robustness of the findings of this research.  
Different methods were used for the supplier and buyer samples. The supplier sample 
was collected using the methods for related firms in event study methodology. Due to the 
nature of the sample, the portfolio CARs were used to estimate the suppliers’ financial 
performance to avoid calendar time clustering bias. Standard event study methods for the 
buyer sample were adopted.  
The hypothesized and control variables were constructed for the buyer and supplier 
analysis. These variables were used in the regression model against the estimated 
individual CARs to test the developed hypotheses in the literature review chapter. While 
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OLS regression was used in buyer analysis, robust regression was used in supplier 
analysis for avoiding potential bias caused by influential observations.  
Subsamples were used in the test of the performance difference between the buyers 
and suppliers. The difference between the buyers’ and suppliers’ CARs was tested by 
using a paired sample t-test.  
In the next chapter, the descriptive statistics and test results based on the methods will 
be presented and discussed.  
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Chapter 4. Results  
This chapter reports descriptive statistics of collected sample data and the test results 
by using the event study methodology and cross-sectional regression analysis. The 
descriptive statistics showed the characteristics of the sample data. The test results 
addressed the scale and significance of the hypothesized variables.  
The descriptive statistics and test results are presented in separate sections for buyers 
and suppliers, as different samples were collected and used. Figure 4.1gives the structure 
of this chapter.  
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Figure 4.1 Structure of Results Chapter  
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4.1 Descriptive statistics of buyer sample 
This section presents the characteristics of buyer sample. The focus is to demonstrate 
the distribution of the data of constructed variables as well as the announcement sample.  
In total, 308 announcements were identified. The announcement sample in this 
research is larger than the similar study of Dam and Petkova (2014) (i.e., 66 
announcements). The large announcement sample improves the power of statistical tests 
in this research.  
Table 4.1 Panel A gives the selected financial characteristics for buyers derived from 
these 308 announcements. Net sales and cost of goods sold show the firm size of the buyer 
sample. The mean (median) values of net sales and cost of goods sold are US$ 59,850 
(US$ 18,916) and US$ 41,500 (US$ 11,525) million respectively. The firm size of the 
sample firms is consistent with the study of Dam and Petkova (2014).  
The mean (median) value of the market to book ratio is 3.15 (2.43), indicating the 
growth prospects for the sample firms. The mean (median) value of the ratio of COGS to 
sales is 0.61 (0.65); the mean (median) value of inventory turnover is 13.79 (6.71); the 
mean (median) value of accounts payable turnover is 7.81 (6.84). These are three 
measures for buyers’ SRM. In comparison with the data in the study of Tang and Liou 
(2010), the sample firms in this research show, on average, a high level of competence in 
SRM. The standard deviation of inventory turnover is relatively large (i.e., 23.79). 
Therefore, the data of inventory turnover was transformed to logarithm in the regression 
analysis to mitigate the outliers.  
Table 4.1 Panel B demonstrates the frequencies of categorical variables in the buyer 
sample. In 18% of announcements, the buyers required their suppliers to improve the 
performance of social dimension of SCSM (i.e., sSCSM), which is consistent with the 
literature that sSCSM is less emphasized (Touboulic & Walker, 2015). In 33% of 
announcements, the buyers demanded third-party certification in suppliers’ SCSM 
compliance. In total, 43 % of announcements were coded as group SCSM, where buyers 
collaborated in groups to adopt SCSM.  
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Table 4.1 Descriptive Statistics for Buyer Sample 
Panel A: Selected financial characteristics for 
buyers (N=308) 
Mean Median SD 
Net Sales (in unit of million) 59,850 18,916 96,792 
Cost of Goods Sold (in unit of million) 41,500 11,525 71,949 
Market to Book Ratio (i.e., growth prospects) 3.15 2.43 3.56 
The ratio of COGS to Sales 0.61 0.65 0.18 
Inventory Turnover 13.79 6.71 23.79 
Accounts Payable Turnover 7.81 6.84 4.85 
Panel B: Frequency Statistics for buyers 
(N=308) 
n %  
sSCSM 56 18  
Third-Party Certification 101 33  
Group SCSM 132 43  
Figure 4.2 shows the year distribution of the 308 announcements. Most of the SCSM 
announcements were after 2003, which is consistent with the literature that business 
raised awareness of sustainability issues since the beginning of the 21st century (Carter & 
Easton, 2011; Carter & Rogers, 2008).  
 



























Number of SCSM announcements between 1990 and 2016
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Figure 4.3 illustrates the industry composition of the buyer sample based on the Fama-
French 48 industry classification (Fama & French, 1997). The top four industries are 
retailers, automotive, utility, and meals (e.g., McDonald’s). In total, 20% of 
announcements were made by retailers which operate close to the point of sales in the 
downstream supply chains, and, thus, have high stakeholder pressure to adopt SCSM 
(Hall, 2000; Schmidt et al., 2017).  
 
Figure 4.3 Industry Composition of Buyer Sample (using Fama-French 48 industry 
classification) 
Figure 4.4 presents the regional distribution in the buyer sample according to the 
geographic locations of primary stock exchanges. Over half of the announcements (68%) 
were made by the firms from North American, while Asian and European firms equally 
make 16% of announcements. The percentage 0.32% in Figure 4.4 represents one 
announcement made by Woolworths Holding Limited listed on the Johannesburg Stock 
Exchange.  
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Table 4.2 reports the Pearson correlation matrix of the variables used in the regression 
analysis for the buyer sample. Inventory turnover was logarithm-transformed. The VIF 
values for all variables are lower than three, indicating low multicollinearity (Cohen et 
al., 2003). 
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Table 4.2 Correlation Matrix of the Variables Used in Buyer Analysis 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
 CAR Group SCSM sSCSM 













          
1 1         
2 0.0598 1        
 (0.2953)         
3 0.0640 -0.2041*** 1       
 (0.2630) (0.0003)        
4 0.0296 -0.2416*** -0.0245 1      
 (0.6052) (0.0000) (0.6691)       
5 -0.0180 -0.0183 0.0806 0.0787 1     
 (0.7525) (0.7489) (0.1581) (0.1680)      
6 -0.0791 -0.0234 0.0808 0.0937 -0.0158 1    
 (0.1705) (0.6860) (0.1614) (0.1040) (0.7845)     
7 -0.0135 -0.1985*** 0.2727*** 0.0450 -0.0557 0.0972 1   
 (0.8156) (0.0005) (0.0000) (0.4357) (0.3351) (0.0935)    
8 0.0222 -0.1277** 0.0204 0.0366 0.0551 -0.0789 0.3037*** 1  
 (0.6999) (0.0260) (0.7238) (0.5246) (0.3387) (0.1724) (0.0000)   
9 -0.0202 -0.1254** 0.2542*** -0.0294 -0.0332 0.1993*** 0.3173*** 0.1640*** 1 
 (0.7287) (0.0304) (0.0000) (0.6127) (0.5683) (0.0006) (0.0000) (0.0046)  
Mean -0.0022 0.4286 0.1818 0.3279 19.2078 3.1464 7.8105 0.6138 0.8968 
SD 0.0216 0.4957 0.3863 0.4702 5.895 3.5637 4.8505 0.1763 0.3732 
Note: ** and *** denote the significance at 0.05 and 0.01 level (two-tailed tests) respectively. p-values are in parentheses. CAR is the buyer's cumulative abnormal return in the event window 
(-1,1) estimated by using the market model. Inventory turnover is transformed with a logarithm to mitigate the outliers. 
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4.2 The impact of buyers’ SCSM adoption on their 
financial performance  
The impact of buyers’ SCSM adoption on their financial performance was measured 
by CARs in the event window (-1,1). Multiple parametric tests and rank tests (section 
3.4.4) were used to test the null hypothesis that the mean CAR is equal to zero, indicating 
there is no impact of SCSM adoption on buyers’ financial performance.  
Table 4.3 provides the results of mean CAR and test significance. The first row 
indicates the test results by using the full sample. The mean (median) CAR is -0.22% (-
0.24%) estimated by using the market model. In total, 54% out of 308 announcements 
have negative CARs. The multiple test statistics show the two-tailed significance of mean 
CAR. Both Patell z and t-BMP tests indicate the significance of the mean CAR at 5% 
level. The mean CAR is significant at 10% level in Cross-sectional t-test. The significance 
of negative mean CAR is supported by rank test, as a non-parametric test, at 10% level. 
These results support the hypothesis (B)H1, which indicates that SCSM adoption creates 
a negative effect on buyers’ financial performance.  
The Fama-French-Momentum model was used to confirm the results were not biased 
by the choice of model. As the data of factors in the Fama-French-Momentum model are 
not readily available for parts of the sample firms (e.g., Korean, Taiwan), the methods 
suggested by Hendricks et al. (2017) were used, where the U.S. sample firms were used 
to compare the results between the market model and the Fama-French-Momentum 
model (section 3.4.2).  
The second and third rows in Table 4.3 show the test results by using only U.S. sample 
firms. The sample size was reduced to 205 (67% of the full sample). The mean (median) 
CARs are -0.34% (-0.29%) by using the market model and -0.55% (-0.31%) by using the 
Fama-French-Momentum model respectively. Although the mean CAR estimated by the 
Fama-French-Momentum model is slightly more negative than that estimated by the 
market model, the figures show the consistently negative CAR across the two models. 
The percentage of negative CAR is 54% for the market model and 57% for the Fama-
French-Momentum model. The parametric tests (i.e., Cross-sectional t-test, Patell z test, 
and t-BMP test) indicate the minimum two-tailed significant at 5% level for mean CAR 
across two models. The non-parametric rank test supports the test results at a minimum 
5% level of two-tailed significance. The consistency on the negativity and significance of 
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mean CAR across two models confirms that the finding of negative buyers’ financial 
performance is unlikely to be biased by choice of model.  
Next, the cross-sectional regression analysis was used to test the effect of influential 
factors (e.g., growth prospects and sSCSM) on buyers’ CARs. The present research 
conservatively used the individual CARs estimated by the market model in the full sample 
as the dependent variable in the regression analysis. The CARs estimated by the market 
model have the lowest difference between mean (-0.22%) and median values (-0.24%), 
and the lowest negativity on mean value across the three rows shown in Table 4.3. Also, 
the market model provides superiority in model specification and adjustment for system 
risk (MacKinlay, 1997), which has been widely used to conduct regression analysis 
(Hendricks & Singhal, 2008b; Ni et al., 2016; Thirumalai & Sinha, 2011; Wood et al., 
2017). Thus, the use of market model estimated CARs avoided unexpected bias in the 
analyses of this research.  
The larger scale of negativity by using the U.S. sample (i.e., -0.34%) than by using the 
full sample (i.e., -0.22%) indicates the necessary control on the country/region effect. In 
this research, the regional effect was controlled in the regression analysis. In the next 
section, the test results of the regression analysis will be discussed.  
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Patell z test t- BMP test Rank Test 
Market Model (Full Sample) 308 -0.0022/-0.0024 54% -1.7745* -1.9665** -2.2172** -1.7837* 
Market Model (U.S. Firms Only) 205 -0.0034/-0.00294 54% -2.3359** -2.3589** -2.7495*** -2.0161** 
Fama-French-Momentum Model (U.S. 
Firms Only) 
205 -0.0055/-0.00312 57% -3.3657*** -2.6153*** -3.2883*** -2.6892*** 
Note: The symbols *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at the 0.1, 0.05, and 0.01 levels, respectively, using two-tailed tests; details of the statistical tests used are in section 3.4.4. 
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4.3 The influential factors to buyers’ financial 
performance in their SCSM adoption 
OLS regression was used to test the influential factors as independent variables against 
CARs as the dependent variable. Table 4.4 shows the results of the regressions using 
robust standard errors (corrected for heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation) (section 
number 3.6.2). Model 1 includes all control variables. Model 2 presents the effect of 
growth prospects. Model 3 focuses on the governances of SCSM. Model 4 is the full 
model testing the three measures of SRM in addition to all variables in prior models. The 
hierarchical multiple regression allows testing the effects of certain predictors 
independent of the influence of other variables (Jaccard et al., 2006).  
Model 1 shows the test results of control variables for the industry, region, and year 
effect. With regard to the effect of industry on buyers’ financial performance, there is no 
large difference across industries except in electronic equipment, where the coefficient is 
negative and statistically significant at 5% level (one tail). Regarding the country/region 
effect, the coefficients of both European and North American firms are statistically 
insignificant. The coefficient of year effect is not significantly different from zero.  
The test results from model 2 show the coefficient of growth prospects is negative and 
significant at 5% level (one tail). The result supports the hypothesis (B)H3, providing the 
evidence that buyers with higher growth prospect have more negative financial 
performance. 
Multiple governance mechanisms were tested in model 3. The coefficient of sSCSM 
is positive at 5% significant level (one tail), which supports hypothesis (B)H6 and 
indicates that the buyers have less negative financial performance when they require their 
suppliers to improve the social dimension of SCSM (e.g., improving labor conditions). 
The coefficient of third-party certification is not significantly different from zero. Hence, 
hypothesis (B)H4 is not supported, which infers that buyers have no significantly 
different financial performance when they use third-party certification as the SCSM 
governance mechanism than others (e.g., code of conduct). The coefficient of group 
SCSM is positive and significant at 10% level (one tail). (B)H5 is supported, which 
indicates that the buyers have less negative financial performance if they partner with 
peers in groups to adopt SCSM.  
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Model 4 tests the effect of SRM. Three measures of SRM were used. Surprisingly, the 
coefficients of the ratio of COGS to sales, accounts payable turnover, and inventory 
turnover are not significantly different from zero. Therefore, hypotheses (B)H2a, (B)H2b, 
and (B)H2c, are not supported, indicating the buyers’ SRM is not significantly related to 
the financial performance in their SCSM adoption. The coefficients of growth prospects, 
sSCSM, and group SCSM are consistently significant in model 4, indicating the 
robustness of the prior test results. The coefficients and significance levels of control 
variables are consistent across models, showing the test results are constant with regard 
to the effects of year and region. Only firms in the electronic equipment industry have 
more negative financial performance while there is no such effect on the firms in other 
industries.  
The hierarchical regression approach allows documenting the proportion of variation 
in dependent variables that independent variables as a group can account for over and 
above the covariates (Jaccard et al., 2006). The changes of R2 values reflect the difference 
of the proportion of variation across models that the grouped independent variables 
explain. The F statistic provides a significance test on the changes. In Table 4.4, the R2 
values are incrementally increased from 3% in model 1 to 7% in model 3, and marginally 
significant for model 3. The results indicate that the explanatory power of model 3 is 
significantly larger than model 1, showing the importance of including the effect of 
growth prospects and factors of governances in the model. However, the R2 value in 
model 4 is merely increased by 0.13% from that in model 3, and the F statistic is not 
significantly different from zero. The result shows the three measures of SRM do not 
have a significant effect explaining the variation of financial performance above or 
beyond growth prospects and SCSM governance. 
Additional analyses were conducted to further understand why model 4 appeared to 
have little explanatory power. The VIF values of all variables in model 4 are below three, 
indicating no multicollinearity concern. The plot of residuals versus fitted values shows 
that there is no non-linear relationship between the independent variables and the 
dependent variable (Figure C.1 in Appendix C). Therefore, there is no issue of 
multicollinearity or non-linearity leading to the reduced explanatory power in model 4. 
The exclusion of statistical reasoning suggests theoretical causes of the changes in R2 
values and F statistic for model 4. The possible explanation is the low applicability of 
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SRM, as a traditional SCM strategy, for SCSM. The details will be discussed in section 
5.1.6.  











Intercept 0.0037 0.0073 0.0040 0.0058 
 (0.0066) (0.0069) (0.0071) (0.0086) 
Consumer Goods -0.0018 -0.0020 -0.0008 -0.0016 
 (0.0045) (0.0046) (0.0051) (0.0052) 
Autos 0.0035 0.0040 0.0042 0.0045 
 (0.0051) (0.0051) (0.0055) (0.0059) 
Computers -0.0009 -0.0010 -0.0007 -0.0001 
 (0.0051) (0.0051) (0.0050) (0.0061) 
Recreation -0.0020 -0.0031 -0.0019 -0.0019 
 (0.0089) (0.0089) (0.0090) (0.0090) 
Electronic Equipment -0.0105** -0.0122** -0.0128** -0.0124** 
 (0.0062) (0.0061) (0.0062) (0.0063) 
Aero 0.0093 0.0077 0.0075 0.0075 
 (0.0081) (0.0078) (0.0078) (0.0080) 
Utility -0.0030 -0.0056 -0.0064 -0.0073 
 (0.0058) (0.0061) (0.0069) (0.0076) 
Retailers -0.0004 -0.0018 -0.0016 -0.0009 
 (0.0042) (0.0043) (0.0044) (0.0042) 
Meals 0.0020 0.0012 0.0001 -0.0021 
 (0.0052) (0.0056) (0.0053) (0.0075) 
European Firms -0.0052 -0.0044 -0.0069* -0.0063 
 (0.0046) (0.0046) (0.0050) (0.0051) 
North American Firms -0.0058* -0.0037 -0.0043 -0.0044 
 (0.0042) (0.0042) (0.0042) (0.0075) 
Year in sample -0.00003 -0.0001 -0.0001 -0.0001 
 (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003) 
Growth Prospects  -0.0008** -0.0008** -0.0009** 
  (0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0004) 
sSCSM   0.0063** 0.0047* 
   (0.0031) (0.0032) 
Third-Party Certification   0.0031 0.0037 
   (0.0031) (0.0032) 
Group SCSM   0.0057* 0.0055* 
   (0.0035) (0.0036) 
The ratio of COGS to Sales    -0.0011 
    (0.0094) 
Accounts Payable Turnover    -0.0001 
    (0.0005) 
Inventory Turnover    -0.0006 
    (0.0054) 
N 308 300 300 290 
F 0.9081 1.1976 1.3983* 1.1455 
R2 0.0356 0.0516 0.0733 0.0746 
Note: Significance levels (one-tailed tests): * 0.1 level, ** 0.05 level. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses and 
corrected for heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation. 
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4.4 Summary of the test results in the analysis of buyers 
Table 4.5 summarizes all test results in the buyer analysis. There are four main findings. 
The buyers’ financial performance was found negative when they adopt SCSM. The 
negative financial performance is more severe if the buyers have a high level of growth 
prospects. However, the joint adoption with other firms by using group SCSM approach 
can reduce the negative financial performance, and the mandate of the social dimension 
of SCSM (i.e., sSCSM ) on suppliers can also decrease the negative financial performance.  









Buyers’ financial performance when 
they adopt SCSM 
(B)H1 Negative 2.5.1.1 Supported 









The ratio of COGS to sales (the 
measure of supplier relationship 
management) 
(B)H2a Negative 2.5.1.2 
Not 
supported 
Accounts payable turnover (the 
measure of supplier relationship 
management) 
(B)H2b Negative 2.5.1.2 
Not 
supported 
Inventory turnover (the measure of 
supplier relationship management) 
(B)H2c Positive 2.5.1.2 
Not 
supported 
Growth prospect (B)H3 Negative 2.5.1.3 Supported 
Third-party certification (governance 
mechanisms) 
(B)H4 Positive 2.5.1.4 
Not 
supported 
Group SCSM (B)H5 Positive 2.5.1.5 Supported 
sSCSM (SCSM dimensions) (B)H6 Positive 2.5.1.6 Supported 
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4.5 Descriptive statistics of the supplier sample  
This section presents the characteristics of supplier sample. The aim is to demonstrate 
the supplier observations generated from the announcement sample and the distribution 
of the data of constructed variables in the supplier analysis.  
In total, 219 SCSM announcements were found to be able to generate 2189 supplier 
observations. Table 4.6 presents the descriptive statistics for the supplier sample. Panel 
A shows the statistics of selected financial characteristics.  
Suppliers were found to be small in size and highly dependent on buyers. The mean 
(median) values of net sales and total assets are US$ 4,586 (US$680) and US$ 5,561 
(US$734) million respectively. Recalling that in the buyer sample, the mean (median) 
values of net sales are US$ 59,850 (US$ 18,916), indicating that buyers found in this 
research are larger in firm size than suppliers. The mean (median) ratio of supplier’s 
dependence on buyer is 0.20 (0.17), and the mean (median) ratio of buyer’s dependence 
on supplier is 0.02 (0.0009), which indicates that buyers found in this research have higher 
supply chain power than suppliers. The attribute that buyers are large in firm size and 
high in power is consistent with the findings of the SCSM studies (Hall, 2000; Seuring & 
Müller, 2008; Touboulic et al., 2014; Touboulic & Walker, 2015), and validates the 
discussion in section 2.3.2, where the supply chain power in favor of buyers enables them 
to transfer SCSM pressure from downstream stakeholders to upstream suppliers. The 
standard deviation of the ratio of buyer’s dependence on supplier is high (0.48); therefore, 
logarithm form of the measure was used in the regression analysis to avoid the bias of 
outliers. 
Moreover, the suppliers were found to have a strong economic link with their buyers. 
The ratio of the supplier’s dependence on buyer is high (0.20), indicating that these 
suppliers have a great percentage of their overall business (i.e., 20%) with the buyers that 
mandate SCSM. The mean (median) relationship length is 7 (5) years, supporting the 
significant and long-term relationships between the suppliers and their buyers. These 
figures suggest a strong economic bond of the suppliers with their buyers in the sample 
of this research. Therefore, the buyers’ SCSM announcements have a salient impact on 
suppliers’ operations, thus their financial performance, which validated the use of the 
event study methodology on related firms (section 3.3.3) in this research.  
Compared with industry peers, the sample suppliers were found to have leanness in 
operations regarding capacity, inventory, and supply chain slack (i.e., cash-to-cash cycle). 
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The mean (median) values of industry-adjusted capacity slack, inventory slack, and 
supply chain slack are -0.38 (-0.62), -0.23 (-0.41), and -0.72 (-12.26) respectively. The 
standard deviation of supply chain slack is high (86.23), and thus was transformed by 
using cube root (to accommodate the negative values) to reduce the bias of outliers. 
Financial slack was measured by leverage. The mean (median) value of leverage is 0.26 
(0.23).  
Panel B demonstrates the frequencies of categorical variables in the sample. Similar 
to the finding in the literature (Hoejmose & Adrien-Kirby, 2012; Touboulic & Walker, 
2015; Walker et al., 2012), there are few suppliers (i.e., 14%) in the sample that are 
required by their buyers to comply with the social dimension of SCSM (i.e., sSCSM). In 
total, 17% of suppliers must achieve third-party certification required by their buyers. 
There are 34% of suppliers whose buyers jointly mandate SCSM with others by using 
group SCSM approach.  
Panel C illustrates the average supplier sample per announcement. Out of a sample of 
219 announcements (i.e., 219 portfolios in the estimate of portfolio CARs), there are on 
average ten suppliers per announcement. The biggest announcement portfolio is 
composed of 98 suppliers (e.g., Wal-Mart’s announcement), and there is one supplier in 
the smallest portfolio.   
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Table 4.6 Descriptive Statistics for Supplier Sample 
Panel A: Selected financial 
characteristics for suppliers (N= 2189) 
Mean Median SD 
Net Sales (in unit of million) 4,586 680 12,737 
Total Asset (in unit of million) 5,561 734 31,009 
The ratio of the Supplier’s Dependence 
on Buyer 
0.20 0.17 0.15 
The ratio of the Buyer’s Dependence 
on Supplier 
0.02 0.001 0.48 
Relationship Length (in year) 7 5 6 
Leverage2 0.26 0.23 0.21 
Capacity Slack -0.38 -0.62 2.54 
Inventory Slack -0.23 -0.41 1.12 
Supply Chain Slack (i.e., Cash-to-Cash 
Cycle) 
-0.72 -12.26 86.83 
Panel B: Frequency statistics for 
suppliers (N=2189) 
N %   
sSCSM 322 15   
Third-Party Certification 392 18   
Group SCSM 746 34   
Panel C: Frequency statistics for 
announcements (N=219) 
Mean Max Min  
Supplier sample per announcement 10 98 1  
Note: 1. The four-digit figure is 0.0009. 2. Leverage is the measure of financial slack; a low level of 
leverage indicates a high level of financial slack. 
Figure 4.5 shows the year distribution of SCSM announcements used in supplier 
sample. The year distribution is consistent with the literature that SCSM is predominant 
in the 21st century (Carter & Easton, 2011).  
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Figure 4.5 Year Distribution of SCSM Announcements (supplier sample) 
Table 4.7 demonstrates the industry composition of supplier sample. The top five 
industries are electronic equipment, business services, automotive, food products, and 
computers. Recalling that the top industry in the buyer sample is retailers, the industry 
compositions in the samples indicate that buyers which mandate SCSM mainly operate 
in the downstream supply chains, while suppliers mostly operate in the upstream supply 
chains, according to the classification by Schmidt et al. (2017). Interestingly, automotive, 
electronic equipment, and computer sectors overlap in the buyer and supplier samples. 
These firms comply with their buyers’ SCSM and require their suppliers’ SCSM 


























Year distribution of SCSM annnouncmeent (between 1990 and 2016)
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Table 4.7 Industry Composition of Supplier Sample  
  N %   N % 
Electronic Equipment 265 12.11% Construction Material 37 1.69% 
Business Service  217 9.91% Petroleum and Natural Gas 35 1.60% 
Automobiles 206 9.41% Rubber and Plastic Products 34 1.55% 
Food Products 186 8.50% Candy and Soda  33 1.51% 
Computers 148 6.76% Communication  30 1.37% 
Consumer Goods  99 4.52% Retailer 28 1.28% 
Recreation 87 3.97% Medical Equipment 25 1.14% 
Apparel 69 3.15% Printing and Publishing  21 0.96% 
Machinery  68 3.11% Steel Work  20 0.91% 
Measuring and Control Equipment  66 3.02% Construction  19 0.87% 
Business Supplies 63 2.88% Textile  18 0.82% 
Wholesale  61 2.79% Agriculture 17 0.78% 
Transportation  47 2.15% Defence 16 0.73% 
Chemicals  44 2.01% Fabricated Products 15 0.69% 
Aircraft 44 2.01% Personal Service  13 0.59% 
Pharmaceutical Products 42 1.92% Utility  12 0.55% 
Electrical Equipment 42 1.92% Shipping Containers  11 0.50% 
Note: The industry samples were created by using Fama-French 48 industry classification (Fama & French, 1997). The industry samples containing less than ten suppliers were removed 
to avoid the bias of singularity in the analysis.  
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Table 4.8 Correlation Matrix for the Variables used in Supplier Analysis 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 
















1 1            
2 0.0048 1           
 (0.8431)            
3 0.0333 0.0462 1          
 (0.2050) (0.0789)           
4 -0.0170 0.1727** 0.1313** 1         
 (0.4298) (0.0000) (0.0000)          
5 -0.0117 -0.0101 0.0315 -0.0297 1        
 (0.6127) (0.6997) (0.2689) (0.2025)         
6 0.0111 0.0583* 0.0849** 0.1014** -0.0273 1       
 (0.6030) (0.0159) (0.0012) (0.0000) (0.2362)        
7 -0.0224 -0.0389 0.0609* -0.0108 0.0412 -0.0964** 1      
 (0.2940) (0.1078) (0.0204) (0.6161) (0.0740) (0.0000)       
8 -0.0685** -0.0637** 0.0789** -0.1598** -0.0925** -0.1925** -0.1121** 1     
 (0.0014) (0.0084) (0.0027) (0.0000) (0.0001) (0.0000) (0.0000)      
9 0.0205 0.0160 0.0869** 0.2272** -0.0556* 0.1260** -0.0709** -0.0841** 1    
 (0.3370) (0.5075) (0.0009) (0.0000) (0.0159) (0.0000) (0.0009) (0.0001)     
10 0.0098 0.0060 0.0891** -0.0140 0.0203 0.0027 0.0404 0.0079 0.0271 1   
 (0.6647) (0.8130) (0.0012) (0.5369) (0.4054) (0.9034) (0.0726) (0.7268) (0.2282)    
11 0.0378 0.0529* -0.1113** 0.0012 0.0037 0.0628** -0.0335 -0.0981** 0.0443 0.0488* 1  
 (0.1073) (0.0448) (0.0001) (0.9590) (0.8834) (0.0074) (0.1531) (0.0000) (0.0593) (0.0398)   
12 0.0539* 0.0190 -0.2422** 0.0267 0.0040 0.1192** -0.0532* -0.1611** 0.0110 -0.0427 0.5712** 1 
 (0.0234) (0.4759) (0.0000) (0.2672) (0.8754) (0.0000) (0.0253) (0.0000) (0.6443) (0.0758) (0.0000)  
Mean -0.0036 0.2029 -2.9758 6.8538 0.2554 0.1471 0.1791 0.3408 18.3997 -0.3753 -0.226 -0.5557 
SD 0.0518 0.1495 0.8698 5.7548 0.2067 0.3543 0.3835 0.474 5.2875 2.5429 1.1171 3.431 
Note: ** and *** denote the significance at 0.05 and 0.01 level (two-tailed tests) respectively. p-values are in parentheses. CAR is suppliers’ individual cumulative abnormal return in even 
window (-1,1) estimated using the market model. SDB is the supplier’s dependence on buyer. BDS is the buyer’s dependence on supplier transformed in logarithm form to mitigate the outliers. 
Supply chain slack is measured by cash-to-cash cycle transformed with a cube root to accommodate the outliers. Leverage is the measure of financial slack. 
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Table 4.8 presents the Pearson correlation between the variables used in the cross-
sectional regression analysis for the supplier analysis. The measure of the buyer’s 
dependence on supplier (BDS) was in logarithm form, and the industry-adjusted supply 
chain slack (i.e., cash-to-cash cycle) was transformed with a cube root. The correlation 
between independent variables highlighted the importance of including them in the 
models to test the hypotheses. The VIF across the variables is lower than 3, indicating 
low multicollinearity (Cohen et al., 2003). 
4.6 The impact of buyers’ SCSM on their suppliers’ 
financial performance  
Suppliers’ equally weighted portfolio CARs in the event window (-1,1) were used to 
test the impact of buyers’ SCSM on suppliers’ financial performance. Table 4.9 shows 
results by using 219 portfolios estimated by using the market model, the Fama-French-
Momentum model, and the market-adjusted model. 
The mean CAR is -0.53%, -0.54%, and -0.45% estimated by the three models 
respectively, and the median CAR is -0.55%, -0.44%, and -0.49% respectively. There are 
more portfolios with negative abnormal returns across three models. The parametric tests 
(i.e., t-BMP test, Time-series Standard Deviation test, Generalized Least Squares test, and 
Collins-Dent test) in the market model and Fama-French-Momentum model show the 
strong significance of the mean CAR at minimum 5% level (two-tail). Except for the 
Time-series Standard Deviation test, all other parametric tests in the market-adjusted 
model indicate the significance at a minimum 5% level (two tail). Rank test, as a non-
parametric test, shows the two-tailed significance at 5% level across three models. 
Therefore, it can be concluded that hypothesis (S)H1 is supported, indicating that 
suppliers have negative financial performance when they are required to comply with 
their buyers’ SCSM.  
Because of the consistency of the mean CARs estimated across models and the 
superiority of model specification and adjustment for systematic risk in the market model 
(Hendricks & Singhal, 2008b; Ni et al., 2016), the market-model-estimated CARs were 
used in subsequent cross-sectional regression analysis. 
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Market Model 219 -0.53%/-0.55% 62% -3.237*** -1.993** -2.818*** -3.399**** -2.359** 
Fama-French-
Momentum Model 
219 -0.54%/-0.44% 58% -3.081*** -2.077** NA NA -2.102** 
Market-Adjusted 
Model 
219 -0.45%/-0.49% 58% -2.906*** -1.615 -2.531** -3.244*** -2.109** 
Note: The mean/median CAR was estimated by using 219 equal-weighted portfolio CARs. AThe symbols **,***, and **** denote statistical significance at the 0.05, 0.01, and 0.001 levels, 
respectively, using two-tailed tests. Generalized Least Square test and Collins-Dent test are not applicable to the multi-factor models (i.e., Fama-French-Momentum Model). 
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The event window (-1, 1) was used to estimate the suppliers’ portfolio CARs. The 
reason is that the sample contains announcements made by international companies (e.g., 
based in Japan, Europe, and the U.S.). The use of a three-day event window (-1, 1) can 
incorporate a more complete stock market reaction to the SCSM announcements, because 
there are time difference across global stock exchanges and the delay due to processing 
the information of related firms. The event window (-1,1) is the most commonly used in 
sustainability-related research (e.g., Fisher-Vanden and Thorburn [2011]; Klassen and 
McLaughlin [1996]), providing a balance between as a short window as practical and 
being sufficiently long to support the involvement of multinational corporations and 
global stock exchanges.  
 Statistical evidence also justifies the use of the three-day event window (-1,1). Table 
4.10 shows the test results of estimated mean CARs by the Market model on individual 
days and multiple event windows. The mean CAR on day 0 is not significantly different 
from zero across multiple statistical tests. Only the mean CAR at the event window (-1, 
1) is significant at a minimum 5% level across all statistical tests (two tail). Thus, the use 
of the event window (-1, 1) leads to rationally and statistically sound estimation of CARs 
in the supplier analysis.  
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Table 4.10 Results of Suppliers’ Mean Portfolio CAR on Individual Days and Multiple Event Windows 
Event Day (s) N 
Mean portfolio 
CAR 










-5 219 -0.21% 54% -0.818 -1.349 -0.683 -0.020 -0.135 
-4 219 0.11% 54% 0.333 0.730 0.279 -0.339 0.181 
-3 219 -0.42% 59% -2.252** -2.696*** -1.832 -1.649 -1.795 
-2 219 -0.11% 54% -0.539 -0.714 -0.404 -0.454 -0.634 
-1 219 -0.25% 54% -2.042** -1.632 -1.686 -1.742 -1.234 
0 219 0.02% 55% -0.814 0.120 -0.714 -1.867 -0.281 
1 219 -0.30% 62% -3.060*** -1.940 -2.634*** -2.486** -2.532** 
(-1,+1) 219 -0.53% 62% -3.237*** -1.993** -2.818*** -3.399**** -2.359** 
(-1,0) 219 -0.23% 58% -2.099** -1.069 -1.779 -2.670*** -1.071 
(0,+1) 219 -0.28% 60% -2.574** -1.287 -2.299** -2.992*** -1.989** 
(-2,+2) 219 -0.38% 57% -1.838 -1.095 -1.392 -2.111** -1.855 
(-5,+5) 219 -0.77% 58% -1.277 -1.507 -0.968 -0.919 -1.226 
Note: The symbols **, ***, and **** denote statistical significance at 0.05, 0.01, and 0.001 levels, respectively, using two-tailed tests. The portfolio CARs were 
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4.7 The influential factors to suppliers’ financial 
performance in their SCSM compliance 
The individual CARs (i.e., 2189 observations) rather than portfolio CARs (i.e., 219 
portfolios) were used in the cross-sectional regression analysis. Each supplier’s CAR as 
a single observation in the cross-sectional tests enabled to explore the firm-specific 
components that make the CARs different (Fee & Thomas, 2004). Robust regression was 
used to test the influential factors as the independent variables against suppliers’ CARs 
as the dependent variable (discussed in section 3.6.4).   
These influential factors were grouped into four models according to the attributes. 
The dependent variable across the four models is the suppliers’ individual CARs 
estimated by using the market model. There were missing data in the regression analysis, 
which leads to 1448 observations in Model 1 and 2, and 1023 observations in Model 2 
and 3. Table 4.11 provides details of the test results. The test results of each model will 
be discussed in detail in the next sections.  
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Table 4.11 Robust Regression Results for the Analysis of Suppliers 
Independent Variables 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
 Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient 
Intercept 0.0070* 0.0050 0.0140** 0.0150** 
 (0.0050) (0.0060) (0.0080) (0.0070) 
Supplier's dependence on buyer (SDB) 0.008 0.0090 -0.0091 -0.0104 
 (0.0080) (0.0080) (0.0090) (0.0090) 
Buyer's dependence on supplier (BDS) 0.0033*** 0.0035*** 0.0043*** 0.0044*** 
 (0.0010) (0.0010) (0.0010) (0.0010) 
Relationship year -0.0004*** -0.0010*** -0.0004** -0.0004** 
 (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) 
Social SCSM  0.0020 0.0040 0.0030 
  (0.0030) (0.0040) (0.0040) 
Third Party Certification  -0.0020 -0.0020 -0.0020 
  (0.0020) (0.0030) (0.0030) 
Group SCSM  -0.0044** -0.0020 -0.0010 
  (0.0020) (0.0030) (0.0030) 
Year in sample  0.0002 0.0001 0.0001 
  (0.0002) (0.0003) (0.0003) 
Capacity Slack   0.0018 0.0023 
   (0.0020) (0.0020) 
Inventory Slack   0.0050** 0.0049** 
   (0.0030) (0.0030) 
Cash-to-Cash-Cycle (C2C)   0.0002 0.0002 
   (0.0005) (0.0005) 
Supplier's leverage (LR)   -0.0044 -0.0037 
   (0.0050) (0.0050) 
Supplier's leverage * Supplier's dependence on buyer    -0.1900*** 
    (0.0480) 
Control for Industry effect Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N 1448 1448 1023 1023 
Note:*, ** and *** denotes the significance at 0.1, 0.05 and 0.01 level (one-tailed tests) respectively. Standard errors are reported in parentheses. We choose not to report R2 values, because the 
iterative reweighting on observations in robust regression gives R2 little statistic inference, see details in Willett and Singer (1988). 
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4.7.1 Supply chain power  
Model 1 provides the tests of the effect of supply chain power on the suppliers’ 
financial performance in their SCSM compliance, while the industry effect is controlled. 
The coefficient of the supplier’s dependence on buyer (SDB) is not significantly different 
from zero. The hypothesis (S)H2a is not supported. The buyer’s dependence on supplier 
(BDS) is positively related to suppliers’ CARs, which is significant at 0.01 level (one-
tailed test). It reveals that suppliers’ negative financial performance decreases with high 
buyer’s dependence. Hence hypothesis (S)H2b is supported. The coefficient of 
relationship length is negative and significant at 0.01 level (one-tailed test) with the 
inference that the suppliers’ negative financial performance is more severe when the 
suppliers have a long-term relationship with the buyers. The hypothesis (S)H2c is 
supported. These results in model 1 partially support that the supply chain power is an 
important factor in estimating the impact of buyers’ SCSM on suppliers’ financial 
performance. 
4.7.2 The nature of SCSM  
Model 2 tests the impact of the nature of SCSM on suppliers’ financial performance 
controlling supply chain power, industry effect, and how the impact may change over 
time (the year in the sample). Consistent with model 1, the coefficients of BDS and 
relationship length are significantly related to the suppliers’ CARs. The coefficient of 
sSCSM is positive as predicted. However, the coefficient is not significantly different 
from zero, which infers that social dimeson of SCSM (e.g., improving labor conditions) 
produces no distinct impact on suppliers’ financial performance relative to the 
environmental dimension of SCSM (e.g., controlling carbon emission). Hence, the 
hypothesis (S)H3 is not supported. Although the coefficient of third-party certification is 
negative as predicted, the coefficient is insignificantly different from zero. The result 
suggests that the SCSM compliance by third-party certification does not lead to different 
suppliers’ financial performance than by other governance mechanisms (e.g., code of 
conduct). The hypothesis (S)H4 is not supported. The coefficient of group SCSM is 
negatively related to the suppliers’ CARs and statistically significant at 0.05 level (one 
tail). Thus, hypothesis (S)H5 is supported, where the suppliers have more negative 
financial performance when their buyers use group SCSM approach. Additionally, the 
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coefficient of year effect is not significantly different from zero, which indicates the 
consistent scale of suppliers’ negative financial performance over time. In general, the 
tests in model 2 support that group SCSM has an economic significance on estimating 
suppliers’ financial performance.  
4.7.3 Operational and financial slack 
Model 3 tests the buffering effects of suppliers’ operational and financial slack on their 
negative financial performance. Capacity, inventory, and supply chain slack were used as 
the forms of operational slack. The coefficients of capacity slack and supply chain slack 
are not significantly different from zero. Thus, (S)H6a and (S)H6c are not supported. The 
coefficient of inventory slack is positive and statistically significant at 0.05% level (one 
tail). Therefore, the hypothesis (S)H6b is supported, indicating that the suppliers that have 
higher inventory slack have less negative financial performance in their SCSM 
compliance. Group SCSM which showed a significantly negative effect in model 2 is not 
statistically significant in model 3, where operational slack is included. The coefficient 
of group SCSM is less negative in model 3 than that in model 2. The result of group 
SCSM provides additional evidence of the buffering effect of operational slack on 
suppliers’ negative financial performance in their SCSM compliance. The results in 
model 3 uphold the operational slack as an important source to cushion the suppliers’ 
SCSM costs. Nonetheless, in the choice of the form of operational slack, inventory is the 
effective force. Leverage was used to measure the financial slack, where a low level of 
leverage indicates a high level of financial slack. While the coefficient of leverage is 
negative, the coefficient is not statistically different from zero. Thus hypothesis (S)H7 is 
not supported, suggesting financial slack alone is not related to suppliers’ financial 
performance in their SCSM compliance.  
4.7.4 The interaction between financial slack and the supplier’s 
dependence on buyer 
Model 4 tests the interaction effect of financial slack and supplier’s dependence on 
buyer, including all variables in the last three models. Figure 4.6 shows the interaction 
plot. The dashed line indicates that a high level of leverage (i.e., a low level of financial 
slack) and dependence on buyer lead to a more negative suppliers’ CAR (i.e., more 
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negative financial performance). The strong negative and statistically significant 
coefficient of the interaction term provides evidence to support hypothesis (S)H8. 
Additionally, model 4 illustrates the consistency of the tested variables. The coefficient 
of the buyer’s dependence on supplier is positive and statistically significant. The 
coefficient of relationship length is significantly negative. The coefficient of inventory 
slack is significantly positive. Group SCSM is the only variable that becomes 
insignificant in model 4.  
 
Figure 4.6 Interaction Plot for the Effect of Financial Slack under a High Level of 
Supplier's Dependence on Buyer on the Financial Performance for Suppliers  
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4.8 Summary of the test results in the analysis of 
suppliers 
Table 4.12 summarizes all the test results in the supplier analysis. There are five main 
findings. The suppliers’ financial performance was found to be negative when they are 
required to comply with buyers’ SCSM. While a long-term relationship increases the 
severity of the negative financial performance, a high level of the buyer’s dependence on 
supplier reduces the scale of negativity. Group SCSM creates a more negative impact on 
suppliers’ financial performance. The suppliers with high inventory slack were found to 
have less negative financial performance. Finally, the negative financial performance is 
more serious when suppliers have a high level of leverage (a low level of financial slack) 
and dependence on their buyers.   
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Suppliers’ financial performance when they 
are required to comply with their buyers’ 
SCSM 
(S)H1 Negative 2.5.2.1 Supported 










The supplier’s dependence on buyer (the 
measure of supply chain power) 
(S)H2a Negative 2.5.2.2 Not Supported 
The buyer’s dependence on supplier (the 
measure of supply chain power) 
(S)H2b Positive 2.5.2.2 Supported 
Relationship length (the measure of supply 
chain power) 
(S)H2c Negative 2.5.2.2.3 Supported 
sSCSM (SCSM dimension) (S)H3 Positive 2.5.2.3 Not Supported 
Third-party certification (governance 
mechanisms) 
(S)H4 Negative 2.5.2.4 Not Supported 
Group SCSM (S)H5 Negative 2.5.2.5 Supported 
Capacity slack (the measure of operational 
slack) 
(S)H6a Positive 2.5.2.6 Not Supported 
Inventory slack (the measure of operational 
slack) 
(S)H6b Positive 2.5.2.6 Supported 
Supply chain slack (the measure of 
operational slack) 
(S)H6c Positive 2.5.2.6 Not Supported 
Leverage (the measure of financial slack)* (S)H7 Negative 2.5.2.7 Not Supported 
The interaction term of leverage (the 
measure of financial slack) and the 
supplier’s dependence on buyer 
(S)H8 Negative 2.5.2.8 Supported 
Note *: Financial slack is measured by leverage. A high level of leverage indicates a low level of financial slack.  
4.9 The different impacts of SCSM on the financial 
performance between buyers and their suppliers 
It was hypothesized that suppliers have more negative financial performance than 
buyers (section 2.5.3). A paired sample t-test was used to test the difference on mean 
CARs between buyer and supplier data. It was required that the buyers and suppliers be 
generated from the same announcements, which ensures the paired sample means 
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(discussed in section 3.7). There were 180 SCSM announcements generating 180 buyer 
observations and 1690 paired supplier observations. Suppliers’ portfolio CARs (i.e., 180 
equally weighted portfolio CARs from 1690 individual suppliers’ CARs) were used in 
the analysis of the paired sample t-test. The null hypothesis is that buyers’ mean CAR is 
not greater than suppliers’ mean CAR. Table 4.13 presents the results.  
Table 4.13 The Result of Paired Sample t-test for the Analysis of the Performance 
Difference between Buyers and their Suppliers 
Mean of the differences 
between buyers’ and their 
suppliers’ CARs 
t value P-value 
0.0046 1.5469 0.0618* 
Note: * denotes the significance level at 0.1 (a one-tailed test). Suppliers’ CARs are 180 portfolio CARs from1690 
individual supplier observations. The null hypothesis is buyers' mean CAR is not greater than suppliers' mean CAR. 
Mean of the difference between buyers’ and suppliers’ CARs is 0.46% tested by using 
suppliers’ portfolio CARs and significant at 10% level. The finding indicates that buyers, 
on average, have significantly greater CARs than their suppliers. Hence, it provides 
evidence that buyers have more favorable financial performance in relating to SCSM than 
their suppliers. The hypothesis (BS)H1 is supported.  
4.10 Chapter conclusion 
This chapter reported the test results of the hypotheses. The mean CARs for both 
buyers and suppliers were found significantly negative, indicating that buyers have 
negative financial performance when they adopt SCSM, and suppliers also have negative 
financial performance in their SCSM compliance. Moreover, the financial performance 
of suppliers was found more negative than that of their buyers. 
In the cross-sectional regression analysis, the test results showed buyers’ negative 
financial performance can be mitigated by using group SCSM approach and adopt social 
dimension of SCSM (i.e., sSCSM), while a high level of growth prospects increases 
buyers’ negative financial performance in their SCSM adoption. Supplier relationship 
management and the use of third-party certification as a governance mechanism are not 
significantly related to buyers’ financial performance.  
Suppliers’ negative financial performance can be reduced by a high level of the buyer’s 
dependence on supplier and inventory slack. A long relationship length with buyers and 
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group SCSM increases the suppliers’ negative financial performance in their SCSM 
compliance. When there is a high level of the supplier’s dependence on buyer, the 
suppliers with low financial slack have more negative financial performance. Capacity 
and supply chain slack are not significantly related to suppliers’ financial performance. 
The suppliers that comply with the social dimension of SCSM and third-party 
certification were not found to have significantly different financial performance from 
others.  
Throughout this chapter, the findings have provided empirical evidence in the negative 
impacts of SCSM on buyers’ and their suppliers’ financial performance. However, the 
influential factors were found to mitigate the negative impacts. In the next chapter, the 
implications of these findings will be discussed. 
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Chapter 5. Discussion  
The concepts discussed in the literature help bridge the hypothesized relationships. 
The test results in this research provide empirical evidence on the relationships. These 
results are discussed and compared to the extant literature in this chapter. The contribution 
of this research is derived by drawing the consistent and contrasting findings with the 
literature in order to derive both academic and managerial implications.  
This chapter is structured to separate the discussion of buyers and suppliers, which 
helps clarify the different perspectives and corresponds to the sections in the literature 
review chapter. Figure 5.1 presents an overview of the chapter structure. Section 5.1 will 
start by discussing buyers’ financial performance and subsequently the factors that 
influence buyers’ financial performance. Section 5.2 will provide the implications for 
society and corporate policies with the findings relating to buyers. Section 5.3 will focus 
on discussing suppliers’ financial performance and subsequently the factors that influence 
suppliers’ financial performance. Section 5.4 will give the implication for society and 
corporate policies with the results relating to suppliers. Section 5.5 will link to the green 
bullwhip effect and discuss the more negative financial performance of the suppliers than 
their buyers. Section 5.6 will provide managerial implication for suppliers to mitigate the 
more negative financial performance caused by the green bullwhip effect. Section 5.7 will 
discuss the theoretical contributions of this research, where the extension to stakeholder 
theory, the green bullwhip effect, TCE, and theory of SEF and VUB will be demonstrated. 
The systhesis of the discussion on the research findings across buyers and suppliers will 
be given in section 5.8. A chapter summary will be in section 5.9.   
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Figure 5.1 Structure of Discussion Chapter 
5.1 Discussions on the findings of how buyers are 
impacted by their SCSM adoption 
Negative financial performance was found for the buyers that required their suppliers 
to comply with SCSM. By using event study methodology and objective measures, this 
finding complements the SCSM literature which has dominantly used survey-based 
methods and perceptual measures as discussed in the literature review by Touboulic and 
Walker (2015). NRBV is commonly used to support the discussion of the benefits 
associated with SCSM. This finding of buyers’ negative financial performance indicates 
NRBV needs to be developed taking into account the substantial costs relating to SCSM 
to provide a more complete theory for SCSM. The negative financial performance 
increases buyers’ reluctance to SCSM adoption, and suggests the fragility of the SCSM 
system in transferring the stakeholder pressure of sustainability to suppliers.  
This research explored the factors that influence buyers’ negative financial 
performance. The strategic monitoring and analyzing of these factors can reduce the 
negative impact of SCSM on buyers’ financial performance, which increases buyers’ 
willingness to adopt SCSM and thus means that the effectiveness of the SCSM system in 
environmental and social performance can be maintained. The adoption of the social 
dimension of SCSM (i.e., sSCSM) and the collaboration with other buyers by using the 
group SCSM approach can effectively reduce buyers’ negative financial performance. 
Buyers with high growth prospects need to be particularly cautious when adopting SCSM 
due to the severely negative financial performance. While SRM and third-party 
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certification were found to be insignificant in mitigating the costs of SCSM to buyers, 
potential reasons for this will be discussed. The next sections provide detailed 
discussions.  
5.1.1 The impact of SCSM adoption on buyers’ financial 
performance 
The result indicates that buyers have negative financial performance when they adopt 
SCSM. In this section, the finding is discussed from three perspectives, the complement 
to the literature, developing NRBV by taking into account the costs of SCSM, and 
maintaining the effectiveness of the SCSM system in environmental and social 
performance.  
5.1.1.1 The complement to the literature  
The present research complements the literature by using objective measures. Previous 
studies have predominantly used survey-based methods and perceptual measures when 
investigating the impact of SCSM on buyers’ financial performance. (e.g., Golicic & 
Smith, 2013; Rao & Holt, 2005; Schmidt et al., 2017;  Zhu et al., 2007). However, social 
desirability bias has rarely been addressed in these previous studies (as discussed in the 
literature review in Carter and Easton [2011]). Social desirability bias refers to a positive 
self-evaluation bias when perceptual measures are used to analyze sustainability issues 
(Walker et al., 2012), which leads to a biased finding of buyers’ financial performance. 
In this research, buyers’ abnormal returns associated with SCSM announcements were 
used in the estimate of the financial performance. The objective measure ensures that the 
finding in this research does not suffer from social desirability bias. The unbiased result 
provides empirical evidence that buyers have negative financial performance in contrast 
to the previous studies using perceptual measures.  
The use of event study methodology in this research explored buyers’ overall financial 
performance by including the costs associated with SCSM. There are benefits that buyers 
may gain by adopting SCSM, which supports the finding of buyers’ positive financial 
performance in several prior studies (Rao & Holt, 2005; Schmidt et al., 2017; Thornton 
et al., 2013). Buyers may gain reputation and thus sales growth from environmental and 
socially-conscious consumers (Thornton et al., 2013). Competitive advantages can be 
acquired by having resources that contain high environmental and social attributes 
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(Golicic & Smith, 2013; Schmidt et al., 2017). These prior studies have mainly used 
perceptual measures and survey-based methods. These prior studies provide valuable 
insights into operational effects but are unable to offer a clear impact regarding overall 
financial performance due to the operational perspective in survey-based methods (Dam 
& Petkova, 2014). In this research, the cost associated with SCSM is discussed, an area 
that is commonly overlooked in these prior studies. The management of environmental 
and social performance by SCSM is an additional transaction term to the traditional 
conception of business (Touboulic & Walker, 2015). Buyers’ transaction costs are 
increased with SCSM adoption; that is, SCSM involves inspections, assessments, and 
evaluations of suppliers’ environmental and social performance, requiring substantial 
investment (Adobor & McMullen, 2014). SCSM creates a disruption to the even flow of 
buyers’ operations by adding environmental and social standards to the requirements of 
supplying. The disruption increases coordination and control costs in buyers’ 
management of supply chains (Dam & Petkova, 2014). Also, the disruption increases the 
risk of a supply chain glitch as demonstrated in business cases (Evans, 2013). The 
abnormal returns associated with firms’ announcements is an encompassing measure 
(Hendricks et al., 2017), where the costs and benefits associated with SCSM are both 
included (Dam & Petkova, 2014). The use of abnormal returns as an objective measure 
in this research ensures that a holistic perspective is captured on benefits and costs in 
relation to SCSM. Overall financial performance for the buyers adopting SCSM was 
found to be negative, indicating that the costs associated with SCSM outweigh the 
potential benefits. There is, therefore, a great business risk to buyers that adopt SCSM.  
The relatively large sample and the multiple SCSM initiatives used in this research 
provide a high level of generalizability for the finding. The finding in this research is 
consistent with that of Dam and Petkova (2014). However, the authors focused on a single 
environmental supply chain program (i.e., the Carbon Disclosure project) with a small 
sample (i.e., 66). In this research, a relatively large sample size (i.e., 308 announcements) 
and environmental and social dimensions across multiple firms’ SCSM initiatives were 
used. The buyer sample included firms across countries and industries. The result of this 
research has a relatively high level of generalizability, which is applicable across firms 
and SCSM programs. The scale of the negativity of mean abnormal return found in this 
research (i.e., -0.22%) is smaller than that found by Dam and Petkova (2014) (i.e., -0.80% 
without the adjustment of industry selection bias, but -3.2% with the adjustment for 
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industry selection bias1). The difference in the scale of mean abnormal return indicates 
some of the specific SCSM programs may have a more negative impact on buyers’ 
financial performance than the overall SCSM analyzed in this research. The negative 
financial performance found in this research with a relatively large sample size suggests 
a universal business risk to buyers that adopt SCSM across countries and industries.  
The finding of this research contradicts that of Thornton et al. (2013). By using survey-
based methods, the authors found that buyers can improve their financial performance by 
using socially responsible supplier selection. Supplier selection is one of the SCSM 
practices (section 2.3.4), having orientation toward a selection of suppliers that embrace 
sustainability principles when conducting normal operations (Thornton et al., 2013). 
Supplier selection is more likely to be applied as a preliminary mechanism in SCSM and 
on new suppliers (Zimmer et al., 2016). When applying supplier selection as the only 
SCSM practice, buyers’ engagement is little, and the impact of SCSM on buyers’ 
operations is low (Miemczyk et al., 2012). Because of the low engagement, the SCSM by 
solely using supplier selection may be buyers’ ‘window-dressing’, where buyers pretend 
to be concerned with sustainability issues in order to gain reputation without actually 
managing the supply chain’s environmental and social performance (Thornton et al., 
2013). Thornton et al. (2013) additionally found buyers’ actual investment in 
sustainability programs is largely not related to the financial performance (seven out of 
nine performance measures were found insignificant), providing partial support for the 
concern regarding buyers’ window-dressing by using supplier selection. Therefore, 
buyers’ costs as discussed in this research (e.g., additional transaction costs and 
disruptions to the even flow of operations) are unlikely to be created by using supplier 
selection as the only SCSM practice. In contrast, in this research, the focus is on 
comprehensive SCSM practices, where buyers’ engagement is required, and these 
practices are related to buyers’ existing operations. Buyers create additional 
environmental or social criteria for their suppliers for the continuous supply, as well as 
providing support. Buyers continually evaluate and measure suppliers’ 
environmental/social performance through, for example, on-site inspections (Dow Jones 
Newswires, 2013; Nikkei Report, 2014). Buyers require suppliers to provide material/ 
                                                          
1
 Dam and Petkova (2014) included buyers in their sample that did not publicly announce their environmental 
supply chain program but reported this in their annual reports (i.e., non-announcing buyers); therefore, these non-
announcing buyers are adjusted for industry bias by using the Heckman model. In this research, only the buyers making 
public announcments were included in the sample. Hence, it is unlikley that there is such bias in this research.  
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components that contain high environmental and social attributes, and then use these 
materials/ components in buyers’ own operations (e.g., recyclable materials) (PR 
Newswire, 2010). Buyers’ engagements and subsequent operational changes are 
necessary for these comprehensive SCSM practices (Hoejmose & Adrien-Kirby, 2012), 
which are more likely to increase the transaction costs and the risk of disruption to the 
operations.  
The finding of this research represents the most common impact of SCSM on buyers’ 
financial performance. Supplier selection is rarely used alone in SCSM. In business 
practices, most buyers create comprehensive SCSM practices, focusing on managing 
suppliers’ compliance (Hoejmose & Adrien-Kirby, 2012). Supplier selection is likely to 
create a certain level of environmental and social standards for suppliers. However, 
suppliers’ commitment to these standards can hardly be maintained without buyers’ 
engagement (Miemczyk et al., 2012). Buyers that solely rely on supplier selection are 
likely to have substantial supply chain sustainability risk because the suppliers’ 
commitment to SCSM is not closely managed by buyers. In practice, buyers commonly 
adopt comprehensive SCSM practices to manage suppliers’ compliance, where buyers’ 
engagement is required (Tachizawa & Wong, 2015). This research focuses on these 
comprehensive SCSM practices. The finding of this research, thus suggests the most 
likely financial performance that buyers can have in their SCSM adoption. 
5.1.1.2 The cost perspective in SCSM theory building  
NRBV needs to be developed taking into account the costs associated with SCSM. The 
empirical evidence in this research is contrary to the propositions in earlier conceptual 
works (e.g., Hart, 1995; Markley & Davis, 2007; Srivastava, 2007). These conceptual 
works have used a theoretical perspective to discuss the relationship between SCSM and 
buyers’ financial performance, and developed NRBV as an important theory to support 
the benefits that buyers achieve by adopting SCSM. NRBV proposes that the 
management of the natural environment is an important source of rare, valuable, 
imperfectly imitable, and non- substitutable resources and capabilities. The possession 
and configuration of these resources and capabilities develop competitive advantages 
(Schmidt et al., 2017). NRBV has been a widely applied theory in the SCSM literature 
(Touboulic & Walker, 2015), and is used to motivate firms’ adoption of SCSM (Golicic 
& Smith, 2013; Schmidt et al., 2017). In this research, the finding of buyers’ negative 
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financial performance indicates that the adoption of SCSM in practice creates substantial 
costs to buyers. This finding reveals the gap between SCSM in practice and the theoretical 
desirability of NRBV. This gap may be created by the incomplete theories of SCSM as 
noted by Wu and Pagell (2011) and Pagell and Shevchenko (2014). The resources 
suggested by NRBV are mostly intangible assets (e.g., reputation); however, the 
relationship between intangible assets and performance outcomes are often causally 
ambiguous (Pullman et al., 2009). Importantly, NRBV does not include buyers’ costs 
associated with SCSM. Transaction costs are increased, and there are also costs as a result 
of the disruption to the even flow of buyers’ operations as discussed in section 2.5.1.1. 
These costs are higher than the potential benefits as revealed by buyers’ negative financial 
performance in this research. There is no discussion in NRBV on what to do with the 
costs. The emphasis on the benefits while overlooking the costs in theories such as NRBV 
creates a theoretical issue that the true relationship between SCSM and financial 
performance is not captured (Pagell & Shevchenko, 2014). The recent conceptual works 
have increased the awareness of this theoretical issue. Pagell and Shevchenko (2014) and 
Touboulic and Walker (2015) both discussed from a theoretical perspective that there 
may be a trade-off between financial performance and environmental and/or social 
performance, and scholars should study the SCSM issues with the awareness of this trade-
off. This research provides empirical evidence to support that the financial performance 
decreases with SCSM adoption. Theories represent the keystone of knowledge production 
(Handfield & Melnyk, 1998). The development of theory in SCSM should capitalize on 
the strong connection with practices (Touboulic & Walker, 2015). The evidence provided 
in this research reminds that the theory development of SCSM, in particular of NRBV, 
should take into account the costs associated with SCSM and provide strategies for 
dealing with the costs. More complete theories of SCSM may constitute useful frames 
that firms can use to help them address the sustainability challenges.  
5.1.1.3 Maintaining the effectiveness of the SCSM system by mitigating buyers’ 
negative financial performance 
 Buyers’ negative financial performance creates a risk to the effectiveness of the 
SCSM system on sustainability performance. Hall (2000) discussed that SCSM as a 
systematic approach (as discussed in section 2.3.2), where buyers use supply chain power 
to mandate their suppliers’ sustainability, is an effective approach to transfer stakeholder 
Chapter 5 Discussion 
191 
pressure on sustainability to the upstream supply chains. SCSM effectively improves 
supply chain environmental and social performance (Touboulic et al., 2014). In this 
research, the finding indicates SCSM trades off buyers’ financial performance against 
environmental/social performance. Buyers are less likely to rely on environmental/social 
performance than on financial performance to make business decisions (Tachizawa & 
Wong, 2015). The substantial costs of SCSM may increase the reluctance of buyers in 
adopting SCSM. Even though buyers may adopt certain levels of SCSM, pressured by 
the fear for the supply chain sustainability risk imposed by their stakeholders, buyers are 
more likely to adopt the practices of window-dressing in order to avoid the substantial 
costs of SCSM. The practices of window-dressing provide little value to the improvement 
of environmental and social performance in the supply chains and reduce the 
effectiveness of the SCSM system as designed. 
 The mitigating sources of buyers’ financial performance can be used to restore and 
maintain the effectiveness of the SCSM system in sustainability performance. Buyers’ 
willingness to adopt SCSM is dependent on it doing no harm to their financial 
performance (Pagell & Shevchenko, 2014). In this research, despite the generally 
negative impact of SCSM on buyers’ financial performance, there are factors (i.e., the 
nature of SCSM and firm-specific attributes) that influence buyers’ negative financial 
performance. sSCSM and group SCSM can be developed as business strategies to 
proactively mitigate the costs that buyers have in their SCSM adoption. In particular, 
buyers that have high growth prospects need to deal with the high business risks of their 
SCSM adoption. Third-party certification and SRM are not significantly related to 
buyers’ financial performance. Possible reasons for the insignificant findings are 
credibility issues in the application of third-party certification and the fitness of SCM 
strategies in the SCSM context. These possible reasons may provide potential insights 
into SCSM to mitigate buyers’ costs further. The costs of SCSM adoption can be 
effectively reduced by strategically monitoring and analyzing these influential factors as 
found in this research. In turn, the reduced costs motivate buyers to continuously adopt 
SCSM to meet stakeholder demand for sustainability and to avoid supply chain 
sustainability risk. Thus, supply chain environmental and social performance can be 
improved and maintained. In the next sections, these influential factors are discussed in 
detail.  
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5.1.2 sSCSM  
The result shows that buyers have less negative financial performance when they 
require their suppliers to comply with the social dimension of SCSM practices (i.e., 
sSCSM). The result provides empirical evidence that buyers may utilize sSCSM as a 
strategy in SCSM design. Busse (2016) discussed that for each SCSM practice, associated 
financial performance effects can be computed by weighting the associated benefits 
against the costs. All implementable SCSM practices can then be sorted by their financial 
performance effects, beginning with those that pay off the most strongly and finally 
arriving at those for which the performance effects become negative. The finding of the 
mitigating effect of sSCSM in this research offers a measure by which to sort the order 
of the adoption between the practices of sSCSM and eSCSM. Buyers may begin with 
sSCSM practices (e.g., work safety) and incrementally move forward to eSCSM practices 
(e.g., carbon emission reduction). The less negative impact of sSCSM on financial 
performance enables buyers with sufficient resources to maintain the existing operations 
and incrementally implement more costly eSCSM. 
This research fills the research gap concerning sSCSM in the literature. The main focus 
in SCSM research has remained on eSCSM (Ashby et al., 2012)). Both Seuring and 
Müller (2008) and Touboulic and Walker (2015) in their review of the SCSM literature 
called for filling the deficit of the research on sSCSM. This research contributes to the 
literature by exploring the effect of sSCSM on financial performance relative to eSCSM. 
Few studies have investigated the impacts of both sSCSM and eSCSM on financial 
performance (Pullman et al., 2009; Wang & Sarkis, 2013). However, these studies have 
mainly examined sSCSM as a part of integrated SCSM, discussed the consistently 
positive impacts of sSCSM and eSCSM on financial performance, and found an unclear 
impact of sSCSM relating to financial performance. In this research, sSCSM was 
explored as a strategic factor. A comparative discussion between sSCSM and eSCSM 
was presented. The empirical evidence provided in this research points to the 
effectiveness of sSCSM in mitigating buyers’ negative financial performance relative to 
eSCSM. From the perspective of financial performance, this research fills the research 
gap concerning sSCSM in the literature.  
The mitigating effect of sSCSM is quickly revealed to buyers; however, the negative 
effect of eSCSM can last over a long term. In contrast to their hypotheses, Wang and 
Sarkis (2013) found that eSCSM practices are negatively related to lagged financial 
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performance (i.e., return on asset [ROA] and return on equity [ROE] two years after 
adopting these practices), but sSCSM practices are insignificant to the lagged financial 
performance. In this research, the concurrent measure of financial performance was 
employed (i.e., the abnormal returns associated with SCSM announcements), which 
provides an instant estimate of the current and future impact of SCSM on financial 
performance. Thus, the finding in this research indicates that the mitigating effect of 
sSCSM can be quickly revealed to buyers. In contrast, the substantial costs of eSCSM 
may persist in the long term (as shown by using lagged ROA and ROE in the study of 
Wang & Sarkis [2013]).  
The mitigating effect of sSCSM relative to eSCSM may be reduced in certain 
industries. Pullman et al. (2009) found that in the food industry both eSCSM and sSCSM 
are not significantly related to buyers’ cost performance. In this research, the observations 
in the food industry are only 2% of the total sample (in the category of ‘others’ in Figure 
4.3). Thus, the effect of sSCSM in reducing negative financial performance relative to 
eSCSM may not be noticeable in the food industry. Also, the present research 
acknowledges that firms in certain industries (e.g., the chemical industry) may place 
particular weight on eSCSM as industry-specific factors (e.g., toxic materials and waste) 
may trigger a high environmental risk (Robertson & Nicholson, 1996). However, this 
research provides a generic pattern by controlling these industry-specific factors (by 
controlling the industry effect in the regression analysis). Thus, the less negative impact 
of sSCSM on buyers’ financial performance should be considered in the SCSM design, 
when the choice between sSCSM and eSCSM is available.  
5.1.3 Group SCSM  
The result indicates that there is less negative financial performance when buyers 
collaborate by using the group SCSM approach. This finding complements the literature 
by providing empirical evidence supporting the benefits of buyers’ collaboration in 
SCSM. The main focus in SCSM research has remained on buyer-supplier relationships, 
with discussion predominantly on the individual buyers’ management of suppliers’ 
compliance (Gimenez & Sierra, 2013; Jiang, 2009b; Tachizawa & Wong, 2015), and the 
consequence on buyers’ financial performance (Golicic & Smith, 2013; Thornton et al., 
2013). Carter and Rogers (2008) and Jacobs and Singhal (2017) discussed the possible 
benefits of buyers’ collaboration in SCSM, such as reduction of transaction costs. 
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Nonetheless, there has been a lack of empirical evidence to support their discussion. In 
this research, the benefits of buyers’ collaboration are comprehensively discussed in line 
with the group purchasing literature (e.g., Nollet & Beaulieu, 2005; Nollet et al., 2016; 
Sandberg & Mena, 2015; Schotanus et al., 2010), where group SCSM share similar 
attributes. The finding supports the discussion of Carter and Rogers (2008) and Jacobs 
and Singhal (2017). The SCSM research should be extended to include buyers’ 
collaboration because of the mitigating effect of group SCSM on the financial 
performance found in this research 
The finding confirms buyers’ benefits as discussed in the group purchasing literature 
(Nollet & Beaulieu, 2003; Schotanus & Telgen, 2007). Buyers’ collaboration is a hybrid 
form, which extends the dichotomy of market versus hierarchy in the traditional TCE 
(Tella & Virolainen, 2005). The centralized and standardized institution creates a group 
effect, which increases the bargaining power, thus significantly reducing the transaction 
costs (Schotanus et al., 2010). Economies of scale and scope can also be achieved through 
the recurrent use of the same investment in group activities (Sandberg & Mena, 2015). 
The information sharing between group members improves the firms’ expertise and 
know-how (Bakker et al., 2006). Group SCSM shares similar attributes to group 
purchasing as discussed in section 2.5.1.5.1. The finding of this research is consistent 
with that of the group purchasing literature, indicating similar benefits also come to 
buyers that collaborate in their SCSM adoption.  
The effect of group SCSM on reducing buyers’ negative financial performance found 
in this research provides an interesting discussion in comparison with the finding of 
Jacobs and Singhal (2017). After the 2013 Rana Plaza disaster in Bangladesh, two SCSM 
groups (i.e., AFBSB and ABWS) were formed to reinforce the inspection system for 
Bangladeshi factories. Jacobs and Singhal (2017) found an insignificant stock market 
reaction for the buyers who participated in these two SCSM groups. While AFBSB and 
ABWS were formed in response to the misconduct of the suppliers, the identified SCSM 
groups in the present research represent the proactive adoption of buyers’ collaboration. 
The SCSM groups, such as “The Electronics Industry Citizenship Coalition”, “Supply 
Chain Leadership Coalition”, and “Automotive Industry Guiding Principles”, were 
created amid the buyers’ own concern about SCSM operations rather than in reaction to 
any significant aftermath of suppliers’ misbehavior. Hence, the mitigating effect of group 
SCSM is likely to be revealed only to buyers that proactively search for collaboration. 
Jacobs and Singhal (2017) discussed the low contribution of the participating buyers in 
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two SCSM groups after the Rana Plaza disaster led to an insignificant cost saving from 
the group efforts, which may reflect the nature of requiring genuine collaboration between 
member buyers in group SCSM. This genuine collaboration is more likely to be built with 
long-term commitments as illustrated in the SCSM groups in this research. The reactive 
formation of SCSM groups in response to non-compliant suppliers is unlikely to represent 
long-term cooperation between buyers but rather to rescue the stained image. Therefore, 
group SCSM is more effective when used as a proactive strategy rather than being used 
as a reactive mechanism. 
5.1.3.1 Group SCSM – future development of SCSM 
The present research discusses that group SCSM operations may provide a direction 
for future development of SCSM. As shown in some of the SCSM announcements in the 
sample of this research, several SCSM groups invited NGOs to join SCSM operations or 
to provide expertise and information on suppliers’ monitoring; for example the 
partnership of ‘Supply Chain Leadership Coalition’ with the NGO ‘Carbon Disclosure 
Project’ (Spencer, 2007), and the collaboration in “Automotive Industry Guiding 
Principles” with the NGO ‘CSR Europe’ which represents 38 National Partners (PR 
Newswire, 2014). Due to a very small sample of group SCSM announcements indicating 
the partnership with NGOs, the effect of group SCSM together with NGOs is not 
statistically tested in this research. However, the close work of these buyers with NGOs 
links the SCSM groups to downstream stakeholders. Direct contact with downstream 
stakeholders through group SCSM discloses the participating buyers’ efforts to end 
markets; in particular, the group effect may amplify the efforts and thus the reputation of 
the participating buyers. The reputation gain may bring the participating buyers the access 
to new markets, increasing sales and the charge of premium prices (Roberts & Dowling, 
2002; Zhu & Sarkis, 2004).  
Moreover, group SCSM enables the direct involvement of buyers’ downstream 
stakeholders (e.g., NGOs) in SCSM operations. Downstream stakeholders hold buyers 
accountable for their suppliers’ sustainability performance due to their concern with low 
visibility and stakeholder power to upstream suppliers (Busse, 2016). Group SCSM 
provides an opportunity that downstream stakeholders can directly be involved in 
sustainable operations in the supply chains by working with, for instance, NGOs. The 
transparency of the SCSM operations may effectively increase the market forces to 
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reward the genuinely sustainable firms (both buyers and suppliers) and threaten firms’ 
misconducts or window-dressing. The benefits of group SCSM to buyers’ downstream 
stakeholders, buyers, and suppliers continuously motivate the joint efforts, which may 
present the future trend of SCSM.  
5.1.4 Growth prospects  
The results indicate that the buyers with high growth prospects experience more 
negative financial performance when they adopt SCSM. The finding is consistent with 
those of previous studies that have explored the impact of growth prospects on financial 
performance when firms face disruptions in their operations, such as product recalls (Ni 
et al., 2016; Thirumalai & Sinha, 2011), supply chain glitches (Hendricks & Singhal, 
2003), and demand-supply mismatches (Hendricks & Singhal, 2008a). The firms with 
high growth prospects need to constantly introduce new and innovative products to keep 
competitive in the markets (Fisher, 1997; Hendricks & Singhal, 2003). These firms have 
a relatively high requirement for the reliability and responsiveness of their supply chains 
(i.e., even flow of operations as discussed in the theory of SEF in section 2.2.3.3). A 
disruption to operations substantially increases the costs of the firms with high growth 
prospect. The congruent finding in this research extends the previous studies to the SCSM 
context. The requirements on environmental and social performance in supplying are 
additional to the ordinary business activities (Touboulic & Walker, 2015). Buyers’ 
planned throughput time and product specifications are required to change in order to 
realign with their suppliers’ physical material flow upgraded with more environmental 
and social elements in operations, which creates a disruption to buyers’ operations. The 
disruption created by SCSM is against the reliability and responsiveness strongly required 
by the buyers with high growth prospects, and thus adds more costs to the buyers. The 
consistent finding of this research with those in previous studies indicates the high 
business risks associated with high growth prospects when a disruption to firms’ 
operations incurs, such as SCSM adoption.  
The more negative financial performance to the buyers with high prospects is likely to 
reveal a gap between the SCSM required innovation and the present innovation. The firms 
with high growth prospects are often characterized as having high innovativeness (Fisher, 
1997; Ni et al., 2016). Klassen and Vereecke (2012) found by using case studies that 
innovative firms have a high capability of developing an effective SCSM system and thus 
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can improve sustainability and financial performance. In contrast, the finding of this 
research implicitly suggests that highly innovative buyers (i.e., buyers with high growth 
prospects) have not effectively transferred their innovativeness to cost-saving in the 
SCSM context. SCSM requires substantially different components and capabilities from 
SCM (Tachizawa & Wong, 2015). Most supply chains are presently not sustainable from 
environmental and social perspectives (Pagell & Shevchenko, 2014). The innovations that 
the firms have in the present supply chains scarcely include environmental and social 
elements. The integration of SCSM and present innovation may require substantial 
investment in supply chain operations over the long term (Geffen & Rothenberg, 2000), 
or radical innovation with new business models may be required in supply chain 
configurations (Pagell & Shevchenko, 2014). There may be a gap between the SCSM 
required innovation and the present innovation, which prevents the currently innovative 
firms from reducing the negative impact on financial performance when they adopt 
SCSM. While a certain cost-saving in some cases, as discussed by Klassen and Vereecke 
(2012), may occur, the finding of this research suggests that by using large empirical data 
and statistical analysis, on average the innovativeness that buyers with high growth 
prospects commonly have has not been effective in reducing the costs associated with 
SCSM.  
5.1.5 Third-party certification  
The coefficient sign of third-party certification is positive as predicted, but the 
coefficient is not statistically different from zero. The result indicates that the buyers that 
require their suppliers to meet SCSM compliance through third-party certification do not 
have a different financial performance from others by using different governance 
mechanisms (e.g., code of conduct).  
The insignificant finding suggests that the buyers’ choice of SCSM governance 
mechanisms may not be a factor influencing financial performance. SCSM governance 
mechanisms are necessary to ensure the suppliers’ commitment to sustainability, and in 
general to improve suppliers’ social and environmental performance (Gimenez & Sierra, 
2013; Tachizawa & Wong, 2015). However, the transaction costs are substantially 
increased with any form of governance mechanisms (Dyer, 1997). The minor saving of 
using third-party certification may not sufficiently offset the transaction costs that are 
increased with buyers’ management of additional supplying criteria (i.e., environmental 
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and social performance) in SCSM. Other governance mechanisms such as code of 
conduct or collaboration may require higher buyers’ costs and asset-specific investments 
than in the case of third-party certification (Jiang, 2009a), which could further increase 
negative financial performance.  
Another aspect is that the credibility of third-party certification may be influenced by 
complex factors, thus creating an uncertain effect on financial performance. In the study 
of firms’ internal efforts to improve environmental performance, Jacobs et al. (2010a) 
discussed that scope, prestige, certifiers, and transparency are different across different 
types of third-party certification, which, therefore, provides different levels of credibility. 
They found that there is no difference between firms’ self-reported corporate 
environmental efforts and third-party certified environmental performance in firms’ 
financial performance. However, ISO 14001 as a highly regarded environmental 
certification shows a significant and positive impact on financial performance. This 
research focuses on the overall effect of third-party certification on buyers’ financial 
performance. The sample in this research covers different types of third-party 
certifications, where the scope, prestige, certifiers, and transparency may be various. 
Hence, the credibility of these third-party certifications may not be consistent, resulting 
in an insignificant relationship with buyers’ financial performance. While this research 
was constrained by the sample size to study very specific categories of SCSM 
certifications, the result may suggest buyers should carefully evaluate the credibility of 
one type of third-party certification used in their SCSM. 
5.1.6 Supplier relationship management 
In this research, three measures were used to test buyers’ SRM in relation to the 
financial performance in SCSM adoption. These are the ratio of COGS to sales, accounts 
payable turnover, and inventory turnover. Contrary to the predictions, none of the 
measures was found to be significantly related to buyers’ financial performance. 
In section 4.3, the test results showed the reduced explanatory power of the model by 
introducing three measures of SRM. After excluding any potential statistical reasoning 
(e.g., multicollinearity and non-linearity), the present research proposes that one potential 
cause is the gap between SCSM and SCM (as represented by SRM). SRM is an important 
component of SCM (Johnston et al., 2004). Good SRM has been widely found to improve 
firms’ financial performance in ordinary business, where environmental and social 
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elements are absent in operations (Forkmann et al., 2016; Lambert & Schwieterman, 
2012; Liou & Gao, 2011; Tseng, 2014). SCSM is a concept developed by interacting 
SCM with sustainability (Ashby et al., 2012). SCM strategies (e.g., SRM) are expected 
to be highly relevant to SCSM adoption. The findings in this research, however, suggest 
that from the financial performance perspective the SRM strategies in SCM are not useful 
in the SCSM context. Pagell and Shevchenko (2014) critically discussed how today 
SCSM is researched as a separate stream of SCM. The authors argued that while SCSM 
research mostly relies on existing and traditional SCM strategies and practices (e.g., 
SRM), SCM practices and strategies are designed to improve financial result in the 
absence of the management of environmental and social performance in the supply 
chains. Therefore, there may be a limitation of applicability of these existing SCM 
strategies in the SCSM context as more than just financial result is considered. The 
finding in this research partially supports the argument of Pagell and Shevchenko (2014) 
with regard to the use of SRM (as one of the SCM strategies) relating to financial 
performance. In the SCSM research, scholars may have to move beyond traditional SCM 
strategies and adopt radical innovation in the development of the strategies that are fit for 
the SCSM context, where different business norms and performance measures should be 
accommodated (Pagell & Shevchenko, 2014). 
Another possible explanation is that the used measures may not proxy the full domain 
of SRM. While the ratio of COGS to sales, account payable turnover, and inventory 
turnover are the established measures for SRM (Liou & Gao, 2011; Tang & Liou, 2010), 
the relational rents developed from good SRM may not be fully covered by using these 
measures, such as commitment and trust built by informal mechanisms (Cho et al., 2012; 
Forkmann et al., 2016). The present research discusses this limitation in detail in section 
6.3.  
5.1.7 Summary of the discussion from the perspective of buyers 
This research adds value to the literature by finding the negative impact of SCSM on 
buyers’ financial performance, where a relatively large sample and objective measures 
were used. This research reveals substantial costs to buyers in their SCSM adoptions. The 
literature that has used NRBV to discuss the impact of SCSM on buyers’ financial 
performance has often overlooked these costs. 
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sSCSM and group SCSM are discussed in this research as effective strategies to 
mitigate negative financial performance. In particular, group SCSM may represent the 
future development of the SCSM model. This research also discovered the vulnerability 
of buyers with high growth prospects in SCSM adoption, which may demonstrate that the 
innovativeness that firms with high prospects are characterized by has not been 
effectively transferred to cost-saving in SCSM adoption. While third-party certification 
and SRM were found insignificant in buffering buyers’ negative financial performance, 
the potential explanations are discussed in relation to the credibility of third-party 
certification and potential divergent strategies and practices between SCSM and SCM.  
5.2 Implications of SCSM adoption for buyers’ 
corporate policies and society  
The findings enable this research to provide buyers’ managers and society with the 
insights of business risks and strategies relating to SCSM adoption. Buyers’ managers are 
able to be more effective in adopting SCSM by allocating proper resources in dealing 
with the business risks. Moreover, only balanced development of environmental, social, 
and economic/financial performance is beneficial to society. Thus, supportive forces in 
society should be provided to mitigate the business risks that the buyers have. In addition 
to the corporate policies that buyers’ managers may deploy, some implications for society 
are highlighted in this research, focusing on financial, technological, and political 
supports from downstream stakeholders. The cooperative operations of buyers and 
society can effectively mitigate the costs that buyers have in their SCSM adoption, which, 
in turn, continuously motivates buyers to improve the environmental and social 
performance of the supply chain.  
5.2.1 Implications for buyers’ corporate policies 
Buyers’ managers should improve internal capabilities and resources to buffer the 
costs in their SCSM adoption. This research provides four practical suggestions. First, 
buyers’ managers can make a strategic choice between sSCSM and eSCSM. The response 
to the stakeholder pressure on SCSM can be initiated with the management of the social 
dimension of suppliers’ operations (e.g., workplace safety), where the disruption to 
buyers’ operations is relatively low. Buyers are able to reduce the costs at early stages in 
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their SCSM adoption. Also, through these initial practices, the alignment of supply chain 
operations with the additional SCSM terms can be incrementally reached. Buyers, 
therefore, can adopt more complicated and costly practices of the environmental 
dimension of SCSM (i.e., carbon emission).  
Second, buyers should proactively form SCSM groups and invite the participation of 
downstream stakeholders in the SCSM operations. In the collaboration between buyers, 
standardized and centralized SCSM mandates should be created to realize the reduction 
in operational and transaction costs and to share expertise. Moreover, buyers’ managers 
should utilize the group effect to attract the participation of downstream stakeholders in 
the SCSM operations. The group SCSM that directly include the forces and supports of 
downstream stakeholders can effectively provide the buyers with the opportunities to 
promote their efforts to the end markets, thus improving the buyers’ reputation and 
bringing financial benefits. Furthermore, governments and NGOs should also actively 
facilitate the formation and operations of SCSM groups. The proactive participation of 
downstream stakeholders motivates additional buyers to join SCSM groups, thus 
promoting the positive extension of group operations.  
Third, buyers with high growth prospect should strategically reconcile SCSM to their 
supply chain design by strategic purchasing on a limited supply base. In this research, a 
more negative financial performance was found relating to buyers with high growth 
prospects. SCSM disrupts the reliability and responsiveness of the supply chains that are 
strongly required by buyers with high growth prospects. As the stakeholder pressures of 
SCSM are increasing, SCSM adoptions are also inevitable by buyers with high growth 
prospects. Strategic purchasing with a limited number of suppliers in a close working 
relationship can provide opportunities for these buyers to reduce the business risks in their 
SCSM adoption. A limited supply base is more likely to enable the cooperation of 
suppliers in transactions, where the information sharing is increased, suppliers’ 
opportunism is reduced, and importantly, suppliers’ asset-specific investment is 
encouraged (Chen et al., 2004). A limited supply base facilitates the buyers’ realignment 
of their supply chain to maintain high reliability and responsiveness in their SCSM 
adoption. The highly cooperative suppliers developed by using a limited supply base can 
enable smooth compliance with the buyers’ SCSM. The buyers with high growth 
prospects, therefore, can reduce the disruption to their supply chain operations and 
meanwhile meet downstream stakeholders’ demand on SCSM.  
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Fourth, buyers’ managers should carefully evaluate the credibility of different types of 
third-party certification. In the choice of third-party certification, credibility is built on 
the evaluation of suppliers’ commitment. Managers may assess the scope (single versus 
multiple facilities, environmental versus social dimension of sustainability), the certifier 
(government versus non-government), the prestige (short versus long history, low versus 
high requirements) to ensure the quality of different types of third-party certification.  
5.2.2 Implication for society  
There are three implications for society concerning buyers’ negative financial 
performance. First, downstream stakeholders (e.g., governments, NGOs, and consumers) 
should offer a clear incentive to the buyers that adopt SCSM. Most downstream 
stakeholders do not appear to acknowledge the business risks that buyers have in their 
SCSM adoption, while continuously pressuring buyers to ensure sustainable operations 
in their supply chains (Hartmann & Moeller, 2014). As discussed (section 2.3.2), buyers’ 
mandates are an important and effective method in the SCSM system of transferring 
sustainability responsibility to upstream supply chains. Downstream stakeholders should 
raise concerns about buyers’ negative financial performance. The negative financial 
consequence from SCSM adoption discourages buyers’ continuous investments and 
management in their supply chain environmental and social performance (Pagell & 
Shevchenko, 2014), which may threaten the continuity of the SCSM system. Buyers 
expect to gain credibility and reputation from downstream stakeholders through SCSM 
mandates (Busse, 2016). Governments and NGOs may stipulate rewards or awards 
publicizing buyers’ SCSM efforts and therefore increase corporate credibility and 
reputation in end markets. Therefore, a high brand value, premium prices, and new market 
entry can be realized by the buyers.  
Second, political and technological support from downstream stakeholders should be 
given to the buyers with high growth prospects when adopting SCSM. Buyers with high 
growth prospects are characterized by high innovativeness (Fisher, 1997; Ni et al., 2016). 
Buyers with growth prospects were found to have more negative financial performance 
in their SCSM adoption, indicating that the innovativeness that these buyers have is not 
effectively transferred in their SCSM and does not support financial growth. Firms’ 
innovativeness and SCSM are both important to societal development (Beckman & Sinha, 
2005; Busse, 2016). Downstream stakeholders should provide support to minimize the 
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negative impact of SCSM adoption on buyers with high growth prospects. Additional 
political and technological support should be provided to reach the reconciliation of 
innovation and sustainability. The governments’ financial support and funded training, as 
well as consultation with external experts (e.g., NGOs), may effectively develop 
technological innovation in the sustainability domain (van Hoof & Lyon, 2013).  
Third, managers may improve communication with investors over their SCSM efforts. 
Buyers’ managers may increase the awareness of investors over the substantial cost of 
supply chain sustainability risk to firms. SCSM mandates are an effective method of 
reducing risks and costs, which justifies buyers’ SCSM initiatives. The investors will 
rebalance the cost structure associated with the SCSM efforts, and buyers’ SCSM 
initiatives may not be so negatively evaluated.  
5.3 Discussions on the findings of how suppliers are 
impacted by their buyers’ SCSM 
There is negative financial performance for suppliers required by their buyers to 
comply with SCSM. This research is the first empirical study to find suppliers’ negative 
financial performance by using objective measures. The finding indicates that there is a 
discernible cost to the suppliers in their SCSM compliance. These costs are discussed as 
being harmful to the efforts in improving environmental and social performance and to 
overall society.  
This research analyzed the nature of SCSM and supplier resources that influence 
suppliers’ negative financial performance. Buyers’ dependence on supplier and inventory 
slack are effective capabilities and resources that suppliers can build to buffer negative 
financial performance. A long-term relationship with buyers in the SCSM context, 
however, indicates more negative financial performance due to the increase in buyers’ 
opportunism and transaction costs. The group SCSM approach tends to increase the 
negative impact of SCSM on suppliers’ financial performance, in contrast to group 
purchasing which provides benefits to the suppliers. Financial slack is found to 
conditionally buffer suppliers’ negative financial performance under a high level of 
supplier’s dependence on buyer. The insignificant effect of sSCSM and third-party 
certification will be critically discussed below.  
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In the next sections, the discussion will start with the finding of suppliers’ negative 
financial performance. Each influential factor explored in this research will be discussed 
in the sections corresponding to the hypothesis sections in the literature review chapter.  
5.3.1 The impact of SCSM compliance on suppliers’ financial 
performance 
The finding in this research suggests that buyers’ SCSM has a negative impact on 
suppliers’ financial performance. This research is the first to provide empirical evidence 
on suppliers’ financial performance in response to their buyers’ SCSM. The main interest 
in the SCSM literature has remained on buyers’ perspective (e.g., Busse, 2016; Golicic 
& Smith, 2013; Hajmohammad & Vachon, 2016), providing little insight into the 
financial consequences for suppliers when required by their buyers to improve 
environmental and social performance. The uncertainty on financial performance results 
in difficulty in suppliers’ managers’ business-decision making concerning SCSM 
implementations and compliance. The finding in this research suggests that there is a 
discernable cost to suppliers of buyers’ SCSM.  
The exploration of suppliers’ financial performance in this research answers the calls 
of Carter and Easton (2011) and Pagell and Shevchenko (2014). The authors discussed 
that the lack of analysis in the supply chain context leads to understanding only a limited 
set of impacts that SCSM may create. The analysis of SCSM should be at least at a dyadic 
level (Carter & Easton, 2011). This research responds to the authors’ calls by revealing 
suppliers’ negative financial performance in their SCSM compliance using the suppliers 
and their buyers as a supply chain dyad. The negative financial performance of both 
buyers (as discussed in section 5.1.1) and their suppliers (as in this section) provides the 
empirical evidence that SCSM is harmful to financial performance in the supply chain 
dyads.  
5.3.1.1 Costs and benefits to the suppliers in SCSM compliance 
This finding indicates that the costs outweigh the benefits for suppliers. The previous 
studies discussed the benefits to the firms in terms of improving their environmental and 
social performance, including increased purchasing prices (Busse, 2016), enhanced 
reputation, and cost reductions on labor, energy, and production lines (Markley & Davis, 
2007). Nonetheless, these studies hardly counted in the costs of developing these benefits 
Chapter 5 Discussion 
205 
and the business risks raised by SCSM compliance. The substantial and continuous 
investment in manufacturing-changeover creates implementation costs to suppliers. The 
additional requirements in supplying criteria create compliance costs, where suppliers 
bear the disruption to the even flow of their operations. Many of the benefits created by 
suppliers’ SCSM efforts may be retained by buyers.  
These benefits discussed in the literature (Busse, 2016; Markley & Davis, 2007) may 
remain uncertain to suppliers. The increasing purchasing prices largely rely on the 
suppliers’ traditional operational competence (e.g., costs, quality, flexibility, and 
delivery) rather than on environmental and social performance (Seuring & Müller, 2008). 
Cost-saving through SCSM implementation may be difficult to achieve and unlikely to 
offset the substantial implementation and compliance costs. Giunipero et al. (2012) 
conceptualized that investment and economic uncertainty are top barriers for suppliers in 
implementing sustainability practices. The finding in this research provides empirical 
evidence to support the study of Giunipero et al. (2012) that considerable costs are a 
reasonable concern for suppliers. The finding in this research suggests that these 
implementation and compliance costs outweigh the potential benefits that suppliers may 
have through SCSM.  
Different benefits and costs may exist between self-selected and buyer mandate 
practices. The finding in this research contradicts that of Schmidt et al. (2017). By using 
survey-based methods, the authors found that suppliers have a positive financial 
performance when they implement green supply chain practices (e.g., the design of 
disassembly, reuse, recycling of materials, and environmental packaging). There may be 
two reasons for the conflicting findings. First, in their research design, ‘suppliers’ is 
defined by self-reported “business unit’s position within the supply chain” (Schmidt et 
al., 2017, p. 12). The environmental practices are more likely to be suppliers’ self-selected 
implementation. Suppliers may have high flexibility in adjusting internal operations to fit 
the SCSM design. Suppliers are also less likely to rely on the values shared with buyers 
to ensure financial performance. Thus, the compliance costs to the suppliers may not be 
substantial in the self-selected implementations as shown in the study of Schmidt et al. 
(2017). In this research, the focus is on suppliers’ compliance with their buyers’ SCSM 
in line with the discussion of stakeholder pressure in the SCSM literature (Hall, 2000; 
Touboulic et al., 2014). The nature of compliance adds compliance costs to suppliers, 
where disruption to operations and the retained values of buyers occur. Second, although 
there are some environmental benefits, the primary reason for these self-selected practices 
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are more likely to be concerned with reducing costs (Dam & Petkova, 2014). However, 
suppliers’ engagement in buyers’ SCSM is primarily in the pursuit of environmental 
(and/or social) performance (Busse, 2016). The practices mandated by buyers contain 
more comprehensive environmental (and/or social ) elements. Therefore, in this research, 
suppliers were found to have more costs than in the study by Schmidt et al. (2017). The 
SCSM literature has consistently found that downstream stakeholder pressure and buyers’ 
enforcement are the main drivers of suppliers’ improvement in environmental and social 
performance (Busse, 2016; Seuring & Müller, 2008; Touboulic & Walker, 2015). The 
present research is consistent with the literature through its focus on suppliers’ 
compliance with buyers’ SCSM. Relative to self-selected implementation, as in the study 
of Schmidt et al. (2017), the finding of this research suggests the most common impact 
of SCSM on suppliers’ financial performance is negative.  
5.3.1.2 The harm of suppliers’ negative financial performance to the 
efforts to improve environmental and social performance and to 
overall society 
Suppliers’ negative financial performance in response to SCSM is harmful to the 
efforts of improving environmental and social performance in the supply chains. A high 
percentage of environmental and social problems take place in suppliers’ operations 
(Gimenez & Sierra, 2013). Therefore, suppliers’ sustainable operations are essential to 
the success of SCSM (Caniëls et al., 2013). However, investment and economic 
uncertainty are the highest barriers to suppliers regarding SCSM compliance (Giunipero 
et al., 2012). Foerstl et al. (2010) discussed that suppliers’ commitment to SCSM efforts 
can only be maintained if there is no harm to their financial performance. The negative 
financial performance as found in this research may lead to greater supplier resistance to 
buyers’ SCSM. Suppliers are unlikely to continuously improve their environmental and 
social performance. Each element of TBL in SCSM (i.e., environmental, social, and 
financial performance) should support each other (Pagell & Wu, 2009). Without the 
support of financial performance (i.e., suppliers’ negative financial performance), the 
SCSM efforts to improve environmental and social performance in the supply chains may 
fail.  
Suppliers’ negative financial performance is a threat to the development of overall 
society. The improvement of supply chain environmental and social performance is an 
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increasing social requirement (Tachizawa & Wong, 2015). Economic viability is also 
critical to human development (Pagell & Wu, 2009). Sustainability is expected to reach 
a balanced improvement among environmental, social, and economic/financial 
performance (Carter & Rogers, 2008). However, the finding in this research indicates the 
suppliers’ improvement in environmental and social performance is a trade-off against 
the growth of financial performance. This trade-off is harmful to suppliers’ operations. 
The negative financial performance associated with these efforts in SCSM decrease the 
availability of resources to maintain traditional operational performance. Quality, 
delivery, and flexibility may not be ensured while production costs are increasing. 
Suppliers’ decreasing operational performance may restrict or reduce the supply volumes, 
which creates a contagion effect on their buyers. Buyers’ delivery to the downstream 
markets may be negatively influenced by such as supply chain glitches. The overall 
society may be affected by the disruption of supply as a result of suppliers’ struggle to 
fulfill SCSM. Pagell and Wu (2009) discussed that only ‘true sustainability’ contributes 
to the development of overall society, where firms can improve environmental and social 
performance while still maintaining economic viability. At this stage, this research found 
that SCSM does not create true sustainability. 
Despite the generally negative impact of buyers’ SCSM on suppliers’ financial 
performance, not all suppliers have an equally negative financial performance. Supply 
chain power is identified as an influential factor, where the suppliers that have high 
buyers’ dependence can reduce their negative financial performance. Suppliers in a long-
term relationship with the buyers need to especially deal with the high business risk in 
SCSM compliance. The development of inventory slack is an effective business strategy 
that suppliers can deploy to mitigate the costs. The buffering effect of financial slack in 
the form of leverage, however, is conditionally effective based on the high dependence 
on buyers. In contrast to group purchasing, the suppliers that are required to comply with 
the group SCSM approach suffer more costs. The details of the discussions are provided 
in the next sections.  
5.3.2 Supply chain power 
Three measures of supply chain power (i.e., buyer’s dependence on supplier, supplier’s 
dependence on buyer, and relationship length) were used in this research. A high level of 
buyer’s dependence on supplier reduces the suppliers’ negative financial performance, 
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while a long-term relationship with buyers increases the negative effect. Supplier’s 
dependence on buyer was found not to be statistically significant to suppliers’ financial 
performance.  
The findings in this research support that supply chain power is an important factor in 
the analysis of suppliers’ financial performance in the SCSM context. The focus on 
studying supply chain power in SCSM has, from buyers’ perspective, remained on the 
management of suppliers’ compliance (Hoejmose et al., 2013; Touboulic & Walker, 
2015) or buyers’ financial performance (Dabhilkar et al., 2015). In this research, the 
effectiveness of supply chain power from the suppliers’ perspective in dealing with 
business risks relating to SCSM was examined. The findings suggest that the suppliers 
that have high buyers’ dependence can explore the opportunity to mitigate the negative 
financial performance, while suppliers in a long-term relationship with buyers need to 
deal with the substantial costs.  
This research evaluates the effect of supply chain power on suppliers’ financial 
performance by using three objective measures. In previous SCSM studies that have 
investigated the effect of supply chain power (Dabhilkar et al., 2015; Hoejmose & Adrien-
Kirby, 2012; Touboulic et al., 2014), justification has largely been based on case studies 
or survey-based research using perceptual measures. Case studies may limit 
generalizability, due to the lack of systematic statistical evidence (López-Gamero et al., 
2010). Perceptual measures may merely represent the unilateral perspective of power 
(i.e., by only using the perception of power by either buyers or suppliers) (Kim & 
Wemmerlöv, 2015). In this research, the bilateral and objective measures of supply chain 
power address the dependence of both upstream and downstream in the supply chains. 
This research supplements previous studies with rigorous empirical data, providing a 
stronger rationale for prescribing strategies to deal with the negative financial 
performance concerning SCSM.  
5.3.2.1 Different power effect in disruptive and favorable supply chain 
practices  
The power effect may differ depending on suppliers’ financial performance in different 
supply chain practices. By also using event study methodology, Deitz et al. (2009) found 
suppliers have positive financial performance when they are enforced by their buyers to 
conduct supply chain technology integration, and this positive financial performance is 
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increased with high supplier’s dependence on buyer. In this research, there was found to 
be no significant effect of supplier’s dependence on buyer in suppliers’ financial 
performance, while suppliers were found to have negative financial performance in 
SCSM compliance. The different findings may be caused by the nature of supply chain 
practices that suppliers must comply with. In the study of Deitz et al. (2009), the authors 
found that overall positive financial performance indicates that the buyers’ mandates on 
supply chain technology integration are a favorable practice amongst suppliers. In such a 
favorable practice, the suppliers that are highly dependent on buyers may have an 
opportunity to explore more benefits, as the buyers’ practice positively influences a large 
percentage of overall business due the high dependence on buyers. In this research, the 
overall negative financial performance found for suppliers shows that buyers’ SCSM 
mandates are a disruptive practice to suppliers. The finding in this research indicates that 
in such a disruptive practice, the high dependence on buyers is not a factor that influences 
financial performance.  
In contrast, the result in this research suggests a clear mitigating effect of high buyer’s 
dependence on supplier in a disruptive practice such as buyers’ SCSM. The suppliers that 
have high buyers’ dependence have high buyers’ loyalty in the relationships, and thus 
fewer transaction costs in their SCSM compliance (Kim & Wemmerlöv, 2015). The 
suppliers that have high buyers’ dependence may also motivate buyers’ desire for mutual 
benefits, thus allowing an equal share of the value generated from SCSM (Hawkins et al., 
2008). The reduction in transaction costs and increased shared value are effective 
resources to reduce suppliers’ negative financial performance, as proven by the finding 
in this research.  
Nonetheless, Deitz et al. (2009) did not measure the effect of buyer’s dependence on 
supplier (BDS) on suppliers’ financial performance in their study. It is uncertain, in a 
favorable practice, how suppliers’ financial performance will change with high buyer’s 
dependence. Further investigation in future research may provide an interesting 
comparison with the finding in this research.  
5.3.2.2 Relationship length  
The result suggests that the negative impact of buyers’ SCSM on suppliers’ financial 
performance increases with the relationship length.  
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This finding is partially congruent with the study of Brown et al. (2009). The authors 
found that suppliers’ abnormal returns are negatively related to buyers’ leverage buyouts 
(i.e., acquisition by using debt), and a long and dependent relationship (i.e., the combined 
measure of a long-term relationship and high supplier’s dependence on buyer) increases 
suppliers’ negative abnormal returns. While Brown et al. (2009) focused on the financial 
perspective (i.e., leverage buyouts), this research explores the effect of relationship length 
on suppliers’ financial performance from the operations and supply chain perspective 
(i.e., SCSM compliance). SCSM adoption increases buyers’ costs (as the buyers’ negative 
financial performance found in this research). When managing the suppliers’ compliance 
with SCSM, the increased asset-specific investment of a supplier in a long-term 
relationship gives the buyer an opportunity to reduce the costs by exploiting the supplier. 
Thus, a buyer’s SCSM will create more costs for a supplier that has a long-term 
relationship with the buyer.  
In the SCSM context, a long-term relationship may increase buyers’ opportunism. 
Previous studies found that a long-term relationship can increase trust in the buyer-
supplier relationship, which mitigates the buyers’ opportunism (Hawkins et al., 2008; 
Johnston et al., 2004). Suppliers may reduce the transaction costs by decreasing 
opportunism in a long-term relationship and thus improve their financial performance 
(Liu et al., 2009). The finding in this research contradicts that of these previous studies, 
suggesting the increased buyers’ opportunism in the SCSM context due to their 
substantial costs. The trust effect of improving financial performance is more likely to be 
in pursuit of mutual benefits between buyers and suppliers, such as improving supply 
chain responsiveness (Handfield & Bechtel, 2002), and building cooperative relationship 
behaviors (Johnston et al., 2004). This research found that in the SCSM context, buyers 
have substantial costs in the SCSM adoption. In a long-term relationship, there is 
increasing asset-specific investment and thus high cost of switching to alternative buyers. 
Buyers are more likely to utilize this chance of opportunism to reduce their own costs. 
Therefore, suppliers that have been in a long-term relationship with their buyers have 
more costs in their SCSM compliance as found in this research 
Moreover, in the SCSM context, buyers may not have the same vulnerability to 
suppliers’ opportunism. Kim and Wemmerlöv (2015) discussed that in a long-term 
relationship, where buyers have dominant power, buyers do not have a large asset-specific 
investment with their suppliers, because buyers manipulate the asset-specific investment 
in the relationship with their power to safeguard against suppliers’ opportunism. In the 
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SCSM context, as shown in Table 4.6, buyers on average have higher power than 
suppliers. Thus, while suppliers may suffer from their buyers’ opportunistic behavior, 
they are unlikely to reduce their costs by doing the same to their buyers.  
In summary, in SCSM compliance, a long-term relationship is more likely to increase 
buyers’ opportunism, thus suppliers’ costs. The finding in this research suggests 
suppliers’ costs increase with relationship length. The trust that is built in a long-term 
relationship may reduce the opportunism, which is, however, unlikely to be relevant in 
the SCSM context due to the substantial costs on buyers.  
5.3.3 sSCSM  
Although the coefficient of sSCSM is positive as predicted, the coefficient is not 
statistically different from zero. There is no significant impact found on suppliers’ 
financial performance when they are required to comply with the social dimension of 
SCSM (i.e., sSCSM).  
Suppliers’ nature of compliance may explain the insignificant relationship between 
sSCSM and suppliers' financial performance. In general, a positive relationship between 
the social dimension of sustainability practices and financial performance is supported in 
the literature (Lo et al., 2014; Orlitzky et al., 2003). However, these previous studies have 
mainly focused on firms’ internal improvement of the social dimension of sustainability 
practices, where firms make their own strategic choices on the tasks and timeline of the 
implementation. In this research, suppliers are compelled by their buyers’ strategic 
choices to improve the social dimension of SCSM. The green bullwhip effect suggests 
that buyers intend to improve suppliers’ compliance by compressing the timeline and 
increasing the stringency of sustainability requirements (Lee, 2016; Lee et al., 2014). 
Buyers may attempt to exploit suppliers’ compliance with sSCSM by continuously 
adding requirements (e.,g., a higher standard or shorter timeline), which eliminates 
potential benefits such as costs savings and quality improvement as discussed in section 
2.5.2.3. Thus, the sSCSM is not significantly related to suppliers’ financial performance 
as found in this research.  
5.3.4 Third-party certification 
While the coefficient of third-party certification is negative as predicted, the 
coefficient is not statistically different from zero. There is no significant impact on 
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suppliers’ financial performance when they are required by their buyers to comply with 
third-party certification.  
The insignificant finding may be related to the nature of third-party certification at the 
supplier level. Third-party certification at the supplier level is mostly process-based 
(Foerstl et al., 2015). Suppliers are mainly certified by having underlying environmental 
and/or social processes in their operations. However, these certifications do not ensure 
the improved environmental or social outcomes at suppliers’ sites (Hoejmose & Adrien-
Kirby, 2012). The level of continuous investment in maintaining and improving 
environmental and social performance is uncertain once the desired value in the third-
party certification is attained. This uncertainty regarding the actual investment in 
suppliers’ compliance may be the reason for the insignificant finding on third-party 
certification.  
5.3.5 Group SCSM 
Suppliers’ financial performance was found more negative when their buyers 
collaborate by using the group SCSM approach. Few SCSM studies have provided a 
similar discussion to group SCSM in relation to suppliers’ financial performance (Carter 
& Rogers, 2008; Jacobs & Singhal, 2017). However, there has been a lack of empirical 
evidence in the literature. Drawing on the discussion in the group purchasing literature 
(Nollet & Beaulieu, 2005; Sandberg & Mena, 2015; Schotanus et al., 2010), this research 
suggests a negative impact of group SCSM on suppliers’ financial performance.  
The consolidation and standardization of SCSM practices are harmful to suppliers’ 
financial performance. Carter and Rogers (2008) discussed that that consolidation of the 
auditing procedures adopted by an industry coalition can allow a signal, effective supplier 
sustainability audit, which decreases suppliers’ transaction costs. Suppliers, otherwise, 
have to meet different SCSM criteria from individual buyers (Jacobs & Singhal, 2017). 
SCSM groups consolidate the auditing procedures that are mainly created by industry 
peers (as discussed in section 2.5.1.5.2). Thus, group SCSM discussed in this research 
refers to the ‘industry coalition’ suggested by Carter and Rogers (2008). However, the 
finding in this research indicates that the ‘consolidation of auditing procedures’ creates 
additional costs for suppliers. The nature of group SCSM is to improve suppliers’ 
commitment to SCSM implementations. The consolidation and standardization of SCSM 
practices reinforce compliance costs that suppliers may bear, because group SCSM 
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creates institutional pressure and stringent compliance as discussed in section 2.5.2.5. The 
additional compliance costs are substantially greater than the benefit suppliers may have 
(e.g., reduction on transaction costs), which is supported by the finding in this research.  
Group SCSM and group purchasing have different impacts on suppliers’ financial 
performance. The finding in this research is in contrast to those in the group purchasing 
literature. In group purchasing, suppliers, in general, improve their financial performance. 
While buyers reduce their purchasing costs, suppliers maximize their revenue by the 
increased sales volumes (Anand & Aron, 2003). The suppliers may also realize 
economies of scale and scope, as group purchasing provides suppliers with a minimum 
quantity of orders and multiple product categories that individual buyers cannot guarantee 
(Sandberg & Mena, 2015). Additionally, with the expansion of group purchasing from 
traditional its purchasing function to include inventory management, supply chain 
finance, and IT solution, suppliers may have spare resources freed from inventory 
holding, cash flow pressure, and infrastructure investment (Shi et al., 2016). In contrast, 
this research found that group SCSM increases suppliers’ negative financial performance. 
The reason may be that the improvement of environmental and social performance does 
not lead to the increased sales volume of suppliers from their buyers. Cost is a buyers’ 
primary concern in supply chain operations (Tachizawa & Wong, 2015). In group 
purchasing, suppliers offer lower purchasing prices, which increases their sales volume 
to buyers, and thus suppliers’ revenue. In group SCSM, suppliers primarily improve their 
environmental and social performance (Carter & Rogers, 2008). However, buyers do not 
make a purchasing decision primarily based on suppliers’ environmental and social 
performance (Tachizawa & Wong, 2015). Improved environmental and social 
performance cannot ensure suppliers’ increased sales volume from their buyers. The 
intensified pressure from group SCSM increases the suppliers’ costs in SCSM 
compliance (as discussed in section 2.5.2.5). Thus, in contrast to group purchasing, the 
group SCSM approach increases suppliers’ negative financial performance.  
Suppliers’ negative financial performance may decrease the effectiveness of group 
SCSM in environmental and social performance. The group purchasing literature has 
found that the savings on purchasing costs can be effectively achieved by group 
purchasing due to the pressure of group work on supply markets (Schotanus & Telgen, 
2007). Using a similar argument, the institutional pressure created by group SCSM may 
effectively improve supply chain environmental and social performance. However, the 
continuous saving by group purchasing is supported by the mutual benefits to buyers and 
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suppliers (Tella & Virolainen, 2005). While buyers reduce their purchasing costs, 
suppliers increase their sales volume (Anand & Aron, 2003). Given suppliers’ negative 
financial performance as found in this research, the effectiveness of group SCSM in 
improving environmental and social performance may be reduced in the long term. Nollet 
and Beaulieu (2005) discussed the harm to the group purchasing when suppliers have 
negative financial performance as a result of buyers’ excessive control of purchasing 
costs. In the case that buyers carelessly use their negotiation power to drive prices down, 
suppliers could be forced to withdraw from the markets and/or merge with/acquire other 
suppliers in the long term. Also, the entry barriers are increased in supply markets. 
Alternative suppliers may not have sufficient sales volume to continue their business. In 
the long term, suppliers’ power would dynamically move to a high level relative to the 
buyers due to the high concentration in the supply markets (Cox, 2014). Buyers may have 
no option but to deal with powerful suppliers with high purchasing prices (Nollet & 
Beaulieu, 2005). The same effect, as discussed by Nollet and Beaulieu (2005), may also 
be relevant to group SCSM due to the shared attributes with group purchasing. In the 
group SCSM context, the negative financial performance as found in this research may 
also pressure suppliers to either withdraw from the markets or acquire/merger with other 
suppliers. The high entry barriers (e.g., environmental performance in addition to 
traditional operational performance) prevent new entrants. Suppliers’ power may also 
move dynamically to a high level relative to buyers. Buyers may have to negotiate with a 
few powerful suppliers over SCSM implementations by using the group SCSM approach. 
SCSM as a systematic approach is supported by buyers’ power to effectively transfer 
sustainability responsibilities to suppliers (Hall, 2000). The suppliers’ high power in 
supply markets would create a substantial barrier to the implementation of SCSM 
(Touboulic et al., 2014). Consequently, effective efforts of group SCSM to improve 
supply chain environmental and social performance would be substantially reduced.  
5.3.6 Operational slack  
Capacity slack, inventory slack, and supply chain slack were used to measure the 
suppliers’ operational slack. While the coefficients of capacity slack and supply chain 
slack are positive as predicted, the coefficients are not statistically different from zero. 
There is no significant impact of capacity slack and supply chain slack on suppliers’ 
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financial performance. Inventory slack was found to have a significant effect on 
mitigating suppliers’ negative financial performance as predicted.  
The results suggest building inventory slack is an effective operational strategy that 
suppliers may adopt to mitigate the negative impact of SCSM. The advantage of holding 
spare inventory mirrors as presented in the findings of Azadegan et al. (2013) and Wood 
et al. (2017), demonstrating the necessity of building inventory slack in the face of 
disruption (e.g., suppliers’ SCSM compliance). The additional inventory provides 
suppliers with the flexibility to reallocate resources as necessary to ensure continuity of 
supply, which ensures the sustenance of their operations and, thus, cash flow to address 
the SCSM commitments. As buyers increasingly enforce SCSM (Gimenez & Tachizawa, 
2012), the buffer afforded by slack may be valuable. The evidence of buffering afforded 
by inventory slack provides the empirical evidence that suppliers’ managers must 
strategically plan the inventory slack to prepare for the business challenge (e.g., suppliers’ 
SCSM implementations).  
The result suggests firms need to strategically analyze market conditions when 
choosing to develop operational slack and efficiency. Driven by the concepts of lean 
management, many firms have focused on improving operational efficiency by 
eliminating slack and redundancy (Hopp & Spearman, 2004). There is empirical evidence 
that operational efficiency is positively related to firms’ financial performance (Modi & 
Mishra, 2011; Shah & Ward, 2003). However, these studies mostly focus on a stable 
market environment (i.e., the absence of SCSM compliance as a disruption to the even 
flow of operations). Buyers’ SCSM changes their suppliers’ market conditions, where 
social and environmental performance are additional operational criteria in supplying 
(Seuring & Müller, 2008). This change in the market conditions disrupts the even flow of 
suppliers’ operations. The sole emphasis on leanness increases the suppliers’ 
vulnerability in dealing with operational disruption (Hendricks et al., 2009). The 
adaptability and flexibility built with operational slack reduce the suppliers’ business 
risks relating to SCSM compliance. The finding in this research provides empirical 
evidence to support that the presence of inventory slack is rewarded in the suppliers’ 
SCSM compliance. The effectiveness of operational slack in financial performance under 
various disruptive market conditions has been found in previous studies (i.e., the overall 
negative financial performance has been found, and operational slack reduces negative 
financial performance) (Azadegan et al., 2013; Hendricks et al., 2009; Kovach et al., 
2015; Wood et al., 2017). The result of this research adds value to the literature, 
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suggesting that firms need to strategically analyze the market conditions (i.e., disruptive 
or stable) and develop appropriate operations attributes. While operational efficiency is 
beneficial in a stable market condition, firms need to effectively utilize operational slack 
to reduce business risks when facing a disruptive market condition, such as SCSM 
compliance.  
Firms should make strategic choices in the form of operational slack that they use in 
disruptive market conditions. Inventory, capacity, and supply chain slack are the three 
most common forms of operational slack (Kovach et al., 2015). However, the mitigating 
effects of the three forms of operational slack vary over the different types of disruptive 
market conditions. Wood et al. (2017) found capacity slack increases firms’ negative 
financial performance in toy recalls, while inventory slack reduces negative financial 
performance. Hendricks et al. (2009) found that inventory slack has no significant effect, 
but supply chain slack and capacity slack can reduce firms’ negative financial 
performance in supply chain disruptions. Kovach et al. (2015) found that in unstable 
market conditions (i.e., high market instability), supply chain slack has a negative impact 
on the firms’ financial performance, while capacity and inventory slack improves the 
financial performance. Similar to these prior studies, the findings of this research suggest 
that inventory slack is an effective form of operational slack in reducing suppliers’ 
negative financial performance in the context of suppliers’ SCSM compliance. In 
contrast, capacity slack and supply chain slack have no significant buffering effects. The 
results of this research and those of previous studies indicate that choice in the forms of 
operational slack should be carefully considered in the different disruptive market 
conditions. Firms may not have sufficient resources to develop every form of operational 
slack. A wrongly-deployed form of operational slack wastes resources (as the 
insignificant effect of capacity slack found in this research) and may even create a 
negative impact on financial performance (as the negative impact of capacity slack found 
by Wood et al. (2017)). Due to the high stakeholder pressure, SCSM has been increasingly 
adopted by buyers in modern business (Tachizawa & Wong, 2015). The finding in this 
research was that suppliers need to focus on developing inventory slack rather than supply 
chain and capacity slack, which provides the most effective cushion for negative financial 
performance.  
Wood et al. (2017) discussed that the disruption-specific context (i.e., toy recalls and 
the toy industry in their study) may have an impact on the effectiveness of the different 
forms of operational slack in terms of firms’ financial performance. In this research, the 
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SCSM-specific conditions may make capacity slack and supply chain slack less effective. 
First, fundamental SCSM compliance is to require suppliers to undergo a change in 
internal manufacturing processes. Therefore, capacity slack (e.g., equipment and 
machinery) is likely to be become obsolete by transitions to more sustainable operations. 
Capacity slack is found to be more useful in buffering the disruptions when changes to 
internal operations are not required, such as supply chain disruption (Hendricks et al., 
2009) and venture survival (Azadegan et al., 2013).  
Second, suppliers’ benefit of high supply chain slack may be offset by buyers’ 
management of cash flow. Supply chain slack is estimated by a cash-to-cash cycle which 
is cash flow between a firms’ upstream and downstream supply chains (Kovach et al., 
2015). A long cash-to-cash cycle indicates that a firm has a positive account balance, 
which should provide sufficient cash flow to support the firm in any operational difficulty 
(Hendricks et al., 2009). However, a core component in a long cash-to-cash cycle is the 
high level of ‘accounts receivable’. Accounts receivable is the trade credit offered by 
suppliers to buyers in order to maintain suppliers’ existing sales volume (Oliveira et al., 
2017), and thus the management of supply chain slack requires collaboration from buyers 
(Farris & Hutchison, 2002). In the context of suppliers’ SCSM compliance, given buyers’ 
negative financial performance and bargaining power, buyers are more likely to secure 
their own cash flow by delaying the payment of suppliers’ accounts receivable. Therefore, 
suppliers may not effectively utilize the supply chain slack to buffer the negative financial 
performance. In the disruptions where the power between supply chain partners is less 
relevant, such as supply chain disruptions (Hendricks et al., 2009), or sales surprise (i.e., 
actual sales exceed expected sales) (Manikas & Patel, 2016), the supply chain slack is 
found to be an effective buffer.  
5.3.7  Financial slack  
Financial slack is measured by leverage in this research. High leverage indicates a low 
level of financial slack. While the coefficient of leverage is negative as predicted, the 
coefficient is not statistically different from zero. The result indicates that financial slack 
alone does not have a significant effect on reducing suppliers’ negative financial 
performance.  
The finding in this research is consistent with previous studies that have examined the 
effect of financial slack under disruptive conditions, while using a different form of 
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financial slack. Voss et al. (2008) found no significant effect of financial slack measured 
by cash reserves on product exploration and exploitation. Wood et al. (2017) found no 
significant effect of financial slack measured by inventory-adjusted working capital on 
financial performance in toy recalls. Wood et al. (2017) also called for using an alternative 
form of financial slack to further explore the mitigating effect in a disruptive condition. 
This research answered their call by using leverage as the form of financial slack. The 
consistent result in this research to the previous studies adds knowledge to the literature 
that the effectiveness of financial slack as a buffer to the firms under these disruptive 
conditions is not salient.  
In contrast, by employing meta-analysis Daniel et al. (2004) found that financial slack 
is significantly and positively related to firms’ financial performance. The authors used 
multiple forms of financial slack (e.g., leverage and working capital). The finding of the 
insignificant effect of financial slack in this research may be related to the operational 
slack that suppliers hold. Daniel et al. (2004) focused only on financial slack. This 
research is consistent with Wood et al. (2017) and Voss et al. (2008), where the mitigating 
effects of both operational and financial slack were considered. Operational slack shows 
the ease of redeployment and versatility in the application of a broad set of production-
related issues (Azadegan et al., 2013), which have been widely found to be effective in 
mitigating business risks (Wood et al., 2017). While financial slack is an important 
resource to support firms’ growth (Daniel et al., 2004), it may be reasonably assumed that 
the presence of firms’ operational slack reduces the necessity of holding financial slack. 
In this research, there is a low correlation between operational slack and financial slack, 
as shown in Table 4.8. The finding in this research is congruent with that of Wood et al. 
(2017) and Voss et al. (2008), where financial slack is not significantly related to financial 
performance when operational slack in considered. The presence of suppliers’ operational 
slack may be the reason for the insignificant effect of financial slack found in this 
research.  
5.3.8 The interaction of financial slack and supplier’s 
dependence on buyer  
The result indicates that a high level of leverage (thus a low level of financial slack) 
and supplier’s dependence on buyer has a significant and negative effect on suppliers’ 
financial performance. The finding suggests financial slack has a buffering effect on 
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suppliers’ negative financial performance, which is, however, only effective under high 
supplier’s dependence on buyer. Figure 5.2 recapitulates the interaction plot. Financial 
slack is measured by supplier’s leverage, where a high level of leverage indicates a low 
level of financial slack. The horizontal axis shows the level of leverage. Suppliers’ 
financial performance is measured by suppliers’ CAR on the vertical axis. The dashed 
line indicates the high supplier’s dependence on buyer. The downward slope of the dashed 
line shows that suppliers’ CAR is reversely related to suppliers’ leverage under a high 
level of supplier’s dependence on buyer.  
 
Figure 5.2 Interaction Plot for the Effect of Financial Slack under a High Level of 
Supplier's Dependence on Buyer on the Financial Performance for Suppliers 
(reproduced from Figure 4.6) 
The effectiveness of financial slack in reducing firms’ business risks is conditional. 
The finding in this research is consistent with that of Voss et al. (2008) and Mishina et al. 
(2004). The authors in both studies found that financial slack alone does not have a 
significant buffering effect of reducing various business risks, while the effectiveness of 
financial slack is significant when financial slack interacts with additional disruptive 
conditions (e.g., environmental threat and new product development). In this research, 
the financial slack alone was found to be insignificantly related to suppliers’ financial 
performance. However, under a high level of supplier’s dependence on buyer, financial 
slack was found to be an effective buffer to suppliers’ negative financial performance. 
The high level of supplier dependence on buyer intensifies suppliers’ needs in compliance 
with buyers’ SCSM requirements, due to the high percentage of sales to buyers in 
suppliers’ overall business. Therefore, supplier’s high dependence is an additional 
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disruptive factor that increases the requirement of slack resources to maintain suppliers’ 
operations while complying with buyers’ SCSM. The congruent finding in this research 
to those previous studies provides empirical evidence that the effectiveness of financial 
slack as a buffer is conditional. Unless there is a strong disruption caused by additional 
factors (i.e., high supplier’s dependence on buyer in this research), the financial slack is 
not useful in reducing firms’ business risks.  
This finding adds knowledge to the literature by investigating an alternative form of 
financial slack. The results in this research (i.e., the insignificant buffering effect of 
financial slack alone but a significant buffering effect of financial slack interacting with 
additional disruptive conditions) are consistent with previous studies (Mishina et al., 
2004; Voss et al., 2008). However, leverage is used in this research as an alternative form 
of financial slack in contrast to cash reserves (Voss et al., 2008) and working capital 
(Mishina et al., 2004). Cash reserve, working capital, and leverage are different forms of 
financial slack, where leverage has the strongest impact on firms’ financial performance 
as found in the meta-analysis of Daniel et al. (2004). The use of leverage as a form of 
financial slack in this research supplements previous studies, and provides robust 
evidence that the effectiveness of different forms of financial slack (e.g., leverage, 
working capital, and cash reserve) is only significant when additional disruptive 
conditions exist.  
In summary, the suppliers in their SCSM compliance may not have to always maintain 
financial slack, as the insignificant buffering effect of financial slack alone was found 
both in this research. However, the effectiveness of financial performance as a buffer is 
revealed when interacting with additional disruptive conditions. A high level of financial 
slack is required when the disruptive condition refers to the supplier’s dependence on the 
buyer in the SCSM context.  
5.3.9 Summary of the discussion from the perspective of 
suppliers 
Suppliers’ financial performance was found to be negative when they are required to 
comply with their buyers’ SCSM. The finding suggests that there is a discernible cost to 
suppliers in their SCSM compliance. The present research discusses that suppliers’ 
negative financial performance is harmful to sustainability efforts and overall society. 
The negative financial performance reduces suppliers’ resources of investing in the 
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maintenance of environmental and social performance and of continuing their business, 
which creates a contagion effect to reduce the production of buyers and the delivery to 
the downstream markets.  
The factors influencing suppliers’ negative financial performance are explored in this 
research. Supply chain power was found to be an essential factor in SCSM research, 
which needs to be addressed in the analysis of suppliers’ financial performance. 
Particularly, buyer’s dependence on supplier and relationship length are the significant 
factors that influence suppliers’ financial performance. In contrast to group purchasing, 
suppliers have negative financial performance when their buyers use the group SCSM 
approach, suggesting that environmental and social performance as the primary concern 
in group SCSM can not ensure suppliers’ growth in revenue. Among three forms of 
operational slack (i.e., capacity, inventory, and supply chain slack), inventory slack is the 
most effective resource suppliers can build to mitigate the negative financial performance, 
indicating the buffering effect of inventory slack in a disruptive market condition. 
Financial slack in the form of leverage has a conditional buffering effect. Unless a high 
level of supplier dependence on buyers exists, financial slack is not a salient resource to 
reduce the negative financial performance in suppliers’ SCSM compliance. Third-party 
certification and sSCSM were found insignificantly related to financial performance. 
Third-party certification in the SCSM context is process-based rather than performance-
based; therefore, it may create uncertainty regarding suppliers’ actual costs, which is the 
potential reason explaining the insignificant effect of third-party certification. Due to the 
nature of compliance, suppliers are compelled to buyers’ uncertain changes in stringency 
and conditions in SCSM implementation, which is the possible explanation of the 
insignificant effect of sSCSM.  
5.4 Implications of SCSM compliance for suppliers’ 
corporate policies, buyers, and society  
The findings enable this research to provide managers and society with insights into 
business risks and strategies relating to SCSM compliance. For suppliers’ managers, the 
explored mitigating sources provide insights into the necessary resources that suppliers 
need to deploy under the increasing pressure of buyers’ SCSM. Moreover, suppliers’ 
negative financial performance is harmful to buyers’ operations and society due to the 
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contagion effect in the supply chain operations. Thus, supportive forces from buyers and 
society should be provided to mitigate the business risks that suppliers have. The 
implications for suppliers’ corporate policies, buyers, and society are provided in this 
research.  
5.4.1 Implications for suppliers’ corporate policies  
The present research provides five practical suggestions to suppliers’ managers in 
coping with negative financial performance in SCSM implementations.  
First, suppliers may proactively request buyers’ support when high buyers’ 
dependence exists. The positive relationship between buyer’s dependence on supplier 
(BDS) and suppliers’ financial performance indicates the potential opportunities for 
supplier development from buyers (e.g., information and capability sharing) in SCSM 
compliance. When a buyer mandates SCSM practices, the managers of a supplier may 
strategically analyze the buyer’s power and dependence in the supply markets (with 
publicly available data). If it is observed that there is a higher level of the buyer’s 
dependence on the supplier than on peers, suppliers’ managers may utilize the information 
to proactively negotiate to establish collaborative programs relating to SCSM 
implementation, where additional benefits (e.g., inventory flexibility) may be achieved 
through compliance.   
Second, suppliers should strategically develop inventory slack. As suppliers may not 
have sufficient resources to develop every form of operational slack, they will, therefore, 
need to evaluate the trade-off associated with likely events. In the case of SCSM 
implementation, suppliers’ managers should concentrate on the strategic development of 
inventory slack, as this research has demonstrated that it is most likely to cushion negative 
financial performance. Moreover, investors could appreciate inventory productivity (i.e., 
low inventory slack) in ordinary operations (i.e., in the absence of SCSM implementation) 
(Alan et al., 2014). Suppliers need to explain to investors the necessity of building 
inventory slack with increasing buyers’ mandates on SCSM implementation so that 
investors accurately reflect the value of slack in their valuations (Hendricks et al., 2009).  
Third, suppliers’ managers should strategically develop financial slack. This research 
found the mitigating effect on financial slack in SCSM implementation is conditional. 
Unless the level of supplier’s dependence on buyer (SDB) is high, financial slack does 
not reduce suppliers’ negative financial performance. Suppliers’ managers should balance 
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the firms’ financial slack with market information. Financial slack may not be necessarily 
developed when a supplier is required by its buyer to comply with SCSM. However, the 
suppliers’ managers should measure the dependence on the particular buyer in the overall 
business. If compliance is required by a buyer taking a high percentage of sales of the 
suppliers’ total business, financial slack is needed. The development of an effective form 
of financial slack is to reduce the leverage ratio.   
Fourth, suppliers’ managers should be careful with long-term relationships with the 
buyers that mandate SCSM practices. In the SCSM context, long-term relationships are 
more likely to be a mechanism used by the buyers to conduct opportunism; suppliers’ 
managers, thus, should develop protective strategies to safeguard buyers’ opportunism. 
An effective safeguard is ‘supplier development investment’, where suppliers negotiate 
with buyers to provide direct financial, technical, and quality training assistance to 
suppliers relating to SCSM implementation (Mahapatra et al., 2012), which may increase 
buyers’ asset specific investments and thus reduces buyers’ opportunism. However, the 
ultimate solution may be the change in buyers’ negative financial performance, which 
may release buyers’ financial difficulty and motivate genuine buyer-supplier 
relationships in the long term.  
Fifth, suppliers may negotiate with SCSM groups to develop cooperative programs. 
As observed in the announcement sample, suppliers have not actively participated in the 
decision-making of SCSM groups, possibly due to the low supply chain power. In fact, 
suppliers’ managers may strategically present genuine commitments, technological 
advantages, and operational competence to SCSM groups, which can effectively attract 
SCSM groups to design a collaborative function with suppliers. 
5.4.2 Implications for buyers and society 
Suppliers’ negative financial performance in SCSM compliance may have a contagion 
effect on buyers’ operations and society. The negative financial performance reduces 
suppliers’ resources and ability to maintain operational competence. Buyers’ operations 
are negatively influenced by the reduced supply in volume and speed. Also, the 
substantial costs increase suppliers’ resistance to SCSM compliance (Giunipero et al., 
2012). The continuous improvement of supply chain environmental and social 
performance as demanded by society cannot be provided. Therefore, buyers and society 
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are required to proactively support the suppliers in dealing with the business risks in 
SCSM compliance. There are two relevant implications provided in this research.  
First, buyers and downstream stakeholders should motivate suppliers implementing 
SCSM practices. Reputation is an important asset in SCSM, however, is less likely to be 
secured by suppliers due to their position in the upstream supply chain (Schmidt et al., 
2017). Buyers and downstream stakeholders may facilitate the reputational exposure of 
suppliers’ compliance through sustainable eco-labels available to consumers. Suppliers 
are thus provided with a mechanism to share the profits reaped from sustainable 
operations (e.g., cost reduction on supply chain sustainability risk). Such mechanisms can 
highlight the efforts made by supply chains and enable a more equitable sharing of the 
benefits of SCSM across the different firms involved. 
Second, buyers and downstream stakeholders should effectively utilize the resources 
created by group SCSM to support suppliers’ sustainable operations. The group SCSM 
approach is beneficial to buyers through cost reduction and to downstream stakeholders 
by improvement in environmental and social performance. Suppliers, however, bear more 
costs. The member buyers in SCSM groups may share the costs to create co-funding 
programs to financially support compliant suppliers. SCSM groups can expand the supply 
chain collaboration with suppliers into inventory management, supply chain finance, and 
IT solutions. For example, SCSM group members may share with suppliers the 
information on the market demand for sustainable goods, where the suppliers can build 
inventory flexibility to reduce the costs of compliance. 
5.5 Discussions on the finding of the difference in 
financial performance relating to the green bullwhip 
effect 
The green bullwhip effect indicates that buyers impose a shorter timeline of 
compliance and add more stringent sustainability practices to their suppliers than what is 
actually demanded by their downstream stakeholders (Lee et al., 2014). In this research, 
from the financial performance perspective, the green bullwhip effect is regarded as 
adding more costs to suppliers due to the compressed timeline and rigorous practices in 
their SCSM compliance. The finding supports the prediction that suppliers have more 
negative financial performance than their buyers in SCSM.  
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5.5.1 The opposite financial performance to environmental 
performance and buyers’ shift of the costs of SCSM to 
their suppliers 
This research provides empirical evidence on the consequence of the green bullwhip 
effect on financial performance. Previous studies have found that the green bullwhip 
effect amplifies the environmental stringency of upstream supply chains, and thus 
improves supply chain environmental performance (Lee et al., 2014; Seles et al., 2016). 
Nonetheless, the resulting effect on financial performance remains unclear (Schmidt et 
al., 2017). In this research, samples of buyers and their paired suppliers were used in order 
to be consistent with the studies of Lee et al. (2014) and Seles et al. (2016), as major 
studies of the green bullwhip effect. Objective measures and statistical tests were used to 
ensure a high level of generalizability in order to supplement the studies of Lee et al. 
(2014) and Seles et al. (2016) by using case studies.   
The green bullwhip effect creates opposite environmental performance to financial 
performance, indicating buyers’ shift of the associated costs with SCSM to their suppliers. 
The compressed timelines and stringent requirements imposed by buyers increase the 
scale of SCSM implementation in the upstream supply chains. There is a positive spill-
over effect with regard to supply chain environmental/social performance (Seles et al., 
2016). Lee et al. (2014) proposed that the green bullwhip effect is not necessarily a 
negative phenomenon and might create positive value that exceeds direct costs as 
suppliers may be capable of providing their buyers with greener/safer products ahead of 
demand in the point of sales. However, the finding in this research contrasts with the 
proposition of Lee et al. (2014). Environmental and social performance is not transferred 
to the resources that offset the considerable costs of SCSM implementation (as the 
negative financial performance of buyers and suppliers found in this research). The green 
bullwhip effect increases the requirements of suppliers’ investment in 
environmental/social management relative to their buyers. Thus, suppliers suffer more 
severely negative financial performance. In contrast to generating positive value that 
exceeds direct costs as suggested by Lee et al. (2014), this research adds understanding 
to the green bullwhip effect that financial performance is worse in the upstream supply 
chains. 
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The reason for more negative financial performance of suppliers than their buyers is 
buyers’ shift of the costs to their suppliers. The main cause of the green bullwhip effect 
is buyers’ information distortion to create a buffer in their SCSM adoption (Lee et al., 
2014). This buffer enables buyers to reduce their costs of suppliers’ opportunism in 
SCSM. Suppliers have substantial costs in SCSM compliance as found in this research 
(section 5.3.1). Suppliers may intend to reduce the costs by opportunistically violating 
the pre-agreed environmental and social conditions in their compliance. The more 
rigorous practices and compressed timeline can ensure a certain level of suppliers’ 
sustainability performance. Buyers can reduce the supply chain sustainability risk and the 
associated costs. Also, the buffer reduces buyers’ negotiation costs in suppliers’ SCSM 
compliance. The distorted information amplifies the urgency of the demand from 
downstream stakeholders, which reduces the costs of buyers to provide an incentive to 
their suppliers in SCSM compliance (Adobor & McMullen, 2014). Nonetheless, this 
buyers’ buffer creates additional costs taken by suppliers in the SCSM compliance, due 
to the overly rigorous practices and conditions (Schmidt et al., 2017). The finding of more 
negative financial performance for suppliers than buyers in this research supports the 
buyers’ shift of the costs to their suppliers in SCSM.  
5.5.2 The effective shift of costs to paired supply chain partners 
and by high supply chain power 
The shift of the associated costs of SCSM may be more effective between the paired 
supply chain partners (i.e., buyers and their immediate suppliers) and with a high level of 
buyers’ power. The finding in this research contradicts that of Schmidt et al. (2017). In 
contrast to their prediction linking with the green bullwhip effect, the authors found that 
financial performance decreases from the upstream to the downstream supply chains. 
Two issues may lead to the different finding of Schmidt et al. (2017) from that in this 
research. First, buyers can more effectively shift the costs to their paired suppliers. 
Schmidt et al. (2017) categorized the supply chain positions based on self-reported 
measures. In their methodology section, “A total of 750 randomly selected companies 
from German-speaking Europe were contacted […]. Informants were asked to choose 
their business units’ position within the supply chain” (Schmidt et al., 2017, pp. 9, 12). 
Therefore, the downstream and upstream firms may not be paired supply chain partners 
(i.e., buyers and their immediate suppliers working in the same supply chains). However, 
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the green bullwhip effect is consistently found between the buyers and their paired 
suppliers (Lee et al., 2014; Seles et al., 2016). A buyer can effectively coerce the suppliers 
working in the same supply chains to include a more stringent and additional 
sustainability requirement. In this research, the paired sample was used, which is 
consistent with the studies of Lee et al. (2014) and Seles et al. (2016). In contrast to that 
of Schmidt et al. (2017), the finding in this research suggests that buyers can more 
effectively shift their costs to their paired suppliers.  
Second, a high level of buyers’ power supports the shift of costs to paired suppliers.  
Lee et al. (2014) found that suppliers’ responses to the green bullwhip effect vary as the 
supply chain power differs. The suppliers that have low supply chain power relative to 
their buyers are coerced by highly stringent sustainability practices, while the suppliers 
that have high supply chain power are influenced by their buyers using non-coercive 
strategies (e.g., negotiation). In the link to financial performance, buyers are less likely to 
effectively transfer their costs to suppliers that have high supply chain power, because the 
non-coercive strategies used by buyers indicate buyers need to share the costs with their 
suppliers in SCSM (Jiang, 2009a). In this research, as shown in Table 4.6, buyers have 
high supply chain power relative to their paired suppliers in the sample. The finding of 
greater suppliers’ negative financial performance bears the attribute of high buyers’ 
supply chain power. In contrast, Schmidt et al. (2017) did not evaluate the supply chain 
power in their study. The finding of this research indicates buyers can effectively transfer 
the costs to their suppliers when supply chain power is in favor of buyers.  
In summary, the green bullwhip effect improves supply chain environmental 
performance by adding stringent and compressed sustainability practices toward 
upstream supply chains. However, the consequence of the green bullwhip effect on 
financial performance is the increased costs in the upstream supply chains, indicating 
buyers’ shift of their costs to their suppliers. Moreover, the effectiveness of buyers 
shifting costs to their suppliers is high when the suppliers are paired supply chain partners, 
and the buyers have high supply chain power.  
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5.6 Implications of the green bullwhip effect for 
suppliers’ corporate policies, buyers, and society  
Linking with the green bullwhip effect, suppliers were found to have more negative 
financial performance than their buyers, suggesting a greater business risk to suppliers 
that comply with their buyers’ SCSM. In this research, the implications for suppliers’ 
corporate policies are provided. Suppliers’ managers can proactively mitigate the 
additional costs by strategically increasing buyers’ dependence and information sharing.  
Moreover, the green bullwhip effect occurs in a supply chain context, where 
environmental requirements are transferred from downstream stakeholders to their next 
tier supply chain partners (Lee et al., 2014). The ultimate solution to remove the additional 
costs raised by the green bullwhip effect requires the cooperation offered by the buyers 
and society. The implications for buyers and society are also provided in this research. 
The financial, technological, and political support from the buyers and society in 
cooperation with suppliers can ultimately remove the additional costs in relation to the 
green bullwhip effect.  
5.6.1 Implications for suppliers’ corporate policies 
The present research discusses two strategies that suppliers’ managers may use to 
reduce the costs in relation to the green bullwhip effect. First, suppliers may strategically 
increase buyers’ dependence and develop a loyal partnership with buyers. Buyers in 
transactional relationships with their suppliers are more likely to amplify and compress 
the SCSM demands to the suppliers than in a partner-based relationship, as in a 
transactional relationship, the low buyer’s dependence on supplier may allow buyers to 
exercise power to enforce additional SCSM practices (Lee et al., 2014). Suppliers, 
therefore, may strategically increase buyers’ dependence by, for example, attracting 
buyers’ asset-specific investment, which motivates buyers to move from transaction-
based to partner-based relationships. The increasing importance of the suppliers in 
buyers’ supply chain operations can defer buyers to add the extra burden of SCSM on 
suppliers.  
Second, as illustrated in the classic bullwhip effect (Lee et al., 1997a), information 
distortion is a critical cause of the green bullwhip effect. Thus, information sharing on 
SCSM demands is necessary in the supply chains. The information sharing is twofold. 
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On the one hand, suppliers may improve buyers’ visibility of the information on 
suppliers’ sustainability competence. As discussed in section 2.5.3.2, one of the important 
causes of the green bullwhip effect is buyers’ rationing game, where buyers’ uncertainty 
of suppliers’ compliance encourages buyers’ tougher SCSM requirements to mitigate 
potential delay and low commitment. Suppliers, therefore, must proactively provide 
buyers with their information on sustainability capabilities, managerial dedication, and 
operational slack, which effectively increases buyers’ confidence in suppliers’ 
competence in SCSM practices. On the other hand, an integrated SCSM information flow 
must be created in the supply chains. Buyers, as the partners in the central position 
between upstream suppliers and downstream stakeholders, need to develop integrated 
sustainability information systems, where the information on suppliers’ competence and 
accurate sustainability demand may be continuously exchanged and evaluated. The low 
uncertainty created by the integrated information flow may translate into appropriate 
SCSM practices and timelines.  
5.6.2 Implications for buyers and society 
The reduction of the negative consequence of the green bullwhip effect on suppliers’ 
financial performance requires the cooperation offered by buyers and society. It depends 
on buyers how the downstream stakeholders’ demand for sustainability is transferred to 
their suppliers, and in turn, whether a green bullwhip effect occurs (Lee et al., 2014). As 
buyers’ financial performance remains negative in their SCSM adoption, buyers are 
unlikely to remove the shift of their SCSM costs by compressing timelines and increasing 
the stringency of sustainability practices in their suppliers’ SCSM compliance. Suppliers, 
thus, are unlikely to avoid the additional costs as discussed in the green bullwhip effect. 
The ultimate solution to the additional costs that are raised by the green bullwhip effect 
is to improve buyers’ financial performance in their SCSM adoption, which requires the 
cooperation of the partners from the downstream to the upstream supply chain.  
Buyers’ managers can adopt corporate policies as discussed in section 5.2, such as 
using the group SCSM approach. Society needs to work with buyers and suppliers in their 
SCSM practices jointly. Consumers should be aware of constraints in firms’ efforts to 
improve their environmental and social performance. The willingness to pay for 
sustainably produced products provides a great financial incentive for buyers and 
suppliers that conduct sustainable operations. Governments and NGOs should offer 
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technological and political support in addition to penalizing firms that show 
environmental and social misconduct. Government rewards (e.g., tax reduction) should 
be provided to sustainable buyers and suppliers in addition to regulatory pressure. NGOs 
can propagate and facilitate the technology and know-how related to environmental and 
social elements in products and production. The technology and know-how should 
provide add-on attributes that can be easily incorporated into existing processes rather 
than investing in extensive change-over in manufacturing. Also, governments and NGOs 
can facilitate the identification of sustainable suppliers to consumers by improving 
information transparency, which creates a market demand for the products related to the 
suppliers’ operations. 
The cooperation among suppliers, buyers, and downstream stakeholders can ultimately 
create a synergy among environmental, social, and financial performance. The synergy 
can remove buyers’ concern about the costs associated with SCSM. In turn, the negative 
financial consequence of the green bullwhip effect on suppliers can be removed.   
5.7 Theoretical contributions 
In this research, the established theories deepen the understanding of the phenomena 
relevant to SCSM and help to develop the hypothesized relationships. The findings by the 
hypotheses testing can be related back to these established theories and provide useful 
insights into theory development  (Stratton, 2008). The theoretical contributions of this 
research focus on suggestion, explanation, and extension of stakeholder theory, the green 
bullwhip effect, TCE, and the theories of SEF and VUB.  
5.7.1 Coercive and supportive forces in stakeholder theory 
This research suggests stakeholder theory should consider the stakeholders’ supportive 
functions in addition to the coercive force in the SCSM context. Shareholder theory has 
merely contained the coercive force in the SCSM context. Stakeholder theory illustrates 
that stakeholder pressure is a core force in firms’ adoptions of SCSM practices, and this 
pressure is transferred from the downstream to the upstream firms (as discussed in section 
2.3.2). This research discusses that stakeholder pressure in the SCSM context is more 
likely to be a coercive force concentrating on improving supply chain environmental and 
social performance. Downstream stakeholders (governments, NGOs, consumers) 
continuously request buyers to adopt SCSM practices due to the concern for 
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environmental and social performance. However, buyers’ negative financial performance 
found in this research illustrates the uncertainty of buyer support and rewards from 
downstream stakeholders. Moreover, suppliers are pressured by their buyers (i.e., 
suppliers’ stakeholders) to implement SCSM practices. However, suppliers’ financial 
performance was found to be more negative than their buyers. The finding demonstrates 
that in the SCSM context, buyers as a stakeholder to suppliers merely focus on shifting 
their costs and fulfilling their own market demands by using stakeholder power. 
Stakeholder theory in the SCSM context is more likely to illustrate the coercive force to 
improve environmental and social performance while overlooking the supportive force to 
reduce negative financial performance.  
The supportive function of stakeholders should be added to stakeholder theory in the 
SCSM context. Stakeholder pressure, as an important element in the SCSM system, 
effectively coerces firms in the supply chains to improve their environmental and social 
performance. However, stakeholders’ supportive force is missing in the SCSM context. 
The failure of SCSM increases buyers’ and suppliers’ costs (e.g., supply chain 
sustainability risk). The firms that comply with their stakeholder demands on 
sustainability, however, are unsure of business success. Stakeholder theory in the SCSM 
context should include supportive forces for compliant firms. For example, governments 
could provide regulatory benefits (e.g., tax reduction) to firms with good environmental 
and social performance. Consumers would be willing to pay for the firms’ sustainability 
efforts. NGOs could promote the brand image of sustainable firms. Buyers would increase 
the purchasing prices or volume of sustainable suppliers, given that buyers are rewarded 
and supported by their downstream stakeholders. Meanwhile, the coercive force of 
stakeholders should remain to pressure for continuous improvement and genuine 
compliance in environmental and social management. Supply chain sustainability risk 
and associated costs could effectively defer the firms’ environmental and social 
misconduct. If the balanced use of coercive and supportive force was illustrated in 
stakeholder theory in the SCSM context, suppliers, buyers, downstream stakeholders 
could together meet different stakeholders’ expectations on environmental, social, and 
financial performance.  
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5.7.2 The financial performance in relation to the green 
bullwhip effect 
This research adds understanding to the green bullwhip effect by exploring related 
financial performance, suggesting the green bullwhip effect creates an opposite impact 
on environmental performance to financial performance in the supply chains. The focus 
of studying the green bullwhip effect has remained on the changes in environmental 
performance (Lee et al., 2014; Seles et al., 2016). The stringent practices and compressed 
timeline lead to the increasing implementation of environmental practices from the 
downstream to the upstream supply chains. The supply chain environmental performance, 
thus, is improved with the overly strict requirements. Financial performance relating to 
the green bullwhip effect is found in this research. The intensified requirements on the 
SCSM implementations add more costs to the upstream suppliers, suggesting buyers’ 
shift of the costs associated with SCSM to suppliers. The financial performance, thus, 
decreases from the downstream to the upstream supply chains.  
Suppliers’ increased costs relating to the green bullwhip effect as found in this study 
indicates that SCSM should be studied in a supply chain context. SCSM research has 
remained focused on buyers’ financial performance (Carter & Easton, 2011). This 
research links the green bullwhip effect to financial performance and reveals that buyers 
can shift their costs to their suppliers. Any potential improvement of buyers’ financial 
performance in their SCSM adoption may indicate buyers’ cost reduction through 
outsourcing of environmental and social responsibilities to their suppliers. A limited 
impact of SCSM in the supply chains is seen if focusing only on buyers. Thus, in the 
analysis of financial performance in the SCSM context, multiple links in the supply chains 
should be explored (e.g., buyers and suppliers). An SCSM approach should be developed 
that provides solutions to dealing with business risks in the holistic supply chains.  
5.7.3 A further extension to TCE  
This research supports that a hybrid form created by buyers’ collaboration as an 
extension to TCE reduces buyers’ transaction costs. Traditional TCE suggests the firms 
should use transition costs as a unit of analysis to make a business decision between ‘buy’ 
and ‘make’ (Williamson, 1981). Group purchasing extends TCE by adopting buyers’ 
collaboration as a hybrid form between buy and make. The hybrid form can effectively 
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reduce the transaction costs for both buyers and suppliers in purchasing while keeping 
the independence of operations to explore low production costs in market transactions 
(Tella & Virolainen, 2005). Group SCSM in this research also refers to the hybrid form, 
where buyers collaborate to work on SCSM. From buyers’ perspective, the finding in this 
research supports the group purchasing literature that the group SCSM approach can 
effectively reduce buyers’ transaction costs. The increased bargaining power creates an 
institutional pressure, which can save buyers’ negotiation and enforcement costs in 
managing their suppliers’ SCSM compliance.  
This research further extends TCE by identifying the shift of buyers’ transaction costs 
to their suppliers. In group purchasing, the overall transaction costs are reduced in the 
buyer-supplier relationship through the mutual benefits. While buyers reduce their 
negotiation, search, and enforcement costs, suppliers also reduce their transaction costs 
as they deal with the consolidated transactions from a group of buyers (Tella & 
Virolainen, 2005). In contrast, in this research the suppliers that comply with the group 
SCSM approach were found to have more negative financial performance, suggesting 
buyers’ transaction costs are shifted to their suppliers through the hybrid form. The 
consolidation and standardization of buyers’ SCSM mandates may partially reduce 
suppliers’ transaction costs (Carter & Rogers, 2008). However, the increased bargaining 
power by using the group SCSM approach enables the buyers to intensify their suppliers’ 
compliance. Buyers may opportunistically add stringent conditions and compress the 
timeline of implementations so that they can buffer their operations to meet the 
downstream stakeholders’ demands ( Lee et al., 2014). In group SCSM, transaction costs 
are still in the buyer-supplier relationship but shifted from the buyers to their suppliers.   
In group SCSM, buyers shift additional transaction costs as a result of SCSM. In group 
purchasing, it is more likely that buyers reduce the existing transaction costs by using the 
hybrid form. When buyers pursue low production costs by using market transactions (i.e., 
purchasing), transaction costs inevitably incur (Grover & Malhotra, 2003). By using the 
group SCSM approach, buyers are more likely to reduce the additional transaction costs. 
Environmental and social performance are additional terms to the ordinary transactions 
due to the downstream stakeholder pressure (Tachizawa & Wong, 2015). The 
management of supply chain environmental and social performance adds transaction 
costs (e.g., extra coordination and control costs) to buyers in the buyer-supplier 
relationships (Dam & Petkova, 2014). The additional transaction costs are not offset by 
the improvement in operations as indicated by buyers’ negative financial performance 
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found in this research. Group SCSM increases the buyers’ bargaining power and thus 
enables the buyers to reduce the additional transaction costs by shifting them to their 
suppliers. Additional transaction costs incur as a result of SCSM, which is the reason that 
group SCSM is utilized to shift buyers’ transactions costs to their suppliers.  
5.7.4 The application of the theory of SEF and the extension to 
the theory of VUB 
The theoretical contributions of this study are also underlined by the application of the 
theory of swift, even flow (SEF) and explanation of the theory of variation and uncertainty 
buffing (VUB) in a supply chain context, focusing on buyers’ and suppliers’ financial 
performance. There are previous studies that have investigated the effect of buffering 
mechanisms in a disruption to the even flow of operations in the context of product recall 
(Wood et al., 2017), supply chain disruptions (Hendricks et al., 2009), dynamic 
environments (Kovach et al., 2015), and product exploitation and exploration (Voss et 
al., 2008). However, these studies have mainly focused on single firms. This research 
expands the application of SEF to a supply chain context, focusing on buyers’ and their 
suppliers’ operations linked to SCSM, as well as empirically testing the propositions of 
SEF and VUB by using event study methodology. Buyers’ additional requirements in the 
supply criteria result in the increased variabilities and thus disrupts the even flow of 
suppliers’ operations. While suppliers’ financial performance is degraded, there is a 
knock-effect on buyers’ operations. The variabilities in supply chains consequently also 
disrupt buyers’ even flow in production and decreases the financial performance. The 
findings of buyers’ and their suppliers’ negative financial performance support the 
propositions of SEF and VUB that this disruption degrades financial performance.  
Moreover, multiple buffering mechanisms from the perspective of suppliers were 
empirically tested in this research. The finding of the buffering effect of inventory on 
suppliers’ negative financial performance supports the proposition of VUB that firms that 
adopt buffering mechanisms can protect their financial performance from the disruption 
to the even flow of operations. From suppliers’ perspective in the SCSM context, this 
research additionally identified that inventory slack is a more effective buffer mechanism 
than capacity slack, which further explains VUB in the choice of buffering mechanisms.  
Furthermore, this research explains VUB by finding the conditional buffering effect 
of financial slack. VUB illustrates three buffering mechanisms: forward load, inventory, 
Chapter 5 Discussion 
235 
and capacity (Stratton, 2008). Financial slack in the form of leverage is not discussed in 
VUB. In this research, the conditional effects of financial slack under a high level of 
supplier’s dependence on buyer is found. The finding illustrates that in a supply chain 
context, supply chain power should be considered as a trigger for the necessity of holding 
financial slack when a disruption to the even flow of operations occurs. This finding 
explains VUB by including financial slack as a buffering mechanism to protect financial 
performance, and explaining the choice of financial slack (i.e., leverage) and the condition 
of effectiveness (i.e., supply chain power).  
In summary, this research answers the calls for verification of SEF and VUB through 
empirical testing (Schmenner, 2004; Stratton, 2008) and expands the application of the 
theories from a single firm to the level of supply chain dyad. This research explains VUB 
by exploring financial slack as a buffer mechanism in addition to those proposed by VUB.  
5.8 The synthesis of the discussions on the research 
findings  
In this research, the novelty of studying supply chain dyads in SCSM contributes the 
initial step of exploring the supply chain impact of SCSM to the literature. The findings 
in this research provide empirical evidence that SCSM degrades the shareholder value 
within supply chain dyads and negatively affects both suppliers and buyers. The 
detrimental financial performance supports the discussion on cost outweighing benefits 
from the supply chain perspective, where the adoption of sustainability practices 
substantial disrupts the even flow of supply chain operations. While SCSM provides a 
systematic approach for propagating sustainability practices upstream along the supply 
chain (Busse, 2016), the detrimental financial performance for supply chain dyads would 
discourage the long-term management and implementation on sustainability practices in 
supply chains. 
The study of SCSM on the level of supply chain dyad also enables this research to 
discover the extent of buyers’ cost transfer to their suppliers in SCSM. This finding is 
important as the review of the literature in this research shows that SCSM research is 
dominated by studying from the buyers’ perspective, and some studies found positive 
financial performance for buyers (e.g., Busse, 2016; Dam & Petkova, 2014; Golicic & 
Smith, 2013; Thornton et al., 2013; Wang & Sarkis, 2013). The evidence of buyers’ 
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shifting cost to their suppliers raises an interesting question about the positive financial 
performance for buyers suggested by the previous studies: Does buyers’ positive financial 
performance merely indicate that these buyers have the competence to transfer the costs 
associated with SCSM to their suppliers, and suppliers consequently bear more 
detrimental financial performance? The finding in this research suggests the importance 
of studying the impact of SCSM at the supply chain level rather than solely relying on the 
buyers’ perspective.  
This research took the first step in exploring the influential factors relating to financial 
performance. The significant factors found in this research show the opportunities that 
firms can deal with the negative impact of SCSM. The influential factors from buyers’ 
perspective are mostly related to the SCSM governance (e.g., group SCSM and sSCSM). 
Additionally, buyers with high growth prospects should take special care in dealing with 
the increased variabilities in supply chain operations. The influential factors from 
suppliers’ perspective relate to operational competence. Suppliers can improve own 
operational capacity by strategically developing inventory- and financial-slack. The 
increased resources can not only buffer the disruption but also reduce buyers’ intent to 
use “rationing gaming” strategy and thus shift costs to suppliers. Suppliers should also 
tactically measure and enhance their supply chain power, which creates the opportunity 
to gain buyers’ financial and technical support.  
Economic viability is important for business firms to maintain the SCSM governance 
and implementation (Foerstl et al., 2015). The finding of detrimental financial 
performance in this research indicates substantial efforts required for the supply chain 
actors to achieve the synergy of TBL, where the support in downstream markets, efficient 
and effective governance, and the fitted operational competence for SCSM need to be 
developed.   
5.9 Chapter conclusion 
In this chapter, the research findings were highlighted, discussed and compared with 
previous studies, providing academic, managerial, and societal implications. The 
theoretical contributions of the research focus on stakeholder theory, the green bullwhip 
effect, TCE, the theory of SEF and VUB. This research complements the SCSM literature, 
focusing on investigating the impact of SCSM on financial performance in a supply chain 
dyad (i.e., buyers and suppliers), exploring the mitigating sources to reduce the costs and 
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business risks that buyers and suppliers should deal with, and examining buyers’ shift of 
the costs to their suppliers linked with the green bullwhip effect. The influential factors 
explored have implications for further research to develop a framework of SCSM, where 
financial, environmental, and social performance can be improved in a synergic manner 
as SCSM is designed for.  
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Chapter 6. Conclusion 
“To be truly sustainable a supply chain would at worst do no net harm to natural or 
social systems while still producing a profit over an extended period of time; a truly 
sustainable supply chain could, customers willing, continue to do business forever.” 
(Pagell & Wu, 2009, p. 38) 
The preceding chapter discussed the academic and managerial implications of this 
research. This chapter provides the conclusion for this research. The contribution of this 
research will be discussed in this chapter, and the answers to the research questions will 
be provided. The value of this research to a wider context will be presented. The 
limitations of this research and future directions driven by this research will be discussed. 
Finally, a final remark will be provided to close the thesis.  
6.1 The contribution of this research 
This research provides four broad contributions.  
First, by using objective measures and a relatively large sample, this research 
quantified the negative impact of buyers’ SCSM adoption on their financial performance 
with unbiased analysis. The research explored the business risks to buyers in SCSM 
adoption, and thus increased the knowledge on the relationship between SCSM and 
buyers’ financial performance.   
Second, this research, as the first, found the negative impact of buyers’ SCSM on their 
suppliers’ financial performance. Given the buyers’ negative financial performance, the 
finding of the negative impact on suppliers’ financial performance highlights the impact 
of SCSM in the supply chain context (in dyadic relationships).  
Third, suppliers’ financial performance was found to be more negative than their 
buyers’. While suppliers are mandated on more stringent sustainability practices, buyers, 
in fact, shift their financial costs to their suppliers.  
Fourth, this research explored the factors that influence negative financial performance 
from both buyers’ and suppliers’ perspective. The findings indicated opportunities for 
firms at any level of the supply chains to offset negative financial performance.   
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These four broad contributions are supported by achieving the research objectives and 
answering the research questions. Next, the research objectives and questions are restated, 
and concise answers are provided.  
6.1.1 Research objective one  
Research objective one: to investigate the impact of buyers’ SCSM on their financial 
performance, using objective measures. 
Research objective one is achieved. This research concludes that SCSM adoption has 
a negative impact on buyers’ financial performance. This negative impact is reduced by 
the use of the social dimension of SCSM practices (i.e., sSCSM) and the group SCSM 
approach. The buyers that have high growth prospects have a more negative impact. This 
research objective is achieved by providing the answers to two research questions (i.e., 
1.1 and 1.2).  
6.1.1.1 Answer to research question 1.1  
Research question 1.1: What is the impact of buyers’ SCSM on their financial 
performance? 
This research used event study methodology to test buyers’ abnormal returns in 
response to SCSM announcements in a relatively large sample of 308 SCSM 
announcements. There is statistically significant and negative mean cumulative abnormal 
return (CAR) in the event window (-1,1) at -0.22%. Thus, research question 1.1. is 
answered by showing that the impact of SCSM on buyers’ financial performance is 
negative.  
This research contributes to the literature by providing an unbiased and statistically 
generalized result that demonstrates the negative impact of SCSM on buyers’ financial 
performance. Prior to this research, the SCSM literature remained uncertain as to whether 
SCSM improved buyers’ financial/economic performance. Perceptual measures were 
predominately used while hardly addressing social desirability bias. Due to the use of 
objective measures, this research does not suffer from social desirability bias. Also, the 
relatively large sample size and the different SCSM programs across industries and 
countries used in this research provide a relatively precise estimate of buyers’ financial 
performance supported by high statistical power.  
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6.1.1.2 Answer to research question 1.2  
Research question 1.2: What factors influence the negative impact of buyers’ SCSM on 
their financial performance? 
OLS regression was used to test the hypothesized factors against the CARs. The ratio 
of COGS to sales, accounts payable turnover, and inventory turnover was not found to be 
significantly related to the buyers’ CARs, which indicates that supplier relationship 
management does not reduce buyers’ negative financial performance. However, growth 
prospects were found to be significantly and negatively related to buyers’ CARs; thus, 
buyers with high growth prospects have more negative financial performance. The use of 
third-party certification to manage suppliers’ SCSM commitments was not found to be 
significantly related to buyers’ CARs; therefore, the buyers that use third-party 
certification as the governance mechanism in SCSM do not have a better financial 
performance than those using code of conduct. Buyers that require their suppliers to 
comply with sSCSM practices (e.g., improving labor welfare) and that collaborate with 
other buyers through group SCSM were both found to have less negative financial 
performance. 
Research question 1.2 is answered by highlighting the following SCSM attributes and 
firm-specific characteristics as influential factors in buyers’ negative financial 
performance;  
 sSCSM: the social dimension of SCSM (e.g., working conditions, labor rights, 
diversity) 
 group SCSM: buyers’ collaboration on mandating suppliers to improve 
environmental and social performance 
 growth prospect: buyers having a high market expectation of their growth 
(measured by the ratio of market to book value) 
These findings enable this research to provide evidence of the effectiveness of three 
business strategies to mitigate negative financial performance. First, buyers may 
strategically choose to require suppliers to improve the social dimension of SCSM rather 
than beginning with the environmental dimension of SCSM (e.g., reduction of carbon 
emissions). Second, buyers may proactively collaborate with peers to conduct SCSM 
mandates, which create the sharing of both the business risks and the benefits of SCSM. 
Third, buyers with high growth prospects should be cautious in adopting SCSM; external 
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support from downstream stakeholders should be claimed, and supply chain design 
should accommodate the negative impact with strategic purchasing.  
6.1.2 Research objective two  
Research objective two: to investigate the impact of buyers’ SCSM on their suppliers’ 
financial performance by using objective measures, providing a supply chain impact of 
SCSM. 
Research objective two is achieved. This research concludes that buyers’ SCSM has 
a negative impact on their suppliers’financial performance. Both buyers’ and suppliers’ 
negative financial performance suggest a negative impact SCSM in a supply chain context 
(with a dyadic relationship). From suppliers’ perspective, the negative impact of buyers’ 
SCSM on the financial performance is reduced by a high level of buyer’s dependence on 
supplier, inventory slack, and high financial slack under the condition of high supplier’s 
dependence on buyer. The negative impact is further increased by buyers’ use of the group 
SCSM approach and a long relationship with buyers. This research objective is achieved 
by providing the answers to two research questions (i.e., 2.1 and 2.2). 
6.1.2.1 Answer to research question 2.1  
Research question 2.1: What is the impact of buyers’ SCSM on their suppliers’ financial 
performance?  
The methods of studying related firms in event study methodology were used to test 
the suppliers’ abnormal returns in response to the buyers’ SCSM announcements. In total, 
219 announcements were used to generate 2189 supplier observations. The mean 
portfolio CAR (with 219 observations) in the event window (-1,1) was found to be 
negative and statistically significant at -0.53%. Research question 2.1 is thus answered 
that the impact of buyers’ SCSM on suppliers’ financial performance is negative.  
The main research focus in the SCSM literature has remained on buyers’ perspective 
as discussed in several literature review papers (Ashby et al., 2012; Hoejmose et al., 2013; 
Touboulic & Walker, 2015). This research is the first to provide empirical evidence on 
suppliers’ financial performance. The finding in this research suggests that buyers’ SCSM 
have a discernable and negative impact on suppliers’ financial performance. Also, the 
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finding on suppliers’ financial performance highlights the impact of SCSM in a supply 
chain context (in dyadic relationships).  
6.1.2.2 Answer to research question 2.2 
Research question 2.2: What factors influence the negative impact of buyers’ SCSM on 
their suppliers’ financial performance?  
Robust regression was used to test the hypothesized factors against suppliers’ CARs, 
where suppliers’ individual CARs were used to facilitate cross-sectional regression 
analysis. In the analysis of the effect of supply chain power on suppliers’ CARs, the 
buyer’s dependence on supplier was found to be significant and positive; relationship 
length was found to be significant and negative; the supplier’s dependence on buyer was 
found to be insignificant. These results partially confirm that supply chain power is an 
important factor in influencing suppliers’ financial performance. In the investigation of 
the effects of SCSM-related factors on suppliers’ CARs, buyers’ use of third-party 
certification and the requirement for the compliance with sSCSM practices were not 
found to be significant, while buyers’ collaboration through group SCSM was found to 
be significant and negative. In the examination of the effects of operational slack and 
financial slack on suppliers’ CARs, while capacity slack and supply chain slack were not 
found to be significant, inventory slack was found to be significant and positive. Financial 
slack measured by suppliers’ leverage was not found to be significantly related to 
suppliers’ CARs. However, a lack of financial slack (i.e., a high level of leverage) under 
the condition of high supplier’s dependence on buyer was found to be significant and 
negative in relation with suppliers’ CARs. 
Research question 2.2 is answered by highlighting the following SCSM attributes and 
firm-specific characteristics as influential factors in suppliers’ negative financial 
performance;  
 Buyers’ dependence on suppliers  
 Relationship length with buyers 
 Group SCSM: the suppliers that are mandated by a group of buyers to improve 
environmental and social performance 
 Inventory slack 
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 The interaction term between leverage (the measure of financial slack ) and 
suppliers’ dependence on buyers 
Through these findings, this research provides evidence of the effectiveness of several 
mitigating sources in response to the suppliers’ negative financial performance. First, 
suppliers should evaluate the supply chain power when required by their buyers to 
implement SCSM practices. Buyers’ dependence and relationship length can effectively 
influence the associated financial performance of SCSM compliance. Second, suppliers 
should be cautious about buyers’ collaboration through group SCSM as it creates 
substantially negative financial performance to suppliers. Third, suppliers should 
strategically develop inventory slack to buffer negative financial performance, which is 
the most effective operational slack found in the SCSM context. Finally, suppliers that 
are highly dependent on buyers should increase financial slack to accumulate resources 
in preparation for buyers’ SCSM mandates. While financial slack is not always required, 
the effectiveness of financial slack as a buffer is salient when high dependence on buyers 
exists in suppliers’ SCSM compliance.  
6.1.3 Research objective three 
Research objective three: to investigate the different impact of buyers’ SCSM on the 
financial performance of buyers and suppliers. 
Research objective three is achieved. This research concludes the impact of SCSM 
is more negative on the financial performance of suppliers than their buyers, providing 
understanding to the green bullwhip effect with buyers’ shift of the costs to their suppliers. 
This research objective is achieved by answering the research question 3 
6.1.3.1 Answer to research question 3  
Research question 3: Is there a difference in financial performance between buyers and 
their paired suppliers relating to buyers’ SCSM?  
This research used paired samples (i.e., suppliers were paired with buyers in the same 
supply chains). The use of paired samples is consistent with the setting of the green 
bullwhip effect as discussed by Lee et al. (2014), which ensured an unbiased result in this 
research. A paired t-test was used to test the difference in mean CAR between buyers and 
suppliers. This research found that buyers’ mean CAR is statistically significant and 
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greater than that of suppliers. Research question 1.3. is thus answered in that suppliers 
have a more negative financial performance than their buyers when adopting SCSM 
practices.  
This research contributes to the literature by revealing a more negative financial 
performance in the upstream than in downstream supply chains in SCSM. The finding 
provides a greater understanding bullwhip effect. By adding stringent practices and 
compressing the timeline of suppliers’ SCSM compliance, buyers buffer their business 
risks by shifting the transaction costs to their suppliers.   
6.2 This research in a wider context 
This research provides six implications in a wider context for both SCSM research and 
policymaking.  
First, the sustainability (including SCSM) literature should not always rely on the 
proposed positive relationship between sustainability and financial performance. The 
findings of negative financial performance (for both buyers and suppliers), resulting from 
the objective measures used in this research, oppose the propositions found in the 
conceptual literature (Carter & Rogers, 2008; Markley & Davis, 2007) and empirical 
studies by using perceptual measures (Golicic & Smith, 2013; Schmidt et al., 2017). 
Scholars should be cautious of the findings in this research. It is true that sustainable 
development is urgent, as natural resources are running out over time, and the working 
conditions in suppliers’ factories are continuously disclosed as inadequate (Pagell & 
Shevchenko, 2014). However, corporate economic/financial growth is important to the 
overall society, and sustainable development includes economic/financial performance 
(Carter & Rogers, 2008). The sustainability literature has not yet provided confirmative 
information on the impact of environmental and social management on financial 
performance. This is harmful to the overall society and sustainable development as it 
motivates firms to implement environmental and social management with the assumption 
that a positive outcome will emerge following the integration of environmental and social 
management into economic activities. When negative financial performance is observed 
by managers, there are no meaningful strategies to cope with the business challenge. 
There are operational and transaction costs to the firms that adopt SCSM as found in this 
research. The disclosure of these costs would remind scholars and managers of the 
potential business risk in the design of sustainable operations. Accordingly, sustainability 
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research may develop better environmental or social management practices that 
incorporate corporate economic growth.  
Second, sustainability scholars should examine the potential bias in the use of 
perceptual measures and apply more objective measures. Sustainability (including 
SCSM) is still a new research field (Ashby et al., 2012); thus, researchers often adopt the 
mature methodologies (e.g., survey and case study) developed in traditional research 
fields (e.g., operations and supply chain management). However, researchers should be 
aware of major methodological problems when applying these methodologies in the 
sustainability context. While social desirability bias has been commonly mentioned as a 
critical issue in survey-based research, which often uses perceptual measures (Carter & 
Easton, 2011; Walker et al., 2012), the empirical literature using survey-based methods 
have hardly addressed this bias (Carter & Easton, 2011). This research used objective 
measures and found significant and opposite results to those the studies that have mostly 
used perceptual measures (e.g., Golicic & Smith, 2013; Schmidt et al., 2017). This should 
alert sustainability scholars to the need to examine potential bias when perceptual 
measures are applied. Sustainability scholars are therefore advised to apply and explore 
more objective measures to overcome social desirability bias. Abnormal returns can be 
compared with the results of self-reported operational/accounting performance in order 
to provide multiple measures of firm performance in response to sustainable 
development.  
Third, in the SCSM context, suppliers’ commitment should be motivated by providing 
mitigating strategies to their negative financial performance. While SCSM is conducted 
through the operations of multiple links from supply chains, SCSM research surprisingly 
overlooks the impact of SCSM on suppliers’ financial performance. Rather, the SCSM 
literature appears to focus on buyers’ management of suppliers’ commitment to 
maintaining the operations of SCSM (Foerstl et al., 2015; Gimenez & Sierra, 2013; 
Hoejmose et al., 2013). However, this research found that suppliers have negative 
financial performance. Given the suppliers’ negative financial performance, it is 
questionable that suppliers’ genuine commitment can be developed merely through the 
management of buyers. SCSM operations are unlikely to be truly ‘sustainable’ in the long 
term. Therefore, SCSM scholars should further explore from suppliers’ perspective, 
including the costs of compliance, the required resources and capabilities, and supply 
chain power. By providing the analysis of the costs and benefits and discovering strategic 
factors to avoid business risk relating to SCSM compliance, the SCSM literature may 
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offer genuine motivation to suppliers’ commitment to SCSM operations, and thus SCSM 
as a systematic approach can sustain in the long term.  
Fourth, the SCSM research should analyze the multiple links in the supply chains in 
the study of the impact of SCSM on firms’ financial performance. This research found 
that the negative impact of SCSM on suppliers’ financial performance, and the negative 
impact on suppliers, are more severe than that on buyers. The SCSM literature could 
explore certain sources to mitigate buyers’ negative firm performance. However, if the 
negative impact on suppliers is not explored and reduced with specific mitigating sources 
from the suppliers’ perspective, only limited solutions can be provided. Due to the 
connection to supply chain operations, the suppliers’ negative firm performance may 
harm suppliers’ business and in turn, threaten buyers’ businesses and overall societal 
benefits. Thus, SCSM research should study the financial performance of multiple links 
in the supply chains, which would give a holistic view of supply chain impacts, thus 
enabling the development of strategies in a supply chain context to decrease overall 
business risks relating to SCSM.  
Fifth, SCSM research could utilize the influential factors explored in this research to 
develop a framework for SCSM adoption. This research identified significant factors 
influencing buyers’ and suppliers’ financial performance. These findings indicate that 
there is an opportunity for SCSM research to provide business strategies to change 
negative financial performance. The SCSM literature should adopt these factors in the 
analysis of financial performance and explore more influential factors to ultimately create 
a framework, where both buyers and suppliers may accordingly analyze the required 
resources and capabilities and evaluate business risk in SCSM adoption. Group SCSM as 
discussed in this research (section 5.1.3) could contribute to the design of this framework. 
The group SCSM approach was found to reduce buyers’ costs, which simplifies the 
development of the framework by mainly focusing on accommodating suppliers’ negative 
financial performance. Also, group SCSM creates an opportunity to integrate the SCSM 
efforts of buyers’ downstream stakeholders, buyers, and suppliers, which could facilitate 
SCSM researchers to develop SCSM practices that meet multiple and different 
stakeholder expectations (e.g., environmental, and financial growth).  
Sixth, downstream stakeholders (e.g., government, NGOs, and consumers) should 
provide clear economic/financial incentives to support firms’ SCSM adoption. SCSM is 
an effective and systematic approach to improving environmental and social performance 
within the supply chain (Hall, 2000). However, downstream stakeholders are more likely 
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to be a coercive force rather than a supportive force in SCSM operations. While there is 
increasing downstream stakeholder pressure (both market and regulatory pressure) on 
firms’ SCSM adoption, it is questionable if consumers will be willing to pay for such 
sustainability (Dam & Petkova, 2014) and there is no explicit reward from governments 
for compliance. The firms face a dilemma in which SCSM adoption may not secure 
financial benefits, while supply chain sustainability risk is high with no SCSM adoption. 
This research suggests that downstream stakeholders should balance coercive and 
supportive forces. One one hand, the firms that genuinely adopt SCSM should be 
provided with explicit financial benefits; for example, governments may provide tax 
reductions, or NGOs may positively expose these firms’ efforts to increase the awareness 
of conscious consumers. On the other hand, governments should enforce fines and NGOs 
should provide negative exposure to those firms resisting SCSM adoption. Hence, firms 
that have adopted SCSM would be differentiated with competitive advantages supported 
by downstream stakeholders from the firms that have not adopted SCSM.  
6.3 Limitations and future research  
Although this research was based on careful and rigorous methods, there are inevitable 
trade-offs and limitations. Also, some avenues of future research may be derived from 
this research.  
The methods used in collecting samples led to several limitations. The sample firms 
were limited to public firms, as stock return data were required. Therefore, the findings 
in this research may not be fully applicable to private firms.  
The supplier sample included only U.S. public firms. The supplier data were collected 
from Compustat Segment File which includes only U.S. public firms, and the database 
for identifying buyer-supplier relationships are not readily available in other countries. 
Since the U.S. market shows a higher level of consumer concern and regulatory pressure 
on SCSM than in other markets (Zhu et al., 2005), the suppliers in other markets may not 
have the same scale of financial performance found in this research. Additionally, the past 
sustainability performance of the suppliers in the sample was not controlled in this 
research. The use of secondary data, relatively large data set (i.e., 2189 supplier 
observations), and long year span (i.e., 26 years) in the sample places a constraint on the 
measure of past sustainability performance than could be employed in this research.  
Chapter 6 Conclusion 
248 
Also, U.S. buyers may have more negative financial performance than non-U.S. 
buyers. Table 4.3 shows that in the estimate by using the market model, the mean CAR 
by using U.S. sample (-0.34%) was more negative than the mean CAR by using the full 
sample (-0.22%). The full sample covered non-U.S. buyers (e.g., Japanese, Korean, and 
European firms); thus, U.S. buyers may have more negative financial performance when 
they announce their SCSM. This research focuses on exploring the overall impact of 
SCSM on buyers’ financial performance and only controlled the country effect in the 
cross-sectional regression analysis. Thus, there is no statistical evidence to confirm the 
more negative financial performance of U.S. buyers in this research.  
Given the limitations of this research discussed above, two avenues for future research 
may be provided. First, it would be interesting to study if SCSM has a different impact 
on the financial performance of suppliers in other countries. In particular, the 
effectiveness of the influential factors on suppliers studied in this research could be 
evaluated under different country contexts. However, researchers may have to mine for 
supplier data in other countries or continue to use secondary data as in this research. 
Alternatively, survey-based research may provide access to supplier data, although social 
desirability bias must be addressed. Second, future research could explore the gap in 
buyers’ financial performance focusing on U.S. and Non-U.S. firms. Researchers could 
apply a statistical test on the difference between mean CARs with a sample containing 
more non-U.S. buyers than that in this research. The abnormal returns associated with 
SCSM announcements made by buyers in emerging markets (e.g., China) may provide a 
meaningful comparison with those in U.S. markets, due to the cross-cultural context of 
sustainability.  
In the sample used in this research, buyers had a higher level of power than suppliers, 
as demonstrated in Table 4.6. The literature suggests, in general, buyers are more 
powerful than suppliers (Kim & Wemmerlöv, 2015), and the supply chain power in favor 
of buyers enables them to mandate supply chain practices, and thus creates the systematic 
approach of SCSM (Hall, 2000). Buyers’ high level of power presented in the sample is 
consistent with the literature and validates the findings of this research. However, there 
could be a scenario in which suppliers are more powerful than buyers in SCSM operations 
(Touboulic et al., 2014). Hence, future research should be cautious in applying the 
findings of this research when a high level of supplier power is observed. Additionally, 
In section 5.3.2.1, the contrast findings of Deitz et al. (2009) relating to power in a 
favorable supply chain practice (i.e., positive suppliers’ financial performance was found) 
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were discussed. This research focuses on a disruptive supply chain practice (i.e., the 
SCSM compliance leads to suppliers’ negative financial performance) and found the 
mitigating effect of high buyer’s dependence on supplier. Future research may further 
investigate the effect of buyer’s dependence on supplier in a favorable supply chain 
practice. The findings of future research may provide an interesting comparison with 
those in this research.  
This research did not explore specific operational problems for both buyers and 
suppliers. As discussed in section 3.2, this research estimated buyers’ and their suppliers’ 
financial performance by using stock returns which incorporate a series of operational 
changes relating to SCSM adoption (e.g., increasing transaction costs and operational 
complexity). Therefore, these results represent the overall impact of SCSM on financial 
performance but do not deconstruct specific operational problems (e.g., the rise of 
inventory costs, longer lead time). This research chose to accept this inevitable trade-off 
in order to use an objective measure (i.e., stock returns) in the statistical tests of financial 
performance.  
Future research could explore specific operational problems based on the findings of 
this research. The case study and simulation approach could be used with primary data to 
identify the potential problem area. Survey-based methods could be subsequently used to 
explore the core operational problems by designing survey items reflecting negative 
financial performance, such as asking respondents to identify the operational difficulty in 
adopting SCSM with the assumption of negative financial performance. 
This research investigated the financial performance of dyadic buyer-supplier 
relationships. The literature supports using the method of ‘related firms’ in event study 
methodology only in terms of immediate suppliers (Brown et al., 2009; Fee & Thomas, 
2004). The content of announcements in the sample used in this research indicates salient 
information relating to immediate suppliers only. However, the analysis of SCSM can be 
based on the triadic (e.g., second-tier suppliers) (Touboulic et al., 2014), chain, or network 
levels (Miemczyk et al., 2012). This research did not reveal the financial performance of 
the firms in the further upstream supply chains (e.g., second-tier suppliers), or the holistic 
supply chain impact. Future research could work on exploring the financial performance 
in a wider supply chain context, such as from second-tier suppliers’ perspective. 
The buyers’ cost transfer to suppliers is an important finding made possible through 
investigating the supply chain dyad in this research. This finding suggests future SCSM 
research should focus on supply chain impact rather than solely rely on the buyers’ 
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perspective. In SCSM research, when a study finds that buyers increase their profits with 
reduced carbon emission, it commonly assumes a positive ‘supply chain impact’ (Pagell 
& Shevchenko, 2014). The present research demonstrates the potential bias of such 
assumption. Future SCSM research should, therefore, provide evidence at the supply 
chain level (e.g., suppliers’ emission and profits). Moreover, future studies can explore 
the governance mechanisms and operational capacity to manage/avoid/reduce the cost 
transfers, which supports developing TBL synergies at the supply chain level.  
One of interesting future research might use the influential factors explored by this 
research to develop an SCSM framework to mitigate overall negative financial 
performance. Two directions of future research may be i.) the development of SCSM 
practices (e.g., group SCSM) or ii.) the improvement of firms’ capabilities in SCSM 
operations (e.g., operational slack). Further exploration of SCSM practices and firms’ 
capabilities may be integrated to create an SCSM framework, which could effectively 
improve environmental/social performance while maintaining financial performance. 
Group SCSM may provide a direction for future research to develop the SCSM 
framework. While this research found that suppliers have more negative financial 
performance when buyers utilize the group SCSM approach, the effect of group SCSM 
on reducing buyers’ negative financial performance provides an opportunity for group 
SCSM to be designed in a way that leads to the sharing of the values generated from 
SCSM adoption with suppliers. Therefore, buyers and suppliers may both be able to 
mitigate their negative financial performance. Future research could use a qualitative 
approach (e.g., case study) to study the mechanisms in group SCSM of how to mitigate 
suppliers’ costs. Additionally, the case that suppliers are more powerful than their buyers 
could be studied with group SCSM. The power in favor of suppliers may facilitate their 
decision-making in group SCSM operations and create equally shared costs and benefits 
between buyers and suppliers. The group purchasing literature could be used to develop 
such future research, or to investigate the possible integration of SCSM function into 
group purchasing. 
The insignificant effect of supply chain slack (i.e., cash-to-cash cycle) and capacity 
slack could represent an important area for future research in supply chain management. 
This research suggests that the discussed mitigating effect of supply chain slack should 
be carefully considered in supply chain research (e.g., buyers mandate a supply chain 
practice to their suppliers), as the mitigating effect may be offset by the power 
relationships between buyers and suppliers. Also, the effectiveness of capacity slack is 
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likely to fluctuate in different disruptive events. Firms do not usually have sufficient 
resources to develop capacity, inventory, and supply chain slack altogether. Future 
research could explore the strategic development of operational slack under different 
scenarios. A meta-analysis study could be conducted to explore the moderators or 
mediators in the relationship between financial performance and various forms of 
operational slack.  
Also, in this research, the financial slack was found to be less important than the 
operational slack in relation to suppliers’ financial performance. The meta-analysis of 
Daniel et al. (2004) focused only on financial slack (e.g., leverage and working capital). 
An updated meta-analysis can include both financial slack and operational slack and 
analyze comparatively the mitigating effect between these two broad forms of slack 
resources relating to the financial performance.  
The ‘swiftness’ and ‘forward load’ as proposed by the theories of SEF and VUB can 
be further tested. This research focuses on the disruption to the even flow of operations 
as proposed by SEF. Further research can investigate the ‘swiftness’ component of the 
theory. For example, how the changes in throughput time influence the financial 
performance. Moreover, the investigation can be connected to forward load as a buffering 
mechanism suggested by VUB. Forward load indicates additional time buffer against 
variation included backlogs (Stratton, 2008). This research explored inventory, capacity, 
and supply chain slack as the buffering mechanisms. Future research could examine the 
effectiveness of forward load to mitigate the financial performance influenced by the 
changes of throughput time.   
More SCM factors can be tested in relation to the financial performance in SCSM 
adoption. This research found an insignificant relationship between supplier relationship 
management and buyers’ financial performance. However, supplier relationship 
management may only represent one aspect of SCM strategies. Future studies could 
examine other components of SCM strategies, such as the impact of effective and efficient 
information flow on buyers’ financial performance in SCSM adoption, which could 
explore more links between SCM and SCSM. 
The use of secondary data (rather than primary data) places constraints on the 
measurement of some variables in this study. Secondary indicators and measures often 
reflect the influence of multiple processes, and sometimes may not be a perfect proxy for 
the full domain of the construct of interest (Houston, 2004). In this research, the cost of 
goods sold to sales, inventory turnover, and account payable turnover were used to 
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measure SRM. While these measures for SRM are well established (Liou & Gao, 2011; 
Tang & Liou, 2010), the complex strategic and relational factors of SRM may not be fully 
measured and evaluated in these measures, such as the scale of integration of operations 
between buyers and suppliers that SRM commonly represents (Lambert & Schwieterman, 
2012). Also, capacity slack (as measured by the ratio of property, plant, and equipment 
to sales in this research) might be better measured using planned idle time or machine 
load rate (Bourland & Yano, 1994), which, however, are variables more likely available 
if primary data were collected. While the present research benefited from the use of 
secondary data to avoid self-reported bias in sustainability research and provide 
triangulation to the findings of the prior research dominated by using perceptual 
measures, the use of secondary data constrained how variables were measured. Based on 
the findings in this research, future research could use alternative measures and 
approaches (e.g., simulation, in-depth case studies and surveys) to further explore the 
mitigating effects of SRM and capacity slack in the SCSM context.  
There are limitations to adopting TCE as a theoretical lens when analyzing the SCSM 
governance. This research focused on the market governance of SCSM in a dyadic 
relationship, and thus, used TCE as a theoretical lens to understand the relationships 
between market governance and financial performance. However, some scholars claim a 
key limitation of TCE, the focus on cost efficiency, limits the potential for the firms to 
form value-creating linkages (Hawkins et al., 2008). Dyer and Singh (1998) discussed 
from the relational view that firms may choose to continue relationships even when 
economic benefits diminish, because there are relational rents (e.g., knowledge sharing 
and the combining of complementary resources) that firms can develop through long-
term, inter-firm linkages. The present research used RDT and discussed the extension of 
TCE through the group approach of SCSM to complement TCE. However, the potential 
relational rents in SCSM are not fully explored in this research. Relational governance 
has a greater impact than market governance on environmental and social performance 
(Jiang, 2009b; Tachizawa & Wong, 2015), which may indicate the development of 
relational rents from the perspective of environmental and social performance. There is a 
lack of SCSM research relating the relational governance to financial performance, and 
the use of relational governance may increase firms’ investment (Jiang, 2009b). Future 
research should adopt alternative theoretical lenses, such as the relational view, to analyze 
the trade-off between the increase of capital investment and the development of relational 
rents, and its impact on the financial performance in the SCSM context.   
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There may be long-term effects of SCSM that are not fully captured by using the stock 
market reaction as an instant assessment surrounding announcements. Event study is a 
well-established methodology, and the assumption of market efficiency is economically 
and empirically sound (Kothari & Warner, 2007; MacKinlay, 1997). The stock market 
reaction is a forward evaluation for the impact of managerial decisions on future cash 
flow and thus is assumed to include long-term effects (Eroglu et al., 2016). However, one 
may argue that the SCSM is very complex due to its nature of changing traditional 
operations domain by incorporating environmental and social attributes. Therefore, there 
may be long-term effects which are not accurately assessed and evaluated in the 
immediate assessment by market participants. If this is the case, future studies may assess 
the long-term effects of SCSM, such as conducting a longitudinal event study. 7 
Nonetheless, the assessment on long-term announcement effect is acknowledged as 
difficult (Kothari & Warner, 2007) and such longitudinal event studies have not been 
widely justified in related-firms research (e.g., the impact of buyers’ announcements on 
suppliers in this research). Future research using a longitudinal event study must carefully 
examine the data and justify the application of the approach if adopted. At the current 
stage of SCSM research, although the assessment period in this research may be limited 
in the short term, the well-established methodology used in this research seems to be the 
best possible option for estimating financial performance relating to SCSM.  
6.4 Final remarks 
This research was motivated by the debate on the relationship between SCSM and 
firms’ financial performance. TBL states that corporate sustainability involves the 
integration of environmental, social, and economic/financial performance. Indeed, 
corporate sustainability is necessary for the development of human society. However, the 
overall society appears to de-emphasize financial performance as an important bottom 
line, when continuously requesting firms to improve environmental and social 
performance. Due to high stakeholder pressure, many firms adopt sustainability practices 
without a clear view of the business risk. Moreover, sustainability research has solely 
relied on the synergy of environmental, social and financial performance suggested by 
TBL and has not clearly provided suggestions on what firms can do when the synergy 
                                                          
7 The detailed discussion on the longitudinal event study methodology is given by Barber and Lyon 
(1996) 
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cannot be reached. The improvement of environmental and social performance to the 
detriment of financial performance is not true sustainability. Firms are unlikely to be able 
to improve environmental and social performance when negative financial performance 
persists. This research analyzed the potential financial costs relating to sustainability in a 
supply chain context (for both buyers and suppliers) and provided researchers, managers, 
and overall society with empirical evidence on the need to be aware of and prepared for 
business risk in the adoption of SCSM.  
These mitigating sources (e.g., collaboration through group SCSM and the 
development of operational slack) identified in this research demonstrate that there is an 
opportunity for the synergy of environmental, social, and financial performance to be 
reached, if firms are internally prepared with the resources, and overall society provides 
firms with supports. Therefore, researchers, managers, and overall society should focus 
on exploring and implementing these internal resources and external support, and 
ultimately developing a framework accommodating firms’ overall business risks relating 
to sustainable development. Corporate sustainability is valuable and urgent. True 
sustainability that includes the improvement in environmental, social and financial 
performance, however, can only be realized when firms are able to skillfully cope with 
the business risks in a well-developed sustainability framework.
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Appendix A. OLS and Robust Regression 
(supplier sample) 
Given that there were influential observations detected in supplier dataset, robust 
regression was used in the analysis of suppliers. Cohen et al. (2003) suggested that the 
results by OLS regression should have substantial differences from those by robust 
regression if there are influential observations in the dataset, and the difference provides 
evidence to use robust regression to ensure the reliability of the test results. OLS 
regression was additionally performed by using supplier data to show the difference.  
Table A.1 provides the coefficients and significance estimated by using OLS 
regression, which compare with those in Table 4.11 (reproduced in this appendix below 
in Table A.2) estimated by robust regression. The results between the two tables are 
substantially different. Supplier’s dependence on buyer (SDB) and third-party 
certification are additionally significant when using OLS regression but not when using 
robust regression, while the interaction term and group SCMS are significant when using 
robust regression but not when using OLS regression. The effect scales on inventory 
slack, buyer’s dependence on supplier (BDS), and relationship length are larger in OLS 
regression than in robust regression. These differences support the use of robust 
regression in the supplier analysis to avoid bias by these influential observations on the 
estimated coefficients and significance.  
Appendix A 
256 
Table A.1 OLS Regression Results for the Analysis of Suppliers 
Independent Variables Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
 Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient 
Intercept 0.0083 0.0043 0.0210** 0.0210** 
 (0.0071) (0.0096) (0.0113) (0.0113) 
Supplier's Dependence on Buyer (SDB) -0.0030 -0.0020 -0.0366*** -0.0376*** 
 (0.0118) (0.0119) (0.0141) (0.0142) 
Buyer's Dependence on Supplier (BDS) 0.0032** 0.0034** 0.0049** 0.0049** 
 (0.0018) (0.0018) (0.0022) (0.0022) 
Relationship length -0.0007*** -0.0008*** -0.0005* -0.0005* 
 (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003) 
sSCSM  -0.0020 0.0040 0.0005 
  (0.0051) (0.0060) (0.0060) 
Third-Party Certification  -0.0027 -0.0058* -0.0059* 
  (0.0037) (0.0042) (0.0042) 
Group SCSM  -0.0020 0.0000 0.0002 
  (0.0035) (0.0042) (0.0042) 
Year in sample  0.0004 0.0001 0.0001 
  (0.0003) (0.0004) (0.0004) 
Capacity Slack   0.0035 0.0036 
   (0.0031) (0.0031) 
Inventory Slack   0.0097** 0.0096** 
   (0.0044) (0.0044) 
Supply Chain Slack   0.0004 0.0004 
   (0.0007) (0.0007) 
Leverage   -0.0029 -0.0026 
   (0.0079) (0.0079) 
Leverage * Supplier's Dependence on Buyer    -0.0507 
    (0.0731) 
Control for Industry effect Yes Yes Yes Yes 
     
N 1448 1448 1023 1023 
F 2.2780 2.1060 2.189 2.147 
Significance 0.0000 0.0001 0.0000 0.0000 
R2 0.0549 0.0564 0.0838 0.0843 
Note: The dependent variable is the suppliers’ individual CARs in the event window (-1,1) using the market model. *, ** and *** denote the significance at 0.1, 0.05 and 0.01 level (one-




Table A.2 Robust Regression Results for the Analysis of Suppliers (Reproduced from Table 4.11) 
Independent Variables 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
 Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient 
Intercept 0.0070* 0.0050 0.0140** 0.0150** 
 (0.0050) (0.0060) (0.0080) (0.0070) 
Supplier's Dependence on Buyer (SDB) 0.0080 0.0090 -0.0091 -0.0104 
 (0.0080) (0.0080) (0.0090) (0.0090) 
Buyer's Dependence on Supplier (BDS) 0.0033*** 0.0035*** 0.0043*** 0.0044*** 
 (0.0010) (0.0010) (0.0010) (0.0010) 
Relationship Length -0.0004*** -0.0010*** -0.0004** -0.0004** 
 (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) 
sSCSM  0.0020 0.0040 0.0030 
  (0.0030) (0.0040) (0.0040) 
Third-Party Certification  -0.0020 -0.0020 -0.0020 
  (0.0020) (0.0030) (0.0030) 
Group SCSM  -0.0044** -0.0020 -0.0010 
  (0.0020) (0.0030) (0.0030) 
Year in Sample  0.0002 0.0001 0.0001 
  (0.0002) (0.0003) (0.0003) 
Capacity Slack   0.0018 0.0023 
   (0.0020) (0.0020) 
Inventory Slack   0.0050** 0.0049** 
   (0.0030) (0.0030) 
Supply Chain Slack   0.0002 0.0002 
   (0.0005) (0.0005) 
Leverage   -0.0044 -0.0037 
   (0.0050) (0.0050) 
Leverage * Supplier's Dependence on Buyer    -0.1900*** 
    (0.0480) 
Control for Industry effect Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N 1448 1448 1023 1023 
Note: The dependent variable is the suppliers’ individual CARs in the event window (-1,1) using the market model. *, ** and *** denote the significance at 0.1, 0.05 and 0.01 level (one-tailed tests) 
respectively. Standard errors are reported in parentheses. Leverage is the measure of financial slack; low leverage indicates high financial slack. R2 values are not reported, because the iterative 
reweighting on observations in robust regression gives R2 little statistic inference (Willett & Singer, 1988). 
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Appendix B. OLS and Robust Regression 
(buyer sample) 
Given there were no influential observations detected in buyer data, OLS regression 
was used in the buyer analysis. As suggested by Cohen et al. (2003), the test results by 
OLS regression should have a small difference from those by robust regression when 
influential observations were absent. Robust regression was additionally performed by 
using buyer data to validate the use of OLS regression in the buyer analysis.  
Table B.1 provides the coefficients and significance of the variables estimated by using 
robust regression in comparison with those in Table 4.4 (reproduced in Table B.2) 
estimated by using OLS regression. The only difference is that the significance of group 
SCSM in model 4 becomes lower when using robust regression than when using OLS 
regression. There is no substantial difference on effect scales and significance of the 
tested variables across the two tables, which provides additional support for the use of 
OLS regression in the buyer analysis.   
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Intercept 0.0019 0.0056 0.0031 0.0061 
 (0.0056) (0.0058) (0.0061) (0.0083) 
Consumer Goods -0.0005 -0.0012 -0.0002 -0.0015 
 (0.0056) (0.0057) (0.0059) (0.0059) 
Autos 0.0048 0.0038 0.0043 0.0046 
 (0.0048) (0.0051) (0.0053) (0.0054) 
Computers -0.0014 -0.0019 -0.0014 -0.0010 
 (0.0052) (0.0052) (0.0053) (0.0058) 
Recreation 0.0040 0.0024 0.0032 0.0032 
 (0.0064) (0.0065) (0.0067) (0.0066) 
Electronic Equipment -0.0108** -0.0129*** -0.0130*** -0.0126** 
 (0.0052) (0.0052) (0.0054) (0.0054) 
Aero 0.0095* 0.0076 0.0083 0.0077 
 (0.0064) (0.0065) (0.0067) (0.0071) 
Utility -0.0016 -0.0044 -0.0044 -0.0058 
 (0.0047) (0.0048) (0.0052) (0.0057) 
Retailers -0.0005 -0.0020 -0.0022 -0.0014 
 (0.0035) (0.0036) (0.0038) (0.0040) 
Meals 0.0019 0.0008 -0.0003 -0.0015 
 (0.0046) (0.0048) (0.0051) (0.0067) 
European Firms -0.0040 -0.0039 -0.0057 -0.0052 
 (0.0047) (0.0048) (0.0051) (0.0051) 
North American Firms -0.0035 -0.0022 -0.0030 -0.0027 
 (0.0039) (0.0041) (0.0042) (0.0042) 
Year in sample -0.0001 -0.0001 -0.0001 -0.0001 
 (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) 
Growth Prospects  -0.0006* -0.0007** -0.0007* 
  (0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0004) 
sSCSM   0.0062** 0.0050* 
   (0.0035) (0.0036) 
Third-Party Certification   0.0026 0.0031 
   (0.0028) (0.0028) 
Group SCSM   0.0040* 0.0035 
   (0.0029) (0.0030) 
The ratio of COGS to Sales    -0.0001 
    (0.0099) 
Accounts Payable Turnover    -0.0002 
    (0.0004) 
Inventory Turnover    -0.0015 
    (0.0046) 
N 308 300 300 290 
Note: Significance levels (one-tailed tests): * 0.1 level, ** 0.05 level, *** 0.01 level. R2 values are not reported, because 
the iterative reweighting on observations in robust regression gives R2 little statistic inference (Willett & Singer, 1988). 
Appendix B 
260 












Intercept 0.0037 0.0073 0.0040 0.0058 
 (0.0066) (0.0069) (0.0071) (0.0086) 
Consumer Goods -0.0018 -0.0020 -0.0008 -0.0016 
 (0.0045) (0.0046) (0.0051) (0.0052) 
Autos 0.0035 0.0040 0.0042 0.0045 
 (0.0051) (0.0051) (0.0055) (0.0059) 
Computers -0.0009 -0.0010 -0.0007 -0.0001 
 (0.0051) (0.0051) (0.0050) (0.0061) 
Recreation -0.0020 -0.0031 -0.0019 -0.0019 
 (0.0089) (0.0089) (0.0090) (0.0090) 
Electronic Equipment -0.0105** -0.0122** -0.0128** -0.0124** 
 (0.0062) (0.0061) (0.0062) (0.0063) 
Aero 0.0093 0.0077 0.0075 0.0075 
 (0.0081) (0.0078) (0.0078) (0.0080) 
Utility -0.0030 -0.0056 -0.0064 -0.0073 
 (0.0058) (0.0061) (0.0069) (0.0076) 
Retailers -0.0004 -0.0018 -0.0016 -0.0009 
 (0.0042) (0.0043) (0.0044) (0.0042) 
Meals 0.0020 0.0012 0.0001 -0.0021 
 (0.0052) (0.0056) (0.0053) (0.0075) 
European Firms -0.0052 -0.0044 -0.0069* -0.0063 
 (0.0046) (0.0046) (0.0050) (0.0051) 
North American Firms -0.0058* -0.0037 -0.0043 -0.0044 
 (0.0042) (0.0042) (0.0042) (0.0075) 
Year in sample -0.00003 -0.0001 -0.0001 -0.0001 
 (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003) 
Growth Prospects  -0.0008** -0.0008** -0.0009** 
  (0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0004) 
sSCSM   0.0063** 0.0047* 
   (0.0031) (0.0032) 
Third-Party Certification   0.0031 0.0037 
   (0.0031) (0.0032) 
Group SCSM   0.0057* 0.0055* 
   (0.0035) (0.0036) 
The ratio of COGS to Sales    -0.0011 
    (0.0094) 
Accounts Payable Turnover    -0.0001 
    (0.0005) 
Inventory Turnover    -0.0006 
    (0.0054) 
N 308 300 300 290 
F 0.9081 1.1976 1.3983* 1.1455 
R2 0.0356 0.0516 0.0733 0.0746 
Note: Significance levels (one-tailed tests): * 0.1 level, ** 0.05 level. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses and 




Appendix C. Robustness Check on Non-
linearity (buyer analysis) 
The plot of residuals versus fitted values was used to detect any non-linear trend for 
the regression model 4 in Table 4.4. The equally spread residuals around the horizontal 
dash-line without distinct patterns indicate no concern with the non-linear relationships 
(Fox & Weisberg, 2010). The red line in Figure C.1 shows the pattern of residuals for 
model 4. The residuals are equally distributed along the horizontal dash-line, and thus 
there is no concern with non-linear relationships in the model.  
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